

IMPERIAL AMBITION IN THE EARLY MODERN MEDITERRANEAN

GENOESE MERCHANTS
AND THE SPANISH CROWN



CÉLINE DAUVERD

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Genoese Merchants and the Spanish Crown

This book examines the alliance between the Spanish Crown and Genoese merchant bankers in southern Italy throughout the early modern era, when Spain and Genoa developed a symbiotic economic relationship undergirded by a cultural and spiritual alliance. Analyzing early modern imperialism, migration, and trade, this book shows that the spiritual entente between the two nations was mainly informed by the religious division of the Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish threat in the Mediterranean reinforced the commitment of both the Spanish Crown and the Genoese merchants to Christianity. Spain's imperial strategy was reinforced by its willingness to acculturate to southern Italy through organized beneficence, representation at civic ceremonies, and spiritual guidance during religious holidays.

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Introduction

The natural outcome of commerce is to bring peace. Two nations who trade together become mutually dependent. If one should sell, the other should buy. All alliances are based on mutual needs.

—MONTESQUIEU, *De l'Esprit des Lois*¹

In 1559, the Genoese ambassador in Madrid, Marcantonio Sauli, addressed King Philip II about their common stake in keeping the western Mediterranean both Spanish and Christian:

In order to muster our fortunes together, we should make sure that in the winter we have many galleys that navigate the Mediterranean. To your twelve galleys more should be added so that they would provoke jealousy and disquiet in the Turks. This way they would think twice before coming into our waters and crushing the designs of His Majesty.²

Ambassador Sauli's proposition was more than suggestive. By recommending the mustering of their mutual forces, the Genoese demonstrated a shared concern with the king of Spain. Sauli's tone was indicative of Spain's reliance on the Genoese forces. Most importantly, Sauli was speaking to the king as an

1. "L'effet naturel du commerce est de porter à la paix. Deux nations qui négocient ensembles se rendent réciproquement dépendantes: si l'une a intérêt d'acheter, l'autre a intérêt de vendre; et toutes les unions sont fondées sur des besoins mutuels." Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, vol. II (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1979), 10.

2. Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG), Archivio Segreto (A.S.) 2707, "Istruzioni al Pronotario Marcantonio Sauli, Ambasciatore al Re di Spagna," Genoa, February 14, 1559.

equal because their defense of the Mediterranean rested on mutual participation. As the Mediterranean Sea had been the stage of continual warfare between Muslims and Christians for the better part of two centuries, the exchange between Sauli and Philip II illustrates the main theme of this book: the forging of an alliance between the Genoese merchant empire and the Spanish dynastic empire against the growing advance of their mutual enemies. The Atlas Miller shows the division of the Mediterranean Sea through Muslim and Christian flags (Figure I.1).

The alliance took a shape I call “symbiotic imperialism.” Just as biological symbiosis is a mutually beneficial relationship between two different organisms in close association, so the proximity of the Spanish rulers to the Genoese granted the Genoese a family network through which to extend their mercantile empire across the major cities of Europe and gave the Iberian crown a financial network to undergird its imperial expansion in Europe and the Mediterranean. The dynastic imperialism of Spain and the mercantile imperialism of Genoa expanded simultaneously. This thriving symbiosis benefited both parties in their efforts to advance their interests in and around the highly contested Mediterranean Sea. The Genoese depended on Spanish imperial authority to protect their coastal trading posts, vital locations where commodities from the Levant were unloaded, making southern Italy a pivotal point in the Spanish imperium on the continent. Through trade, the Genoese colonies in the two kingdoms of




FIGURE I.1. Lopo Homem, *The Mediterranean Sea*, also called “Atlas Miller,” 1519

Courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Richelieu, Ge AA 640 (RES)

Naples and Sicily generated revenues that allowed the Spanish Crown not only to feed the Spanish territories on the continent but also to sustain large armies in Europe and to combat frequent rebellions. Genoese finances enabled Spanish ascendancy in Europe; in return, Spain granted the Genoese financial privileges in its domains.

Over time, the history of southern Italy, as I demonstrate, began to reflect the Genoese shift from a Mediterranean commercial network to a European financial empire. This empire allowed the Genoese merchant bankers to successfully combine economic and social capital and thereby weather the many Spanish bankruptcies that occurred throughout the early modern period; thanks to their international network, the Genoese became mediators for the Spanish imperial project on the European continent.

In the Middle Ages, the merchants of Genoa developed a network of family members and associates located in strategic outposts across the Mediterranean Sea.³ Genoa, the “*Superba*,” managed the state as a business affair and acted as a republic of merchants.⁴ These merchants, affluent bourgeois of feudal origins, founded self-governing commercial colonies across the Mediterranean and functioned as importers of riches from the East.⁵ The situation changed in the mid-fifteenth century as a result of Genoese control of their colonies’ finances. What made the Genoese a merchant empire was their determination to heighten their financial acumen. Adding to their prosperous sea commerce, they began dominating the financial life of their host, though not its politics.⁶ They monopolized the

3. See David Jacoby, “Les Génois dans l’Empire Byzantin: Citoyens, Sujets et Protégés (1261–1453)” in *Trade, Commodities and Shipping*, ed. David Jacoby (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), 245–284. See also Benjamin Kedar, *Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth-Century Depression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

4. See Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese, 958–1528* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

5. Enrico Basso, *Genova: un Impero sul Mare* (Cagliari: Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Istituto sui Rapporti Italoiberici, 1994). The quintessential study on Genoese colonies in the Mediterranean is Roberto López, *Storia delle colonie Genovesi nel Mediterraneo* (Genoa: Marietti, 1996). See also Georges Jehel, *Les Génois en Méditerranée Orientale (fin XIè-Début XIVè siècle)* (Amiens: Université de Picardie, 1993).

6. Looking at the city of Genoa itself, Thomas Allison Kirk has argued that the revival of shipbuilding and maritime commerce served as a counterbalance to the city’s volatile financial sector. See *Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559–1684* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2005).

trade in certain commodities but retained an informal sociopolitical organization. As a merchant empire that boasted both commercial and financial supremacy, Genoa was the most compelling candidate for symbiosis with the Spanish Crown's dynastic empire.

Imperial Ambition underscores that the symbiosis between the Spanish and the Genoese was not just a matter of economics, as the current historiography suggests, but was also underpinned and strengthened by powerful sociocultural ties. Scholars have acknowledged the economic coalition between Genoese bankers and Spanish monarchs, but there was a more entrenched religious, sociological, and cultural bond between the two parties. Examining this bond in southern Italy expands our understanding of early modern imperialism. The symbiosis of Spanish and Genoese imperialism in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily was balanced by acculturation. The Genoese were vital supporters of Spanish power in the western Mediterranean not only because of their financial links to the Iberian crown, but also because of their feudal investment in the vice-royalties of Naples and Sicily, their social pledge to local institutions, and their moral commitment to upholding the Spanish Empire as a Catholic polity in conflict with the Protestants in Europe and with the Muslim Turks in the Mediterranean.

Both the Spanish dynastic imperium and the Genoese financial emporium vested political, financial, and religious interests in southern Italy, which they sought to protect through a reciprocal alliance. Spain proposed itself as the advocate of Catholicism in Europe and the Mediterranean, and the Genoese community demonstrated a particular concern for the protection of Christian souls in southern Italy. The Muslims' repeated forays into the western Mediterranean reinforced the alliance of the Christian empires, which sought to protect their spiritual interests in southern Italy through charities, hospitals, churches, religious festivals, civic processions, orphanages, and confraternities. Both the Genoese and Spaniards demonstrated an alternative imperial system in that they invested money in safeguarding, protecting, and relieving souls in southern Italy. The Genoese mercantile empire concentrated not only on financial resources but also on spiritual rapprochement with both the Spanish Crown and southern Italian subjects through organized beneficence, representation at civic ceremonies, and spiritual guidance during religious holidays.

The spiritual entente between the Genoese and Spaniards was mainly informed and reinforced by the religious division of the Mediterranean Sea.

Christianity unified the two empires, serving as a tool for state building and providing a way to preserve civic identity. Both the Spanish and Genoese financially sheltered widows, orphans, the sick, and the poor because their empire was Christian. Through an analysis of the religious liturgy that the Spaniards and Genoese adopted and transformed, I outline the interplay between Catholic rituals and Spanish imperial strategy in the Mediterranean. In their Christian empire, spiritual and material welfare worked in unison.

The Genoese played a crucial role in the defense of the Spanish-Christian empire both on the continent and in the Mediterranean. They adapted to the Spanish imperial system, which used its naval expertise to serve Spain's defense of Catholicism and its pursuit of religious uniformity.⁷ For Spanish imperialism, politics and religion were entwined. The Turks were not only a major military and economic power but also a much-feared religious opponent, a fact that strengthened the emergence and then the longevity of symbiotic imperialism between the Spanish and Genoese in southern Italy. In the Mediterranean, the Genoese had to prepare for a war unlike those in any of their other outposts, such as Bruges, London, or Lyon. Many acts of social life expressed the underlying notion that the Ottoman Empire was a constant threat: guild members bequeathed funds for the care of soldiers' widows and orphans or established hospitals to accommodate the victims of the Ottoman wars and religious and civic rituals sought to bind people to Christianity in the face of Muslim attacks or processions: represented the universalism of Christianity. Moreover, in their symbiosis with the Spaniards, the Genoese had to consider the spiritual welfare of a third party: the local southern Italian population.

What made the Genoese the quintessential partners for symbiotic imperialism was their willingness to acculturate to the Kingdom of Naples through donations to charities, religious processions, and spiritual architecture. Their capacity to acclimatize to southern Italy's social mores enabled the Genoese to remain significant even after 1627, when the Spanish Crown started using Portuguese Marranos operating out of Amsterdam as imperial financiers.

7. Carla Rahn Phillips has found that the Catholic faith as a tradition served as an organizing principle for Iberia's transoceanic empires. See "Organization of Oceanic Empires: The Iberian World in the Habsburg Period" in *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges*, eds. Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 71–86.

While other nations in southern Italy competed with Genoese supremacy, the Spanish chose the Genoese as their symbiotic partners because only they took steps to adapt culturally to their new environment.

Along with the discussion of the financial and cultural alliances, this book offers a new independent perspective on the Habsburg Empire in premodern times, that of the Genoese. The Genoese were not only very active in the symbiosis but were also intent on building their own mercantile empire. Historians have examined either Spanish or southern Italian sources, but this study, combining archival research from Simancas (Spain), Naples, Messina, Palermo, and Genoa, proposes a merchant banker point of view on the construction of the Habsburg imperial domain in southern Italy. The Genoese were not under the thumb of Spanish power; their vision was different from those of local vassals or Spanish authorities, both of whom have dominated the historiography. In the Kingdom of Naples, although they acted hand in hand with the Spanish, they were no less imperialistic, monopolizing the trade, extracting goods sent to their European entrepôts, and acting as a vital link in the precapitalist economy.

Scholars have long emphasized the Genoese as financiers of the Spanish Crown, but we have to transcend the notion that they acted solely as merchant bankers.⁸ The symbiosis with the Spaniards worked because the Genoese were power brokers, too, which explains the longevity of the Spanish Empire. The Genoese were essential to establishing the political legitimacy of the Spaniards. They acted as traders, bankers, and financiers but also worked in the central and peripheral administration of the state. Through a careful reconstruction of nearly three hundred years' worth of dispatches from consuls, ambassadors, ship captains, guild members, princes, merchant bankers, and religious figures (chaplains, popes, and cardinals), this book presents the Genoese as significant actors in the imperial management of Italy. Both their outlook and their contribution to the Spanish Empire afford a new assessment of the Spanish capacity to resolve financial and religious pressures throughout the early modern era.

8. The Genoese are still portrayed as precapitalist entrepreneurs who, because of a lack of local resources, took on to the sea. See for instance Thomas Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea* and Quentin van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Imperial Ambition reveals that the Genoese adeptness at creating a mercantile empire stemmed from their ability to make use of family-based networks to penetrate the local market.⁹ The Genoese role as merchants in the Spanish Empire was based on local kinship networks, reciprocal favors, and a strong commitment to the mother city.¹⁰ They used southern Italy as one of their commercial outposts, operating under the model of “trade diaspora.” Anthropologist Abner Cohen has defined a trade diaspora as “a nation of socially dependent, but spatially dispersed communities,”¹¹ whereas historian Philip Curtin has outlined it as “an interrelated net of commercial communities forming a trade network.”¹² The particular feature of these Genoese mercantile colonies was a sense of solidarity reinforced by a clan- or family-based system of operation.¹³ In the case of Naples, members of the Genoese community identified themselves as Genoese even after a few generations because connecting to the Genoese commercial network was more beneficial than acquiring a new citizenship.¹⁴ The trade diaspora communities found support in family ties, which

9. Avner Greif sees the trade expansion of the late medieval period as fundamental in the transformation of the medieval economy, itself sparked by institutional innovations. See *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

10. A trade diaspora community is spatially dispersed: its members strive to monopolize the trade in certain commodities, enjoy informal social and political organization, and exchange commercial information through friends belonging to the same group. See Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

11. Abner Cohen, “Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas” in *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa*, ed. Claude Meillassoux (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 266–278.

12. Philip D. Curtin, *Cross Cultural Trade in World History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

13. Jonathan Israel talks about “networks within networks” when examining the early modern Jews’ use of non-Jews and non-correligionists within their commercial dealings. See *Diasporas Within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews, and the World of Maritime Empires, 1540–1740* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

14. This was a conscious choice on the part of the Genoese as their lack of Neapolitan citizenship meant that they could not participate in the government of the city. The Genoese government prohibited its citizens from entering the Neapolitan *seggi*, the city’s seven districts, which would have given political power to nobles but also to high-ranking professionals. See Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Identità sociali: La nobiltà napoletana nella prima età moderna* (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 1998), 144–147.

in turn facilitated their adaptation to all kinds of political milieux and alien nations.¹⁵ As a commercial state, the *Superba* instructed its merchants to diversify their portfolios in times of need but to always maintain mercantile activities as their economic basis. As a result of the profits reaped from trade diaspora, by the mid-sixteenth century, most Genoese merchants resided outside of Genoa.¹⁶

As a diasporic nation, the Genoese in southern Italy followed the leadership of their doge, who resided in the *Superba*. Whenever they had a conflict with their host community, the Genoese consuls in Naples examined their doge's instructions on how to conduct diplomatic relations. The doge corresponded with his conational, who resided in the merchant colonies, via instructions on the necessary course of action.¹⁷ The doge's power was great, and the consuls had to obey his mandates. For instance, although the consuls were voted in situ, the nation ratified the elections with the doge back in Genoa.¹⁸ In their colonies, the Genoese registered via their consulate as members of the Genoese nation, thereby accessing the networks of family, commerce, and alliances necessary for immigrant life. Their registration with the Genoese consulate entailed declaring Genoese citizenship, which was mutually exclusive. Through affiliation with the consulate, members acquired the privileges bestowed on Genoese citizens: they could obtain Genoese citizenship for their heirs; vote for the consul; access the Genoese commercial network in southern Italy and abroad; benefit from the services of the Genoese church and charitable institutions; create

15. Maartje van Gelder examines the trade diaspora of the Netherlands's merchants in early modern Venice, arguing that the Antwerp diaspora community sought its fortune in one of the historical hearts of Mediterranean trade. See *Trading Places: The Netherlandish Merchants in Early Modern Venice* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

16. See Edoardo Grendi, *La repubblica aristocratica dei genovesi: Politica, carità e commercio fra Cinque e Seicento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987), 19–20.

17. Michael J. Levin, *Agents of Empire: Spanish Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) explores the limitation of Spanish power through diplomatic machinery.

18. Interestingly, as of 1578, there was a fee of eight cent of gold imposed on anyone refusing the charge of consul. See ASG, A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Paolo Giustiniano to Doge of Genoa, Naples, May 5, 1589. Responsibilities that involved civic consciousness such as doge, consul, or governor could not be turned down across the Italian city-states. For ample explanation on the Genoese consuls, see Giovanni Brancaccio, "*Nazione genovese*" *Consoli e Colonia nella Napoli Moderna* (Naples: Guida, 2001).

family alliances back in Genoa; and most of all inherit feudal privileges such as government gabelles (taxes levied on commodities) on revenues, legal proceedings, and customs in the Kingdom of Naples.¹⁹

An interesting feature of the Genoese in southern Italy, however, was their capacity to simultaneously acculturate to their new environment and maintain their Genoese identity. They settled in Naples and Sicily, acquired fiefdoms and titles, joined local institutions, and partook in local social and spiritual life while they continued to express and advance a Genoese agenda. They continued to operate as a Genoese community using mechanisms of solidarity such as allegiance to the mother patria, provision of assistance to their poor, endogamous intermarriages, and devotion to the Ligurian patron St. George. This hybridization enabled them to perforate the socio-spiritual landscape while remaining faithful to their collective identity, and this dynamic facilitated their diasporic community's continuity and adaptability.

The Genoese hybridity and adaptability stemmed from their capacity for social change. What aided the Genoese to both participate in the sociocultural life of southern Italians and continue living as foreign merchant bankers was the very concept of Genoese nobility. In Genoa, the *nobili* (urban patriciate) were members of the feudal aristocracy. The Doria, Spinola, Fieschi, Grimaldi, and any other family that had served on the Council of Elders, or as consuls, were considered noble. From the twelfth century on, the feudal nobility took up residence in the city and were at the same time active in maritime trade. Starting in 1289, however, nobles could not hold public offices (according to a law ratified in 1339 by Simon Bocanegra, the first doge). But the benefit of trade led some families to abandon their nobility to become *popolari* (men of the people who practiced trade, such as the Giustiniani, Sauli, Franchi, Fornari, and Promontorio).²⁰ Feudal investments enabled commercial, maritime, and financial activities. In Genoa, "the people who controlled most of the land were the same ones who took to the sea."²¹ Over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,

19. See the Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN) series on *Arrendamenti*, *Dogane Antiche* and *Precettori dei Diversi Tribunali*.

20. For a longer discussion on the process see Thomas Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea*.

21. Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, 25.

these *popolari* acquired imperial fiefs and landed estates in Liguria, a process they would replicate when they settled in Naples. By that time, both *nobili* and *popolari* could serve in government as they could and did engage in trade. Thus, the feudal aristocracy of Genoa formed a heterogeneous group, albeit a socially adaptable one.²² Naval Commander Andrea Doria's contract with Emperor Charles V in 1528 put the final touch on the alteration of Genoa's social compact. The admiral restructured the city into twenty-eight *alberghi* (clans) that made up the ruling class. The 1528 contract also conferred Doria and his fellow Genoese fiefdoms in the Spanish realms, notably Naples and Sicily.

Imperial Ambition underscores that the success of the Genoese was attributable to their capacity to both organize under an efficient mercantile system and work under the umbrella of the Spanish Empire. David Abulafia relates the success of diasporic medieval Italians to the fact that they were "citizens who had travel in their blood."²³ The Genoese merchants operating in the Spanish world developed skills born out of their diasporic conditions. This book shows that Renaissance Genoese had a unique talent for combining family networks and imperial alliances. Whereas family business dictated the terms of their relations with their host society, collaboration between political and economic interests allowed the Genoese merchants to fashion an informal empire within the formal empire of the Spanish. Felipe Fernández-Armesto has described the Genoese traders as "hermit crabs," "versatile in their ability to adapt to every economic environment and political climate."²⁴ As a result of this versatility, the Genoese thrived in all the cities dominated by the Spanish Crown.

As a result of Muslim encroachment in the Mediterranean, notably after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Genoese lost their markets in the

22. The subdivision in Genoese social ranks is more complex than the partition between *popolari* and *nobili*. For instance, the *alberghi* (families along with their retinue) of great, medium, or lower importance provided order (and disorder) to the social world of the Genoese. Also, even though *popolari* and *nobili* engaged in the same activities, they made a distinction between merchants and artisans. For a detailed account, see the first two chapters of Edoardo Grendi, *La repubblica aristocratica dei genovesi: politica, carità e commercio fra il Cinque e Seicento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987).

23. David Abulafia, "Gli Italiani fuori d'Italia" in *Commerce and Conquest in the Mediterranean, 1100–1500*, David Abulafia ed. (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993), 261–286.

24. Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonisation from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229–1492* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987).

Levant, where they had made their fortune as medieval traders. They then turned to the handsome profits of banking, quadrupling their medieval commercial proceeds. In fact, lending to the Spanish Crown wound up yielding more profit than trading with the East. The political stability provided by the Spanish Empire in Europe helped the Genoese compensate for the loss of their formal colonies in the Levant. I therefore extend the geographical range of this book longitudinally to include the impact the eastern Mediterranean had on the Genoese in their European outposts. During the Renaissance, the southern Italian trading outposts grew in importance, giving the Genoese a crucial stake in the economics and politics of the Spanish territories in Europe. Genoese merchant colonies in Seville, Paris, Lisbon, London, Constantinople, Hamburg, Algiers, Antwerp, Marseille, Barcelona, Chios, Cagliari, and Bruges gained economic momentum. Using apt commercial techniques, the Genoese managed to penetrate southern Italy both financially and politically, tying the region to their extensive commercial networks on the European continent.

Imperial Ambition focuses on the financial and political role played by the colony of Genoese merchant bankers in southern Italy during the “golden age” when Genoa was the financial hub of the Western world. This adds significantly to our understanding of their operations. Despite Genoa’s pivotal importance in the period from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries (as Fernand Braudel demonstrated half a century ago, portraying the city-state as “an ultra-sensitive seismograph registering each vibration of the world”), it remains seriously under-researched.²⁵ Opening a new window into this neglected subject, this book analyzes the relationship between the Genoese merchant colony, the Spanish authorities, and the host community. What this book reveals is a complex relationship that is both symbiotic and contentious. Spain and its domains relied even more on their Genoese financiers in southern Italy than scholars have previously recognized. The larger Habsburg imperial claims on the

25. Fernand Braudel, *Civiltà ed imperi del Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II* (Turin: Einaudi, 1976), 363. Arturo Pacini interestingly confesses that scholars continue to apprehend Genoa simultaneously as an “economic giant and a political dwarf.” See “I Mercanti-banchieri genovesi tra la Repubblica di San Giorgio e il sistema imperiale ispano-asburgico” in “L’Italia di Carlo V: Guerra, religione e politica nel primo Cinquecento,” eds. Francesca Cantù and Maria-Antonietta Visceglia (Rome: Viella, 2001), 581–595.

European continent depended on the dynasty's rapport with the Genoese merchant bankers and on capital generated in southern Italy. This symbiotic relationship made southern Italy a pivotal point in the Spanish imperium, while benefiting the commercial interests of the Genoese.

In the Habsburg Mediterranean Empire, the Genoese benefited from opportunities for merchants to raise fiscal and land revenues, receive tax privileges, acquire fiefs and live as absentee owners, lend to town and crown, and influence viceregal policies.²⁶ Yet no historical study has adequately tackled the three centuries of Genoese economic preeminence in southern Italy. Scholars of the Habsburg Empire's economy will be familiar with the Genoese assimilation into a banking market called *Juros* (securities); what they may be less familiar with is that the Spanish granted the Genoese free access to the finances of southern Italy in exchange for long-term loans.²⁷ Using southern Italy as one of their network bases enabled the Genoese to serve the Spanish Crown in its grand colonial project. Southern Italy was as important as Castile in bearing the financial burden of Spain.²⁸ In times of crisis – and these were numerous considering the number of bankruptcies – the Spanish Crown resorted to *asientos* (short-term loans at high interest). Southern Italy provided these types of loans throughout the period.²⁹ Spain relied on capital generated in

26. For fiscal and land revenues, see ASN, Pagamenti delle rendite sopra arrendamenti and Sopra fiscali, Regia Camera della Sommaria, 91: Arrendamenti, and 318: Fiscali. For the privileges granted to Genoese traders, see ASG, A.S., Litterarum 2328: Lettere Ministri Napoli; for loans to the crown and individuals, see ASN, Sommaria, Istituti di credito e monetazione: Banchi Antichi.

27. Antonio Calabria, *The Cost of Empire: The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Time of Spanish Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

28. Edoardo Grendi has demonstrated that the Genoese position in the financial management of sixteenth-century Naples was analogous to that of Castile. See *La Repubblica Aristocratica dei Genovesi*.

29. Giovanni Muto has established that one of the particulars of the sixteenth century was the impossibility to dissociate *hombres de negocios* from their king or emperor. He maintains there was a tacit agreement between the Spanish Crown and the Genoese bankers in places where “operators” of the crown were able to control all the movements. See *Le finanze pubbliche napoletane tra riforme e restaurazione (1520–1634)* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1980). Fernand Braudel and Felipe Ruiz Martín have also argued that the realm of public finances could only be studied through private ones. See Fernand Braudel, “Le pacte de recours au service du roi d’Espagne et de ses prêteurs à la fin du XVIème siècle,” in *Studi in onore di A. Saporì*, II (Milan: Einaudi, 1957), and

Mediterranean outposts because the Genoese provided financial stability.³⁰ Thanks to their relationship, and to Genoese fiscal resiliency, the Spaniards enjoyed three centuries of political domination in southern Italy.

A sea empire when it focused on trade, Genoa rapidly transformed itself into a land empire when it converted to finance. Although some scholars claim that Spain derailed Genoa from its original mercantile and maritime vocation, turning it to the more sterile and dangerous field of finance, Spain's financial investments arguably enabled the Genoese not only to survive as a land empire, but also to acquire political acumen in southern Italy.³¹ Finance was a risky but lucrative and politically gratifying activity. Through their financial weight in southern Italy, the Genoese were able to sway imperial policies for three centuries. The Genoese's financial and political roles were beneficial not only to them, but also to the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, which engaged in precapitalism through Genoese trade, and to the Spanish Crown, which was subsidized by southern Italy in times of crisis.

Imperial Ambition provides a new perspective on the nature of empire by investigating southern Italy's political role in the early modern period.³² Southern Italy was far from being a periphery, as it is still depicted in the current historiography: as both an oriental-type luxury market and an occidental-type agricultural producer, it represented an important arena for the expansion of both commercial and dynastic empires.³³ Because empires of the sea are mainly interested in exchange and in establishing

Ruiz Martín, "Las finanzas españolas durante el reinado de Felipe II," in *Hispania: Cuadernos de historia* (1968), 26–48.

30. José Gentil da Silva has underlined that the way Genoese financiers controlled the market economy of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean was not by making extreme profit but by guaranteeing stability. See *Banque et crédit en Italie au XVII^e siècle* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1969).

31. Scholars have recently argued that the Genoese financial services offered to the Spanish monarchs were really "golden chains." Carlo Bitossi, "Lo strano caso dell'antispagnolismo Genovese," in *Alle Origini di una Nazione: Antispagnolismo e identità italiana*, a cura di Aurelio Musi (Milan: Ed. Angelo Guerini e Associati, 2003), 163–200.

32. Scholars have conceived of the politics of Charles V in Italy as following either adherence or resistance to the Spanish imperial system. See Francesca Cantù e Maria Antonietta Visceglia eds., *L'Italia di Carlo V: Guerra, religione e politica nel primo Cinquecento* (Rome: Viella, 2003).

33. David Abulafia, *The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 283.

trading monopolies, the region became one of the political axes of the Spanish Mediterranean and a vital locus of exchanges for the Genoese commercial empire.³⁴

This book revisits the “backwardness of the south,”³⁵ instead depicting southern Italy as a prosperous entrepôt whose trade was connected to precapitalism on the European continent through the agency of the

34. *Annalistes* who seek to approach history in its totality have recently pondered the functioning of merchant networks in the early modern period, as well as their relationship with the economic structures and political institutions of the time. See Anthony Molho and Diogo Ramada Curto, “Les réseaux marchands à l’époque moderne,” in *Annales H.S.S.*, n. 3 (Mai-Juin 2003), 569–579.

35. Southern Italy has been perceived as feudal, backward, and inanimate. Most studies on the Italian communes have concentrated on Tuscany and the Veneto, seen as the quintessential civic communities of the late Middle Ages. Until recently, historians have contrasted the civic conscience of the northern communes with the lack of civic concern of the south (mainly agrarian and feudal). See Nicholas Eckstein and Nicholas Terpstra, eds., *Sociability and Its Discontents: Civil Society, Social Capital, and Their Alternatives in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Turnhout: Brepols Pub., 2009). Because southern Italy’s economy was in the hands of foreigners, it has been treated as an economic victim of the north. Because feudal principles still prevailed and municipal liberties were unheard of, the kingdom has been characterized as lacking commercial activities. The notion of “colonial economy,” however, has slowly been undermined. The most active debate about colonial economies in the medieval Mediterranean addressed the place of the Italian south in the systems of exchanges linking the Italian islands and mainland southern Italy to the big cities of northern Italy and Catalonia. David Abulafia argues that the importation of southern Italian products had a highly stimulating effect on the northern Italian economy. See “Introduction: Seven Types of Ambiguity, c.1100–1500,” in *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, eds. David Abulafia and Nora Berend (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 1–35. He concludes that during the Middle Ages, there were “two Italies” because a complementary relationship between the two parts developed. To say that two Italies existed does not necessarily mean that northern Italy naturally dominated its southern counterpart. See his *The Two Italies: Economic Relations Between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). From the work of Stephan Epstein, three distinct approaches emerge to define the economic relationship between the different economies of northern and southern Italy. The first approach emphasizes the dependence of Sicily on foreign merchants, proposing a colonial relationship. The second approach emphasizes the continued vitality of the internal markets within the island, downplaying the significance of foreign trade. The last approach seeks to avoid positive or negative value judgments about the island economy, insisting instead that foreign demand for the island products had a highly stimulating effect on the north Italian economy. Stephan R. Epstein, *An Island for Itself:*

Genoese brokers in the production, exportation, and foreign consumption of southern Italian goods.³⁶ The idea of capitalism is central for this work, and the work of Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden provides a critical context in which to understand the Spanish imperial world in Europe.³⁷ Pagden and Canny have contended that empires are territorially based (i.e., their very existence depends on expansion, eventually leading to their destruction, the opposite of the Genoese “empire”). But if we juxtapose the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, what made the latter’s expansion possible was its reliance on informal trading posts, a technique that made Europe, and not the New World, the harbinger of capitalism.³⁸ The prosperity and longevity of the symbiosis between the Spanish and Genoese help us recognize that the south was anything but backward, at least economically.

The historiography of Spanish Naples and Sicily has been plagued by the notion that Spanish domination of Italy brought political and economic decay and cultural decadence in comparison with the rest of the peninsula. Until recently, bad government, sociopolitical decadence, and lack of commercial entrepreneurship have been the leitmotifs of most Italian scholarship assessing the Spanish presence.³⁹ This book demonstrates, by contrast, that

Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

36. Jonathan Israel analyzes the critical economic function of merchants to Dutch dominance in early modern Europe and the Atlantic. See *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

37. See “Afterword: From Identity to Independence,” in *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800*, eds. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 190–226.

38. Much like the present work, authors such as Martha Howell (*Commerce before Capitalism in Europe, 1300–1600* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010]) and Francesca Trivellato (*The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* [New Haven: Yale University Press 2009]) examine the early modern European economy as an important moment for the rising commercialization of society. Trivellato sees cosmopolitanism, along with culture and institutions, as the main triggers of the rise of European commercial capitalism.

39. This historical perspective started with historian Benedetto Croce’s seminal work *History of the Kingdom of Naples*, trans. by Frances Frenaye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). Historians still ponder Croce’s impact on the history of Naples. See Jack D’Amico, Dain A. Trafton, and Massimo Verdicchio, eds., *The Legacy of Benedetto Croce: Contemporary Critical Views* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

the Genoese, operating in a feudal society and using their network relations, linked disparate regions of Europe and made the Kingdom of Naples a pivotal actor in the early modern economy. Hence, symbiotic imperialism led not to stagnation but rather to prosperity in southern Italy.

Contrary to established scholarship, which generally perceives proselytizing and military conquest as the main tools of Spanish expansion, the case of southern Italy suggests that commerce was a fundamental instrument in the construction of empire.⁴⁰ Because southern Italy had been acquired by dynastic ties, conversion and subjugation were not necessary. Rather, the imperial strategy of the Aragonese and Habsburgs was to attract social capital. Their alliance with the Genoese enhanced the value of their imperial domains. Leaving the commerce of their domains to foreign investors, the Spanish welcomed the financial dexterity and commercial entrepreneurship of the Genoese.

SCHOLARSHIP AND METHODOLOGY

Imperial Ambition borrows from a number of historical fields while modifying some of their concepts. I have employed the merchant empire model developed by scholars of world history in my analysis of the Mediterranean. World historians of Asia are already familiar with the linkages between merchant networks and empire formation through symbiotic imperialism: a common religion, a fearless mutual enemy, political stability, economic negotiations, and dynastic versus mercantile dominance. Scholars working on patterns of cross-cultural commerce in Asia have concluded that the age of partnership constituted a prelude to the great imperial era.⁴¹ Scholars interested in European merchants in south Asia, such as Sanjay

40. Ana Crespo Solana visits the tension between political desirability of monopoly following the peace of Westphalia and the economic necessity for allowing foreigners to trade in the Americas. See "A Change of Ideology in Imperial Spain? Spanish Commercial Policy with America and the Change of Dynasty, 1648–1740" in *Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750)*, eds. David Omekink and Gijss Rommelse (London: Ashgate, 2011), 215–241.

41. James D. Tracy, ed., *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). By the same author, see *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Subrahmanyam, propose that the interactions among Portuguese merchants, local producers, and regional Indian courts in early modern times followed a pattern of “contained conflict.”⁴² John E. Wills sees merchant empires through the lens of “interactive emergence,” declaring that a set of preconditions such as common religion and unified political authority allowed prosperity and safety for merchants in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and China.⁴³

Imperial Ambition extends the concept of merchant empires by showing that in Spanish Italy, merchants were involved in every single type of financial movement: collection of gabelles,⁴⁴ loans to the aristocracy and court, banking, guilds, and trade. In other words, merchants dominated the entire economy of southern Italy, which became, as a result, one of the principal trading hubs of the early modern European economy. Not only were the Genoese fully integrated into the economy, but they also controlled it by practicing various methods of acculturation enabled by their symbiosis with the Spanish Crown.

Scholars pondering the interaction between empire formation and individual economic players in Europe and the Mediterranean have used the pre-colonial model. Robert Bartlett, for instance, has pinpointed colonial towns as one of the offspring of Italian colonial traders, triggering European colonialism *avant l'heure*.⁴⁵ Likewise, studying the institution of the *funduk* (warehouse) across the Mediterranean Sea, Olivia Remie Constable has treated merchant colonies in the Mediterranean as forerunners of modern

42. See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Improvising Empire: Portuguese Trade and Settlement in the Bay of Bengal, 1500–1700* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990). James C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburg, 1580–1640* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007) shows how Asian-Portuguese commerce was part of a global trading network that connected Europe and Asia, but also the rest of the world.

43. See John E. Wills, “Maritime Asia, 1500–1800,” in *American Historical Review* (February 1993), 83–103.

44. The collection of taxes, as was the case throughout Europe, was a private enterprise system. It was in the hands of financiers, and in Naples in Genoese hands, which advanced the government money on the taxes they then collected, with huge profits from the taxpayers.

45. Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change 950–1350* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

colonialism.⁴⁶ Finally, Felipe Fernández-Armesto has linked the Genoese commercial activities in the Mediterranean to their investments in Spanish colonial ventures in the Atlantic.⁴⁷

Imperial Ambition offers a new spin on these approaches and presents the Genoese not as colonial actors but as partners in symbiosis with the Spanish Crown. In southern Italy, although the Genoese controlled the economic situation, it was the Spaniards who maintained the colonial status quo. This book therefore follows the concepts of “relationships and interconnections” proposed by Horden and Purcell, interpreting the Genoese network system as a factor of success.⁴⁸ But in contrast to *The Corrupting Sea*, *Imperial Ambition* presents empires and kinship structures as central to the creation of the Mediterranean economy, focusing on the interactionist approach, according to which exchange and commerce provided effective structures to the precapitalist economy.⁴⁹

46. Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean: World Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Likewise, because he saw that there needed to be two sets of players in a colonial situation, John Elliott has suggested the possibility of soft imperialism or informal empires whose players control the economy. See “Introduction: Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World,” in *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World 1500–1800*, eds. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 3–35. Those “soft” imperial actors worked in the background of the Atlantic empire similarly to the Genoese in the Mediterranean. In the same vein, Michael Hechter has proposed internal colonialism as a forerunner of external colonialism. This means that colonialism started within the European confines, suggesting that states “practiced” their colonial skills in their satellite European regions such as Ireland, Portugal, and Italy, as playground before expanding to their most lucrative non-European possessions.

47. See Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonisation from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229–1492* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987). Charles Verlinden follows up on the theory with “The Transfer of Colonial Techniques from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic” in *The Medieval Frontiers of Latin Christendom: Expansion, Contraction, Continuity*, eds. James Muldoon and Felipe-Fernández-Armesto (London: Ashgate, 2008).

48. Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

49. Along these lines, Faruk Tabak, *The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550–1870* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) locates the shifting fortunes of Mediterranean city-states and empires in patterns of long-term economic and ecological change. He affirms that mercantile republics were empire-building city-states. John

THE NARRATIVE

The book examines the socioeconomic contribution of the Genoese to both southern Italy and the Habsburg Empire in the first part, and their cultural adaptation to their new environment in the second. [Chapter 1](#), “Empires of the Renaissance, 1452–1650: The Genoese Response to Shifting Alliances in the Mediterranean,” shows the confrontation of Renaissance empires via shifting alliances (whose process was either diplomatic or violent). It shows that the Genoese supported Spain’s imperialism in the Mediterranean to protect their trade networks. Arguing that the history of Mediterranean trade was made up of ruptures followed by alliances, this chapter stresses the ways in which dynastic and merchant empires fought over supremacy of the sea. I discuss the impact of the long Habsburg–Valois conflict on the Genoese merchant empire. As the Habsburg–Ottoman wars informed events on the European continent, this chapter also explores France’s diplomatic policies toward the Ottoman Turks, which interrupted the precarious balance of power in the Mediterranean, notably for the Genoese.⁵⁰ In southern Italy, the

A. Marino has offered southern Italy as part of the premodern world economy in “Economic Encounters and the First Stages of a World Economy” in *A Companion to the Worlds of the Renaissance*, ed. Guido Ruggiero (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 279–295. For Avner Greif, *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) examines how the development of markets and institutions gave birth to the commercial expansion that began in Europe during the late medieval period and supported the dynamic modern economy.

50. The figure of Andrea Doria, although not a merchant, was crucial to the Genoese merchant empire, as will be seen throughout the book. He and his successors provided military leadership, financial acumen, and political support to the Spanish Crown. By siding with the Spaniards in the Habsburg–Valois struggle, he demonstrated diplomatic insight and facilitated the rise of the Spanish Empire. Doria’s decision to side with the emperor had wide repercussions throughout the Spanish domains. In Naples, for instance, Giulio Passaro declared that Doria fulfilled a prophecy. “La venuta di Andrea Doria et essendosi dichiarato per l’imperatore poté un ultima disperatione il fatto di francesi et assicurò la speranza delli imperiali, così si sperimentò vera la profetia o vero oracolo.” See *Aggiunta delli giornali di Messere Giuliano Passaro dell Cose di Napoli fatta da me, Notar Gregorio Russo per insino dell’anno 1537*. Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli (BNN), mss Brancaccio IV B vol. 10, car 157.

Genoese supplied galleys, funds, gunpowder, and leadership to protect the Spanish domains from invasion, as well as to maintain their own commercial interests, especially in the silk trade.

Chapter 2, “Genoese Emporium and Spanish Imperium in the Kingdom of Naples,” introduces Genoese trading activities in the Levant and North Africa from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. The methodological framework focuses on the concept of “trade diaspora” and presents the Genoese families in southern Italy as a microcosm of their greater network. The concept of symbiotic imperialism is developed to show that they became instruments of the Spanish Crown, occupying positions not only of traditional financial activities, acting as traders and bankers, land proprietors and feudal owners, but also of nontraditional pursuits working as tax collectors, treasurers, custom officers, and as chief informal actors in the wars in Europe.

Using silk production as an example of investment in the precapitalist economy, **Chapter 3**, “Commercial Ascension through Silk: Genoese Artisans, Merchants, Bankers,” examines the ways in which the Genoese were able to dominate commerce in southern Italy over a period of two hundred years. Working first as artisans, they gained commercial privileges from the Aragonese sovereigns, which enhanced both their portfolio and their commercial capital in the region. Then they were able to penetrate the guild system of southern Italy, working in conjunction with local producers and foreign merchants. And last, the Genoese converted from merchants to bankers, linking southern Italy to Germany, Flanders, and England. This chapter revisits the “backwardness of the south” by emphasizing that through silk production, Naples occupied a prominent position in the Italian and Mediterranean trade network.

Chapter 4, “Achieving Favorite Nation Status: The Economic Journey of the Genoese,” explores the competition among the diasporic communities over the Iberian monarchy’s favors, retracing the arduous path the Genoese followed to reach economic success. Favors from the Spanish Crown guaranteed wealth, resources, and prestige in exchange for services (military aid, loans, administrative office holding). The most important actors in the mercantile triangle were the Catalans, the Genoese, and the Florentines. Whereas the Genoese relationship with the Catalans reached quite noteworthy levels of symbiosis, that with the Florentines remained competitive. Through their connection with the Naples’s and Sicily’s manufacturing and trade, and later as crown financiers, the Genoese gained enduring imperial favors.

Chapter 5, “The Genoese Merchants: Between the Viceroys’ *Buon Governo* and Habsburg Expansion,” exposes the conflict of interests between imperial vision and local necessities. It discusses the concept of *buon governo* (good government), whereby the viceroys tried to limit the economic exploitation of the Spanish Crown in southern Italy. I contextualize the kingdom within larger European events, presenting the Genoese as significant informal actors in the wars in Europe, and Naples as a vital link in the Habsburg imperial expansion on the European continent. From 1530 to 1648, the Spanish monarchy tapped southern Italy to conduct its expansionist policies in Europe. I argue that the viceroys made efforts to engage in good government but were foiled by the powerful Genoese merchant bankers who used adept political maneuvers to protect their interests.

The last three chapters tackle the spiritual entente between Genoese and Spaniards, informed and reinforced by the religious division of the Mediterranean Sea. The main argument is that Genoese imperialism in the Kingdom of Naples was balanced by acculturation to Neapolitan charities, religious rituals, and religious and social values as expressed in sacred architecture. Through an analysis of change in the religious liturgy, Chapter 6, “Holy Week: The Genoese in the Ceremonial Triptych,” outlines how the Genoese became dominant in the city’s Christian rituals. Their inclusion in the Easter procession aimed at showing spiritual unity in the Habsburg domains in the face of constant Muslim threat, and it subtly proposed the Genoese as a substitute for the feudal nobility, who provided neither spiritual nor financial assistance during wartime.

Chapter 7, “The Genoese Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Competition in Church, Sea, and Grave,” examines the entwining aspects of commerce, piety, and representation through church building, spiritual competition with the Knights of Malta, and funerary monuments. The chapter probes the tensions in the spiritual life of a mercantile nation whose aim was to reconcile piety and trade while competing actively with other nations. The Church of San Giorgio was the focal point of the Genoese quarters in Naples, Palermo, and Trapani, contributing to the reputation of its members and to their standing in the kingdom. Whereas the churches sought to attract the Spanish king’s favors through competitively opulent piety, they also served as the meeting places of the nation, as election halls, and as merchants’ entrepôts. Spiritual competition spread to the sea through the Genoese struggle with the Knights of Malta for honor, and even to death via magnificent funerary monuments.

Chapter 8, “The Genoese Participation in Charitable Institutions,” appraises the Genoese involvement in the kingdom’s charities. I argue that the Genoese generosity toward the kingdom’s poor and sick served to fulfill Tridentine precepts, attract the crown’s favors, obtain financial gain, and ensure social insertion into the kingdom. For the Genoese community, the display of spirituality through charities was tied to their moral and financial obligation to the kingdom. This chapter illustrates how the Genoese maintained their identity while acculturating to their new social landscape.

The Conclusion considers the implications of symbiotic imperialism for the realms of finance, commerce, empire, culture, and migration, and it proposes new avenues of research on early modern empires and trade. It discusses the implications of the Genoese trade diaspora for the wider Mediterranean trade networks of the Renaissance, suggesting new conclusions about the inclusion/exclusion of migrants in early modern societies. It ponders the meaning of dislocation, identity, and hybridity in the early modern Mediterranean. Finally, it asks for more research on Mediterranean empires. Positing that empires can be studied through the lens of cultural symbiosis, it ends by asking for the examination of Mediterranean history on a long-term basis, but also in terms of interaction among actors and disciplines.

CHAPTER ONE

Empires of the Renaissance, 1453–1650: The Genoese Response to Shifting Alliances in the Mediterranean

I, Emperor Sultan Mehmed, son of Prince and King Murat . . . swear that the Genoese from Pera will be able to practice commerce by land and by sea . . . to keep control over their belongings . . . to organize themselves according to their own laws and customs . . . to manage their affairs and commerce without anyone disturbing them.

In 1453, Sultan Mehmed II granted commercial and legal privileges to the Genoese colony of Pera.¹ The alliance between Mehmed and the Genoese in the Levant proved profitable to both parties until the death of the sultan, when similar trade agreements were granted to the Venetians, and then in the sixteenth century to the French, thereby changing the

1. Archivio Storico di Genova (ASG), 2774 D Materie politiche (negoziazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Miscellanea, notizie politiche e del commercio del Levante e della Costa d’Africa. “Capitulatione fatta dall’Imperator Sultan Mehmet con li Perotti.” This is not to say that the relationship between the Genoese of Pera and the Ottoman Turks went smoothly. Many accounts retrace the loss of Constantinople and territory by the Genoese. See for instance Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli (BNN), mss Brancaccio, V F, vol 4 car 53 “della gran città di Costantinopoli,” which recalls how a Genoese knight called Giustiniani lost strength facing the Turks during the fall of the city. Then the Genoese also lost their trading rights over the outpost of Caffa in the Black Sea in 1475, which triggered a period of return to the west as far as Genoese commercial investments.

balance of power in the Mediterranean.² The Mediterranean experienced ruptures followed by alliances, themselves resulting in ruptures followed by new alliances. Ruptures were due to momentous sieges, sacks, raids, and battles such as those in Caffà (1475), Otranto (1480), Rhodes (1522), Malta (1565), and Lepanto (1571). Alliances brought closure to ruptures. Renaissance imperialism hinged on shifting alliances as did maritime competition. David Abulafia defines the medieval Mediterranean as a zone of fluid exchange of commodities controlled and financed by a number of merchant nations that included the Genoese and the Venetians.³ From the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, Christian presence in Levantine trade shifted from being prominently Italian to becoming increasingly French. By the dawn of the sixteenth century, Italian commercial hegemony in Levantine networks was experiencing a severe rupture because of the imperial struggle for maritime hegemony. The Genoese were allies of the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century, but once they sided with the Spanish Habsburgs, they battled simultaneously the French and the Ottomans. Similarly, the Venetians clashed periodically with the Genoese, and occasionally with the Ottomans.⁴ The French

2. The sixteenth century also saw the arrival of other European powers such as the English. See Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). The Dutch sought trade with the Ottoman Empire starting in 1612. Latin nations such as the Ragusans, Florentines, Venetians, Amalfitans, and Catalans had been trading in the Levant before the Ottomans' arrival, but the Genoese treaty was the first to acknowledge a Latin nation as foreign subjects.

3. See David Abulafia, "Introduction: Seven Types of Ambiguity, c. 1100–1500," in *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, eds. David Abulafia and Nora Berend (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 1–35.

4. Venice had been a prominent medieval trade empire in the Levant and the Near East. It possessed trading outposts: Crete, Acre, and Constantinople. At the end of the fifteenth century, however, it was constantly at war with the Turks, usually in alliance with Spain, most prominently at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, yet at the same time it entertained a commercial relationship with the Turkomen to maintain the mutually beneficial spice trade through Alexandria. The main Venetian trading outposts in the Mediterranean were Ancona, Bari, Zara, Dubrovnik, Negroponte, Modon, Constantinople, Candia, Acre, and Tripoli. Molly Greene acknowledges the importance of the Italian city-states for the early modern Mediterranean economy as a whole. See "The Early Modern Mediterranean" in *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, eds. Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita (New York: Wiley, 2014), 91–106.

originally wrestled with the Ottomans but increasingly sought commercial alliances with the sultans. And the French and the Habsburgs clashed throughout the early modern period. All of these relationships were about trade.

The Genoese fate was linked to alliances because alliances were always seeking trade. Earlier horizontal commercial exchanges gave way to what I call “Renaissance empires,” characterized by a loose system of alliances that emphasized formal colonies, repeated naval conflicts, and increasing clandestine diplomatic activities.⁵ All trading nations were fighting to trade with the Levant, and the Levant also needed products from the west.⁶ So there was an antithetical relationship between trade (which required entente) and the background of war (which entailed a lack of entente). When one alliance ceased (such as the one between the Genoese of Pera and Mehmed), others saw the light.⁷ Only by understanding that process can one assess the dynamic of Mediterranean history.

The real driving force in Mediterranean relations was territorial advance to preserve commercial outposts.⁸ Until recently, the historiography of the

5. Diplomacy became one of the crucial elements of Renaissance empires, the root of which has been traced by Daniel Goffman to the Ottoman-Habsburg conflict. See *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). In doing so, he diverges from Garrett Mattingly, who previously located its origins in fifteenth-century Italy. See *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964). Thomas Dandeleit's recent monograph, *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) is enlightening on the concept of Renaissance empires in Europe but also in the Early Modern Mediterranean. New warfare technology was a big part of the continuing struggle over the Mediterranean. See John Francis Guilmartin Jr., *Gunpowder & Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

6. See Rhoads Murphey, “Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East” in *Studies in Ottoman Society and Culture, 16th–18th Centuries*, n. V, ed. Rhoads Murphey (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 217–263.

7. The Habsburg, Valois, and Ottoman were full-fledged empires with efficient navies, state-controlled expansionist policies, and political hegemony over their formal colonies.

8. James Tracy, “The Background War of the Early Modern Era: Christian and Muslim States in Contest for Dominion, Trade, and Cultural Preeminence” in *Religious Conflicts and Accommodation in the Early Modern World*, eds. Marguerite Ragnow and William Philips Jr. – (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2011), 9–54, emphasizes conflicts of civilizations ignoring that in the Habsburg-Ottoman competition accommodation was as common as conflict.

early modern Mediterranean tended to concentrate on religious tension. As a result of the need to reassess commercial strategies, David Abulafia has suggested that Mediterranean politics sometimes led to “unholy alliances.”⁹ In fact, Palmira Brummett views the Mediterranean more as a commercial space than a sacred space or war space.¹⁰ Fernand Braudel described the Mediterranean networks of commerce at the dawn of the early modern age as “complementary enemies,” emphasizing confrontation as well as cooperation.¹¹ Similarly, Brian Catlos has offered the “convenience principle” of cross-cultural relations.¹² This chapter underscores that the conflict over the Mediterranean was based on the Renaissance empires’ territorial expansion, whose main pursuits were to maintain commercial outposts to feed their growing populations and to hold strategic territories, sources of revenues, and manpower.¹³ Commercial agreements, trade privileges, and financial strategies attest that trade, more than war, provided the foundation for shifting alliances among the Renaissance empires.¹⁴ By examining the commercial alliances, we can reconsider the bipolar vision of the

9. See David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 411–427.

10. See Palmira Brummett, “Visions of the Mediterranean: A Classification,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 37:1 (Winter 2007), 9–55.

11. Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century*, vol. 2, trans. by Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1982 [1979]), 163.

12. See Brian Catlos, “The Convenience Principle: Communal Interaction in the Multi-Confessional Medieval Mediterranean,” History Faculty Seminar, University of Colorado, Boulder, April 2010. See also his “Politics of Convenience: Ethno-Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in the Medieval Mediterranean,” Center for Asian Studies, University of Colorado, Boulder, January 28, 2013.

13. Daniel Goffman found that individual merchants, diplomats, and religious men helped spawn new sorts of diplomacy and statecraft between the Italian and Ottoman Empires. What I call “shifting alliances,” he calls “New Diplomacy.” See “Negotiating with the Renaissance State: The Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy” in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61–74.

14. Scholars have argued that “war, as a constant reality of Mediterranean life above and beyond the Christian-Islamic divide, also acted as a stimulus of economic development and fiscal and financial innovation.” Rossella Cancila, “Introduzione: Il Mediterraneo assediato” in *Mediterraneo in Armi* (sec. XV–XVIII) 2 vols. ed. Rossella Cancila *Quaderni Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, n4 (2007), 7–66.

Mediterranean deplored by Ariel Salzmann.¹⁵ Medievalists see the Fall of Constantinople as the moment when the Mediterranean stopped being a zone of intercultural contact, fluid religious exchange, and informal long-distance trade. But through trade, the Mediterranean remained an arena of interaction, encounters, and exchanges long after 1453.¹⁶

Maritime historian Maria Fusaro has remarked that “in the study of the socio-economics of the [Mediterranean] sea, ‘states’ and ‘empires’ remain ever present in the background.”¹⁷ François Ollivet’s map depicts the maritime competition between French and Italian ports as a way to extend their markets across the Mediterranean Sea (Figure 1.1). This chapter

15. See Ariel Salzmann, “The Passport of Religion: Conversion and the Mediterranean Frontier, 1450–1750,” Braudel Conference (Los Angeles: Clark Library, December 7, 2002). See Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229–1492* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987); Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Michel Balard, “A Christian Mediterranean, 1000–1500” in *The Mediterranean in History*, ed. David Abulafia (Los Angeles: Paul Getty Museum, 2003), 183–212. The first scholar to notice that the sixteenth-century Mediterranean was split into a Spanish and an Ottoman sphere of influence was Fernand Braudel himself. See *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. by Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1972 [1949]), 137–138. The ensuing Ottoman-Spanish struggle ushered in what John Elliott labels the birth of Spanish imperialism, which he sees in the Spanish reaction to Turkish incursions. “For the first time” Elliott declares “Spain confronted a state that possessed resources of money and power of imperial scale, it was a state organized for war.” See *Spain and its World: 1500–1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 168–169. Andrew Hess argues that “ideally the historian of the Mediterranean world should struggle to expose the patterns of both unity and diversity that lie beneath the surface of events. Practically, however, the scale of most ventures into the field of Mediterranean history tends to drive the scholar toward a viewpoint based upon only one of the two themes.” See Andrew Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 1. The most recent attempt to depict the Mediterranean as a zone of exchanges, connectivity, and hybridity is by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

16. Peter Burke, “Civilizations and Frontiers: Anthropology of the Early Mediterranean” in *Early Modern History and the Social Sciences: Testing the Limits of Braudel’s Mediterranean*, ed. John Marino (Kirkville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2002), 123–144.

17. Maria Fusaro, “After Braudel: A Reassessment of Mediterranean History between the Northern Invasion and the *Caravane Maritime*” in *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel’s Maritime Legacy*, eds. Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood, and Mohamed-Salah Omri (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 1–22.




FIGURE 1.1. François Ollivet, *Carte particulière de la Méditerranée*, 1664
 Courtesy of Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Site Richelieu. GE SH
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follows the Genoese adaptation to shifting alliances between empires.¹⁸ The Genoese adapted to the waves of ruptures by forming strategic alliances with rulers: first with Mehmed up to 1480, second with the Aragonese and Castilian kings from 1450 to 1528, and third with the Habsburgs against the French from 1528 to 1580. The Genoese made themselves economically indispensable to the various empires in order to survive.

THE GENOESE ALLIANCE WITH MEHMED, 1453–1480

Up to 1480, Genoese traders were transnational agents who connected the east and west of the sea. They possessed three colonies in the east – Caffa,

18. Abulafia, *The Great Sea* 2011, 418, argues that Christian forces impelled simultaneous policies of confrontation and accommodation. Dominique Valérian acknowledges that Italian merchants had been crucial both in the Crusades and in establishing commercial colonies. See “The Medieval Mediterranean” in *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, 77–90.

Chios, and Pera, and one, Corsica, in the west.¹⁹ At the time of the Fall of Constantinople, they maintained good relations with Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II, who granted them trade privileges until his death in 1481.²⁰ Similarly, following the loss of their trading rights in Caffa in 1475, the Genoese continued to trade with the other Islamic powers such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.²¹ The Genoese maintained a strong presence in the Levant until the mid-sixteenth century. After the loss of Chios in 1566, however, they concentrated their trade mainly in the western Mediterranean.²²

Traditionally, scholars have maintained that the demise of the Genoese trading colonies in Galata-Pera and the Black Sea stemmed from the fact that “fewer and fewer merchants were prepared to pay the tolls demanded by the Sultan officials” and that Genoese and Venetians no longer enjoyed full exemption from tariffs or unlimited access to markets.²³ Evidence points to the contrary, at least for the generation after the fall. Following 1453, Mehmed the Conqueror did not raise tolls on trade but encouraged Turks to trade with Venetians and Genoese, and “life continued.”²⁴ The Italian merchants continued to use the Ottoman Empire as their primary

19. ASG, 2774 B Materie politiche (negoiazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Arcipelago-Scio. In 1470, Mehmed granted the Genoese rulers of the island of Chios an *ahdname*, which guaranteed them autonomy in return for a tribute.

20. ASG 2774 D Materie politiche (negoiazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Miscellanea, notizie politiche e del commercio del Levante e della Costa d’Africa. “Capitulazione fatta dall’Imperator Sultan Mehmet con li Perotti.” I thank David Jacoby for graciously sharing his ideas on this project and for sending me his article “Caviar Trading in Byzantium” in *Mare et Litora* (Moscow: Indrik, 2009), 349–364.

21. ASG 2774 C Materie politiche (negoiazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Africa, corrispondenza.

22. The main Genoese colonies were Naples, Pera, Bougie, Bône, Granada, Malaga, Cádiz, Palermo, Marseille, Tunis, Messina, Caffa, Varna, and Moncastro.

23. Steven Runciman, *The Fall of Constantinople* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 163.

24. Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 126. Sites similar to Pera, with large contingents of foreigners, were installed in the Ottoman Empire by the end of the sixteenth century. See Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Matters, *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For continuity of trade with Europeans, see Kate Fleet, “The Treaty of 1387 between Murad I and the Genoese,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 56:1 (1993), 13–33.

market for alum, cloth, grain, and slaves, but also as a transit market for luxury items such as silk and spices.²⁵ Sultan Mehmed granted the Genoese from the enclave of Pera legal and financial privileges, facilitating their integration in the Ottoman Empire, provided that they paid customs duties.²⁶ The Genoese also acted as functionaries of the state and as tax farmers for the Ottomans, thus inserting themselves into the embryonic Ottoman economy.²⁷

The Genoese relation with the Levant was altered only in 1480, when Mehmed's son Bâyezîd II took the side of Naples and Milan against the Franco-Venetian alliance but wanted Otranto in return.²⁸ Following the Muslim attack on Otranto (which the Neapolitans recovered in September 1481), the Genoese doge called on Genoese subjects scattered across the Mediterranean to assist King Ferrante.²⁹ Already commercially active in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the diasporic community responded by using its accumulated wealth and know-how to concentrate on the west. The decisive moment for the rupture of Italian trade with the Levant was not in 1453 but in 1480.³⁰

The Genoese sought to maintain trade relations with the Levant, but mounting tensions between Spain and the Ottoman Empire (along with interests to protect in the west) led to a rapprochement with the Aragonese kings. In 1480, the Genoese of Pera were already contemplating

25. Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, 22–23.

26. See Céline Dauverd “Cultivating Differences: Genoese Trade Identity in the Constantinople of Sultan Mehmed II, 1453–1481,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* (forthcoming).

27. Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, 134. I have argued that Mehmed actually revered Italian culture. See Céline Dauverd, “The Ottoman Caesar: Mehmed II’s Strategy of Possession 1453–81” in *The Islands of the Eastern Mediterranean: A History of Cross-cultural Encounter*, eds. Lucca Zavagno and Ozlem Tackent (London: I.B. Tauris Press, 2014).

28. In 1480, the Ottomans started playing a greater part in European politics, especially in the Italian wars. Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, trans. by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (New York: Praeger, 1973), 31.

29. ASG, 2774 A Materie politiche (negoziazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Oriente e Africa-Costantinopoli. “1480 proposta fatta in consiglio di governo a Genova per aiutare il Re Ferdinando contro l’armata turca a Otranto.”

30. Kate Fleet and Ebru Boyar call 1453 another “1066 date” whose significance as a turning point in history is unquestioned. See *A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11.

an alliance with Ferrante.³¹ Genoese operating in the Levant joined their enclaves across the European continent. Some went to their commercial outposts in Bruges, London, and Seville; others headed to southern Italy, where Ferrante had welcoming migration policies. Ferrante's favorable attitude vis-à-vis foreign merchants in his Italian possessions in the fifteenth century (giving them commercial privileges, financial incentives, tax deductions, fiefs, and titles of nobility) enabled the Genoese to shift their commercial interests to the Spanish domains in the sixteenth century (Portugal, Spain, the New World, Flanders, and Italy). Thus, ensuring the prosperity of the Aragonese-Spanish Empire went hand in hand with that of their own mercantile empire. The combination of Ferrante's policies with the death of Mehmed in 1481 elicited both a rupture and a new alliance.

THE MEZZOGIORNO: CRUX OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN GENOESE AND HABSBURGS, 1480–1571

The Genoese posted in southern Italy actively protected Spain's empire in the Mediterranean against Ottoman attacks by providing galleys, money, ammunition, and grain; in return, Spain provided most-favored nation status to Genoese trade throughout the Iberian Empire. After the 1480 Turkish landing in Otranto, Iberian rulers sought to shatter Ottoman incursions into their territorial waters. The *Mezzogiorno* (southern Italy) exercised a critical influence in bringing the Hispano-Genoese alliance to maturity. Had Otranto not been recaptured, in the words of the humanist Galateo, "we would not be in Bari today, nor the Pope in Rome, nor would this kingdom [Calabria] be in the Christian faith."³² Southern Italy represented a crucial buffer zone against the Turkish threat. Most of the Ottoman attacks aimed at the Italian possessions, but Spanish officials regarded them as preparatory moves to facilitate a large-scale invasion of

31. The Doria family was considering a partnership with the Aragonese upon the death of Mehmed, thus long before Andrea Doria concluded it in 1528. ASG, 2774 A Materie politiche (negoiazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Oriente e Africa-Costantinopoli. "Parere di messer Doria per provvedimento da prendersi dopo la morte del turco maometto II."

32. Antonio de Ferraris Galateo, "Esposizione del Pater Noster" in *Gli Umanisti e la guerra Otrantina: Testi dei secoli XV e XVI*, eds. Lucia Gualdo Rosa, Isabella Nuovo, and Domenico Defilippis (Bari: Dedalo, 1982), 253.

the Iberian Peninsula.³³ Both the revolts occurring during the times of Charles V (by the Comuneros, Germanías, and German princes) and the upheavals occurring during those of his son Philip (the Dutch Revolt of 1572, and the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1612) put the Spanish monarchs on the defensive in both northern and southern Europe. Their reaction was to seek a line of defense beyond their own borders. In 1503, when the Spanish Crown conquered Naples, no other European power (except the Ottomans) could claim similar territorial expansion in the Mediterranean.³⁴ The kingdoms of Naples and Sicily became the pivot of Spain's Mediterranean empire,³⁵ vital bastions in the struggle against the Turks in the central Mediterranean, including northern Africa.³⁶ Spain's dynastic prerogative over the Mediterranean basin was checked only by the Ottomans.

33. María José Rodríguez-Salgado, *The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority, 1551–1559* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 263.

34. For an enlightening account on the Ottoman expansion in the Indian Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean, see Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For Casale, the Portuguese, and not the Spaniards, were the main commercial opponents of the Ottomans in the early modern age.

35. See Paul M. Dover, "Royal Diplomacy in Renaissance Italy: Ferrante d'Aragona (1458–1494) and His Ambassadors," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, XIV (2005), 57–94.

36. Benedetto Croce claimed that the Spanish presence in the Kingdom of Naples stemmed from the need to create a buffer zone against the Turks and their Barbary vassals. See *Storia del regno di Napoli* (Bari: Laterza, 1923); similarly, Gabriele Pepe wrote that "[t]he reason why the Spanish occupied the Mezzogiorno of Italy was to push ahead, far from their own land, the frontier against the Turks." See *Il Mezzogiorno d'Italia sotto gli Spagnoli: la tradizione storiografica* (Florence: G.C. Sansoni Ed., 1952), 218; John Elliott corroborates these views by claiming that Charles V sought to establish a more resilient link between his territories to form a barrier to impede further Turkish advance. See *Imperial Spain: 1469–1716* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990 [1963]), 168. Along these lines, Aurelio Musi supports "the bastion theory" whereby the imperial provinces' duty was to protect the Iberian Peninsula. See *L'Italia dei Viceré: Integrazione e resistenza nel sistema imperiale spagnolo* (Rome: Avagliano Ed., 2000), 20; interestingly, Francisco Elías de Tejada has argued that the Turkish threat provoked more alarm than fear. He maintains that because Spain had jurisdiction over southern Italy, Naples was the capital of "the Spains" and the most prominent city of the Italian peninsula. See *Napoli Spagnola*, vol. 2 *Le decenni imperiali (1503–1554)*, trans. by Silvio Vitale (Naples: Controcorrente Edizioni, 2002), 13; conversely, Italian scholarship contextualizes the Habsburg expansion within the Mediterranean struggle against the Ottomans and the French. Giuseppe Galasso maintains that "the Italian peninsula had, for the Spanish sovereigns, the double function of buffer against the Turks in the Mediterranean and strategic point of entry toward central Europe

Tension between Spain and Turkey rose gradually. The main bone of contention was dominion over the coasts.³⁷ Spanish outposts were established on the North African coast, but then the Spanish attack on Tunis in 1535 evoked a Turkish response: the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over the North African corsair principalities (analyzed later). At that point, the dynamic began to shift, partly because of emerging Turkish outposts in the western Mediterranean that directly threatened Spain. In 1529, when Charles V faced a protracted siege of Vienna, Castilian leaders willingly assumed the costs of the Iberian Peninsula's defense, but they firmly opposed any financial backing of Charles's efforts to face the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman Empire).³⁸ A member of his royal council, Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal, remarked, "the expenses of the empire and of other countries that are not Spain should not be paid with Spanish money nor discharged on Spain."³⁹ Left without support from Spain to fight on the northern frontier, Charles V turned to the Genoese.⁴⁰

The Genoese were a financial force sustaining the decisive battles fought in the Mediterranean. When in June 1534 the corsair Barbarossa threatened northern Italy with a powerful fleet, Genoa became a fundamental part of the imperial defense, sheltering troops in its port and conveying dispatches to the rest of Europe.⁴¹ When in 1536 Charles V decided to take Algiers, Imperial Counselor Don Pedro de Figueroa contracted the Genoese Tommaso and

behind the back of France. Until Philip II's deployment into the Atlantic around 1580, Naples remained a point of reference in Madrid's Mediterranean politics, which still represented the principal enterprise of the monarchy." See *Alla Periferia dell'impero: Il Regno di Napoli nel periodo spagnolo (secoli XVI–XVII)* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Ed., 1994), 8.

37. Molly Greene, "The Ottomans in the Mediterranean" in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, 104–115.

38. Because only the Ligurian Republic financially encouraged the Iberian expansion into the eastern Mediterranean, Arturo Pacini has labeled the Genoese the "preceptors of the crusade." See *La Genova di Andrea Doria nell'Impero di Carlo V* (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1999), 336.

39. Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power 1492–1763* (New York: Perennial Ed. HarperCollins, 2004), 71.

40. John Elliott regards Charles V's struggle against the Turk as emerging out of Castile's crusading traditions; by "giving it a new sense of purpose and directions, he undoubtedly met a psychological need." See *Imperial Spain*, 169.

41. Private citizens of the Republic provided the Genoese galleys. Genoese state galleys were few throughout the sixteenth century; those operated by private owners and captains often had the flag of the Catholic kings. See Carlo Bitossi, "Il Genio ligure risvegliato: La

Agostino Spinola and Francesco and Stefano Grimaldi, as well as Agostino Doria, to finance the endeavor. The operation resembled other monetary transactions (or *operazione di ricambio*). The emperor cashed the money in Rome, Genoa, and Milan while reimbursing the Genoese in Naples.⁴² Forced donations (*donativi*) from the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily paid for the rest of the Algiers campaign. Viceroy Don Pedro de Toledo adroitly negotiated 230,000 scudi to support Charles V among Genoese residents in Naples, such as Francesco Lomellino, Damiano Pallavicino, and Giovanbattista and Raffaele de Mari.⁴³

In return, the Genoese lenders and donors received vast territorial and monetary compensation. For instance, in 1541, the emperor rewarded Admiral Andrea Doria with a yearly income of two thousand ducats from the customs of Apulia, an asset transmissible to his heirs, for “saving the day” in Algiers. Charles also named Andrea Doria the *Protonotario* (protonotary or main clerk of the court) of the Kingdom of Naples.⁴⁴ Similarly, King Philip III expressed his gratitude to the Genoese Filippo Cigala, who had been instrumental in expelling the Turks from Messina in 1595. Cigala had actively assisted the viceroy of Sicily, serving as an imperial guard and incurring severe injuries. The viceroy recommended Cigala to the king, who bestowed upon him a yearly income of one thousand ducats⁴⁵ and the prestigious Order of Santiago.⁴⁶ Simultaneously the viceroy in Naples knighted his son Carlo.⁴⁷

potenza navale nel discorso politico Genovese del Seicento” in *I linguaggi del potere nell’eta barocca*, ed. Francesca Cantù (Rome: Viella, 2009), 81–112. In the sixteenth century, the cost to rent a Genoese galley was seven thousand ducats. Because the Genoese galleys served Spain, the import-export tax on all their goods and ports was waived for the ship captains. See Giovanni Brancaccio, “Consoli, colonia Genovese ed attività mercantile nella Napoli moderna” in *Rapporti diplomatici e scambi commerciali nel Mediterraneo moderno*, ed. Mirella Maffrici (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2005), 197–206.

42. Arturo Pacini, *La Genova di Andrea Doria*, 357.

43. *Ibid.*, 429–432.

44. *Ibid.*, 438–439.

45. Archivo General de Simancas (AGSim), Fondo Estado, Legajo 1097, folio 89, “memoriale della consulta della summa,” Madrid, July 4, 1600. See also *ibid.*, folio 88, letter from Viceroy Count of Olivares to the King, December 27, 1600.

46. AGSim, Fondo Estado, Legajo 1099, folio 77, letter from Juan Alonso Pimentel de Herrera Count of Benavente and Viceroy of Naples to the King of Spain Philip III, Naples, July 1, 1603.

47. AGSim, Fondo Estado, Legajo 1099, folio 78, Naples, July 2, 1603.

Although much smaller than the Ottoman fleet, the Genoese fleet, posted in Naples and Messina, continuously volunteered to protect the western Mediterranean waters from random Turkish assaults.⁴⁸ The Genoese provided galleys for major military campaigns in Tunisia (1535), Algiers (1564), Malta (1565), and Lepanto (1571).⁴⁹ At Lepanto, they were auxiliaries of the Spanish and Venetian fleets, but their intervention was vital. On the eve of Lepanto, the Genoese pledged their unconditional financial support: “We should try to prevent evil without looking at the price in order to confront an imminent Armada of Infidels so powerful and damaging for Christians. Its arrival disturbs the navigation of our patria and the safety of our inhabitants.”⁵⁰

The two kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, significant Genoese mercantile and naval bases, acquired increasing strategic value as the closure of the Levant forced Europeans to evaluate their own resources, making southern Italy central to grain supply.⁵¹ As the Genoese explained to the Spanish king, the main benefit from trading with the Levant was the commerce in grain to support the western Mediterranean: “once stabilized, the said commerce would be of service and common benefit to the kingdoms of both His Majesty and ours.”⁵² But obtaining grain from the Levant became

48. The Ottoman arsenal of Constantinople was large, counting 120 small naval workshops that served as assembly points. Thus, their fleet could be dispatched at an incredible speed to descend for a quick dispatch to even remote regions in the Mediterranean. For a discussion on maritime technology, see John Pryor, *Geography, Tehnology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

49. Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain became a World Power, 70–73, 155–157, 183–186*. For a lively interpretation of these decisive battles, see Roger Crowley, *Empires of the Sea: The Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the Contest for the Center of the World* (New York: Random House, 2008). For Algiers, see Özlem Kumrular, *Las Relaciones entre el Imperio Ottomano y la Monarquía Católica entre los Años 1520–1535 y el Papel de los Estados Satélites* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010).

50. ASG, A.S. Litterarum 2328, N 659 letter from Niccolo Fiesco to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, March 3, 1570.

51. Until the sixteenth century, Genoa dispatched roughly 240 ships each decade to the Levant. This number does not include other Genoese vessels located in alternative western Mediterranean ports such as Livorno, Ragusa, and Barcelona. See John Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 201.

52. ASG, A.S. 2707, “Istruzioni al Pronotario Marcantonio Sauli, Ambasciatore al Re di Spagna,” Genoa, February 14, 1559.

difficult at the dawn of the sixteenth century, when the Sublime Porte closed off its market to the west because it experienced periodic monetary and grain crises. Only southern Italy provided grain on a stable basis. A 1515 merchant dispatch from Naples to Madrid reported that “in Venice, there is penury of grain and it is understood that it is impossible to get some from Turkey where [they] used to get it. Now they are trying to get some from Apulia.”⁵³ After 1555, grain was in short supply from Alexandria, Constantinople, and Syria. In the 1570s, at the eve of the Battle of Lepanto, Venetians, like other Europeans, purchased grain from Apulia.⁵⁴ Food for the Spanish troops and the city-states rested on the exploitation of the *Mezzogiorno*, which was mainly in the hands of foreigners including the Genoese.⁵⁵

THE GENOESE BETWEEN THE LILY AND THE CRESCENT MOON: A NEW ALLIANCE, 1525–1559

The Genoese got caught up in the Habsburgs-Valois-Ottomans struggle over the Mediterranean at the Battle of Pavia. For David Abulafia, Francis I’s “aim in seeking an alliance with the Turks was not peace but mischief.”⁵⁶ Arguably he is right. The alliance between the French and the Ottomans greatly disturbed the balance of power in the premodern Mediterranean.⁵⁷

53. For centuries, the Venetians had been exporting grain from Bari, which remained the only steady supply for Europeans. See Giuseppe Coniglio, *Il Regno di Napoli al Tempo di Carlo V: Amministrazione e vita economica-sociale* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1951), 122.

54. Francesco Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli nei secoli XVI e XVII*. Rome: Tipografia Pio X, 1966, 137.

55. The Spanish viceroys often deprived southern Italy of its grain to feed the Iberian Peninsula. Shortly before Lepanto, a Genoese minister complained to the Republic that the little wheat produced in the Kingdom of Naples that year was to be exported to Spain. See ASG, A.S. Litterarum 2328 Lettere Ministri Napoli (1537–1708), N 655 letter from Niccolò Fiesco to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, January 25, 1570.

56. David Abulafia, *The Great Sea*, 421.

57. During the last years of Mehmed’s reign, the Genoese still benefited from privileges Mehmed had granted them after the fall of Constantinople. ASG, 2774 A Materie politiche (negoziazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Oriente e Africa-Constantinopoli. “Memoriale di Claude Dubourg, cavaliere e consigliere del re di Francia andato a Constantinopoli per ragioni di traffico.” “concessioni di privilegi commerciali ai genovesi.” Dubourg’s notice reveals the extent of the Genoese trade protection but also of the

Traditional historiography suggests that Doria's alliance with Spain resulted in a rupture between France and Genoa.⁵⁸ Genoa, however, had had a long, complex, and hostile relationship with France to which it lost sovereignty various times. Louis XII's royal entry in 1507 symbolized the ultimate submission of the Republic to France.⁵⁹ Examining the aftermath of the Battle of Pavia in 1525, thus, provides a better understanding of the imperial reorganization of the alliances.⁶⁰ For the Ottomans, the coalition with France sought to forestall Habsburg expansion into the Mediterranean Sea: for the French, it sought to stop Habsburg expansion on the continent.⁶¹

nascent privileges to the French. "Il signor Claudio Dubourg cavaliere e consigliere della sua maesta christianissima e thesorario di Franza espera partire di Venetia infra 15 giorni per andare in Constantinopoli il quale dice aver parlato in Genoa alla sua Excellentia e per questo offerisse anchora offerir e impotrare del gran Turco suficiente comandamento e capitulationi per la quale fara concesso agli Genovesi potere andare e tornare per tutto gli luoghi sottoposti al ditto turco tanto per conto di mercantia qualtre effetto ne piu ni manco che gli francesi godendo gli ditti Genovesi delli medessimi privilege e capitoli."

58. Upon favoring the emperor's troops in the Kingdom of Naples, Doria was responsible for the expulsion of the Genoese from France. See for instance *Discorso sopra la repubblica di Genova*, BNN, mss Brancaccio, V D, vol 18 car 199 r. "Restando dopo Francesi rotti a Napoli con l'imperatore si confermò in Genova tanto più il governo sotto protezione di esso imperatore quanto che assai presso il Re Francesco persuaso da false opinioni espulse tutta la nation Genovese dal suo Regno, che quanto sia stato in pregiudicio suo et beneficio di nemici non se ne diranno per hora."

59. Political tension between France and Genoa is discussed by George L. Gorse "Question of Sovereignty: France and Genoa, 1494–1528" in *Italy and the European Power: The Impact of War, 1500–1530*, ed. Christine Shaw (Boston: Brill, 2006), 187–205. See also Christine Shaw, "The French Signoria over Genoa, 1458–1461" in *Libertà e Dominio: Il Sistema Politico Genovese: Le Relazioni Esterne e il Controllo del Territorio*, eds. Matthias Schenettger and Carlo Taviani (Rome: Viella, 2011), 39–54.

60. Local informants described that "by siding with the emperor and by coming to Naples, Andrea Doria put the French in a situation of despair. Doria's actions were seen as prophecy or oracle and gave hope to the imperial factions." BNN, mss Brancaccio, IV B, vol 10, 149 v *Aggiunta delli giornali di Messer Giuliano Passaro delle cose di Napoli fatte da me. Notar Gregorio Russo per insino all'anno 1537*, 157.

61. The military alliance between Francis I and Süleyman the Magnificent aroused condemnation from the Habsburgs and their supporters on religious grounds as an aberration from accepted diplomacy. See Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Tauris, 2011).

Starting with the Valois dynasty, strategic trading agreements between French and Ottomans threatened the Italian trade hegemony in the Mediterranean. The commercial alliance between the French and the Ottomans had already been cultivated by Sultan Bayezid when the Kingdom of Naples had fallen under French jurisdiction for a short period in 1494–95, greatly troubling Genoese commerce. The French sought to “arrange commercial activities.”⁶² In the clauses of the Genoese maritime code affecting relations with foreign powers, article fourteen stated that “the Commerce of the Levant and Barbary is now organized and directed by the King of France.”⁶³ This new alliance threatened Genoese trade and territories, and Spanish claims in the western Mediterranean.

At the Battle of Pavia in 1525, Charles V’s armies defeated those of Francis I, capturing him and forcing him to relinquish all dynastic claims over Italy. Threatened by the rise of the House of Habsburg, Francis I turned to Süleyman the Magnificent (r.1520–66) as a natural ally. Francis’s smoldering resentment against Spain following the latter’s conquests in Italy informed the relations among Eastern and Western powers over the Mediterranean.⁶⁴ Pavia had deeper repercussions. In 1526, Süleyman attacked Hungary, defeating Charles’s troops at the Battle of Mohaçs. In 1528, Francis I launched an attack on Naples in which Andrea Doria refused to participate.⁶⁵ The Genoese took Charles’s

62. ASG, 2774 D Materie politiche (negoziazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Miscellanea, notizie politiche e del commercio del Levante e della Costa d’Africa.

63. ASG, 2774 D Materie politiche (negoziazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) Miscellanea, notizie politiche e del commercio del Levante e della Costa d’Africa. “Charles VIII et pour la grace de Dieu Roy de Naples et de Sicile a profité de la paix pour mettre de l’ordre dans le Commerce du Levant et de Barbarie et a organisé un traité de commerce entre le Grand Seigneur [the sultan], ses tributaires, et Nous [Genoese]. Le Commerce du Levant et de Barbarie est maintenant organisé et dirigé par le Roi de France. Article 15 stipule que les marchands seront remboursés des droits des marchandises, qu’ils voyagent par mer ou par terre. Article 13 stipule que toutes les marchandises qui se tirent de Turquie, des échelles du Levant, et de toute la côte de Barbarie dans toute l’étendue du Royaume de Naples, le Roi aura le privilège exclusif.”

64. Bertrand Haan, *L’Amitié entre princes: Une alliance franco-espagnole au temps des guerres de Religion (1560–1570)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011) argues that Habsburgs and Valois sincerely pursued intimate relationships and that their expertise in the art of dissimulation reflected a true case of friendship.

65. Paolo Lingua, *Andrea Doria: Principe e Pirata nell’Italia dell’500* (Genoa: Nuova, 2006).

side,⁶⁶ and the 1528 alliance with Spain alienated the Genoese from the Ottomans. In turn, the new Genoese-Habsburg coalition intimidated the Ottomans, precipitating the rapprochement with the French Valois,⁶⁷ crowned with the Siege of Vienna in 1529, which signaled long-lasting rivalry in Europe.

Faced with stiff French competition, the Genoese were the first to experience the negative impact of the Franco-Ottoman alliance. In 1534, for instance, and perhaps unjustly, they suspected that French intelligence was orchestrating Turkish attacks on their possession in the eastern Mediterranean: the island of Chios, a strategic location that had been in the possession of the Giustiniani albergo for nearly three hundred years and served as a Genoese base for grain and alum. In his correspondence with the Genoese doge, the ambassador to the court of Spain declared that the French were taking advantage of a grain shortage in the Mediterranean to unfold their sinister anti-Genoese commercial scheme. The consul exaggerated somewhat; if the French interfered with Genoese trade relations, it was partly because the latter had become Spain's allies. The Genoese consul claimed, "Since the French are backed up by the Turks in everything they do, they also forbade us from trading in their kingdoms."⁶⁸

Through their alliance, both French and Turks nourished political and commercial goals.⁶⁹ Süleyman gained a political ally within Christendom. In 1532, they prepared an attack on Naples,⁷⁰ and in 1533, the Sultan sent

66. Carlo Bitossi argues that Genoese politics was driven by the idea of giving impetus to the republic as a naval power in the Mediterranean. See "Il Genio Ligure Risvegliato."

67. Greene states that the Ottomans pursued a "politics of strengthening of Islamic civilization in the Mediterranean basin" and revised their imperial project of eliminating competing frontier societies. See "Resurgent Islam, 1500–1700." In *The Mediterranean in History*, ed. David Abulafia, 212–249." She also argues that "increasingly, the conflict between the Spanish and the Ottomans rendered the Mediterranean coastal waters a 'no man's land.'" See "Markets and Sovereignty," Braudel Conference (Los Angeles: Clark Library, April 11, 2003).

68. Raffaele Ciasca, ASG, A.S. 2707 "Istruzioni a Giambattista Lercari, Oratore" Genoa, March 6, 1534.

69. The Ottomans wanted to trade and protect traders to get silk and grain and to tax non-Muslim traders. See Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

70. See Gilles Veinstein, "Les préparatifs de la bataille navale franco-turque de 1532 à travers les ordres du Divan ottoman" in *Etat et Société dans l'Empire Ottoman, XVI^e–XVIII^e siècles* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1994), 35–67.

Francis 100,000 gold pieces to help him form a coalition with English and German princes against Charles V.⁷¹ Ottoman scholars argue that economically, the Turks actually depended on European commerce with the Levant.⁷² The alliance with France enabled them to obtain scarce goods, such as woolen cloth, tin, steel, and paper, as well as bullion. This dependence empowered European traders who bargained for privileges through capitulations (trade agreements for the Genoese of Pera) and at times threatened to boycott the Ottoman ports.⁷³ The arrival of the first French ambassador, Jean de la Forêt, paved the way for the capitulations in 1535.⁷⁴

Not only did the French become the most important embassy in Istanbul, but the capitulations, later renewed by Süleyman, also ensured concrete military cooperation in the Mediterranean.⁷⁵ The alliance between the French and the Ottomans strengthened following Charles V's attack on Tunis in 1535 and the renewal of hostilities between France and Spain in Italy in 1536. Although Süleyman could not extend

71. Philip Mansel, "The French Renaissance in Search of the Ottoman Empire," in *Re-Orienting the Renaissance: Cultural Exchanges with the East*, ed. Gerald MacLean (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 96–107.

72. Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003) challenges the predominant view that there was a desire to spread Islam. Instead, he argues that the primary motive was the desire for booty and slaves. The empire was a "plundering confederacy" and open to anyone who could contribute to this goal. The consensus now seems to indicate that the Ottomans sought to maintain high standards of living in the capital and get funds from taxing merchants using commercial routes. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper argue that when dealing with trade, the Ottomans were pragmatic and combined religious protection with the politics of loyalty. See *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

73. Halil İnalcık, "Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe," in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*, ed. Halil İnalcık (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), 115–121.

74. Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Baki Tezcan argues that in the sixteenth century, merchants and financiers were active and empowered political participants.

75. The capitulations were first ratified by Selim. See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "L'apogée de l'Empire ottoman: les événements (1512–1606)", in *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, ed. Robert Mantran (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 139–158.

to the French the same *ahdname* (imperial pledge) that Mehmed II had granted to the Genoese in 1453 (because it would have made them Ottoman subjects), among all the nations with commercial agreements with the Ottoman sultan, after 1535 only the French enjoyed actual capitulations ensuring trade throughout the entire Ottoman territory (including Egypt, Syria, and North Africa).⁷⁶ The French thus displaced the established nations that the Ottomans had usually favored in the Levant: the Italians. Only subjects of the French king were freed from ordinary customs taxes. Moreover, French merchants were placed under the jurisdiction of French consuls and ambassadors in Istanbul, Algiers, Alexandria, and Tripoli.

The Genoese consul complained to the king of Spain that “during the treaty of peace with ‘the Grand Turk’ the ambassador of the King of France in Constantinople managed to prevent [the Genoese] ambassadors from being heard and given license [to trade].” The consul explained that “all of this happened because we are faithful to the enterprise of His Majesty [the king of Spain] and His fortune. As a result of the altercation with the French Ambassador, we [Genoese] had to ask ‘the Turk’ permission to trade in Constantinople . . . our merchants finally gained the said license at the peril of their life.”⁷⁷ French merchants started supplanting Venetian and Genoese traders in the export of silk, wool, cotton, wheat, carpets, cloth, spices, and perfumes from Syria and Alexandria.⁷⁸ As a result, the volume of Genoese shipping from the Levant declined from 180 ships to 20 between 1550 and 1569.⁷⁹

76. For trade agreements between Ottomans and Venetians, see E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). See also Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

77. Raffaele Ciasca, ASG, A.S. 2707, “Istruzioni al Pronotario Marcantonio Sauli, Ambasciatore al Re di Spagna,” Genoa, February 14, 1559.

78. Gilles Veinstein, “L’empire dans sa grandeur (XVI^{ème} siècle),” in *Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman*, ed. Robert Mantran, 159–226.

79. Edoardo Grendi, *La repubblica aristocratica dei Genovesi*, 215. The Genoese actually continued to trade with the Levant and had consulates in Smyrna and Constantinople to defend their interests until the last quarter of the seventeenth century. See Onorato Pàstine, *Genova e l’Impero Ottomano nel Secolo XVII*, vol. 73 (Genoa: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1952).

The French then extended their imperial design to the Genoese-controlled island of Corsica during the Wars of Corsica (1553–59).⁸⁰ Strategically located between the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, Corsica represented an indispensable stepping-stone to ensure logistic comfort for Franco-Turkish troops; furthermore, its human resources included mariners, galley rowers, infantrymen, and military commanders.⁸¹ For France, an invasion of Corsica meant a general shift in Genoese priorities from the eastern to the western Mediterranean. For Spain, any loss of Italian territory became a potential enemy base for an invasion of Iberia. Philip II quickly realized Corsica's strategic value. A French takeover of the island would jeopardize access to the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Spanish possessions in Italy.⁸²

With the aim of salvaging the island, the Genoese ambassador to Spain, Marcantonio Sauli, suggested that the Spanish and Genoese should combine their fortunes to repel the Turks from the western Mediterranean, and that Spanish and Genoese galleys should jointly patrol the sea.⁸³ Sauli emphasized the mutual benefit from Iberian assistance in “regaining Corsica which has been unjustly occupied by the French.”⁸⁴ If we understand the history of alliances in terms of ruptures and continuity, the annexation of Corsica, Genoa's only colony in the western Mediterranean, marked the end of

80. Genoa had already lost sovereignty over its territory to the French from 1396 to 1409, then from 1458 to 1461, and finally from 1499 to 1512. For a recent article on the submission of the city, see Christine Shaw, “The French Signoria over Genoa, 1458–1461” in *Libertà e Dominio*, 39–54.

81. Michel Vergé-Franceschi and Antoine-Marie Graziani, *Sampiero Corso (1498–1567): Un mercenaire européen au XVIème siècle* (Ajaccio: Ed. Alain Piazzola, 1999), 227–228.

82. Therefore, the Pax Hispanica over Italy resulting from the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis would prove illusory. As opposed to current historiography, Michael J. Levin argues that the concept of Pax Hispanica did not really apply to either the European continent or the American colonies of the Iberian Empire. See *Agents of Empire: Spanish Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2. Thomas Kirk treats Doria as a naval commander, political spokesman, and political brokers of Philip II in “Giovanni Andrea Doria: Citizen of Genoa, Prince of Melfi, Agent of King Philip II of Spain” in *Double Agents: Cultural and Political Brokerage in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Marika Keblusek and Badeloch Noldus (Boston: Brill, 2011), 59–70.

83. *Ibid.*

84. Raffaele Ciasca, ASG, A.S. 2707, “Istruzioni al Pronotario Marcantonio Sauli, Ambasciatore al Re di Spagna,” Genoa, February 14, 1559.

diplomatic relations between Genoa and France. The consequences of a French-owned island between Spain and Italy were unthinkable.

The ensuing Wars of Corsica not only expelled the French, but also further strengthened the alliance between Genoa and Spain. The king's interest in the island was more than strategic – its release from the French “yoke” liberated the majority of Genoese troops stationed there for deployment elsewhere in the Mediterranean.⁸⁵ In addition, should the crown support the Genoese Republic's recovery of Corsica and renewal of trade privileges in its domains, Genoa guaranteed financial assistance in the Spanish territories of the western Mediterranean. Marcantonio Sauli assured the king of Spain: “if we provide money and forces to maintain the States of His Majesty and the dominion of this Republic, we need the support of His Majesty. Together, we'll be able to maintain, as we have said so many times, the State of Milan, the Kingdom of Naples, and all the other countries of Spain.”⁸⁶

With the help of the Genoese posted in Corsica and the Kingdoms of Sicily and Naples, the Habsburg Crown sought to stem the rising Ottoman tide in the Mediterranean. Between the 1570s and 1580s, internal religious turmoil kept France on the sideline of Mediterranean politics. However, when Henri IV ascended the throne in 1589, he again sought Ottoman support for expansion. The result was a series of crucial European events following what French ambassadors in Istanbul called “the union of the lily and the crescent.”⁸⁷

NEW ALLIANCES: THE CORSAIRS, FROM 1532

An added dimension to the Habsburg–Ottoman struggle was an increasing presence of corsairs in the Mediterranean.⁸⁸ As Fernand Braudel put it,

85. Antoine-Marie Graziani, “Saint-Georges et la Corse: Un “bon gouvernement”?” in *Libertà e Dominio*, 267–279.

86. Raffaele Ciasca, ASG, A.S. 2707, “Istruzioni al Pronotario Marcantonio Sauli, Ambasciatore al Re di Spagna,” Genoa, February 14, 1559.

87. Mansel, “The French Renaissance in Search of the Ottoman Empire.”

88. Robert Davis has argued that the Habsburg–Ottoman imperial struggle over the sea encouraged the first large-scale slave raids. Both empires used the politics of jihad to wear down the other side and harvest its human wealth. For instance, in 1544 Algerian corsairs sailed into the Bay of Naples and carried off seven thousand people. See *Holy War and Human Bondage: Tales of Christian-Muslim Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), 21–22.

“besides the great predators, lesser scavengers prowled the seas.”⁸⁹ Pirates had wandered the Mediterranean Sea for millennia; starting in the 1500s, they were joined by corsairs, also known as privateers, or government-supported individuals commissioned to harass enemy shipping lanes.⁹⁰ The emerging war through proxy Christian and Muslim privateers ran parallel to the system of alliances created by the Renaissance empires in the sixteenth century.⁹¹ Christian corsairs operated out of Malta, Palermo, Messina, Trapani, Mallorca, Almeria, and Valencia, whereas their counterparts were stationed in Tripoli, Tunis, Bizerte, Tetouan, and Algiers; the Turks had the numeric superiority. Moreover, the Ottomans institutionalized corsair involvement within their naval structure. Corsair ships were, according to an Italian ambassador, “the backbone of the entire fleet.”⁹² Hence, in their protection of the Habsburg domains, the Genoese had to cope with both high and low diplomacy.

To control the frontier in North Africa, the Ottoman sultans enlisted corsairs to patrol sea routes paralleling the Spanish frontier defenses in Malta, Sicily, and La Goleta (Tunisia).⁹³ The Sublime Porte commissioned corsairs from Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli with orders to honor all Ottoman treaties to respect the vessels of allied nations, especially France.⁹⁴ In 1518, Khayr al-Din Barbarossa declared himself a vassal of Sultan Selim, and by 1534, he became the naval commander of Sultan Süleyman. In this role, Barbarossa severely disrupted commercial networks between the Italian city-states and their eastern Mediterranean outposts. The corsair system triggered a heightened alertness in the Mediterranean.⁹⁵ Henri II of France relied on corsairs to

89. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 871.

90. Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs and European Renegades* (New York: Autonomedia, 2003), 143.

91. Molly Greene argues that corsair activities increased following the Battle of Lepanto. See “Resurgent Islam,” 212–249.

92. “Relazione de Antonio Barbarigo” in *Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al senato*, ed. Eugenio Albèri (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 153.

93. Andrew Hess argues that corsair action was not random but corresponded to an Ottoman policy of centralization and continuous expansion to the western Mediterranean. See “The Battle of Lepanto and its Place in Mediterranean History,” *Past and Present*, no. 57 (November 1972): 52–73.

94. Wilson, *Pirate Utopias*, 143.

95. See Barnaby Rogerson, *The Last Crusaders: The Hundred Year Battle for the Center of the World* (London: Little Brown Hardbacks, 2008).

complement his small fleet of forty-two galleys.⁹⁶ The Spanish viceroys posted in southern Italy informed the monarch that envoys from the Levant warned them of eventual “alliances struck between Lutherans, French, and Turks.”⁹⁷ In the event of such alliance, Spanish overseers stressed the need to defend southern Italy by raising “money, foreign infantrymen and cavalry.”⁹⁸

Whereas the North African coastline (Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis) became the center of Muslim privateering, the island of Malta sheltered the most fearsome Christian predators: the Hospitaller Knights of Saint John.⁹⁹ Andrew Hess labels the Knights of St. John the “border warriors” of Charles V protecting North African and Italian bases.¹⁰⁰ Their rise to power in the early sixteenth century was the direct result of the Ottoman confrontation with Spain. The Maltese knights targeted French vessels following this nation’s alliance with the Ottoman Turks.¹⁰¹ In the 1550s, Spanish viceroys in Naples learned of a French attempt to take over Malta; the French ambassador’s scheme was to order his galleys to wait for those of the Turkish armada.¹⁰²

This war through proxies disrupted vital trade routes and threatened commercial exchanges established by the Italian merchants. The *Superba*’s ships crisscrossing the Mediterranean found their ability to import merchandise from Chios and Crete hampered by the corsairs. Similarly, for the Ottomans, the essential issue was to protect their commercial shipping.¹⁰³ Genoese consuls’ dispatches blamed the French acting on Muslim

96. Bartolomé Bennassar and Jean Jacquot, *Le XVIème Siècle*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997), 239.

97. Giuseppe Coniglio, ed., *Il Vicerego di don Pietro di Toledo*, 552. A.S. 1036, 103, Naples, December 4, 1546.

98. *Ibid.*

99. See Ayşe Devrim Atauz, *Eight Thousand Years of Maltese Maritime History: Trade, Piracy, and Naval Warfare in the Central Mediterranean* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008).

100. Andrew Hess, “The Battle of Lepanto.”

101. See Simon Mercieca, “Maritime Caravans and the Knights of St John: Aspects of Mediterranean Seaborne Traffic (Sixteenth–Eighteenth Century)” in *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, 157–175.

102. Giuseppe Coniglio, ed., *Il Vicerego di don Pietro di Toledo*, 663–64. ASG, A.S. 1044, 26, “Relazione a Carlo V sulle istruzioni date a Garcia di Toledo,” Naples, March 1552.

103. See Kate Fleet, “Ottoman Expansion in the Mediterranean” in *The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603*, eds. Suraiya N. Faroqhi and Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 141–172.

intelligence. Algerian corsairs acting under French protection roamed the seas and preyed on Christian shipping and trade. The proxy war affected the Genoese ability to trade as they paid acute attention to corsair activities while waiting for their galleys to return from the Levant. Genoese agents frequently alerted the republic about departures from the ports of Algiers and Marseilles. Galleys destined for Naples often had to stop in the friendly port of Ragusa, where they remained stationed for as long as “both those French and Algerian corsairs roamed the sea.”¹⁰⁴ French and Algerian corsairs whose vessels periodically interrupted shipping lanes between pivotal allied towns represented the main threat. Islands that were most vulnerable because of their connection to vital commercial port cities, especially Bari, Ragusa, or Cagliari, experienced frequent disruptions.¹⁰⁵

Sicily was instrumental to Spanish imperial policies in the Mediterranean, which increasingly perceived the western islands as the last bastions of Christianity. As a result, the Spanish viceroys in Sicily required that the bulk of the Spanish fleet (and its allies whenever possible) be stationed on the island.¹⁰⁶ Posted in Naples, Palermo, and Messina, the Genoese galleys were the first ones called upon by the Spanish king in case of Ottoman attacks, and they were in the front line of military and naval operations. Their own immediate interests on the island coincided with those of the Iberian Empire as a whole.¹⁰⁷ The island witnessed Muslim attacks throughout the sixteenth century, notably in 1532 and 1552, following Charles V's incursions into Ottoman territories. In 1561, Spanish Viceroy of Sicily Juan de la Cerda's attack on La Goletta resulted in a disaster, leaving the island dangerously exposed. Because of the Genoese role in the military protection of the island, the Spanish kings exempted the Genoese from the new tax on the importation of armaments.¹⁰⁸ So during the whole period of dominance, upon

104. ASG, A.S. 2634 letter from Consul Pietro Lomellino de Campo to Republic of Genoa, Messina May 10, 1532.

105. *Ibid.*

106. Rodríguez-Salgado, *The Changing Face of Empire*, 338–339. Around 1580, the Spanish fleet counted 130 ships and 30,000 men. See Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker, *The Spanish Armada* (London: Hamilton, 1988), 135.

107. Helmut Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain: A Study in the Practice of Empire* (New York: Staples Press, 1951), 55.

108. ASPa, Secrezia di Palermo (1397–1842) vol. 1582: Informazione dell'osservanza della dogana di Palermo: year 1582, document title: gabelle di dohana Messina e intratte di Mare e qra. la quale si exige in credenzia.

receiving news of the imminent arrival of Turkish armadas from Constantinople, the Genoese nation rallied its galleys in Messina, Trapani, but also Saragossa (through land troops) and Calabria and tried to secure grain to feed the population in case of siege.¹⁰⁹ The Spanish viceroys, chronically short of manpower, appealed to their allied trading nations in times of adversity. Services ranged from “cleaning the sea” (of corsairs) in preparation for massive Turkish attack,¹¹⁰ to providing safe passage for the Italian infantry from Naples to Sicily,¹¹¹ supplying gunpowder for the campaigns in Tripoli,¹¹² and protecting the Sicilian naval squadron near Alexandria.¹¹³

In this period of corsair warfare, Sicily was a crucial line of demarcation in the Mediterranean. As Diogo Homem’s map illustrates, Sicily stood half way in between Muslim Tunisia and Christian Italy (Figure 1.2). Strategically speaking, Messina became the quintessential port of the Habsburg Mediterranean. Helmut Koenigsberger’s analysis of theories of Spanish Empire in Sicily depicts the island as the front line of military and naval operations against Turkish threats.¹¹⁴ Don Juan de Austria’s crowded galleys in the harbor of Messina became a symbol of Sicily’s growing importance in the Spanish Empire. Control of the seas mandated that an enemy’s maritime commerce be crippled. This was done first by destroying his fleet, and second by blockading enemy ports to sever maritime trade.¹¹⁵ As

109. ASG, A.S. 2647, Letter from Consul Pelagio Giustiniano to Republic of Genoa, January 4, 1608. When the Turkish armada was spotted, the viceroy asked the Genoese galleys to arrive as soon as possible in Messina. The galleys of Malta had already returned from the east, but their members were not enough. Consequently, the viceroy asked for eighty Genoese galleys to counterattack the enemy’s designs on these parts of the Mediterranean. See ASG, A.S. 2792, Letter from Viceroy of Sicily to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, June 29, 1618.

110. ASG, A.S. 2792 (Lettere dei Principi alla Republica di Genova: Sicilia (I vicere di Sicilia: 1505–1632)) letter from the viceroy to the Republic of Genoa, Palermo, August 3, 1608. To ensure a smooth exportation of silk, Don Ottavio de Aragón, a strategist posted in Messina, worked in concert with Franco de Marini, general of the Republic, in the matter of Turkish Monach Azzael’s raids in the Mediterranean Sea.

111. ASG, A.S. 2792, Letter from Viceroy of Sicily to Republic of Genoa, September 3, 1616.

112. ASG, A.S. 2792, Letter from Viceroy of Sicily, Duke of Medina to Republic of Genoa, Messina, July 27, 1559.

113. ASG, A.S. 2792, Letter from Viceroy of Sicily, Duke of Ossuna to Republic of Genoa, Messina, September 9, 1611.

114. Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily*, 55.

115. John Francis Guilmartin Jr. contends that power at sea depended on power on land. See *Gunpowder & Galleys*. The balance of power during the Habsburg-Ottoman



FIGURE 1.2. Diogo Homem, *The Italian Peninsula*, 1559

Courtesy of Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Richelieu, GE DD 2003 (RES)

a consequence, most naval conflicts occurred within close proximity to fortified ports and involved fleets of galleys and port defenders.

hostilities made action difficult; the goal thus became to seize and control as many fortified ports as possible and to make quick naval forays into enemy territory.

THE GENOESE INTERESTS IN THE SILK TRADE, 1560–1616

Sicily was all the more important because in exchange for protecting Iberian domains, the *Superba's* merchants gained the right to export silk from southern Italy. Raw silk from Sicily and Calabria was the treasure trove of the Genoese from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries. Securing its shipping was of prime importance because the Genoese manufactured it in their city, thus yielding vast profits (one million scudi the most fertile years). For instance, Genoese admiral Don Carlo Centurione took his squadron of galleys to Palermo “in case the Turkish armada would come down to these seas.”¹¹⁶ The viceroy of Sicily, the Marquis of Rigliena, believed that Centurione was deserving of some privileges (such as tax exemption and fiefs) because his actions had enabled the viceroy “to govern with prudence and industry.”¹¹⁷ The Genoese used their naval hegemony to extend their influence in southern Italy. The privilege to export silk from the Kingdoms of Sicily and Naples worked in tandem with the need to find galleys to transport it.

Although current historiography argues that 1580 marks a period of truce between the Spanish and the Ottomans, the first quarter of the seventeenth century still witnessed periods of intense maritime conflict.¹¹⁸ During the Thirty Years' War, the Spanish relocated their troops to northern Europe, relying on their Genoese allies to protect the western Mediterranean. As a result, the viceroys of Sicily begged for Genoese galleys to join those of Malta to repel a massive Turkish attack on the port of Messina in 1618.¹¹⁹ In 1620, intelligence confirmed the assemblage of a Turkish armada.¹²⁰ The Spanish viceroy on Sicily then appealed directly to the Genoese. His aim was to gather Genoese and Spanish squadrons at Messina. Turkish galleys recurrently appeared in the strait of Messina, near the islands of Procida and

116. ASG, A.S. 2792, letter from Viceroy of Sicily Marquis of Rigliena to Palermo, September 14, 1609.

117. *Ibid.*

118. For strategy and military power, see Gabor Agóston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

119. ASG, A.S. 2792, letter from Viceroy of Sicily to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, June 29, 1618.

120. ASG, A.S. Litterarum 2788, N 141, letter from Viceroy of Sicily to Republic of Genoa, Naples, February 30, 1620.

Ischia (across from Naples).¹²¹ As a result, the Spanish viceroys in Sicily required that the bulk of the Spanish fleet (and its allies whenever possible) be stationed on the island.¹²² In case of Ottoman attacks, the Genoese galleys were the first ones called upon by the Spanish king.

The Genoese provided military guidance and leadership for the protection of the Habsburg territories in the Mediterranean. At times, Genoese galley captains remained in Messina assisting those of the Spanish king and the city of Florence.¹²³ They insisted on sole leadership for the protection of Sicily and frequently reminded the Spanish monarch of their expertise in the *arte marinesca*. The viceroy of Sicily, the Duke of Sessa, acknowledged their superiority: “I fear that you have always rescued us because of our clumsiness, but I guarantee that this time the galleys of His Majesty will not be in your way, and neither will mine.”¹²⁴ This can be rationalized in both military and mercantile terms. This military expertise contributed to their rising influence at the expense of other trading nations. Primacy over protection of Sicily entailed primacy over Sicilian trade. Surely the Genoese knew that the Spanish Crown could grant access to the lucrative Sicilian silk trade to its other satellite nations, the Florentines, the Catalans, or even the Venetians. It was their military power that let the Genoese claim both royal privileges (mainly tax exemption) and trade preeminence in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily.¹²⁵

121. ASG, A.S. 2636, letter from Consul Antonio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, July 10, 1615.

122. Rodríguez-Salgado, *The Changing Face of Empire*, 338–339; around 1580, the Spanish fleet counted 130 ships and 30,000 men. See Martin and Parker, *The Spanish Armada*, 135.

123. ASG, A.S. 2636, letter from Consul Antonio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, September 20, 1616.

124. ASG, A.S. Litterarum 2788, N 40, letter from Viceroy of Sicily Duke of Sessa to Republic of Genoa, Naples, April 20, 1579.

125. Tax exemption was an important component of Genoese trade in the kingdom as the customs of Naples usually taxed the silk that arrived in the capital from Sicily. See BNN, Sezione Brancaccio, Decreto circa regimen Regii patrimoni. De Gaeta Goffredus. Lectura super ritibus Camerae Summariae. Scaffale 1, palchetto C, vol 1, car. 36 v, “Alla Regia Dohana di Napoli per l’osservanza del preinserto decreto per lo pagare hanno da fare le sete vengono da messina al presente regno.” And also car. 39 r “Relattione di tutti dritti si exigono nella Regia Dohana Grande di Napoli et cosi del buon denaro della città con distinzione partitamente da chi si essigono in che modo in quali casi et cosi dell’osservanza et stile di essa dohana.”

Therefore, the question of increasing the number of state galleys was linked to the idea of encouraging silk production; in the 1550s, the aspirations of the silk manufacturers' guild in Genoa went hand in hand with armaments projects.¹²⁶ The need to import raw silk increased as Genoa shifted its manufacture to finished cloths, and rising imports generated income for the galleys that carried the raw material to the city from Sicily, income that could finance the production of more galleys.¹²⁷ Thus, the Genoese admirals in Sicily fought the Turks in exchange for securing silk exports. When intelligence spotted Ottoman galleys in the western waters, Genoese assistance was requested in Messina. Viceroy Marquis of Rigliena rationalized the expedition:

These generals would take advantage of the galleys that usually come to Messina for shipment of the silk to arrive on time to help us sweep the seas and make them safe. Aware of the danger, I ask that Franco de Marini, General of this Republic, help us. I beg Your Excellency [the doge] for assistance and promise that in no way will it affect the silk trade. The Republic can rest assured that silk export will be given the highest priority.¹²⁸

This was no random occurrence, and the Spanish Crown granted silk exports in exchange for Genoese service in the Levant. The Genoese shielded Sicily countless times from military attacks in exchange for exclusive rights over silk export. Throughout the period of the Ottoman-Habsburg struggle, the Genoese galleys loaded silk from Messina, dropped infantry on the mainland (Livorno, Naples, or Genoa), and rushed back to provide military assistance to the Kingdom of Sicily.¹²⁹ When Francisco de Castro, viceroy of the Kingdom of Sicily, guaranteed silk exports to any nation that would send galleys to support those of Spain in the Levant, only

126. See Thomas Allison Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in the Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559–1684* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 64–66.

127. *Ibid.*

128. ASG, A.S. 2792, letter from Viceroy of Sicily Marquis of Rigliena to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, August 3, 1608.

129. *Ibid.*, Viceroy of Sicily to Genoa, September 14, 1609; Viceroy of Sicily, Duke of Ossuna, to Genoa, September 9, 1609; Viceroy of Sicily, Nicolao Cigala, to Genoa, April 22, 1612; Viceroy of Sicily to Genoa, September 3, 1616; Viceroy of Sicily to Genoa, June 29, 1618; Letter from Duke of Albuquerque to Genoa, February 8, 1628.

the Genoese accepted.¹³⁰ Thus, although other Italian actors could potentially access the silk trade, only the Genoese provided vital military assistance against Christian and Muslim corsairs. As a result, Genoese commerce steadily grew.

Throughout two centuries of imperial alliance between Genoa and Spain, Genoese galleys recurrently opposed the Turkish attacks on southern Italy, providing much needed protection for the viceroys. The Genoese consuls often dispatched galleys traveling between Naples and Messina to the Levant to fight the enemy armada.¹³¹ The Iberian viceroys and kings sent personal dispatches asking for Genoese assistance during periods of impending Turkish assaults. The Genoese defense of Spanish possessions in the western Mediterranean compelled Philip II to express “his gratitude to the Doge for the Genoese willingness to always serve our Lord and Christianity.”¹³²

Renaissance imperialism came to life when Spaniards and Turks were exposed to each other’s assaults starting in the early sixteenth century. John Elliott explains that the Spaniards realized that “an empire was needed to meet the attack of an empire.”¹³³ This Mediterranean imperial system required temporary partnerships of the Renaissance empires with either other European powers or proxy forces such as corsairs. A complex system of alliances, both symbiotic and contentious, determined by financial and political interests initiated a conflict over the sea that lasted for more than two hundred years, a conflict in which southern Italy became crucial. The Genoese merchants provided essential support service to the Spanish Crown, not only in the form of loans and financial services (tax collection), but also – and this is less well known – in the form of direct military and naval support. In return, they reaped rich rewards. And at the same time, they protected their financial interests ruthlessly, clashing with other Mediterranean empires.

130. ASG, A.S. 2636, letter from Consul Antonio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, August 30, 1616.

131. ASG, A.S. 2636, letter from Consul Antonio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, August 2, 1615.

132. AGSim, Fondo Estado, Legajo 1051 (año 1561), folio 206, Dispatch from the King of Spain Philip II to the Republic of Genoa, Madrid, September 20, 1561.

133. See John Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 168.

Both the French and the Venetians, for instance, started nurturing vested interests in commercial alliance with the Ottoman Turks.¹³⁴ The French used the Mediterranean as a springboard for imperial activities in North Africa and the Atlantic, whereas the Venetians continued to be the most important European trading partner of the Ottomans into the seventeenth century.¹³⁵ The two European states' direct affront to the Republic of Genoa by way of overt political alliance or protracted naval warfare prolonged the clash among the Renaissance empires. This state of affairs in turn accentuated the precarious conduct of commercial exchanges. The Genoese ability to invest the proceeds of their commercial interests into naval armaments enabled them to, first, extend their financial portfolio and, second, to compete with both French and Venetian advances (territorial and commercial).

Only with the assistance of Genoese naval power was Spain able to defend the western Mediterranean from the onslaught of Ottoman imperialism. The Genoese represented a crucial naval and financial ally in Iberian imperial policies. The intervention of allies in the realpolitik of the Renaissance states inexorably changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean. For that reason, scholars suggest that the early modern Mediterranean remained bound to the dictates of ideology and governments.¹³⁶ In return, the Genoese secured increasing trade privileges. The growth in Muslim/Christian commercial contacts was therefore "a quest for commercial profits."¹³⁷

The increasing Ottoman-Habsburg conflict had deeper socioeconomic repercussions on the two kingdoms of southern Italy, a state of play

134. Junko Takeda, for instance, has shown the centrality of Marseille to Levantine trade and to the economic health of France during the early modern period. Her thesis synchronizes civic and absolutist concepts of commercial spirit. See *Between Crown and Commerce: Marseille and the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).

135. Eric Dursteler, "Commerce and Coexistence: Veneto-Ottoman Trade in the Early Modern Era," *Turcica*, 34 (2002), 105–133.

136. María José Rodríguez-Salgado, "Dust and Ashes: The History of Politics and War" in *Early Modern History and the Social Sciences: Testing the Limits of Braudel's Mediterranean*, 145–168.

137. Maxime Rodinson sees in commerce an engine for cultural interaction and comprehension. See *Europe and the Mystique of Islam* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 19–24, 40.

explored in the following chapters. The Genoese merchant empire's capacity to adapt financially and culturally enabled its symbiosis with the Spanish realms. In the Kingdom of Naples, the Genoese cultural adaptation was informed by the reality of war. They took part in social and physical changes to the city. For instance, widows and orphans found themselves under the care of guild members. Hospitals and charitable institutions were built to house the victims of the Ottoman wars. New religious rituals sought to unite fellow Christians in the face of Muslim attacks. And processions represented the universalism of Christianity. All these acts of social life expressed the underlying subjects of empires that clashed.

CHAPTER TWO

Genoese Emporium and Spanish Imperium in the Kingdom of Naples

The Genoese have in their hands the fortresses and the money, all the gabelles, income, and tributes. Really, the Genoese are working for Spain.

—TOMMASO CAMPANELLA, *Orationes politicae pro saeculo praesenti*.¹

One empire was lost to them [Genoese] in the east, so they built another in the west.

—FERNAND BRAUDEL, *The Wheels of Commerce*.²

Active in bridging Eastern and Western markets since the Crusades, the Genoese used commercial skills acquired in daily exchanges with foreign societies to insert themselves into the southern Italian market. Surveying the Genoese skills of *translatio imperii* on a Mediterranean scale, this chapter examines the Genoese ability to convert their commercial empire from east to west of the Mediterranean by extending both traditional and nontraditional financial services to the Spanish Crown. The Genoese were able to assist the Spaniards in ruling because they facilitated imperial management. They were willing to and capable of performing financial activities that were both traditional (banking and financing) and nontraditional (state office holding and feudal ownership). Genoese activities in Naples were central to both commercial and dynastic empires.

1. Tommaso Campanella, “Gli ultimi scritti politici di Tommaso Campanella,” *Rivista Storica Italiana*, Luigi Firpo ed., vol. 73 Anno LXXIII (1961), 770–792.

2. Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce*, 164.

Assessing nearly two hundred volumes of bankers' books covering a period from 1509 to 1650, this chapter explores how Genoese finances altered politics on the European continent and at the same time the social landscape of the Kingdom of Naples. The Genoese became landed proprietors and ascended to the ranks of the nobility but kept their mercantile endeavors. They controlled the Spanish fiscal system partly from Naples so as to enable the Spanish Crown to weather bankruptcies and maintain its imperial politics on the European continent.³ The Genoese acted as traders, bankers, financiers (the traditional activities) and state officers, and as feudal owners (the nontraditional activities).

The Spanish Crown granted the Genoese trade privileges, land concessions, and state appointments, which allowed them to maintain a wide reach over both their mercantile ventures and Spanish finances. They extended their economic dominance by farming the customs and communal taxes, indirect taxes, and gabelles (taxes levied on commodities) and by administering cities, fonduks, feudal holdings, land concessions, and offices. The Genoese truly worked for Spain, and for themselves too. The Spanish benefited from the alliance by securing dedicated servants to run their imperial domains. The Genoese managed southern Italy's resources in support of Spanish designs on the European continent. To profits they received from trade, the Genoese added profits from land, as they slowly infiltrated the local feudal system.

Active members of both the central and peripheral administrations of the state, the Genoese occupied such diverse roles as tax collectors, treasurers, fiscal lawyers, customs officers, gabelle collectors, and contractors (*appaltatori*). In return, the Spanish Crown provided markets and trade privileges throughout its dominions. The Genoese were civil servants of the Spanish Crown, offering their services as creditors, providing a financial link between the kingdom and Milan, Vienna, and Madrid. Borrowing from the Neapolitan humanist Giulio Cesare Capaccio, Aurelio Musi has argued that the foreign elite's presence in the kingdom calls for reevaluating the dichotomy between colony and

3. With regard to Naples's contribution to the Habsburg finances, see James D. Tracy, "War Finance and Fiscal Devolution in Charles V's Realms," in *The World of Emperor Charles V*, eds. Wim Blockmans and Nicolette Mout (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2004), 69–81.

patria.⁴ A *colony* implies an area of transience, a profit from resources, and the strong dependence of the colonized area on a foreign market. A *patria* implies the full participation of foreigners in the political and social life of the kingdom. In Naples and Sicily, the Genoese exhibited both colonial and patriotic expressions because both expressions were means to an end. The other successful elements of the Genoese trade diaspora included the intervention of their relatives in the local fairs; interaction with local merchants in the countryside; and service in public offices, especially financial, which gave them an accurate knowledge of the *Mezzogiorno*'s resources. Their clan-like organization enabled them to survive the Spanish Crown's periodic financial crises.⁵ Throughout the period from 1450 to 1650, a few Genoese families inserted themselves into the economic and commercial life of southern Italy. Their diasporic family networks explain how a relatively small number of merchants created a colonial and patriotic empire. The three sections of this chapter explore respectively the financial conciliation between the Spanish and the Genoese reinforced by the appearance of a new balance of power on the European continent; the traditional commercial and financial activities the Genoese performed for the Spanish in southern Italy; and, finally, the nontraditional endeavors the diasporic nation developed to serve the crown's dynastic empire and preserve its own commercial empire.

RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN CASTILIANS AND GENOESE

In Naples, Genoese privileges included trade agreements, tax exemptions, and fiefs. Since the Middle Ages, the Aragonese kings had granted fiscal remissions to the Genoese and to the other trading nations to enhance the prosperity of their realms. In 1503, the Kingdom of Naples saw a transition when the Spanish troops ably dealt with French invaders and placed the kingdom under the tutelage of a viceroy. Upon the death of Ferdinand of

4. Aurelio Musi, "Le élites internazionali a Napoli dal primo Cinquecento alla guerra dei trent'anni," in *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche in Europa (secoli XII–XVII)*, ed. Mario del Treppo (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1994), 133–161.

5. Musi has followed the vicissitudes of the de Mari family. See Aurelio Musi, *Mercanti Genovesi nel Regno di Napoli* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1996).

Aragon in 1516, the kingdom became part of the Spanish Habsburg domains, after which the Genoese solicited the crown to reconfirm their existing privileges in the region. Upon the arrival of each new viceroy, they went through lengthy negotiations that generally expanded the Genoese economic and political reach. This policy derived from a Spanish effort to control the Neapolitan barons and their rural strongholds, and to fragment the aristocracy's homogeneity.⁶ Indeed, the viceregal motto was *divide et impera*, a policy that proved effective to disempower the *baronaggio* in the countryside and the municipal leadership in the capital city. During the 1528 rebellion, local barons rose up against their Spanish overlords in a futile attempt to expel them from their lands. Many barons were either executed or banished from their possessions, and Charles V bestowed the vacant fiefs on trusted Spanish and Genoese families.⁷ As a result, about twenty Genoese families inserted themselves into the feudal order of the *Mezzogiorno* and consolidated their links with the Spanish Crown, including the Spinola, Ravaschiero, Serra, Centurione, and Grimaldi families. As feudatories, these Genoese obtained a fixed income for further investments. They also took full advantage of Spain's need for trusted political allies in its imperial administration. In short, the Spaniards were replacing a disloyal aristocratic class with a useful entrepreneurial clique.⁸ The political use of foreign elites in state building led Italian observers to conclude that the "citizens of this kingdom, rich or poor, dislike the Spanish. Everyone hates to see the administration of the kingdom in the hands of foreigners. The lower classes hate Spain because of the severity of their methods, and the

6. The Kingdom of Naples has been referred to as a "feudal monarchy." Aurelio Cernigliaro, *Sovranità e Feudo nel Regno di Napoli, 1505–1557*, 2 vols. (Naples: Jovene Editore, 1983), vol. 1, 271.

7. In 1528, Andrea Doria was given the lands and fief of the Prince of Caracciolo, Lord of Melfi, who had conspired against Charles V and allied himself with the (French) Lautrec expedition. See Raffaele Colapietra, "Genovesi in Apulia nel Cinque e Seicento," in *Archivio Storico Pugliese*, 35 (1982), 21–71.

8. The Spanish Crown demonstrated a savvy use of the aristocracy in similar ways to King Louis XIV, who used conspicuous consumption to ensure that the elite continue to gravitate around the French Crown. For more details on this process, see the classic study by Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982). For a more recent account, see Jeroen Duindam, *Myths of Power: Norbert Elias and the Early Modern European Court* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1994).

upper classes because they do not grant them honor and state functions.”⁹ Recent studies, however, suggest that the Spaniards were not so much hated as they were emulated.¹⁰ Spanish efficiency in handling social disturbances was partly enabled by savvy political use of the Genoese merchants, who received feudal privileges in return for their financial dexterity and loyalty to the Spanish Crown.

The internal politics of the Iberian rulers further cemented the alliance between Genoa and Spain. Foreigners were the central component of the Spanish state in the Kingdom of Naples. Since the Angevin period of the early fourteenth century, Genoese and Tuscans had acted as state officials. During the reign of Alfonso V of Aragón in the mid-fifteenth century, Genoese and Catalans continued to serve in the royal administration.¹¹ During the period of state formation in the early sixteenth century, Charles V eagerly utilized foreigners to build his political system.¹² The Genoese served as a stabilizing force and provided a counterbalance to the local barons. And their business skills assisted the kingdom’s financial management. By the mid-sixteenth century, the conversion of the Genoese into

9. “Non mancano ai regnicoli (i.e., in Naples), così grandi come piccoli, occasioni di mala affezione cogli spagnuoli, oltre la universale che in cadauno è di veder mal volentieri il dominio delle cose sue in poter di stranieri. I piccoli per le eccessive gravezze li odiano, e i grandi ne stanno mal contenti perciocchè nel godimento degli onori e carichi fanno poca parte.” Leonardo Donato, *Relazione di Spagna* (1573), in *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante el secolo decimosesto*, ed. E. Alberi (serie 1, vol. 6) (Florence: Sansoni, 1858), 415.

10. The local nobility often liked to associate with the Spanish sense of honor and imperial project of the sixteenth century. This is best expressed in the civil processions and religious festivities, which will be discussed in [Chapter 7](#). To follow the argument of the Neapolitan nobility’s pursuit for grandeur, see Gabriel Guarino, *Representing the King’s Splendor: Communication and Reception of Symbolic Forms of Power in Viceregal Naples* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010).

11. Mario del Treppo has studied the role of Catalan merchant-financiers in the Aragonese kingdom of Naples. See “Stranieri nel Regno di Napoli: Le élites finanziarie e la strutturazione dello spazio economico e politico,” in *Dentro la città: Stranieri e realtà urbane nell’Europa dei secoli XII–XVI*, ed. Gabriella Rossetti (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1999), 179–233. See also “Il re e il mercante: strumenti e processi di razionalizzazione dello Stato aragonese di Napoli,” in *Spazio Società e potere nell’Italia dei Comuni* (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1986), 255–304.

12. Charles V found stringent opposition in the Iberian Peninsula when he staffed the Council of Castile with Flemish advisors. He had to reform the council with Iberian grandees.

functionaries of the state was completed. They served as *asientistas* (providing short-term loans to the crown and local nobility at high interest), as controllers of the local fiscal system, and as members of the central and peripheral administrations. The Genoese stimulated the economy through their trade and their integration into the guild system. Finally, they became indispensable crown officers, providing their services to customs, treasury, legal proceedings, and gabelle collection.¹³

Commercial interaction in the Iberian Peninsula enhanced the rapprochement between Genoese and Spanish. The Genoese were the most important entrepreneurs financing Spanish expeditions to the New World, an appointment that rose with the opening of the *Casa de Contratación* in Seville in 1503.¹⁴ The Genoese were granted privileges and rights of exportation throughout the lands of the Spanish Crown: Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Sicily, Sardinia, the Netherlands, and Naples.¹⁵ Naples was the last addition to a mercantile empire that had been thriving from Antwerp and Lisbon since the fourteenth century. In 1528, when Charles V struck a deal with Andrea Doria, the admiral switched his allegiance from France to Spain, and the emperor promised to employ private Genoese funds instead of the northern European bankers Fugger and Welser for his finances.¹⁶ Though not a banker, Doria's decision to support Spain with his naval might contributed greatly to the finances of his compatriots and to the Spanish expansion project.

At the dawn of the sixteenth century, German and Italian bankers financed both the French and the Spanish sovereigns. Their reliance on

13. See ASN, series on *Arrendamenti*, *Dogane Antiche*, and *Precettori dei Diversi Tribunali*.

14. For the investment of Genoese capital in the Spanish New World, see Ruth Pike, *Enterprise and Adventure, The Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the New World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966).

15. In 1261, Alfonso X granted the Genoese privileges to trade throughout his domains. See Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, "Genovesi a Siviglia e nella sua regione: elementi di permanenza e di radicamento (secoli XIII–XVI)," in *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche*, 211–230.

16. For a history of the Genoese privileges across the Mediterranean, see Roberto López, *Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1938). Locally, Doria's change of allegiance was seen as a good omen because he had saved the kingdom from the French assault. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, IV B, vol. 10, *Aggiunta delli giornali di Messer Giuliano Passaro delle cose di Napoli fatte da me*. Notar Gregorio Russo per insino all'anno 1537, 153–155.

outside funds to fight wars has led scholars to consider both crowns as “puppets manipulated with golden thread.”¹⁷ The Genoese advanced loans to the Spanish Crown against anticipated receipts of American silver. The Habsburg emperor’s dependence on Genoese banks enabled the Ligurian Republic to become an active participant in European economic development. Most prominently, the Banco di San Giorgio – the republic’s financial institution – but also private bankers such as Centurione, Pallavicino, Spinola, and Grimaldi found themselves involved in the most important political and military decisions of the Spanish kings.¹⁸ By providing loans to Spain and collecting taxes from Naples, the Genoese controlled all aspects of Spanish economic life.¹⁹

If the Habsburgs were the formal hegemonic power in southern Italy, the Genoese were, through their financial power, their informal counterpart. They were much better adapted than the Spanish to the financial situation of the *Mezzogiorno*. Their control of the kingdom was informal and based on their financial and mercantile acumen. The Genoese worked as mediators between the feudal nobility, the other trading nations, the viceregal court, and crown officials in the provinces. Genoese domination over every sector of production and distribution was more pronounced than Castilian dominance. Over time, the Genoese proved their indispensability to their new Aragonese and Castilian overlords. The famous Neapolitan writer Giulio Cesare Capaccio noted this situation:

Foreigners enjoy so much freedom here that they have incited others to do the same [move to this kingdom]. In fact, from all places they come and freely express their opinion about the Prince and magistrates and make claims as if they were citizens. As such, they pretend to insert themselves into public offices, and they are right to do so because here

17. Fritz Hartung and Roland Mousnier, “Quelques problèmes concernant la monarchie absolue,” in *Relazioni al X congresso internazionale di scienze storiche*, vol. 4 (Rome: Sansoni, 1955), 1–55.

18. Charles Verlinden, “Italian Influence on Spanish Economy and Colonization during the Reign of Ferdinand the Catholic,” in *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization: Eleven Essays with an Introduction*, ed. Charles Verlinden, trans. by Yvonne Freccero (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 113–131.

19. For an early study, see Roberto López, “Il predominio economico dei Genovesi nella monarchia spagnola,” in *Giornale storico e letterario della Liguria* (1936), 6–22.

people are so courteous that they not only accept them but also allow them to participate in much of the state administration.²⁰

The Genoese reconverted the funds they accumulated as bankers, merchants, and creditors of the crown into fiefdoms in rich provinces. By doing so, they controlled the economic environment of southern Italy.²¹ Acting as traders, merchant bankers, and maritime agents, they lived in prominent coastal and interior cities, importing finished products and exporting raw materials and foodstuffs. For instance, the Genoese possessed fiefs that they enjoyed as officers of the crown in Calabria. Ligurian individuals also resided on the Tyrrhenian side in Gaeta, Procida, Salerno and on the Adriatic side in Apulia, in particular Barletta, as well as in the hinterlands of Calabria. R. Burr Litchfield states that during the early modern era, “the number of titles and fiefs granted to aspiring families increased, especially in the Habsburg possessions in Italy . . . where fiscal need made the infeudation and sale of previously free villages a tempting source of revenue.”²² In the Kingdom of Naples, the number of barons with titles grew from 118 in 1590 to 341 in 1640 and 434 in 1675.

The Genoese incorporation into southern Italy invites reflection on the relationship between diasporic communities and their host society. The Genoese fulfilled a role their host community could not. They were highly adaptable because they were both traders and nobles. They were merchant-aristocrats who engaged in trading activities. The Genoese integration in Calabria demonstrates their ability to dominate the Kingdom of Naples’s

20. “Anzi è tanta la libertà, che vi si gode, che han dato animo agli altri forastieri di volerla godere, poiché non tantosto da diversi lochi giungono qua, che liberamente favellano del Principe che governa, dei magistrati che ministrano giustizia, et vogliono il pan bianco grosso a vil mercato, procurano di prevalersi, quanto si prevagliano i Cittadini, e s’ingeriscono negli ufficii pubblici, e pretendono tutto ciò che potesse pretendere un antico cittadino. E dall’altra parte fan bene, perché ritrovano il popolo così cortese, che li accettano, e li chiamano ad haver parte in molte amministrazioni.” Giulio Cesare Capaccio, “Napoli descritta ne’ principii del secolo XVII,” in *Archivio per le Province Napoletane* (1882), 534.

21. Giovanni Muto, “Cittadini e ‘forestieri’ nel regno di Napoli: note sulla presenza genovese nella capitale tra Cinque e Seicento,” in *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche*, 163–178.

22. See R. Burr Litchfield, “The Social World: Cohesion, Conflict, and the City,” in *Early Modern Italy: 1550–1796*, ed. John A. Marino (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 87–103.

economy. They not only insinuated themselves into local commerce, but also created a real Genoese feudal dynasty in the region.²³ Most of them were in fact part of Genoa's oldest landed aristocracy. As they owned titles and fiefs, the Genoese sometimes intermarried with the local nobility. Even though some Genoese family members opted to return to Genoa, by the mid-sixteenth century, the vast majority chose to become feudal owners. Their ascendancy therefore did not fade with the waning of the Spanish Empire as scholars have suggested. The Genoese displayed both colonial and patriotic features: they extracted resources destined for export, but they also participated in the social life of southern Italy.

Examining the most prominent families over a period of two hundred years, all of whom held noble titles, we can appreciate not only the Genoese network in southern Italy, but also their entrenchment in Spanish politics.²⁴ These included the Adorno, Cattaneo, Centurione, Cigala, De Mari, Doria, Gentile, Giustiniano, Grillo, Grimaldi, Imperiale, Lercaro, Lomellino, Olgiato, Pallavicino, Ravaschiero, Sauli, Serra, Spinola, and Squarciafico families.²⁵ All acquired titles and represented a microcosm of the Genoese investment in Spanish imperial pursuits. For instance, the

23. For a local study of the Genoese integration in the Kingdom of Naples, see Raffaele Colapietra, "Genovesi in Calabria nel Cinque e Seicento" in *Rivista Storica Calabrese*, 2 (1981), 15–89.

24. For a systemic genealogical tree of some of the Genoese families inscribed in the nobility, see ASG, MS. 520 (Indice delle Famiglie) by Ganduccio descrittore di Nobili; for a detailed family ancestry, see ASG, MS. 522 to 524 (libro d'oro delle famiglie nobile).

25. The Centurione arrived from the Riviera di Levante (east of Genoa) in 1520 and were inscribed in the nobility in 1528 (MS 520). Since the year 1444, the Centurione family had worked as officers for the *Illustrissimo Officio di San Giorgio*. See ASG, Banco di San Giorgio n.6145, Foliatium Multiplici Mco Battista Centurione (1524–1780). The Lomellino family was part of the old nobility and was originally from Lombardy, a village called Lumella near Pavia. They were from the family of the Counts Palatine of the Rhine. See ASG, M.S. 520 Ganduccio: Indice delle famiglie. The (de) Mari were an old Genoese family. Their name comes from Ademaro, chaplain of Emperor Charlemagne, who passing through Genoa in the year 795 liberated the city from the Lombards. The emperor bestowed the city on Ademaro, his then baron, who ruled the city as a count. See ASG, M.S. 520 Ganduccio. The Ravaschiero were part of the old Genoese nobility. They traced their origins to the Dukes of Bavaria, like the Fieschi, and were the descendants of the counts of Lavagna. These Lavagna counts were of German origin and came to Genoa in 1260. See ASG, M.S. 520 Ganduccio. The family became important feudal owners in the Kingdom of Naples as Princes of Satriano. See

Adorno family was a noble family that came to Naples in 1528. Giulano Adorno had served under Charles V and married one of Viceroy Don Toledo's daughters. Gabriele Adorno was general of the Galleys of Naples.²⁶ The Giudice family from Genoa was accepted into the *Seggio Capuana* (one of Naples's city districts), a rare privilege. Venazzo became prince of Castellamare and was a member of the Council of Italy.²⁷ The Grimaldi family was a noble house from Genoa. In 1315, Roberto was lord of Policastro. In 1532, Ansaldo served as ambassador to Carlo V, whereas Niccolò was made Duke of Eboli and Prince of Salerno.²⁸ The Grillo, a noble house from Genoa, had established itself in Salerno. Marc'Antonio was made a grandee of Spain; Francesco bought the Terra di Giuliano as a fief.²⁹ The Mari family was integrated into the *Seggio di Porto* (another city district). Carlo de Mari was made Marquis of Assignano, and his son, the Prince of Acquaviva, joined the Consiglio Collaterale and owned the lands of Gioja and Castellaneta.³⁰ Charles V declared Tomaso de Marini Duke of Terranova for his military merits. His brother Stephano was Marquis of Gensano.³¹ Carlo Pallavicino was Duke of Castro, whereas his brother was a general of the seas of the New World.³²

Both aristocratic and common families aimed to get entrenched in the social life of southern Italy. The great *alberghi* (noble clan) families were also included with many more Genoese families of lesser stature, including the Calvo, Cattaneo, De Goano, Italiani, Iudice, Marini, Maruffo, Pinelli, and

ASG, Collezione Lagomarsino (Lettere R) M.S. 461. The Spinola were old Genoese noble citizens of German origins, from the Duchy of Cleves and from Milan (from the Visconte family or Belovesconte). The Vesconte were descended from the Counts of Angeza and came to live in Genoa around the year 1102. They derived their name from the fact that the two brothers Spinola, Guido and Oberto, used to entertain their guests with great honor. The hosts "uncorked" many different types of wine (uncork = *spinolare*). See ASG, Collezione Longhi (Lettere S) M.S. 520.

26. See Biagio Aldimari, *Memorie storiche di diverse famiglie nobili così napoletane come forastiere, così vive come spente con le loro arme: e con un trattato dell'arme in generale: divise in tre libri* (Naples: Stamperia di Giacomo Raillard, 1691), 185.

27. *Ibid.*, 316.

28. *Ibid.*, 322–328.

29. *Ibid.*, 638–639.

30. *Ibid.*, 649.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*, 675.

Usodimare families.³³ Families generally practiced endogamy for males but condoned exogamy for the females, as familial alliances permitted a better integration into the Neapolitan scene.³⁴ The matrimonial strategies all aimed at preserving their network of solidarity and extending control over their host community. Although endogamy was practiced during the fifteenth century, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Genoese intermarried with the local nobility, acquired fiefs, and gained Neapolitan citizenship.³⁵ Investments in the kingdom facilitated Genoese conversion into feudal owners, so that they slowly joined the local Neapolitan feudal barons in the landed aristocracy. These social networks enabled them to relocate their commercial energy into southern Italy and pursue trade and banking for the benefit of Spain and themselves.

SYMBIOTIC IMPERIALISM: TRADITIONAL GENOESE ACTIVITIES EAST TO WEST

The Genoese concentrated on economic and commercial matters such as credit and banking and grain and silk; their activities in the Kingdom of Naples were less associated with the offices of justice, occupied by local barons. By asserting themselves as the greatest grain merchants, the Genoese connected the mercantile empire to the crown's imperial project on the European continent. The Genoese had exported grain from Sicily and the

33. The Maruffo hailed from La Spezia and were part of the old nobility of Genoa where they arrived in 1140. See ASG, M.S. 485 Longhi Collezione (Lettere M) famiglia Maruffo. The Usodimare family belonged to the oldest Genoese nobility and was originally from Athens. They came to Genoa in 1101. See ASG, M.S. 520 Ganduccio. The Italiani family was from the city's old nobility and its origins were in Liguria. They came to live to Genoa in 1300. See ASG, Collezione Longhi (Lettere I) M.S. 520.

34. Aurelio Musi has studied the de Mari family in the kingdom. See *Mercanti Genovesi nel Regno di Napoli* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1996), 63.

35. In her study of Genoese merchants in Seville, Ruth Pike declared that the Genoese engaged in cross-cultural trade with the New World, often intermarried, and joined the local aristocracy so as to remain within the Spanish sphere of commercial activities. See *Enterprise and Adventurers*. Romano Canosa has analyzed the relationship between Genoese bankers and the Spanish Crown and found that in cities such as Madrid, for instance, endogamy was predominant. See *Banchieri Genovesi e Sovrani Spagnoli tra Cinquecento e Seicento* (Rome: Sapere, 2000).

Mezzogiorno since the twelfth century.³⁶ From the last quarter of the fifteenth century, the Spanish kings had supported Genoese endeavors with countless privileges, clearly favoring them over their Italian subjects. As a result, virtually all Genoese residents in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily were involved in the exportation of grain, as contractors, customs officers, traders, or mariners. The Levant often supplied Sicily with grain by way of the Genoese.³⁷ Apulia sent grain to Naples and Ancona; Sicily supplied Spain and Rome.³⁸ North African grain was shipped to Valencia, Cádiz, and Alicante; that from Provence was earmarked for Genoa.³⁹ Islands occupied a strategic role in the Mediterranean food chain. Chios served as the wheat and alum anchor in the eastern Mediterranean, whereas Sicily was the grain anchor of the western Mediterranean. By the mid-sixteenth century, the kingdom produced about 105 million pounds of grain a year, thus contributing to increasing Genoese exports.⁴⁰ Calabria, Apulia, and Sicily were the most appealing provinces of the kingdom for such trade. Although the Iberian possessions were the principal destination of the Genoese galleys, these three regions frequently supplied the city of Naples too. Grain would remain a strategic commodity throughout the early modern era. Its export became a prominent bone of contention among European trading nations.⁴¹ The Spanish

36. Ligurian merchants supplied Genoa with grain and wheat from the Levant through their networks in Caffa and Romania. See Gian Giacomo Musso, *Navigazione e Commercio Genovese con il Levante nei Documenti dell'Archivio di Stato di Genova (XIV–XV)*, vol. 84 (Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, 1975).

37. When Messina was starving, only the Genoese ships coming from the Levant provided grain to the city. See ASG, A.S. 2636 letter from Consul Cornelio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, November 2, 1621.

38. Although the island was deprived of its own grain, the Spanish viceroys often opted to ship grain from Sicily to feed the troops in the ships that protected the “western sea.” Spain and Rome also had prevalence over Naples, Sardinia, and Genoa. See ASG, A.S. Litterarum 2328 Lettere Ministri Napoli (1537–1708), N 655, letter from Niccolò Fiesco to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, January 25, 1570.

39. Edoardo Grendi, *La repubblica aristocratica dei Genovesi: Politica, carità e commercio fra Cinque e Seicento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987), 200.

40. Giuseppe Coniglio, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 123–124.

41. In 1605, Damiano Ravaschiero gave 150,000 tomoli of grain to the city of Naples; Nicola and Agostino Lomellino were granted the right to export grain in exchange for the services rendered with their galleys (A.G.Sim, Secretarías Provinciales, legajo 2,

required grain to feed their European possessions and their soldiers stationed throughout their realms in Spain, Sicily, Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

Grain and silk were the most lucrative trading goods in southern Italy. Since Roman times, silk had always been a luxury commodity. Its manufacture had originally centered in the eastern Mediterranean, arriving in southern Italy by the eleventh century.⁴² Although the cities of Lucca and later on Bologna were centers of silk manufacture, the raw silk originated from Calabria, Apulia, and Sicily. By the mid-sixteenth century, Calabria produced 400,000 pounds of silk per year, a number that doubled by the last quarter of the century.⁴³ Silk was profitable because there were many steps between production and consumption, but few manufacturing centers existed in the kingdoms of Sicily and Naples because the profits resulting from the export of raw silk exceeded those of manufactured products. The Genoese employed their exportation privileges to disseminate raw silk throughout the European continent via the European fairs, and not directly as they did with grain.⁴⁴ The Genoese exploited the resources of the countryside, providing local people with temporary work and finished products. Prominent Genoese silk exporters included Germano Ravaschiero, Cosmo Pinelli, Francesco Lomellino, Benedetto de Mari, Giacomo Spinola, Agostino Pallavicino, Stefano Cattaneo, and Ansaldo Sauli.

Steep trade profits underpinned Genoese credit operations. The Genoese soon advanced loans to prelates, noblemen, rulers, and the court. The capital came from a series of complex investments, primarily in industrial raw materials, half-finished and finished products, and long-distance trade.⁴⁵ The Genoese used the knowledge acquired in their old

folio 43, anno 1568). The competition was intense. A Tuscan merchant, Andrea Sbarra asked for 4,900 ducats of gold from the court for the 140,000 tomoli of grain his firm had shipped to Naples from Sicily (A.G.Sim, *Secretarías Provinciales*, libro 483, folio 55, December 5, 1562).

42. Patricia Skinner maintains that Calabrian monks exchanged silk for foodstuffs. See "Material Life," in *Italy in the Central Middle Ages*, ed. David Abulafia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 147–160.

43. Francesco Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 154–156.

44. The [next chapter](#) examines the role of the Genoese in the silk industry at length.

45. David Jacoby, "The Migration of Merchants and Craftsmen: A Mediterranean Perspective (12th–15th century)" In *Trade, Commodities and Shipping in the Medieval Mediterranean*, ed. David Jacoby (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), 533–560.

merchant-banking companies operating in the Levant to reconvert from trade to more secure banking activities in the kingdom. The sixteenth-century transition from traders to bankers coincides with the acquisition of the Kingdom of Naples by the Habsburg Crown. The very first bank in the Kingdom of Naples was opened in 1509 by the Genoese Germano Ravaschiero.⁴⁶ As Iberia consolidated its western Mediterranean possessions, the Genoese afforded financial backing for Spain's Old (Portugal, Netherlands, North Africa) and New World (Mexico, Philippines, Peru) campaigns, while Spain supplied commercial markets to distribute Genoese goods acquired in the Kingdom of Naples.

The mechanisms of symbiotic imperialism are best illustrated in banking operations. The Genoese provided short-term loans to the crown at high interest rates (the so-called *asientos*) to pursue its dreams of a universal monarchy. The Genoese in return gained privileges that supported their dreams of emerging as the prime Mediterranean trading nation. Genoese and Iberians were skilled in the operations of *cambium et recambium* (change and exchange) to facilitate their transactions: when granting a credit to the king, the Genoese avoided the transfer of funds or the exchange of currencies. For instance, when Charles V required funds in Flanders, Genoese bankers were reimbursed in Naples, Castile, Genoa, or Bruges according to the daily gold standard. Exchange rates of course always carried terms advantageous to the Genoese. They then transferred the capital invested in their banks to other sectors. These undertakings contributed to the proliferation of banks in the kingdom, headed by famous merchants, contractors, and treasurers. Bankers rarely went bankrupt because the diversification of their business activities protected them and because they worked in partnership with local agents across Europe (whom they called financial "consorts" and "companions").⁴⁷ The Genoese were thus able to

46. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 1 (1509) Ravaschiero.

47. The Genoese often used the capital of merchants of average means to loan money to the monarchs. For instance, in 1599, they loaned the monarch, who was in Flanders, 1.5 million scudi in fifty-seven installments. The company was made up of Marco Antonio Iudice, Cosme Massi, and Alessandro De Iunta and included "other participants of his, plus consorts and companions" who were not in the contract. See AGSim, Secretarías Provinciales, libro 523, folio 52–56, July 29, 1600. In exchange for his numerous loans to the monarch in Flanders, Marco Antonio Iudice, an important financier, acquired the high office of Master of the Posts in Naples, which he could pass on to his son Nicolao Iudice.

surmount even the most serious financial crises. The most important crises occurred when the crown itself suspended reimbursement in 1575, in 1607, and again in 1627.

The crown's relentless economic necessity to maintain its empire converged with the Genoese need for capital to reinvest in commercial enterprises. Most of the Spanish Crown's bankers were Genoese: they included the Centurione, De Mari, Doria, Gentile, Grillo, Grimaldi, Imperiale, Lercaro, Lomellino, Olgiato, Pallavicino, Ravaschiero, Serra, and Spinola families. My survey of bankers' records from 1509 to 1636 indicates that for the Kingdom of Naples, sixteen out of forty-five banks were Genoese.⁴⁸ [Table 2.1](#) shows that during the first period from 1509 to 1571, nearly all bankers were Genoese.⁴⁹ During the second period, from 1572 to 1636, Genoese were proportionately less dominant, but their absolute numbers grew. As the political needs of the Spanish Crown hinged increasingly on Genoese finances, the number of banks in the kingdom mushroomed. The year 1571 undoubtedly marked a watershed in the economics of both the

Number of banks	1509 to 1571	1572 to 1636	Total	Growth
Genoese	7	12	19	+ 5
Catalans	2	8	10	+ 6
Florentines	2	5	7	+ 3
Neapolitans	1	2	3	+ 1

Source: This table is based on ASN, Sezione Amministrazione n.109, Banchieri Antichi e Banchi Inventario.

TABLE 2.1. Bankers and their growth in the Kingdom of Naples from 1509 to 1636

48. At the ASN, there are 195 volumes under the title Banchieri Antichi. I attempted a systematic inquiry so as to recreate the financial environment in which the Genoese evolved.

49. From 1572 to 1636, Catalans and Florentines also started to invest in banks. The last period of the individual Neapolitan banking system ranges from 1671 to 1862 (when all the banks in the kingdom were fused into the Banco di Napoli). The new banking system aimed at providing loans at no interest. Some of them were called Banco della Pietà, dello Spirito Santo, dei Poveri, del Popolo, delle Opere Pie. [Chapter 8](#) discusses this particular theme.

Spanish and the Genoese. Lepanto had taken a toll on Spanish finances and created a space for financial investors in Naples.

The Genoese involved themselves in the majority of the kingdom's money transactions. They speculated the most in farming state revenues, with the Spaniards providing preferential treatment because the Genoese offered greater security. The Genoese willingness to provide endless credit allowed them to fill an economic gap in the kingdom: Genoese loans financed local transactions involving foodstuffs, reimbursements for letters of change, and services rendered among tradesmen during the fairs. The Genoese also functioned as a source of credit for the aristocracy, the Spanish court in Naples, and the Catholic Church. They provided advances for the military, income taxes, and loans to officials.⁵⁰ Loans to the Neapolitan court generated profits that the Genoese converted into short-term loans for the Spanish Crown.⁵¹ The Genoese thrived on intermediate banking and financing functions, linking agricultural producers to their mercantile system and diffusing goods through the fairs of Europe.

The Habsburgs benefited from the profits generated in the Kingdom of Naples to face their European enemies (notably in England, the Netherlands, and Germany), while the Genoese obtained the financial resources necessary to maintain their mercantile empire, threatened by French and Venetian advance in Mediterranean trade. On the European continent, the Genoese represented the most financially solvent nation because of their extensive trade in grain, silk, gunpowder, wine, oil, and slaves.⁵² In exchange, they imported the cloth, metal, tin, iron, cotton, wax, aromas, dyes, crystals, gold, silver, and precious stones required by the kingdom. The Genoese banker-traders used financial connections to the Spanish Crown to secure trade between the Kingdom of Naples and the rest of the Mediterranean. In his critique of the Kingdom of Naples, Tommaso Campanella commented:

50. All of this is based on ASN, *Banchieri Antichi's* 195 volumes.

51. In his analysis of the rapport between the Spanish state and private finances in the Kingdom of Naples, Antonio Calabria has noted that in the mid-sixteenth century, the Genoese provided 31 percent of the loans to the Neapolitan state. See Antonio Calabria, *The Cost of Empire: The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Time of Spanish Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

52. Viceroy Don Afán de Ribera reported that the Genoese Andrea de Mari, Antonio Casella, and Domenico Pallavicino possessed the right to the oil from Bari and Capitanata. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, IV B, vol. 3 car 39 r.

Genoa upholds the monarchy of Spain and Austria. First, the Genoese provide loans for any enterprise. And if Genoa does not want to give the money, it is taken by force from its banks and investments, and fiefs are given in return, and then they [Genoese] are betrayed again. Second, they give unity to the body of a monarchy that has many limbs but no torso.⁵³

Campanella knew that the crown granted lands and titles in exchange for financial services, but what he overlooked was that the partnership drove the Genoese into nontraditional financial activities as well, particularly worthy of exploration because they allowed the Genoese to diversify their portfolio and hence pursue continuous support from the Spanish Crown.

SYMBIOTIC IMPERIALISM: NONTRADITIONAL GENOESE ACTIVITIES

The Genoese nation developed both traditional occupations that supported their commerce and nontraditional pursuits that inserted them into the Italian south. Because of their mercantile baggage, they fashioned a class we can call “the new bourgeoisie” rather than integrating into the old feudal aristocracy. Their aspirations were those of a merchant class that exercised its skills to generate wealth. Because the Castilian monarchs chose to continue investing in Spanish imperial ventures overseas, they in turn employed the Genoese community as officers of the *fonduks*, masters of ports, grain officers, and *gabelle* collectors. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Genoese began to acquire economic and commercial offices, which strengthened their alliance with Spain. Although Fernand Braudel called the sixteenth century “the Genoese century,” it can easily be argued that it was also a Spanish century. The Spanish Crown’s revenues and the financial dexterity needed to manage an empire on the European continent and in the New World compelled the Genoese to perform activities foreign to their traditional background to generate revenues. They discharged

53. “Genua è quella che sostiene la monarchia di Spagna e d’Austriachi, primo, con denari ch’in ogni bisogno li socorre e impresta e, se non vuol darli, si li pigliasi a forza accumulati nei banchi e cambi, e vi vende li vassalli per ricompensa, e poi di nuovo vi gabba; secondo, col dar unità al corpo di questa monarchia, ch’ha molte membra senza il busto.” Tommaso Campanella, *Orationes politicae pro saeculo*.

functions such as treasurers of provinces, masters of the mint, tax collectors, fiscal lawyers and jurists,⁵⁴ custom officers, procurators, regents, contractors (*appaltatori*), and *grassieri* of the *annona* (prefects for Naples's grain provision).⁵⁵ To prevent disputes among locals, the viceroys nominated foreigners to be in charge of providing grain to the city of Naples. Gian Francesco Ravaschiero (1548), Gian Battista Lomellino (1551), and Gian Battista Ravaschiero (1555) served as furnishers of the *annona*. The Genoese also served in other official functions. From 1559 to 1560, for instance, Gian Battista Spinola was the regent of Calabria Ultra; from 1564 to 1576, Turino Ravaschiero assumed that function. The Spanish state highly prized their expertise and, in return, the Genoese acquired power, prestige, and state revenues. Simultaneously, the influx of funds invigorated the Genoese mercantile empire. With capable financiers holding the reins of government in the capital city and the countryside, the king of Spain could maintain greater control over the Kingdom of Naples's feudal nobility and properly manage his royal estates.

The Genoese held numerous state appointments in the kingdom's most critical provinces. For example, Cristofaro Grimaldo became treasurer of the Terra di Lavoro and of the Contado di Molise from 1551 to 1574, an office he was to regain in 1587 and 1593. Giovan Antonio Grimaldi assumed the same function from 1578 to 1581.⁵⁶ Other Genoese continually held the office of treasurer of various provinces.⁵⁷ In the mid-sixteenth century, Genoese bankers served concurrently as treasurers and regents of

54. In 1595, Viceroy Enrico Guzman, Count of Olivares, had named a famous Genoese jurist, Ludovico Acerbo, as Reggente of the Vicaria tribunal because of his ability to resolve grave major and minor crimes. See Domenico Parrino, *Teatro Eroico e politico de' governi de' vicere del Regno di Napoli dal tempo del re Ferdinando il Cattolico fin'all'anno 1683. Regnando la fel. mem. di Carlo Secondo. Nel quale si narrano i fatti piu illustri, e singolari, accaduti nella citta, e Regno di Napoli nel corsodi due secoli* (Naples: Nuova Stampa del Parrino e del Mutii, 1692), 376.

55. Giuseppe Coniglio, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 130–133. The *annona*, licensed bakers, supervised the flow of grains and other food items into the city and regulated retail trade. Tommaso Astarita argues that the establishment of the *annona* in 1496 reflected the challenges posed by the quickly increasing population of the city as well as the more prominent role gained by its elites. See *Between Salt Water and Holy Water: A History of Southern Italy* (New York: Norton & Co., 2005), 83.

56. ASN, Tesorieri e percettori n.507, vol. 22 to 54 (1551–1574), vol. 71 to 81 (1578–1581).

57. ASN, Tesorieri e percettori n.509, vol. 480 to 482 (1559–60), vol. 485 to 501 (1564–76).

the Terra d'Otranto, Terra di Bari, Capitanata, Calabria Citra, and Calabria Ultra.⁵⁸ As the most eastern regions of the kingdom, these provinces needed to be well managed for military purposes, as they were constantly threatened by Turkish attacks from the Adriatic. In 1559, the viceroy nominated Vincenzo de Mari fiscal procurator of the kingdom. A few years before, Viceroy Don Pedro de Toledo, a close associate of the emperor, had appointed Giovan Battista Ravaschiero the master of the mint of Naples. Pietro Francesco Ravaschiero had the same charge in 1590. Antonio Belmosto was treasurer of Calabria Citra in 1579. Roberto Squarciafico was treasurer of the Terra d'Otranto in 1556, a task his kin Umberto Squarciafico took over at the end of the year. Augustino de Mari was treasurer of the Terra di Bari from 1558 to 1559. From 1560 to 1565, Giovan Battista Centurioni became the treasurer of Terra di Bari. Domenico Grimaldi was fiscal procurator of the Royal Audience of Principato Citra in 1636. That same year, Giovanbattista de Mari was fiscal lawyer of the Regia Udienza of Principato Citra, at Melfi and Polla. Thus, the Genoese transcended their roles of crown financiers to encompass those of officers of the Spanish state. The practice of appointing the Genoese to state offices lasted until the mid-eighteenth century.

The Genoese's most lucrative state office was the appointment to the *arrendamento*, or the collection of indirect taxes on foodstuffs. There were five types of *arrendamenti*: on customs or tolls (for the introduction of merchandise into the kingdom), on the *fonduks*, on special custom taxes (or *gabelles*), and on the *ius prohibendi* or a right granted by the sovereign to a privileged citizen to sell a particular product introduced into or produced in the kingdom. Most of the Genoese were *arrendatori* or *appaltatori* (contractors) in the areas that affected them the most, including the exportation of silk, oil, cloth, wine, saffron, iron, and salt. These taxes produced revenue that the Genoese booked as extra income.

The Genoese hand reached throughout the Kingdom of Naples in the early modern era. The Aragonese had already started using Genoese as contractors. In 1499, for instance, the Genoese Francesco Rinaldo and Francesco Spinola became the contractors supplying salt to Naples.⁵⁹ Salt

58. ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria, Significatorie della Regia Camera N 301 I, vol. 301 I, fascicolo 1 (1537–1559); fascicolo 5 (1557).

59. ASN, Arrendamenti 1288 Rinaldo-Spinola (1499).

was a significant item because it enabled producers to preserve the food they sold to the Genoese and other merchants who shipped their cargoes to the rest of Europe. The fiscal significance of the salt contractor was that the Genoese held a monopoly on all foodstuff exports. For three centuries, Naples and Calabria became two areas most frequented by the Genoese contractors. Customs and *fonduk* contracting in Naples and Calabria promised the most income,⁶⁰ and the two items for which the Genoese coveted the office of contractor were salt and silk. The Genoese worked as contractors of the salt produced mainly around Naples and the Terra d'Otranto.⁶¹ As for silk, Calabria was evidently the preferred region.⁶² The Ravaschiero family held the position of silk contractor (collecting duties on silk exports) throughout the last quarter of the sixteenth century.⁶³ The position of contractor could be held for one important commodity and then switched to another item in subsequent years.⁶⁴ Pier Francesco Ravaschiero and Nicola Grillo were prominent examples.

60. ASG, M.S. 484 Collezione Longhi (Letter L) famiglia Lercaro; ASN, Arrendamenti n.552 Francesco Antonio Pallavicino (1637).

61. ASN, Arrendamenti n.1290, Francesco Spinola (1501); n.1291, Lomellino; ASN, Arrendamenti n.1315 Nicola Grillo (1565–66); n.1648 and 1683, Spinola.

62. ASN, Regia camera della sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria n.314, Significatoria 285 I fascicolo, n. 10.

63. ASN, Arrendamenti n.1716 Ravaschiero; n.1766 Ravaschiero; n.1787 Ravaschiero; n.1890 Doria, Spinola, Lercaro; n.1906 Doria, Spinola, Lercaro; n.1907 Doria, Spinola, Lercaro; n.1911 Doria, Spinola, Lercaro. The *arrendamento* on the silk of Calabria was held by Ambrosio Lomellino in 1578, by Gianbattista Spinola in 1577, by Pietro Francesco Ravaschiero in 1587 and 1605, by Francesco Doria and Antonio Spinola and Carlo Doria from 1623 to 1627. See ASN, Arrendamenti n.1689 Geronimo Mamello e Ambrosio Lomellino (1578); n.1687 G.B. Spinola (1577); n.1616 Pietro francesco Ravaschiero (1587); n.1766 Pier Francesco Ravaschiero (1605); n.1890 Francesco Doria, Antonio Spinola, and Carlo Lercaro (1623–24); n.1906–07 F. Doria, A. Spinola, and C. Lercaro (1626–27). The Ravaschiero family held the position of *arrendatore* of silk throughout the last quarter of the sixteenth century as did the Doria, Spinola, and Lercaro families. It was to remain in Genoese hands until the seventeenth century. ASN, Arrendamenti n.1689 Geronimo Mamello e Ambrosio Lomellino (1578); n.1687 G.B. Spinola (1577); n.1616 Pietro Francesco Ravaschiero (1587); n.1766 Pier Francesco Ravaschiero (1605); n.1890 Francesco Doria, Antonio Spinola, and Carlo Lercaro (1623–24); n.1906–07 F. Doria, A. Spinola, and C. Lercaro (1626–27).

64. ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria Significatorie della Regia Camera N 301 I, Vol. 301 I, fascicolo 4 (1541–63).

Grillo served as the contractor for salt before switching to iron.⁶⁵ Ravaschiero began his career as iron contractor before moving to silk inspector. His expertise earned him appointment as provincial treasurer. Grillo and Ravaschiero illustrate Spanish determination to maximize profits and control. The system of office rotation prevented venality. The viceroys employed Genoese contractors to avoid corruption and to maximize productivity.⁶⁶ Relying on Genoese dexterity, for instance, the viceroy nominated Batta Spinola as governor of the *arrendamento* on silk and saffron for the entire kingdom from 1576 to 1578,⁶⁷ and he made Francesco Antonio Pallavicino contractor of all the fonduks of Calabria in 1637.⁶⁸

Numerous Genoese served in both financial offices and *arrendamenti*, indicating Genoese commitment to the commercial affairs of the kingdom, and a high degree of Spanish trust in their expertise. A system of office rotation guaranteed local Spanish jurisdiction over Genoese activities, at the same time diversifying Genoese markets and commercial interests. To summarize, the Genoese received income from interest on loans to the barons, the cities, and the state; from the collection of tolls (levies) and

65. In 1571, Lomellino and Cattaneo were *arrendatori* of the iron and fish. See ASN, Arrendamenti n.307 Lomellino-Cattaneo (1571). In 1554, Luca Grillo was *arrendatore* of the iron of Calabria. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria Significatorie della Regia Camera N 301 I, Vol. 301 I fascicolo 4 (1541–63).

66. Battista Lomellino was *arrendatore* on the salt sold at the customs of Gaeta, Salerno, and Policastro in 1507; in 1600, Pier Francesco Ravaschiero was *arrendatore* of iron in Calabria Ultra, and Giulio Ravaschiero lieutenant of the mines of iron; in 1582, Pier Francesco Ravaschiero was treasurer of the Regia Banca of Calabria Ultra; in 1570, he was also preceptor of the gabelle on silk in Calabria; 1627 GB Grimaldi di Ansaldo (lived in Genoa) collected an income from the new tax imposed on the Regia Dogana di Napoli. See ASG, M.S. 484 Collezione Longhi (Letter L) famiglia Lercaro. Francesco Spinola was *arrendatore* of the salt distributed in Naples, Salerno, and Policastro in 1501; Lomellino had the same function the following year. See ASN, Arrendamenti n.1290, Francesco Spinola (1501); n.1291, Lomellino; in 1565, Nicola Grillo was *arrendatore* of the salt in Terra d'Otranto. The following years, the Spinola family held the same position as Nicola Grillo. See ASN, Arrendamenti n.1315 (14) Nicola Grillo (1565–66); n.1648 and 1683, Spinola.

67. ASN, Regia camera della sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria n.314, Significatoria 285 I fascicolo n. 10.

68. ASN, Arrendamenti n.552 Francesco Antonio Pallavicino (1637).

customs; from indirect taxes such as the gabelles on food products; and from feudal entries based on land concessions, offices, and rights of passage.

The granting of fiefs in the Kingdom of Naples is the final expression of symbiosis between the Genoese and the Iberians. After the Spanish Crown crushed the 1528 baronial rebellion, it seized the rebels' estates. New Spanish vassals acquired the confiscated land throughout the Kingdom of Naples. Andrea Doria was the first Genoese to acquire a landed estate, in Apulia, along with the title of prince. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Genoese elite had become feudal owners.⁶⁹ All the Genoese families in my survey received lands, titles, and in some cases jurisdiction over cities.⁷⁰ A 1677 report recounted that "the Genoese possess more fiefs and riches than the Neapolitan nobility who are indebted beyond measure."⁷¹ This movement into the feudal aristocracy, however, did not entail incorporation into the baronial caste. The Genoese acquired fiefs and received titles, but they maintained their mercantile vocation. True to their tradition, the Genoese used their revenues from the land to invest further in the enterprises of the Spanish Crown. Following 1528, the Genoese clearly maintained both investments and capital in the kingdom. Thus, the feudal system did not "corrupt" the Genoese. Instead, it can be argued that the Genoese corrupted the feudal system to serve their mercantile ends because they benefited from it without changing it. Clearly, mercantile profits through myriads of privileges granted by the crown surpassed those from the land. Jacques Heers explains that feudality was the only way for families to survive the economic crises of the late fifteenth century in Genoa.⁷² The Genoese were primarily traders and bankers. Land ownership was merely another way to increase capital and as such represents yet another expression of the symbiotic alliance between the Genoese and the Spanish.

69. For a comprehensive list of fiefs granted to the Genoese in the Kingdom of Naples, see D. Ricardo Magdalena, *Títulos y Privilegios de Nápoles (siglos XVI–XVII)*, vol. 1, Onomástico (Valladolid: Catálogo XXVIII del Archivo de Simancas, 1980).

70. A letter from the king of Spain to the viceroy of Naples indicates that the now Prince Nicolò Grimaldi bought on January 17, 1570, the city of Salerno. See BNN, Mss Brancaccio, IV B, vol. 3, car 39 r.

71. Innocenzo Fuidoro, *Giornali di Napoli dal MDCLX al MDCLXXX*, vol. 2 (Naples: Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, 1938), 245.

72. See Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XV^{ème} Siècle: Civilisation Méditerranéenne, grand capitalisme, et capitalisme populaire* (Paris: Flammarion, 1971), 539.

The Genoese acquisition of fiefs and titles, however, altered the Kingdom of Naples's social landscape. Unlike the offices of the state, lands and titles were granted directly by the king. Lands could be bought, but the titles could not, at least not directly.⁷³ The Pallavicino, de Mari, Grimaldi, Marini, Spinola, Doria, Ravaschiero, Cigala, and Lomellino families benefited from the Spanish kings' generosity while continuing to invest in the Neapolitan economy and long-distance trade. They became dukes, princes, barons, and marquises, owners of cities and estates (in the Kingdom of Naples, Sicily, and Milan), at the expense of the existing feudal aristocracy.⁷⁴ Sometimes they acquired fiefs by forfeiture for unpaid loans. More often than not, however, land grants resulted from government confiscation. The Genoese especially coveted fiefs in the commercially prominent provinces of Calabria, Principato Citra, and Terra di Lavoro.⁷⁵ These lands allowed the Genoese to remain within reach of the Neapolitan court and the mercantile activity of this vital southern Italian city.

Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Genoese steadily invested in land through feudal estates, slowly supplanting the old feudal nobility. The income from the land was a valuable instrument of credit that the Genoese used to further invest in their commercial and financial undertakings. They kept a close watch on baronial activities, quickly acquiring lands when barons became insolvent, while maintaining their commitment to their mother patria and their allegiance to trade. Conversely, the Spanish surrounded themselves with a capable work force in the form of the Genoese. Moreover, supplanting the barons with trusted Genoese allies gave the crown greater control over the countryside. By 1636, the Genoese controlled 1,200 fiefs out of 2,700 rural centers of the Kingdom of Naples.⁷⁶ By integrating unswerving Genoese citizens into the aristocracy, the Spanish Crown gained more control over its imperial domains and ensured the investment of land proceeds being turned into profitable ventures. Figure 2.1 shows that the fiefs were mainly located on the coasts of

73. For such an example, see ASG, M.S. 486 Collezione Longhi (letter M) famiglia Marini.

74. Francesco Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 334–337.

75. D. Ricardo Magdalena, *Títulos y Privilegios de Nápoles*.

76. Luigi Firpo, “Gli Ultimi Scritti Politici di Tommaso Campanella.



FIGURE 2.1. Genoese fiefs in the Kingdom of Naples

Campania, Calabria, and Apulia. The Genoese chose the proximity of urban centers such as Naples, Bari, and Salerno. They thus possessed fiefs in the countryside while remaining in intimate contact with the urban elite of the capital. Also, their need to perform state functions required them to establish close quarters to the main urban centers and ports of the kingdom.

Following are a few of the important feudal acquisitions of the Genoese: Alessandro Pallavicino became Duke of Castro in his domain of Lanciano; Giovan Battista de Mari became marquis of Assigliano; Giulio Centurione became baron of Crispiano in 1591; in 1560, Battista Grimaldi was the feudal owner of the land of Sant'Angelo and then of Terranova; in 1555, Tommaso Marini acquired the lands of San Severino, Eboli, and

Valdediano (these originally belonged to the Prince of Salerno and were confiscated by the government); Nicola Grimaldi acquired many fiefs and finally obtained the title of Prince of Salerno (taken away by the government from the rebel Prince of Sanseverino); in 1581, Ansaldo Grimaldi and Brigida de Mari secured the land of Palo and Modugno; Agostino Spinola was granted the right to acquire fiefs in the Duchy of Milan without having to reside there; Giovan Battista Doria was Marquis of San Stefano and bought the land of Ginosa in Basilicata, only to resell it to Stefano Lomellino for the same price in 1584; in 1588, the Spinola family acquired the fief of Tacena; Eduardo Cigala, a man of the sea, acquired the land of Angri in 1593 in Principato Citra; in 1597, Merualdo Grimadi was made Marquis of Diano; Marcantonio Iudice acquired in 1601 the lands of Bosco, Longobucco, and Trecasi in Terra di Lavoro, along with the city of Rossano; the Bank Ravaschiero-Lomellino procured the city of Arpaglia through an unpaid loan in 1604; the Bank Belmosto acquired the land of Sant'Agata; and Ottavio Ravaschiero gained the lands of Squillace and Cardinale.⁷⁷ Charles V made Tommaso de Marini the Duke of Terra Nova, and Philip II bestowed on him the Marquesato of Castel Nuovo.⁷⁸

The Genoese insertion into the Spanish orbit had tremendous repercussions for southern Italy and European politics as a whole. The acquisition of titles and lands underscores what Tommaso Campanella called “a monarchy without torso” or what I call symbiotic imperialism. The careful coalition of the two powers enabled the Genoese mercantile conversion from the eastern to the western Mediterranean and the Spanish decentralization of imperial management. Meanwhile, each power thrived on its counterpart's financial needs. The Kingdom of Naples became the economic playground in which their alliance became most noticeable.

As a result of this coalition, the Genoese migration changed the social landscape of southern Italy. According to Tommaso Campanella, in 1636 the Genoese in Naples were more numerous than the Spanish themselves. The city counted four thousand Genoese and three thousand Spaniards.⁷⁹ Perhaps this figure is to be doubted, because it did not include the Genoese who had gained Neapolitan citizenship while continuing to participate in the mercantile and financial activities of their conationals. My calculation of

77. Francesco Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 334–337.

78. ASG, M.S. 486 Collezione Longhi (letter M) famiglia Marini.

79. Luigi Firpo, “Gli ultimi scritti politici di Tommaso Campanella”.

the registered Genoese citizens in the Genoese parish of San Giorgio included eight thousand souls. In terms of financial worth, the new bourgeoisie centered on commercial activities replaced the feudal nobility.

As for wider repercussions, early modern European international relations were dominated by the Iberian Crown's efforts to assert itself on the continent. It made headway in Germany, the Netherlands, Milan, and France. Genoese support was essential to this objective. The *Superba's* merchant bankers provided financial acumen and mercantile entrepreneurship. Genoese support not only helped fill the coffers of Aragón and Castile, but also provided credit, affecting the balance of power in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. Examining how foreign merchants, backed by the Spanish Crown, developed a precapitalist economy in the kingdom, the [next chapter](#) expands on the commercial implications of the principle of symbiotic imperialism. The commerce in silk in particular shows how the Genoese involvement as artisans, merchants, and bankers enabled them to embed themselves in every aspect of the industrial, financial, and commercial life of southern Italy. Their management of the great feudal domains, their acquisition of products from the hinterland, their expansion of local markets, and the increasing urban demand connected Naples to the greater European economy.

CHAPTER THREE

Commercial Ascension through Silk: Genoese Artisans, Merchants, Bankers

Viene il Greco, Il Tedesco, e vien l'Inglese,
L'Alemanno e il Francese,
Il Pugliese, Abruzzese e Calabrese,
Non dico il Fiorentin nè il Genovese,
Che stan così in arnese
Che non voglion tornar più nel paese.
Ma il Turco, il Moro e l'Indo, ogni straniero
Ivi sta volontiero

—GIAMBATTISTA DEL TUFO¹

Artists, novelists and philosophers of the Renaissance have repeatedly sung the praises of *Napoli Gentile* for its amiability to foreigners. Naples was so pleasant that the poet equated the pleasure of European merchants with that of Turks, Moors, and Indians whose presence in the city might have been as slaves. The irony served to stress the welcoming character of Naples. Whereas Giambattista del Tufo's lines

1. "The Greek, German, English and French came, the Apulian, Abruzzian, Calabrian, without even mentioning the Florentine or the Genoese, who are so eager, that no one wishes to return to his land. Even the Turk, the Moor and the Indian, each foreigner is so pleased to be here," Scipione Volpicella, *Giovan Battista del Tufo: Illustratore di Napoli del Secolo XVI* (Naples: Stamperia della Regia Università, 1880, [1588]), 89. In early modern times, anyone who was not born in the city where he worked and lived was considered a foreigner. Hence, Apulian and Calabrian who hailed from the Kingdom of Naples (called *regnicoli*) were considered foreigners.

depict foreigners' fascination with the city of Naples, Diomedea Carafa eulogized foreigners' productiveness: "the sterility of the country . . . is compensated by the industriousness of foreigners."² In Aragonese-Habsburg times, Naples hosted Florentines, Genoese, Spaniards, Lombards, Venetians, and Greeks, all of whom established their own churches, neighborhoods bearing their names, and poorhouses that benefited from their charitable spirit. Whether the citizens of these merchant nations settled on a permanent basis or established second residences in Naples, they all found commercial profit in southern Italy. In their treatise on southern Italy, Mazza and Ucelli observed that "the infallible abundance of all kinds of goods, navigation, and commerce with the Venetians has enriched the people of the Kingdom. Its fertile land is a real warehouse where Genoese and Tuscans acquire their silk; Barbary gets almonds, oil, and meat; and Rome bread, wine, wheat, horses, lambs and sheep."³ Using the principle of trade diaspora, these communities of foreign merchants linked the Italian south to their European and Mediterranean outposts throughout the premodern era.

Medieval Naples was a buzzing port city with scores of foreign traders, markets, and exotic items. Boccaccio described the city as "happy, peaceful, prosperous, and magnificent."⁴ In Angevine and Aragonese times, the Kingdom of Naples had become one of the anchors of western Mediterranean commerce. At the dawn of the fifteenth century, the port of Naples was described by a Tuscan informant as "a harbour with two quays in which there are armed galleys at any given time, boats and wood in quantity overlooked by the marvelous Castelnuovo . . . merchants that come and go are continuously greeted with sounds of trumpets and

2. See Tommaso Persico, "Diomedea Carafa: uomo di stato e scrittore del sec. XV," in *Gli scrittori politici napoletani dal '400 al '700* (Bologna: A. Forni, 1974). Tommaso Campanella ironically described the situation: "no sooner any artisan had gathered a hundred ducats, he invested into buying grain rather than pursuing the art [guild industry], this way he pretended to be noble without using his hands." See "Arbitrii sopra l'aumento delle entrate del regno di Napoli, 1608" in Luigi Firpo, *Discorsi ai Principi d'Italia ed altri scritti filo-ispatici* (Turin: Chiantore, 1945), 184.

3. Giovan Battista Mazza and Gasparo Ucelli, *Recueil factice d'histoire généalogique et portraits de souverains de divers états* (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 1598).

4. The great Tuscan writer had come to Naples as a young merchant and a few stories of the *Decameron* were set in the city of Naples.

boisterous music, which is a spectacle to whoever arrives.”⁵ The magnificent *Tavola Strozzi*, an oil painting that celebrates the victory of Ferrante of Aragon over the Angevin king in 1465 illustrates the prominence of the harbor in Naples.

As Italian merchants turned from trade with the Levant to the western Mediterranean, the Italian south remained one of their anchors.⁶ World historian Immanuel Wallerstein depicts southern Italy as peripheral to the world system economy, and local historian Giuseppe Galasso paints the region on the periphery of western commercial empires.⁷ By examining Genoese bankers’ records and Neapolitan guild registers, I have compiled a coherent account of the role of the region in the premodern economy. The emerging story depicts the *Mezzogiorno* as a full participant in the precapitalist economy benefiting both foreign merchants and local producers.⁸ The economic role of the Genoese was as merchants, artisans, and bankers involved in the thriving silk industry of the south.

5. Paul O. Kristeller, “An Unpublished Description of Naples by Francesco Bandini,” in *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1956), 407–408.

6. The Genoese from Chios brought spices, cotton, alum; their two main export commodities to the east were grain and silk from Sicily and Apulia. Slaves (on behalf of Catalans), timber, oil, nuts, cheese, and salt were also valuable income sources in the Genoese portfolio. See ASG, A.S. 2647: Consoli Due Sicilie: Palermo (1506–1581) and ASN, Sommaria, Banchieri Antichi.

7. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist, Agriculture, and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1976). Galasso argues that Calabria is the prototype of a “missed take off” and Apulia was overwhelmed by “provincialism.” See *Alla periferia dell’impero: Il Regno di Napoli nel periodo spagnolo: secoli XVI–XVII* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Ed., 1994), 387–393. He bases these statements on a comparison with the developing industrialism in England and the Netherlands, in which Naples never took part.

8. The economy was still precapitalist or proto-industrial, as it depended on family structures, network connections, and state control. An edited volume by Paola Lanaro, *At the Centre of the Old World: Trade and Manufacturing in Venice and the Venetian Mainland, 1400–1800* (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2006), has shown the importance of the economic development of Italian cities and their proto-industrial districts. Martha Howell, *Commerce before Capitalism in Europe, 1300–1600* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), believes in the development of a precapitalist economy in the Cinquecento. Steven A. Epstein prefers to call this system proto-industrial.

In 1582, according to silk guilds' inventories, about 100,000 people (or half of the population in Naples) "lived off the silk," including workers, merchants, masters, and dependents (children or wives of guild members).⁹ In 1624, guild members estimated that 300,000 people "lived around the silk."¹⁰ And in 1694, one-quarter of Naples's population, or 60,000 people (not including the dependents), worked on silk making.¹¹ Though the Genoese invested in other items such as grain, nuts, salt, and oil, their export profits were invested in industrial, financial, and commercial enterprises, enabling the kingdom to play a crucial role in the European proto-industrial economy.¹² The Genoese relationship with silk in southern Italy underscores their role in the two themes of production (surpassing the rest of the Italian peninsula) and interaction (establishing a complementary relationship with continental Europe).

This chapter examines three roles that involved the Genoese in their relation with the silk industry: as artisans, merchants, and bankers. The Genoese merchant nation knitted commercial connections by making different "career choices." They started in the 1470s as artisans, became merchants by the dawn of the following century, and finally became bankers in the mid-sixteenth century. They deliberately moved from one sector to the next to increase both production and sales, creating ties to European markets that craved the kingdom's silk. The [first section](#) of this

9. ASN, Arte della Seta, Libri di Matricole, Vol. I–XII. AGSim (Archivo General de Simancas), Visitas de Italia, Legajo 25, Libro III "Quello che consiste il Tribunale dell'Arte della Seta" folio 316t, f. 1. As an element of comparison, Spanish Milan considered the "heart and center of the monarchy" employed 40,000 silk and wool workers. See Stefano D'Amico, *Spanish Milan: A City within the Empire, 1535–1706* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 141.

10. The 300,000 figure included the dependents. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria, Processi, Pandetta Comune, Fascicolo 592.

11. ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria, Consultationum, vol XC, folio 175, Consulta of October 16, 1694.

12. *Annalists* who seek to approach history in its totality have recently pondered the functioning of merchant networks in the early modern period, as well as their relationship with the economic structures and political institutions of the time. See Anthony Molho and Diogo Ramada Curto, "Les réseaux marchands à l'époque moderne," in *Annales H.S.S.*, n. 3 (Mai-Juin 2003): 569–579. For an example of Jewish diaspora and Jews' commercial network in and beyond Italy, see Peter Mazur, *The New Christians of Spanish Naples: 1528–1671, a Fragile Elite* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

discussion explores the Genoese as artisans, starting in the 1470s. Their success first stemmed from their capacity to work in concert with other trading nations; then Aragonese monarchs granted them royal dispensations to “enliven the silk industry.”¹³ The [second section](#) covers 1515 to 1580 and analyzes the Genoese transformation from artisans, to merchants, to guild masters. The Genoese continued to work in tandem with other nations, notably Neapolitans and Florentines, but they were the main exporters of the kingdom’s silk, which they shipped to their European commercial nodes. The export trade fueled production in the guilds, which the Genoese dominated. The [third section](#) encompasses 1580 to 1650, a period in which the Genoese continued to act as merchants but also became financiers of the Spanish Crown. This position enabled them to bargain for continuous commercial privileges and also to link the kingdom to the precapitalist economy. Their involvement in the silk industry became more entrenched as they exported both raw and finished silk.

THE GENOESE AS ARTISANS: PRIVILEGES AND COSMOPOLITAN ALLIANCES, 1470–1500

The Genoese exploited their partnership with other merchants (foreign and local, but all Italians) as well as the financial privileges granted by the Aragonese Crown to replace the traditional medieval commercial monopolies of the Catalans and Venetians, and to obtain a pivotal role in the silk industry as merchant-artisans. Although the Genoese usually gained from their dealings with their conational network,¹⁴ in the Kingdom of Naples, their ultimate triumph stemmed from an increasing degree of adaptability and capacity to work with other trading nations.¹⁵ Aragonese commercial policies that aimed at increasing local textile production assisted the

13. ASN, Ministero dell’Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34; Arte della Seta, Napoli, 4 november 1474, section 1.

14. Trading nations have been defined as “controlling minorities” stressing that “any minority will have a tendency to stick together, for mutual aid and self-defense: when abroad, a Genoese merchant would back up his fellow-citizen,” Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century*, vol. 2, trans. by Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1982 [1979]), 165.

15. Francesca Trivellato argues that the diasporic communities able to work in tandem with other merchants were the most successful. See “A Republic of Merchants?” in

Genoese assimilation into the Kingdom of Naples. The creation of the silk and wool guilds by King Alfonso I of Naples (r.1442–58 as the Magnanimous) and the introduction of finer Spanish sheep, which improved the common Neapolitan breed, made these two products the pillars of the Neapolitan economy for three centuries.¹⁶ Alfonso's son Ferrante (r.1458–94) prohibited outright the introduction of foreign wools. Silk was an item of conspicuous consumption. The court, nobility, and priests purchased silk not only for clothing, but also for altar decorations and household furnishings. Worked in the kingdom's regions of Apulia and Calabria but also in Sicily since the thirteenth century, silk was one of the most desired items, not only as a source of prestige for the local aristocracy, but also as an export commodity for the many merchant nations.¹⁷ The kingdom provided raw silk (exported to be worked up elsewhere) and spun silk thread (woven into textiles elsewhere); later using Venetian instructors, the factories supplied velvets and brocades interwoven with gold.¹⁸ Again, the produced silk was mainly for exportation and not for local consumption. Genoese, Florentine, Venetian, and Catalan merchants all exported raw silk.

Table 3.1, based on merchant records, indicates the great deal of foreign investment in cloth, spices, metal, and sugar. Although records use the generic term “cloth,” most of this trade was in silk. Until recently, it had been overlooked by scholars, and not just because research had concentrated on centers such as Bologna, Venice, or Lucca, which had prosperous manufacturing industries. In the historiography, the south has been a victim

Finding Europe: Discourses on Margins, Communities, Images, eds. Anthony Molho and Diogo Ramada Curto (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 133–158.

16. Mario del Treppo, *Els Mercaders Catalans y l'Expansió de la Corona Catalano-Aragonesa al Segle XV*, trans. by Jaume Riera i Sans (Barcelona: Curial Ed., 1972), 210.

17. Silk manufacture, originally centered in the east Mediterranean, had arrived in southern Italy by the eleventh century, as even the bishop of Reggio di Calabria carefully listed his mulberry bushes for silkworms. Patricia Skinner considers that Calabrian monks probably exchanged the product for foodstuffs. Apart from magnificent items such as the coronation robe of King Roger II, it is clear that members of the aristocracy also wore silk clothing as a sign of their social status. See “Material Life” in *Italy in the Central Middle Ages*, ed. David Abulafia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 147–160. See also André Guillou, “La soie du catépanat d'Italie” in *Travaux et Mémoires* 6: 69–84.

18. See Giovanni A. Summonte, *Dell'istoria della città e regno di Napoli*, vol. 1 (Naples: R. Gessari, 1602).

Catalans:	cloth, wax, leather, wool, slaves, spices, sugar, rice
Genoese:	cloth, metals, leather, slaves, salt, spices
Florentines:	cloth, iron and metals, spices, sugar
French:	cloth, coral, metal, hats
Milanese:	armaments
Venetians:	sugar, metals, dyes, and spices

Source: Based on Mario del Treppo, *Els Mercaders Catalans*, 198–204. Slaves (especially Muslims) were still bought in the Kingdom of Naples until the seventeenth century.

TABLE 3.1 Foreign merchants and their trade in Naples in the mid-fifteenth century

of the north-south dialectic, considered a colony of the north, hence not a productive center. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that silk production was in the hands of a foreign market, destined for exportation, and thus had not been viewed as a significant part of local production and promoter of the economy. Only recently have scholars appraised records from the silk guilds.¹⁹

The Aragonese monarchs granted commercial privileges to foreign merchants to stimulate economic production and local markets, encourage business partnerships, allow social mobility, and reduce imports. Fiscal privileges were feudal in substance, yet the economic implications were clearly modern because they were production centered.²⁰ A very capable ruler, Ferrante invigorated the economy of the south by adopting measures

19. Beginning in the twentieth century, a number of southern Italian historians have devoted time to the study of trade in the Kingdom of Naples, such as Giuseppe Coniglio (*Il Regno di Napoli*) and Francesco Caracciolo (*Il Regno di Napoli*), but industry has always tended to be overlooked until recently. For a recent counterbalance, see Rosalba Ragosta, *Napoli, Città della Seta: Produzione e Mercato in Età Moderna* (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 2009). Because southern Italy was such a dominant center of silk production during the premodern era, the excellent study of Luca Molà on Venice establishes links with the Kingdom of Naples. See *The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

20. The acquisition of political authority and dynastic property was a modern phenomenon. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between the French monarchy and the maintenance of the traditional elite's social position, see

that attracted foreign capital.²¹ In 1469, for example, he drafted an edict designed to increase the population of the city of Naples by encouraging the immigration of skilled foreign merchants.²² Hence, in this context, privileges were used to attract skilled people, facilitating the Genoese's joining the silk industry.

The first commercial corporation that benefited from Ferrante's royal privileges was an all-Italian affair composed of Florentines, Genoese, Neapolitans, and Venetians. The Coppola-Cavensi-Di Nerone Company's statutes bestowed by Ferrante in 1474 specified that "the enterprise was designed to ennoble and embellish the arts of the city of Naples."²³ Neapolitan merchants Luise and Francesco Coppola created a commercial partnership with the Florentine merchant Francesco di Nerone and the Genoese silk weaver and merchant Pietro Cavensi. The company's commercial representative in Naples was Venetian silk master Marino di Cataponte, and the Florentine Hieronimo de Giutiente served as the go-between in Florence.²⁴ On May 2, 1465, Di Cataponte,

Matthew Romaniello and Charles Lipp, eds., "The Spaces of Nobility" in *Contested Spaces of Nobility in Early Modern Europe* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 1–10.

21. Access to guilds, tax exemptions, and grant privileges functioned as typical instruments to attract "skilled migrant communities" in early modern cities. See Bert de Munck and Anne Winter eds., *Gated Communities? Regulating Migration in Early Modern Cities* (London: Ashgate, 2012).

22. "nos tantem attendentes maiorem fieri frequentiam hominum exterarum nationum in hanc nostram civitatem Neapolitanam, quae caput nostril Regni est, ad domicilium contrahendum, eamque magis inde repleti libreris hominibus, ac fieri populosam turbis diversorum hominum, suas provincias et civitates relinquentium" in Mario del Treppo, "Stranieri nel Regno di Napoli: Le élites finanziarie e la strutturazione dello spazio economico e politico" in *Dentro la città: Stranieri e realtà urbane nell'Europa dei secoli XII–XVI*, ed. Gabriella Rossetti (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1989), 226.

23. ASN, Ministero dell'Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34: Arte della Seta, Napoli, 4 november 1474, section 1. The Genoese artisan name was sometimes spelled Cavensi and at other times Cavursio. For the sake of consistency, I have kept the spelling Cavensi.

24. ASN, Ministero dell'Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34: Arte della Seta, Napoli, October 5, 1477. In 1531, the Genoese Pietro de Cavensi, the Florentines di Nerone, and Di Giutiente, and the Venetian Di Cataponte were still registered as masters in the art of silk making in the guild of the same name. These plus eight other Genoese craftsmen were registered under the consulate of Pietro de Stephano, Jo Baptista Agnario, and Stephano Mayolo.

who was also involved in exporting alum,²⁵ became the first master weaver to obtain privileges for the making of silk cloth and production of velvets, satins, and damasks.²⁶ Francesco Coppola was an important shipowner who traded regularly with various countries around the Mediterranean and cities in northern Italy, and he possessed strong commercial links in both Italy and the Levant.²⁷ As for the Genoese Cavensi, he was a silk master who benefited from close connections with his conationals in Naples. Coppola, Cavensi, and Di Nerone linked the kingdom to long-distance networks across the Mediterranean. Their access to commercial nodes allowed them to reconvert capital into the “arts” of Naples.

The commercial vision of the three Italians increased production, extended their commercial reach, and invigorated the local economy. The transnational state-sponsored manufacturing enterprise Coppola-Cavensi-Di Nerone was endowed, in the usual way, with commercial and judicial privileges. Besides free access to all segments of the silk and gold businesses, the company benefited from countless other privileges,

See ASN, Mercanti registrati al Consolato del' Arte della Seta: Libro delle Matricole vol. 1. Microfilm vol. 1–12.

25. See Amedeo Feniello, *Les Campagnes Napolitaines à la fin du Moyen Âge: Mutations d'un Paysage Rural* (Rome: Bibliothèque de l' École Française de Rome, 2005), 207.

26. See Luca Molà, *The Silk Industry*, 311.

27. He eventually became a feudal landowner and acquired the title of Count of Sarno. See Francesco Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli nei secoli XVI e XVII*, 79. Coppola's engagement in the kingdom was not merely commercial and along with other barons he defied Aragonese rule. He was part of the first Barons Conspiracy (1460–64), which supported the French Angevin House. By examining the king's involvement in the local guild manufactures, we will see that he had granted fiscal privileges to Coppola's silk company following the barons' rebellion. What can we deduce from this? Perhaps the king was “magnanimous” like his father Alfonso or, more likely, he sought to appease the merchants by focusing his attention on a commercial enterprise rather than on pursuing the feud. After the second Barons Conspiracy (1485–86), Ferrante lost patience and had Coppola killed on his wedding day. For a recent essay on the rebellion, see Elisabetta Scarton, “La Congiura dei Baroni del 1485–87 e la Sorte dei Ribelli” in *Poteri, Relazioni, Guerra nel Regno di Ferrante d'Aragona: Studi sulle Corrispondenza Diplomatiche*, eds. Francesco Senatore and Francesco Storti (Naples: Clio, 2011), 213–290.

such as enticing salaries,²⁸ waived customs rights,²⁹ and tax-free import-exports.³⁰ As a result, Italian merchants and local artisans increased their mutual benefits and established linkages with the countryside. The citizens of Reggio, which had a large Genoese colony, traded silk freely within and outside the region and were exempt from customs fees in the cities of Gaeta and the Calabria and Sicily regions.³¹ Because of their leading role in the silk industry, the Genoese fused local and foreign talents, enabled merchants to deploy their commercial skills connecting Naples to their other locations, and provided the king with regulating rights while furthering the kingdom's economy.

The company's privileges included diplomatic immunity, making Genoese and other Italians prosper.³² The Coppola-Cavensi-Di Nerone merchants and craftsmen also received rights similar to those of Neapolitan citizens.³³ The company's members could be tried only by the *Camera della Sommaria*, a tribunal made up of Aragonese (later Castilian) delegates. This

28. ASN, Ministero dell'Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34: Arte della Seta, Napoli, 4 november 1474, section 1. It included silk masters who belonged to the city's guilds and received from the king a salary of "200 ducats for provisions, 100 other ducats to the gold and silk guild masters." *Ibid.*, section 2.

29. The king also waived the customs rights on all the participants in the joint venture, which was "free and exempt of payment of customs, gabelle, and other rights that are usually paid for gold and silk, regardless of whether they originated from the Province of Calabria or whether they were exported." These rights also applied to all products involved in silk production, such as dyeing products, color, alum, machinery, looms, and grain. *Ibid.*, section 3.

30. "The Di Nerone Company shall export by land or by sea any quantity of gold, silk, and colors involved in the production of said art. It shall also be granted the privilege to export and import freely from and to the city and kingdom of Naples." *Ibid.*, section 4.

31. Giuseppe Coniglio, *Il Regno di Napoli at Tempo di Carlo V: Amministrazione e vita economico-sociale* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1951), 117–120.

32. "His Majesty guarantees that during the duration of the said art's work, the guild members should not be detained inside and outside the kingdom *pro quavis causa*." ASN, Ministero dell'Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34: Arte della Seta, Napoli, 4 november 1474, section 5. In 1478, a decree stated that every man employed in the silk industry, whether silk weaver, master artisan, or simple journeyman enrolled in the guild registers, was immune from prosecution for civil or criminal offenses perpetrated outside of the kingdom. See Luca Molà, *The Silk Industry*, 31.

33. ASN, Arte della Seta, section 6.

ensured the king's control over proceedings involving guild members prosecuted on civil or penal grounds.³⁴ Similarly, the king made the Coppola-Cavensi-Di Nerone's members his vassals, with all the rights and responsibilities that this act entailed.³⁵ For the Genoese Pietro Cavensi, being a king's vassal meant that his merchandise was exempt from excessive taxation and received the protection of the Aragonese tribunals. Commercial privileges became a model for future business enterprises because the numerous fiscal and judicial dispensations invigorated foreign merchants' trade in the kingdom.³⁶ The repercussions of privileges enabled skilled foreign merchants to "own" the kingdom, as Table 3.2 indicates.

Table 3.2, pieced together from bankers' records, reveals that Catalans, from the nation of the Aragonese kings, were the most numerous foreign merchants in the mid-fifteenth century, followed by Genoese, then by equal numbers of Florentines and French. These numbers indicate that the market was mainly in the hands of foreign merchants but that the Italians were second to the Catalans. In the mid-fifteenth century, more merchants, mainly Catalans, Genoese, and Florentines, settled in the Kingdom of

34. "The ministers of the said art of the Di Nerone Co. will not undergo whether for civil or for penal cause a tribunal other than the *Camera della Sommaria*." See ASN, Ministero dell'Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34: Arte della Seta, Napoli, 4 november 1474, section 7.

35. "His Majesty requires Francesco & Co. to be part of his vassals." See ASN, Ministero dell'Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34: Arte della Seta, Napoli, 4 november 1474, section 8. The Genoese Pietro di Cavensi, master of the silk guild in the year 1475 exhibited similar privileges. First, he was given the right to bring into the kingdom twelve men to assist him. Second, they could come and go freely with their merchandise without being taxed. Third, they had the freedom to export the silk "in all the parts of the world" and were free from gabelles and customs. Fourth, they had the right to dye or have the silk dyed. Fifth, they would be treated in the same way as Neapolitans and be taken to no magistrate or judge other than the *Camera della Sommaria*. See ASN, Ministero dell'Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri, vol. 5198 n. 34: Arte della Seta, Napoli, Castel Nuovo, 1475.

36. In 1523, the università dell'arte della seta was granted the right to erect a church. The Duke of Maddaloni bought the church on behalf of the guild, which was called the Church of San Filippo e Giacomo. See S. D'Aloe, "Catalogo di tutti gli edifizii sacri della città di Napoli e suoi sobborghi," in *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Napoletane*, anno VIII, fasc. 1,2,3 (1883).

Nation	Population
Catalans	7,000
Flemish	5,000
Castilians	4,000
Germans	4,000
Milanese	4,000
Venetians	4,000
Genoese	3,300
Florentines	2,600
French	2,500
Sicilians	1,700

TABLE 3.2 Foreign merchant population in the Kingdom of Naples c.1470

Naples to take advantage of the privileges granted by the Aragonese Crown. The sixteenth century would see an increase in the number of Genoese.

However, [Table 3.3](#) suggests that through their financial investment in the mid-fifteenth century, the Venetians led by far, followed by the Catalans, then the Florentines in distant third. In fourth position, the Genoese and French were tied. These numbers imply that even though the number of Catalans, Genoese, and Florentines exceeded that of Venetians, it was the lagoon nation that “owned” the kingdom by exporting its raw product to the Veneto and European fairs. The Venetians sold most of the kingdom’s products, including the silk. Since the Middle Ages, the kingdom’s commerce was in the hands of foreigners, with an industry of raw products exported by foreign actors. Ferrante’s indulgent policies regarding the Italian merchants slowly reversed the ethnic distribution in the kingdom, with more Florentines and Genoese involved in the silk industry toward the last quarter of the fifteenth century.

Having attracted skilled merchant-artisans, Ferrante next worked to draw in capital by encouraging both foreign merchants and wealthy aristocrats to contribute to the silk industry. In 1477, he called for the

Nation	Financial investment (in thousands)
Venetians	485
Catalans	364
Florentines	179
Genoese	97
French	96
Milanese	41
Sicilians	12
Castilians	9
Flemish	3
Germans	3

TABLE 3.3 Financial investment of foreign merchants in the Kingdom of Naples c.1470

participation of Neapolitan barons and made Count Diomedede Carafa and Count Giancarlo Tramontano protectors of the art of silk making.³⁷ Shortly thereafter, edicts asked Florentines and Genoese to settle in the kingdom.³⁸ In 1481, the king ratified the collaboration of foreign nations in the wool

37. In 1483, the Castilian delegate recorded that King Ferrante had sent an invitation to the Neapolitan barons in 1477 to participate in the silk manufacture. See Archivo General de Simancas, *Visitas de Italia*, fasciculo 25, folio 314r. Francesco Coppola, Count of Sarno was invited along with Neapolitan merchants to participate actively in this endeavor such as Di Nerone, Cavensi, Cataponte, Folliero, Vespolo, the Tuscans Vecchietti and Strozzi, and the Genoese Spinola. All in all there were 104 merchants of whom 80 were Neapolitans, 10 Genoese, 6 Florentines, and a handful of Venetians, Milanese, Catalan, Spanish, and Pisans.

38. ASN, Arrendamenti, Arrendamento della seta, fascio 1647, Summario de arrendamenti, “Capitulatio arrendamenti serici fatta per Regiam Cameram tempore Regi Ferdinandi primi in ano 1481 prespectu Ducatus Calabrie pro annis tribus pro ducatis 10,200.”

industry, allowing “Neapolitans, Catalans, Spanish, Genoese, Ragusans, Milanese, Bolognese, and Florentines to introduce to the city of Naples the art of cloth making, which has been useful and of great benefit to the city, its subjects, and the vassals of the kingdom.”³⁹ The previous year, the Turks had raided Otranto, taking half of the local population captive. As Apulia was one of the kingdom’s major silk distributors, the Ottoman foray must have troubled both the king and traders.⁴⁰ In 1483, the need to attract private capital for the art of silk making made the king promise some inducement to “everyone, noble or merchant, citizen or foreigner who will pledge his money to the benefit of the said art.”⁴¹ To continue stimulating the arts and crafts of the kingdom, a few years later, in 1514, King Ferdinand II of Aragón (the Catholic King) granted dual citizenship to merchants and foreigners who manifested interest in participating in the local administration.⁴² As for Ferrante, his interest in the kingdom’s commercial life reached its climax when he agreed to see the guild masters who sought to increase production of these textiles.⁴³ In 1483, he opened up the dyeing industry to Florentines, Venetians, and Genoese, whose cities had acquired a reputation in Europe in the fifteenth century, thereby allowing for new methods of coloration to be developed in the kingdom.⁴⁴ Genoese

39. ASN, Ministero dell’Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di Arti e Mestieri vol. 5197, n. 18: Arte della Lana, Letter from King Don Ferrando, Naples, January 13, 1481.

40. Following the Muslim attack on Otranto, the Genoese Doge called on his Genoese subjects scattered across the Mediterranean to assist King Ferrante. See ASG, 2774 A Materie politiche (negoziazioni e trattati con le potenze estere) “Oriente e Africa-Costantinopoli.” “1480 proposta fatta in consiglio di governo a Genova per aiutare il Re Ferdinando contro l’armata turca a Otranto.”

41. Giovanni Tescione, *Statuti dell’Arte della Seta a Napoli, e la legislazione della Colonia di San Leucio* (Naples: Consiglio provinciale dell’economia corporativa di Napoli, 1933), 18–19.

42. See Andrea Romano, “La condizione giuridica di stranieri e mercanti in Sicilia,” in *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche in Europa (secoli XII–XVII)*, ed. Mario del Treppo (Naples: Liguori Ed., 1994), 113–132.

43. See ASN, Ministero dell’Interno 242, Capitolazione delle Antiche Capelle di arti e Mestieri vol. 5198, n. 33: Arte degli Orefici et Argentieri, Article n. 2, August 3, 1593 [1481].

44. Most dyers in early modern Naples were still Jews from Spain. They were the ones who knew the dyeing techniques, but soon the Italians sought to replace them. See

merchants quickly seized this opportunity and opened dyeing shops in Naples.⁴⁵

Ferrante was successful not only at “ennobling the arts of the kingdom” but also at increasing production. In 1293, about 4,300 pounds of silk had been produced per year.⁴⁶ By 1466, the figure had risen to 30,000 pounds; it then doubled by 1481 to 64,000 pounds and reached 70,000 pounds in 1496.⁴⁷ It reached its heyday between 1550 and 1630, by which time total output was ten times as much as in the 1490s.⁴⁸ The expertise of the trade diaspora communities also heightened sales. Eighty percent of the silk purchased went through the fairs; meanwhile, as Naples rose and Florentines, Catalans, and Genoese redirected their energy toward southern Italy, trade declined in Barcelona.⁴⁹ During Ferrante’s reign, the number of fairs across the kingdom doubled to about 230 every year.⁵⁰

Nicola Ferorelli, *Gli Ebrei nell’Italia Meridionale dall’Età Romana al Secolo XVIII* (Bologna: A. Forni, 1999).

45. In 1510, still the dominant dyeing shop was that of the Genoese Giuliano dell’Isola who employed fellow merchant Francesco del Piano. Francesco del Piano was registered in the year 1531 in the same guild as that of Di Nerone, Cataponte, and Giutiente. Most interestingly, too, merchant banker Iacobo Spinola was also registered in the same silk guild. See *Mercanti registrati al Consolato del’ Arte della Seta: Libro delle Matricole* vol. 1. Microfilm vol. 1–12. The Dell’Isola shop dyed about 16,000 pounds of silk per year. Around 1550, there were six dyeing shops in the city of Naples with pretty much the same capacity of production. After 1570, the number of shops increased. In 1680, there were twenty-eight dyeing shops in Naples, but their importance for the kingdom’s economy had decreased.

46. In 1293, the tax farmers for the silk of Calabria were Andrea and Filippo di Bonito and Ursino de Cazciolo di Cosenza. See Camillo Minieri-Riccio, *Studi sui fascicoli angioini* (Naples: Alberto Detken, 1863), 84.

47. ASN, Arrendamenti, Arrendamento della seta, fascio 1647, Summario de arrendamenti, “Capitulatio arrendamenti serici fatta per Regiam Cameram tempore Regi Ferdinandi primi in ano 1481 prespectu Ducatus Calabrie pro annis tribus pro ducatis 10.200.”

48. Eleni Sakellariou, *Southern Italy in the Late Middle Ages: Demographic, Institutional and Economic Change in the Kingdom of Naples, c. 1440–1530* (Boston: Brill, 2012), 381–382.

49. Mario del Treppo, *Els Mercaders Catalans*, 213.

50. Tommaso Astarita, *Between Salt Water and Holy Water: A History of Southern Italy* (New York: Norton & Co., 2005), 78.

FROM ARTISANS TO MERCHANTS: GUILDS AND PRODUCTION, 1515–1580

Although they always dedicated themselves to reselling, it was the role of the Genoese as guild masters that afforded them a crucial role in production. Foreigners monopolized the reselling portion, but artisans were local residents. Throughout Europe, guild masters were local members of the merchant class whose position entitled them to supervise the general population of apprentices. A close examination of the silk guild registers in Naples, however, reveals that not only were the Genoese involved in the guild, they nearly monopolized it, controlling both production and sales. Thus, there was an explicit relationship between the role of the Genoese in the guilds and that of exporters of Neapolitan silk. The gradual insinuation of the Genoese into Naples's guilds underscores their capacity to both work in tandem with other merchant-nations and connect the Italian south to their commercial nodes on the European continent.

The Genoese role as master artisans secured their role in the production capacity of the silk and in its distribution. The Genoese who benefited from Ferrante's privileges were present in the guild system mainly as master artisans. By becoming masters of the silk guild themselves, the Genoese made an important career shift, concentrating on the training of apprentices. However, they simultaneously maintained their role as merchants, shipping the silk to their European entrepôts. Their dual-focused occupation induced artisans to increase production because the real benefit was in the reselling. The Genoese knew the market and influenced it because their main outlet for the silk was Genoa, followed by important centers such as Bologna, Rome, Milan, Lucca, and Ragusa.

The Genoese involvement in silk production and exportation was both cultural and commercial. The Genoese silk industry followed the Ligurian capital's fashion. In the early sixteenth century, black became the dominant color produced, and Genoa was famous for its beautiful black velvets. Black was the color of the nobility, of church members, of men of law, and of funerals. The weaving of fine textiles was a lucrative sector for which Genoa needed raw material. The Genoese were careful to keep this sector

of production for themselves.⁵¹ Genoa was the most important Calabrian silk importer at the time.⁵² The link between Genoa and the kingdom of Naples was therefore strong.⁵³ Rosalba Ragosta notes that from 1570 to 1600, the Neapolitan silk manufacturing industry declined, but the exportation of raw silk increased.⁵⁴ Over the course of the sixteenth and part of the seventeenth centuries, raw silk accounted for almost half of all Neapolitan imports to Genoa.⁵⁵ For instance, in 1516 the Genoese exported to Genoa 45,000 pounds of Neapolitan silk, in 1521 about 50,000, and in 1537 around 90,000.⁵⁶ According to Consul Teramo Spinola's correspondence from 1516 to 1521, Genoa imported from Sicily and Calabria (especially the city of Paola) 540 quintal (or 119,049 pounds) per year.⁵⁷ The yearly profit from the southern Italian raw silk was of one million scudi. From 1578 to 1678, Genoese involvement in the silk guild continued to increase, especially from 1607 to 1630.⁵⁸

The Neapolitan guild system was an anomaly because the Genoese completely dominated it by holding the focal position of guild master. In

51. ASN, Consulte, Arrendamento della seta, Sommario de Arrendamenti, vol 1968, Concordia tra la Regia Corte, l'Arrendatore delle sete ed i Consoli dell'Arte della seta, November, 15, 1580, ff. 158–163.

52. Between 1507 and 1537, according to the port custom registers, Genoa imported a total of 2,383 bales (170–210 tons) of Calabrian silk, either from Naples or directly from Calabria. See Eleni Sakellariou, *Southern Italy in the Late Middle Ages*, 387.

53. Steven Epstein has argued that Genoa sat in the middle of a trading network that stretched from England to Egypt, with wool and silk becoming the most prominent industries. See *Genoa and the Genoese 958–1528* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 232, 276.

54. Rosalba Ragosta, *Stato, mercanti, e tintori di seta nel regno di Napoli, sec. XVI–XVIII* (Naples: Istituto di Storia Economica, 1988).

55. Thomas Allison Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in the Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559–1684* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 86.

56. Domenico Gioffrè, “Il Commercio d'importazione genovese alla luce dei registri del dazio (1495–1537)” in *Studi in Onore di Amintore Fanfani*, 5 vols. (Milan: Giuffrè, 1962), 113–242.

57. See Giovanni Brancaccio, “Consoli, colonia Genovese ed attività mercantile nella Napoli moderna” in *Rapporti diplomatici e scambi commerciali nel Mediterraneo moderno*, ed., Mirella Maf Ricci (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2005), 197–206.

58. Rosalba Ragosta, *Napoli, Città della Seta Produzione e Mercato in Età Moderna* (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 2009), 68.

contrast, on the rest of the European continent, guilds made it very difficult for newcomers to enter their ranks and to maintain privileges – the position of guild master, which involved overseeing the general population of artisan craftsmen, was generally held by local members of the merchant class, and few guild members were foreigners.⁵⁹ But in Naples the opposite was common, and half of the guild masters were Neapolitan while the other half were foreign.⁶⁰ The Genoese dominated the guild system by holding the two positions of guild master and guild merchant. In fact, in each silk guild, half of the masters were Genoese as were half of the merchants.⁶¹

This anomaly clearly resulted from the Aragonese and Spanish policy that sought to balance “privileges” against tax revenue. Privileges permitted the Genoese to penetrate the local industry. Matriculation fees, however,

59. See R. Burr Litchfield, “The Social World: Conflict, Collision, and the City” in *Early Modern Italy*, ed. John A. Marino (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 87–103. The Conservatorio dei SS. Filippo e Giacomo della seta was created in 1523. Consuls of the guild, dyers, threaders, and weavers contributed to a yearly tax to the guild to protect their orphan daughters. See Scipione Staffà, *Del Riordinamento degli Stabilimenti di Napoli*, 1867. In 1567, the Chiesa di Santa Maria dell’aiuto dei coltrari di seta (literally those who plow the silk) was created by Neapolitan Giacomo Citarella and Giovanni Migliaccio. See Emersto Vecchione and Ettore Genovese, *Le istituzioni di beneficenza nella città di Napoli: Estratto delle opere inedite dell’avvocato Ernesto Vecchione, Storia della beneficenza napoletana e Guida pratica delle Opere Pie di Napoli* (Naples: Premiata Scuola Tipografica dei Sordomuti, 1908). Guild privileges included a separate tribunal and prisons for guild members. The *Conservatorio di S. Rosa dell’arte della lana* was created in 1616 under the explicit desire of the wool makers’ corporation and was designed to protect the daughters of guild members. See Scipione Staffà, *Del Riordinamento degli Stabilimenti*.

60. Guilds were usually “fearful of losing or diluting their economic dominance and privileged status, which might be challenged by newcomers, in particular when they had a stake in local government. They therefore limited or hampered the economic and social integration of immigrants.” See David Jacoby, “The Migration of Merchants and Craftsmen: A Mediterranean Perspective (12th–15th Century),” in *Trade, Commodities and Shipping in the Medieval Mediterranean*, ed. David Jacoby (Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1997), 533–560.

61. In the statutes of San Filippo and Giacomo, the silk guild attached to the congregation founded in 1523, of the six masters one had to be Genoese, another one Florentine, and another Lombard. For an essay on urban identity, see Piero Ventura, “Mercato delle risorse e identità urbana; cittadinanza e mestiere a Napoli tra XVI e XVII secolo” in *Le Regole dei Mestieri e delle Professioni, Secoli XV–XIX* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2000), 268–304.

	Masters	Merchants	Workers
Neapolitans	22,000	40,000	50,000
Genoese	22,000	22,000	1,000
Tuscans	12,000	13,000	20,000
Catalans	11,000	10,000	15,000

Source: This table is based on records from ASN, Mercanti registrati al Consolato del' Arte della Seta: Libro delle Matricole, vol. 1 to 6.

TABLE 3.4 Occupation of the nations in the Neapolitan Silk Guild from 1515 to 1600

enabled the crown to somewhat withdraw the exemptions. The number of people accepted in the guild was dependent on the amount of taxes the Spanish state collected. Luigi De Rosa has argued that through the matriculation fee, the Spanish viceroys transformed every craft into a guild as a source of income.⁶² The foreigners who could afford them paid the high taxes on corporations' matriculation fees. Guild masters held the secrets of the trade but were also responsible for the production of the guild. Hence, those who had a stake in the economy fueled production and paid taxes to the viceregal court. This system guaranteed the well-being of trading minorities while heightening production, backed by the avid hand of the Spanish state.

Table 3.4 illustrates the Genoese monopoly in the silk guilds as both masters and merchants. The registers include three categories of guild members: masters, merchants, and workers. The Genoese were conspicuous in the first two categories. Utilizing their talents as guild masters and/or silk traders, they left the actual craftsmanship to local artisans. The Neapolitans tended to

62. See "Le corporazioni nel sud della Penisola: problemi interpretativi," in *Studi Storici* Luigi Simeoni, n.41 (1991), 55–56. The numerous restrictions imposed on the guild merchants and producers led to abundant litigation. ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria n. 20, Curia dell'arte della lana, Inventario n.512. Similarly, guild members were constantly tried for infringing on laws regarding cloth dyeing, debts to local merchants, or tax owed to the Spanish administration. See for instance ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria n. 20, Curia dell'arte della lana, Fascio 1 fascicolo 11: Atti per la creazione dei consoli della curia. Articoli adottati nella causa di Don Pedro de Toledo contro i consoli della curia. Quietanza (1546–54).

production and local dissemination; Genoese merchants handled the distribution outside the kingdom. At the end of the Aragonese era, a redistribution of the diasporic communities occurred. Neapolitans composed the greatest number of merchants, which highlights the dynamism of internal markets. The Genoese were no longer connected to craftsmanship, dedicating themselves entirely to mastership and sales. Venetians were no longer included, whereas the Tuscan nation was evenly distributed among the three categories. Finally, Neapolitans were by far the largest group, but in terms of positions of power the Genoese undoubtedly led. In Naples from 1515 to 1558, one of the guild masters was invariably a Genoese.⁶³ In fact, the number of Genoese masters equaled that of Neapolitans.

The Genoese came to control production and distribution because of their involvement with European markets that demanded Neapolitan silk. From 1558 to 1570, they consolidated their merchant roles, working in concert with Neapolitans, Castilians, Catalans, French, Flemish, Germans, and traders from the rest of the Italian peninsula such as Milanese, Florentines, Venetians, Romans, Lucchese, and Messinese.⁶⁴ Genoese merchants were able to connect northern and southern markets, but the Neapolitans were not. As a result, the dichotomy between production (dominated by Neapolitans) and exportation (dominated by foreigners) became so severe that in the 1600s, Antonio Serra described Neapolitans as displaying little industriousness.⁶⁵

Because major guilds gradually fell under the control of Genoese merchants, the guild system became a means for dominating the labor market.⁶⁶

63. ASN, Mercanti registrati al Consolato del' Arte della Seta: Libro delle Matricole vol. 1. Microfilm vol. 1–12.

64. *Ibid.*, vol. 2 & 3 (1573–84), vol. 4 (1584–92) & vol. 5 (1592–99).

65. “Not only do Neapolitans not tend to commerce outside of Italy or any other region of the peninsula, but they are not even able to emulate the entrepreneurship of the other Italians in the kingdom.” See *Breve trattato delle cause che possono fare abbondare li regni d’oro e d’argento dove sono miniere con applicazione al Regno di Napoli* (Naples: Scoriggio, 1613), 105. This lack of entrepreneurship might have been due in part to the entrenched feudal system that produced landowners rather than traders. Those who did engage in trade made wrong political alliances, as the rebellions of 1464 and 1528 exemplify. Following these upheavals, the local nobility lost both lives and estates.

66. Recent scholarship on European economic history argues that as a result of innovation, technological change, and entrepreneurship, early modern craft guilds formed the backbone of industrial production before the rise of the steam engine and created institutional environments conducive to technological and marketing

	1,515	1,525	1,535	1,545	1,550	1,560	1,580	1,590	1,600
Neapolitans	1,800	5,000	6,000	5,000	6,500	5,000	5,500	6,000	6,500
Genoese	1,600	2,200	3,000	2,500	1,500	4,000	3,500	4,000	4,000
Tuscans	1,000	1,500	2,000	1,000	800	3,000	2,000	3,000	3,000
Catalans	200	1,000	200	220	200	2,000	1,000	1,000	2,000
Sicilians	300	500	200	180	180	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,500
Spanish	400	500	200	150	140	500	400	550	550
Other	800	200	300	300	200	200	200	300	300

Source: This table is based on records from ASN, Mercanti registrati al Consolato del' Arte della Seta: Libro delle Matricole, vol. 1 to 6.

TABLE 3.5 Population of the Neapolitan Silk Guild from 1515 to 1600

Table 3.5 emphasizes that from 1515 to 1600, the Neapolitans were the chief nation involved in silk production, followed immediately by the Genoese and then the Tuscans. At the end of the fifteenth century, the masters of the craft lost their independence to merchant capital, enabling

innovations. See Stephen R. Epstein and Maarten Prak eds., *Guilds, Innovation, and the European Economy, 1400–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially Stephen R. Epstein, “Craft Guilds: Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Pre-industrial Europe,” 26–51, and Francesca Trivellato, “Guilds: Technology and Economic Change in Early Modern Venice,” 199–231. For Venice, see the quintessential study of Robert Davis, *Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and Workplace in the Preindustrial City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). The city’s shipyard hosted the greatest manufacturing complex in early modern Europe, with about three thousand masters, apprentices, and laborers. A lively debate between Stephen R. Epstein and Sheilagh Ogilve occurred in 2008 via the *Economic History Review*. Stephen R. Epstein, “Craft Guilds in the Pre-modern Economy: A Discussion,” 61:1, 155–174 argued that the guilds offered a superior organizational matrix for the acquisition and deployment of skills by most urban artisans working under the prevailing technological, commercial, and political circumstances. In contrast, Sheilagh Ogilve, “Rehabilitating the Guilds: A Reply,” 61:1, 175–182 replied that the guilds kept the economic pie small but distributed large slices to powerful groups such as masters, town officials, princes, and bureaucrats and by so doing prevented the production of lower-quality products, forcing poor consumers to rely on black markets, and therefore had no legal protection.

the Genoese to have a true impact on the guilds. Quality (for the sake of reputation) lost in favor of quantity (for the sake of export). Even though the guild structure remained intact, it served as a mere façade that allowed the merchant-entrepreneurs to hide the full extent of their power. As a result, throughout the Italian peninsula, merchants were labeled the real masters of the “trading game.”⁶⁷ The relationship between merchants and master craftsmen became conflicted: artisans favored professional prestige, whereas merchants worked according to the principle of competition.⁶⁸ Neapolitan artisans sought to produce good quality pieces whereas Genoese merchants concentrated on production, organizing it for export.

The collaboration between local and Genoese merchants through the guild transformed southern Italy into one of the European leaders in silk production in Habsburg times. In 1527, the Venetian ambassador Marco Foscarelli estimated the production of silk in Florence at 33,900 kilos (74,580 pounds); by the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was at 69,900 (153,000 pounds).⁶⁹ Contrast this growth rate with that in Naples, where the government calculated 40,100 kilos (88,000 pounds) before 1578, after which it shot up to 104,300 kilos (228,000 pounds) by the end of the sixteenth century, surpassing Florence by far.⁷⁰ Between 1607 and 1608, guild members recorded production at 202,500 kilos (444,400 pounds), which clearly put Naples at the top of European silk-cloth production in the early seventeenth century.⁷¹ Data discovered during the past decade suggest that Calabria alone produced 181,800 kilos (398,200 pounds) of spun silk by the mid-sixteenth century, a number that doubled by the last

67. Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce*, 301.

68. The tension between merchants and weavers (who asked for more professional autonomy) flared up into a social conflict in 1647 during the Revolt of Masaniello. See Rosalba Ragosta Portioli, “Conflicts and Norms in the Silkmakers’ Guild in Naples in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries” in *Guilds, Markets, and Work Regulations in Italy, 16th–19th Centuries*, eds. Alberto Guenzi, Paola Massa, and Fausto Piola Caselli (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), 211–226.

69. G. Arnolfini stated that Lucca produced 360,000 pounds of silk in 1500. Tommaso Fanfani argues it was an Indian summer and that a crisis emerged slowly thereafter. See “The Guilds in Italian Economic Developments” in *Guilds, Markets, and Work Regulations*, 395–422.

70. This number is explained by the fact that most of the silk did not enter local production but was shipped to be manufactured elsewhere in the peninsula or across Europe.

71. Molà, *The Silk Industry*, 18–19.

quarter of the century.⁷² This number indicates the amount exported via the customs office, not that produced – we know that much of the silk was exported clandestinely.⁷³ In fact, estimates determined production in the provinces of Terra di Lavoro, Capitanata, Contado di Molise, Bari, and Otranto to be about 722,000 pounds in 1588,⁷⁴ and Calabria alone produced at least 900,000 pounds in 1615.⁷⁵ The Genoese ability to connect the kingdom to their commercial nodes created important outlets for this silk.

FROM MERCHANTS TO FINANCIERS: NAPLES CONNECTS TO EUROPE, 1580–1650

Finally, the Genoese converted from merchants to financiers. The Habsburg political and commercial centralization of the royal domains benefited the Genoese. At the dawn of the sixteenth century, competition over southern Italy's market existed; with the Habsburg ascent, Florentines and Genoese, two banking nations, supplanted both Venetians and Catalans. Neither the Catalans nor the Venetians moved from commerce into banking, so they could not make massive loans to the Spanish Crown. Both Genoese and Florentines could. Banking and commerce thus became inexorably linked. The fate of the kingdom lay with the nation that could invest the most in the interests of the Spanish Crown.

The period from 1570 to 1600 was one of steep economic growth for the Genoese because of the international policy of the Spanish Crown. In 1556, the crown went from Charles V to Philip II, consolidating the role of the Genoese as bankers of the Spanish Empire. The shift from artisans who concentrated on quality and production to merchant bankers who concentrated on production for exportation, sales, and profit was in tune with the Genoese's new banking vocation. Most Genoese banks that served the Spanish Crown were located in Genoa, in which Naples was an important

72. Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 155.

73. It is estimated that between twenty and thirty percent of the produced silk was sold clandestinely. See Rosalba Ragosta, *Napoli, Città della Seta*, n. 20.

74. *Ibid.*, 41.

75. Giuseppe Galasso, *Economia e Società nella Calabria del Cinquecento* (Naples: Guida, 1992), 172, 370.

hub in the western Mediterranean. After 1571, a crucial year for Mediterranean relations as a result of the Battle of Lepanto, the Genoese became the alter ego of the Spanish Crown. In 1588, Spain suffered a disastrous political and financial defeat against England. Over the sixteenth century, the Genoese focus on finances, exports, and banking with services rendered to the Spanish Crown became more concrete.⁷⁶ Their heavy involvement in finance, both in Naples and in Habsburg Europe, coincided with an increasing interest in silk guilds. Along with grain, the Genoese investment in silk production and export formed the basis of their economic stake in the kingdom.

By utilizing their mesh of ties with foreign merchants, local producers, and Spanish kings, Genoese merchants succeeded in connecting the kingdom to the greater European economy.⁷⁷ Although production was still centered in Calabria, the guilds, tribunals (which granted licenses to export), foreign banks and merchants (mainly Genoese), and the viceregal court made Naples an international center of commerce: a trading outpost from which foreign entrepreneurs could ship their merchandise to their international markets in the Netherlands, England, Spain, and Genoa.⁷⁸ The region generated resources that circulated in the European fairs, thereby enriching both Genoese and European markets. In the mid-sixteenth century, the merchandise exported from the kingdom, such as oil, grain, silk, wool, and nuts, was valued at three million scudi per year, whereas imports totaled only 600,000 scudi.⁷⁹ The Genoese and other Italian merchants who served the crown performed a large part of the distribution.

76. In his study of the Genoese capital, Quentin van Dosselaere claims that during the fifteenth century with the loss of control of trading routes, commerce suffered. However, the tighter core of elite families was well positioned for the sixteenth-century's first wave of financial capitalism because raising funds and accessing liquidity were dependent on dense banking connections. See *Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 207.

77. Domenico Sella has argued that large cities in the hinterland of Italy (away from the typical centers of Florence, Venice, and Milan) were becoming increasingly the centers of industries such as wool, iron, and papermaking because they were cheaper in a myriad of ways. First, the countryside was not subject to the rigid guild system; second, the hefty tax of large cities was nonexistent. See *Trade and Industry in Early Modern Italy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009).

78. For the link with the Netherlands, see John A. Marino, *L'Economia Pastorale nel Regno di Napoli* (Naples: Guida, 1992).

79. Coniglio, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 145.

In 1580, Portugal and Castile came under joint rule: this politics of centralization in Castile led to a politics of commercial centralization in southern Italy. Silk now had to be shipped from Naples, and those engaged in the guilds were to be registered in the capital city. A *Concordia* among silk tax farmers, silk guild members, and the Spanish customs house agreed to increase twofold the exportation rate on raw silk.⁸⁰ One would assume that this would bring the prosperous silk exportation to an end because transactions (or tax rates) were now based on the value and not on the weight of the silk. Instead, the *Concordia* first produced an increase in the manufacturing of finished silk cloth. Naples now manufactured both silk threads and woven textiles. Second, the merchants sold their raw silk locally rather than exporting it. This meant that local markets acquired commercial vitality. Third, after the *Concordia*, foreign merchants were able to negotiate the tax on raw silk with the Spanish authorities; they could export raw silk to Genoa and finished silk products not only to Genoa and Rome, but also to Lucca and Milan, changing the productive aspect of the city of Naples's *tessiture* (silk and cloth workshops).⁸¹ In the later sixteenth century, Naples exported both finished cloth and raw and spun silk to be woven into fabrics. Naples became a Genoese entrepôt and the crown was able to keep an eye on taxpayers involved in the guilds.

From 1580 on, northern markets depended on southern production and Genoese suppliers.⁸² The *tessiture* of Naples were supplied with raw wool and silk from Apulia, Abruzzo, and Calabria, creating a real presence of southern Italy in the international market of silk manufacture.⁸³ Silk became the kingdom's chief resource, along with other exported products such as saffron and wool. Productive capacity in Naples reached 3,200 bales (about 265 tons) of raw silk per year, not counting at least 200 bales in clandestine exports. Most of the silk was manufactured outside Naples, especially in Catanzaro,

80. ASN, Consulte, Arrendamento della seta, Sommario de Arrendamenti, vol 1968, "Concordia tra la Regia Corte, l'Arrendatore delle sete ed i Consoli dell'Arte della seta," November 15, 1580, ff. 158–163.

81. Jean Delumeau, *Vita Economica e Sociale di Roma nel Cinquecento* (Florence: Sansoni, 1979), 26–27.

82. For instance, Giulio Ravaschiero bought in Stilo 142 pounds of silk (A.S. Reggio, G. Vitale, f 23, March 5, 1563); Pietro Francesco Ravaschiero acquired 480 tomoli of grain (A.S.N, Sommaria, Relevii, 352, ff 464).

83. D. Domenico Grimaldi, *Osservazioni Economiche Sopra la Manifattura e Commercio delle Sete del Regno di Napoli: alle Sue Finanze* (Naples: G.M. Porcelli, 1780).

which became the principal center of manufacture, closely followed by the capital. The Genoese were involved in much of the exportation of the silk. About ninety percent of the silk that was produced in Sicily was destined for Genoese merchants.⁸⁴ Genoese merchants depended on local production, which itself relied on export by merchants. Cities such as Reggio, Paola, and Tropea asked for silk manufacturing facilities to be opened: this was granted in 1611 and 1613. Tropea claimed that production costs would fall if foreign merchants did not export the raw silk.⁸⁵

Figure 3.1 illustrates the spread of silk markets across the European continent, which made the *Mezzogiorno* a major link among consumers of fine cloth. Thanks to the *Concordia*, Naples eventually became an exporter of finished silk commodities, called “new cloth” or “light cloth” and embroidered with silver and gold, to foreign markets such as Flanders, Holland, England, Germany, Poland, and Spain. About eighty percent of the silk trade was carried on through fairs in Italy and Europe, such as in Besançon, Piacenza, Provins, Troyes, and Medina del Campo.⁸⁶ Traveling both by sea and by land through the Spanish Road, foreign merchants including the Florentines and Genoese conquered new markets by distributing new Neapolitan silk wares.⁸⁷ It was a win-win situation for the merchants, for whom the city of Naples had become a silk haven.

Throughout the sixteenth century, silk production steadily increased: 524,000 pounds were produced in 1550, 560,000 pounds in 1580, and a grand total of 816,000 pounds in 1586.⁸⁸ In the seventeenth century, these numbers escalated, indicating avid foreign markets for Neapolitan silk. The customs house of Naples registered about 635,000 pounds of silk in 1607 “for the use of the guild.”⁸⁹ These numbers suggest that both production and profit increased, and they also signify that Naples was commercially

84. See ASG, A.S. 2634 (1529–1804: Gaeta–Messina–Palermo), Letter from Consul Stefano de Franchi to Doge of Genoa, December 3, 1565.

85. *Ibid.*, 160–165.

86. Braudel’s *Wheel of Commerce*, 91, refers to the Genoese *cambiatori* who met four times per year at the Fairs of Piacenza.

87. For a contemporary study on Florentine silk taxation, see *Provisione sopra li drappi forestieri et lor gabelle: con la prohibitione delli ori falsi* (Florence: Giunti, 1575).

88. Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 154–156.

89. ASN, Arte della Seta, II numerazione, b. 19, fascicolo 14, “Conto di sete sane e filate che si introducono in Napoli per uso dell’arte per fare drappi dal 31 luglio 1607 al 9 luglio 1608.”



FIGURE 3.1. Movement of silk from the Kingdom of Naples from 1580 on

linked to the rest of Europe via the Genoese, who made handsome profits. Writers of the time state that the Spanish kings were able to acquire 2.5 million ducats each year in tax revenue from the Kingdom of Naples. Of this, the tax on exported raw silk provided 250,000 ducats per year.⁹⁰ This means that silk represented ten percent of Spain's total Neapolitan tax revenue annually.

90. In the mid-sixteenth century, southern Italy produced a total of 1.2 million tomoli of grain (48 million kilos or more than 105 million pounds). Giovan Battista Mazza and Gasparo Uccelli, *Recueil factice d'histoire généalogique et portraits de souverains de divers états* (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 1598), 23.

Peregrine Horden, a scholar of the Mediterranean, has recently proposed that the region can be better understood if we examine history through its ecological habitat, offering the systemic approach of the fig leaf.⁹¹ Fig leaves generally hide something of greater importance behind them. Behind the silk manufacturing cities of Venice, Lucca, and Bologna hid the real fertile fruit: southern Italy. The Genoese transitioned from artisans to merchants and finally to financiers. Their involvement in the silk guild, whether at the manufacturing or distribution level, had a deep impact on local and international markets. The internationalization of guilds allowed large-scale production and distribution. The Genoese pressed the Neapolitan guilds to adjust to the ever-increasing market. As a result of Genoese collaboration with local merchants and artisans, the kingdom placed among the leading European metropolises in commodity exports in early modern times.

The Genoese involvement in silk distribution had both local and continental implications. At the height of the early modern age, southern Italy was the only one of all the Spanish domains in Europe that produced a continuous economic surplus.⁹² The mid-sixteenth century marked a watershed in the history of the kingdom's industry. Genoese artisans became financiers of the crown as their mercantile investments buoyed the increasingly expensive Habsburg Empire. At the same time, the Kingdom of Naples emerged as a vital component of Europe's precapitalist economy and of the Genoese commercial empire, thanks to the long-distance trade networks of diasporic nations, the Aragonese-Spanish Crown's encouraging cosmopolitan environment, and the bestowing of commercial privileges.

The [next chapter](#) examines the commercial competition among the trading nations in the orbit of the Spanish Crown. The nations involved in craft and trade asserted themselves economically and socially in the kingdom. Their search for royal privileges heightened the sense of rivalry among them. The Genoese relationship with some nations (such as the Catalans) was symbiotic; with others (such as the Florentines), it was competitive. What invites reflection because it goes to the heart of how

91. Peregrine Horden, conference on "Can We Talk Mediterranean?" University of Colorado, Boulder, April 6–7, 2012.

92. See Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. by Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1972 [1949]), 503.

diasporic communities interacted in early modern times is the fact that certain nations could cooperate in one place and be divided in others. Southern Italy is such an example of cooperation and division among merchant nations. For a diasporic nation, commercial success led to financial success.

CHAPTER FOUR

Achieving Favorite Nation Status: The Economic Journey of the Genoese

Al mio tempo ho veduto grandi signori perdere il stato e deventar pastori

(In my time, I have seen many lords lose their state/status and become shepherds)

—GENOESE FINANCIER'S OBSERVATION IN THE 1530S¹

The Genoese were the masters of international payment, of the fortunes both of Europe and the World, the not-unchallenged but well-entrenched masters of the politics of Spain.

—FERNAND BRAUDEL, *The Mediterranean*²

“Not losing one’s status” was of utmost significance for a trading nation in premodern times. In southern Italy, a trading nation’s powerful status reinforced its commercial opportunities. Braudel has proposed that the Genoese were masters of Spanish politics through their manipulation of European commerce and finances. Status was another way to reach that goal. Catalans, Florentines, and Genoese competed to maintain royal privileges from the Spanish kings through wealth (tax breaks and trade concessions), resources (mainly fiefs),

1. ASG, Archivio Segreto, Litterarum “Litterarum Registri” n.1837 (1528–34).

2. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, translated by Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 393.

and prestige (titles of nobility).³ The relationship among trading nations was by definition therefore largely determined by rivalry over the Spanish kings' favors. In the competition among the trading nations, the Genoese ultimately achieved economic and political dominance.

The Genoese ascended to the status of favorite nation by taking advantage of the economic shortcomings of the Florentines and Catalans. The fading of the Catalans in the early modern period is well documented. Economic crises and wars resulted in their disappearance from the Mediterranean economy.⁴ Although the Florentines continued to prosper on the European continent, their economic downfall in Naples was the result of embezzlement, as this chapter will underscore. At the outset, the Genoese opted to cooperate with the Catalans during the late Middle Ages, when both nations were merely functioning as merchants. But when the Genoese started to occupy administrative positions and to operate as bankers for the Spanish Crown in southern Italy, they proceeded to compete with both the Catalans and the Florentines. Finally, when they diversified their occupations by dedicating themselves to both trading and banking, they were able to eliminate both their Florentine and Catalan competitors.

Genoese financial support and martial assistance to the Spanish Crown proceeded alongside the three phases of cooperation, competition, and

3. Although the Venetians were among the most important trading nations in the Kingdom of Naples, the Genoese were mainly preoccupied by those nations that competed for favors vis-à-vis the Spanish Crown. Principally acting as independent agents and never as financiers of the Spanish Crown, the Venetians never endangered the symbiosis between the Spanish and the Genoese; hence, they do not figure predominantly in the sources as main competitors for social and financial favors from the Spanish Crown.

4. David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) offers a history of the Mediterranean through trade activities and while doing so stresses that Genoese, Greeks, Phoenicians, Venetians, and Catalans all dominated the sea at some point. Mario del Treppo, *Els Mercaders Catalans y l'Expansió de la Corona Catalano-Aragonesa al Segle XV*, translated by Jaume Riera i Sans (Barcelona: Curial Ed., 1972), reduced the crisis to "difficulties," but Jaume Vicens Vives, *Juan de Aragon (1398–1479): Monarquía y revolución en la España del siglo XV* (Pamplona: Urgoiti Editores, 2003) and Pierre Vilar, "Le déclin catalan du bas Moyen Âge: Hypothèses sur sa chronologie," *Estudios de Historia Moderna* 6 (1956–1959), 1–68 spoke about a real economic crisis. Similarly and recently Maria Teresa Ferrer in "Catalan Commerce in the Late Middle Ages," *Catalan Historical Review* 5 (2012), 29–65, has argued that wars had disastrous effects on the Catalan economy.

dominance in banking and trade. The first historical period, that of cooperation between the Genoese and the Catalans, corresponded to the Aragonese expansion into the Mediterranean Sea in the 1300s and ran until the 1500s. The second stage, that of competition between the Genoese and the Florentines, corresponded to the Spanish conflict with the Ottoman Turks over the Mediterranean (1480–1580). The third period, which saw the economic ascent of the Genoese, ran parallel to the last flames of the Iberian–Ottoman struggle for Mediterranean hegemony (1580–1640).⁵ The Genoese commitment to link southern Italy to their international financial network, their service in various administrative positions, their military assistance, the diversification of their commercial portfolio, and their ability to rescue the crown from their competitors' mismanagement of state money enabled the Genoese to reach a true economic symbiosis with the Spanish Crown.

Commenting on the tense relationship among the Italian trading nations, Fernand Braudel remarked that “[t]he Italian cities somehow contrived to hate each other, to quarrel with each other and yet to support each other against outsiders.”⁶ Although this assertion holds true for other parts of the Italian peninsula, in southern Italy the Genoese relationships with the other nations, including the Spanish, were more ambiguous. The Genoese nurtured amicable relationships with some nations at times while forcefully competing with others at other times. Philip Curtin has noticed that “where the host society dominated, the merchants [in a diaspora] were unlikely to develop formal political relations with other merchant communities. At the

5. The ascension of Henri IV to the French throne in 1589 fed the antagonism between Turks and Spaniards. As the French sought Ottoman support for expansion on the European continent, the Mediterranean conflict hardly ceased after 1580. The multifarious sources on Genoese support of the Spanish Crown are indicative of the need to reevaluate the periodization of the conflict. I extend the period of Mediterranean conflicts to 1620, which marks the initial stages of the Thirty Years' War.

6. Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century*, vol. 2, translated by Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 153. Following that thought, Claudio Marsilio has shown that Genoese, Bolognesi, Milanese, and Florentines shared common objectives and strategies at the Italian fairs even after the mid-seventeenth century, a period seen as one of economic decadence. See “Fiere di cambio italiane e mercati del credito europeo: la rivalità tra gli operatori finanziari genovesi e fiorentini nella prima metà del XVII secolo” in *Comprendere le monarchie iberiche: Risorse materiali e rappresentazioni del potere*, ed., Gaetano Sabatini (Rome: Viella, 2010), 191–205.

same time, where the merchants controlled a settlement and its neighborhood it was at least possible that they could have political relationships with other equivalent settlements.”⁷ Such was the case in southern Italy, where an absent Spanish Crown left political authority to viceroys and economic supremacy to foreign traders.⁸ The Genoese’s slow ascent to economic hegemony in southern Italy was the result of their capacity not only to seize opportunities by either competing or cooperating with their rival trading nations, but also to exploit the Spanish Crown’s dynastic expansion on the European continent and in the Mediterranean Sea.

GENOESE AND CATALANS IN SOUTHERN ITALY: COOPERATION 1300–1580

During the Middle Ages, the relationship between the Genoese and the Catalans in southern Italy was one of cooperation. Scholars often argue that Catalan and Genoese traders were bitter economic rivals for Mediterranean trade hegemony. Close examination of their relationship both with each other and with the Spanish Crown, however, reveals that the two nations enjoyed a great degree of interaction and solidarity.⁹ Even though in places such as Corsica, Sardinia, Athens, or North Africa, Genoese and Catalans did not necessarily cooperate, in southern Italy the opposite occurred, speaking to the different nature of trade diaspora. Genoese and Catalans first started to cooperate in Sicily and later extended their collaboration to Naples. Their strategy aimed at rendering themselves indispensable to the crown by serving as customs officers, tax collectors, town bankers, grain importers, military commanders, galley providers, and liaisons with the other trading nations. Both Genoese and Catalans served as protectors of the region in exchange for trading rights. The Genoese benefited from their commercial networks in the North, Mediterranean, and Black Seas to

7. Philip Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7.

8. David Abulafia has argued that in the economic competition between “Latins” and Catalans, royal power was of little consequence. See “The South” in *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, edited by John M. Najemy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 208–225.

9. Although in the islands such as Sardinia and Corsica, Catalans and Genoese fought for supremacy, in the south of Italy from 1300 to 1500, they cooperated.

eventually settle in southern Italy. Similarly, the Catalans established close links with the Muslim parts of the Iberian Peninsula, gaining access to the Barbary Coast and the Byzantine Empire.¹⁰ Eventually, both consolidated their positions through the aid of privileges granted by the Aragonese sovereigns. The Castilian rulers renewed these privileges when they inherited the southern Italian domains.¹¹

Genoese and Catalan merchants arrived in Sicily before the Iberian Crown did; indeed, during the war of the Sicilian Vespers in 1282, both provided manpower in the conquest of territory from the French Angevins.¹² In 1117, the Genoese were granted the right to a consulate along with a *loggia*. The Catalans obtained the right to a *loggia* in 1286, and most importantly the privilege to be free from royal customs. The *loggie* were important institutions because they guaranteed civil and criminal jurisdiction over the merchants' own conationals.¹³ In 1258, King

10. See David Abulafia, "Catalan Merchants and the Western Mediterranean, 1236–1300: Studies in the Notarial Acts of Barcelona and Sicily," in *Viator*, 16 (1985), 209–242.

11. See tax privileges granted to both nations in the Archivio di Stato della Gancia Palermo (ASPa), Secrezia di Palermo vol. 1582: Informazione sull'Osservanza della Dogana di Palermo. For the Catalans, see the works of Mario del Treppo, "Stranieri nel Regno di Napoli: Le élites finanziarie e la strutturazione dello spazio economico e politico" in *Dentro la città: Stranieri e realtà urbane nell'Europa dei secoli XII–XVI*, (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1999), 179–233. *I mercanti catalani e l'espansione della Corona d'Aragona nel secolo XV* (Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1972). "Il re e il mercante: strumenti e processi di razionalizzazione dello Stato aragonese di Napoli" in *Spazio società e potere nell'Italia dei Comuni*, ed., Gabriella Rossetti (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1986), 255–304. See also Imma Schiappoli, *Napoli aragonese: traffici e attività marinare* (Naples: Francesco Giannini e Figli, 1972). For the Genoese, see Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XVème Siècle: Civilisation méditerranéenne, grand capitalisme, et capitalisme populaire* (Paris: Flammarion, 1971). Roberto S. López, "Quattrocento genovese," in *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXXV (1963), 709–27. Edoardo Grendi, "Traffico portuale, naviglio mercantile e consolati genovesi nel Cinquecento" in *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXXX (1968), 593–629.

12. For a good sketch on the activities of foreign merchants in the kingdom during the high Middle Ages, see Pietro Corrao, "Mercanti stranieri e regno di Sicilia: Sistema di protezione e modalità di radicamento nella società cittadina," in *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche in Europa (Secoli XII–XVII)*, edited by Mario del Treppo (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1994), 87–112.

13. The Viceroy Prince Filiberto's decree of February 4, 1588, specified that the Genoese consulate had jurisdiction and extraterritoriality for all Genoese citizens. See ASG, A.S. 2647 n.306, Letter from Consul Camillo Pallavicino to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, April 3, 1623. For a work on the role of the funduk or *loggia*, see Olivia Remie Constable,

Manfred conferred tax exemptions and trading rights on the Genoese nation; in 1296, King Jaume granted the same to the Catalans. By the time the Aragonese Crown acquired Sicily in 1282, both the Catalans and the Genoese were firmly established on the island. From 1282 to 1479, the Aragonese monarchs strengthened their hold on Sicily.¹⁴

Genoese and Catalans drew on their medieval commercial linkages with the eastern Mediterranean to transform the island into their stepping-stone to the Levant. Sicily stood at the center of the “spice route,” and all vessels from the Levant anchored in Sicily. With the coalition of Aragon and Castile, the island replaced Levantine entrepôts as centers for Catalan and Genoese commercial and monetary activities. The Catalan and Genoese bases in Sicily were Palermo and Trapani; in addition, the Genoese controlled Messina and the Catalans Erice.¹⁵ They both shared a *loggia* at Piazza Garrafello in Palermo, and in Trapani their *loggie* were adjacent in the Ruga Amalfitana.¹⁶ Catalans and Genoese exported oil, wine, cheese, olives, sugar, liquor, garlic, coral, spices, wool, salted fish, pork, and beef from

Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

14. In 1409, the Sicilian branch of the Aragonese dynasty died out, and the island was joined to the main line, which ruled from Barcelona. Alphonsus the Magnanimous's triumphal entry into Naples in 1442 marks the height of the Aragonese Empire in the Mediterranean. Choosing Naples as his place of residence, he never returned to his Iberian domains and was the first ruler since 1282 to hold both Naples and Sicily.

15. There was a church of the Genoese built in the cloister of San Lorenzo in Messina. See ASG, Giunta di Marina n. 2 (1636) Consoli Nationali et esteri (1601–94), from Gio Battista Cigala to Doge of Genoa, Palermo, May 26, 1631. According to my records, the island counted the jurisdiction of three consuls: in Palermo, in Messina, and in Trapani. See ASG, Giunta di Marina n. 2, from the Consul of Trapani to the Doge of Genoa, Trapani, March 28, 1620. The Catalans also counted as many consuls as towns they occupied. The Catalan church was in the center of Messina adjacent to the Norman cathedral. See Andrea Romano, “La condizione giuridica di stranieri e mercanti in Sicilia nei secoli XIV–XV,” in *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche*, 113–132.

16. Carmelo Federico declares that from 1100 to 1800, the Genoese conducted business in Piazza Garrafello, where the Catalans later joined them. See *I Mercanti Genovesi in Sicilia e la Chiesa della loro “Nazione” in Palermo* (Palermo: Graf. Luigi Cappugi, 1958), 20. Both nations owned *loggie* in each harbor town. For instance the Genoese had a *loggia* in Syracuse and the Catalans in Messina. See Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World*, 210.

Sicily.¹⁷ They also extracted silk, wheat, cotton, grain, and salt, all important staple products of the Renaissance Mediterranean.¹⁸ Catalans and Genoese took these products from Sicily and distributed them into the European fairs.¹⁹

In the thirteenth century, Catalans and Genoese had the same vested interests in the island: both Genoa and Barcelona were growing cities with large populations to feed. Both had to import grain. Also, both served as centers of cotton production.²⁰ During the Renaissance the Genoese chose to concentrate on silk, whereas the Catalans distributed Catalanian, English, Flemish, and French cloth across the Mediterranean. Sicily provided a ready market for manufactured goods. During the Aragonese rule of the island, the Catalans furnished Sicily with processed goods and obtained foodstuffs in exchange.²¹ It was the Catalan merchants who started the custom of working with the Aragonese kings in Sicily for the pursuit of mutual benefits. The Catalans provided military services in return for rights to import cloth to the island. Since the fifteenth century, cloth (silk) was the island's only significant import.²² The Catalans' proceeds surpassed those of other European merchant nations in Sicily. Catalonia was the wealthiest province within the Kingdom of Aragón's federation. Catalan trade profits had made possible the construction of a vigorous merchant marine. Alfonso the Magnanimous's reliance on the Catalan navy was central to his design for military and mercantile expansion in the Mediterranean.²³ During the

17. ASPa, Secrezia di Palermo (1397–1842) vol. 1582: Informazione dell'osservanza della dogana di Palermo: year 1582.

18. See ASPa, Tesoreria Generale (1559–1811), Gabelle di olio, seta, e sale (1638–1700); ASG, A.S. Litterarum, Lettere ministri Napoli, 2328 (1537–1708), n.336, letter from Ms. Gregorio Cattaneo to the Doge of Genoa, Naples, October 31, 1562, indicates that merchants waited impatiently for the galleys from Messina and Palermo to export grain to Naples.

19. The ASN, Banchieri Antichi files indicate that the Genoese and Catalans established in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily regularly conducted business at the fairs of Besançon and Lyon (France), Messina and Piacenza (Italy), Antwerp and Brussels (Netherlands), and Valencia (Spain).

20. Abulafia, "Catalan Merchants."

21. *Ibid.*, 147.

22. Stephan R. Epstein, *An Island for Itself: Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 296–300.

23. Juan Vicens Vives, *Fernando el Católico: Príncipe de Aragón, Rey de Sicilia, 1458–1478* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1952), 39–41.

conquest of Naples in 1442, the Catalans converted ships usually reserved for commercial purposes into military vessels to assist operations between Naples and Sicily.²⁴ Because of the services rendered, the Castilian Crown maintained the Catalan privilege to import cloth during the early modern era. In fact, the Catalans' alliance with the Iberian Crown allowed them to request a monopoly over the importation of cloth.²⁵

The cooperation between the Genoese and the Catalans during this period was largely informed and enhanced by the financial needs of the Spanish administration on the island.²⁶ Thanks to the amalgamation of profits from export trade, Genoese and Catalan traders came to own most of the kingdom's credits and banks.²⁷ Thus, they involved themselves in the majority of the kingdom's monetary transactions. Whereas the Catalans provided credit for local Sicilian court and public offices (their loans provided advances for the military's salaries and loans to officials), the Genoese thrived on intermediate banking and financing functions, linking agricultural producers to their mercantile system, and distributing their goods through the fairs of Europe.²⁸ The merchants' willingness to provide seemingly endless credit allowed them to fill an economic gap in the kingdom. Sicily therefore provided credit though not capital. In other words, Genoese and Catalans provided lines of credit that served to increase the debt of the court, offices, and nobility, but not to increase their capital. Loans to the viceroyal court enlarged Genoese profits. The Genoese quickly converted any loan into short-term loans to the Spanish Crown. When the Spanish viceroy tried to raise money for a donation in 1575, his

24. Mario del Treppo, *Els mercaders catalans*, 140.

25. ASG, A.S. 2647, letter from Consul Hieronimo Centurione to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, February 15, 1536.

26. See Céline Dauverd, "Genoese & Catalans: Trade Diaspora in Early Modern Sicily," *Mediterranean Studies* 15 (2006), 42–61.

27. The Genoese were merchant bankers operating in southern Italy. The most prominent period was between 1509 and 1571, when all bankers were Genoese. See ASN, Sezione Amministrazione n.109, *Banchieri Antichi e Banchi Inventario*. Catalans specialized in trade and state offices rather than in banking, working in communion with the Genoese during the fairs. Conversely, in the Kingdom of Sicily, the Catalan families involved in trade transactions reconverted their profits into private banking.

28. In 1524, Viceroy Monteleone hired Catalan banker Benedetto Ram to serve as collateral of the royal court. See Rossella Cancila, *Fisco Ricchezza Comunità nella Sicilia del Cinquecento* (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Età Moderna e Contemporanea, 2001), 309.

right-hand man Charles of Aragón complained to the king that he had to cajole and flatter the merchants into accepting a royal order of payment of 75,000 scudi. Even then the merchants would advance the money for two months only at an exorbitant interest rate.²⁹

The Genoese and the Catalans adopted a policy of assistance to the local Spanish authorities, which made their cooperation endure and their profits increase. The two trading nations farmed the Kingdom of Sicily's revenues, and the Spaniards on the island offered preferential treatment because of their prospect of greater securities. Their loans to the public offices and involvement in the kingdom's commerce furthered the merchants' links to the Court of the Royal Patrimony (the office that controlled the financial resources of the kingdom). For instance, because of their expertise in the kingdom's commerce and their commitment to the Iberian Crown, both Genoese and Catalans were appointed to the office of harbor master. Harbor masters were in charge of the kingdom's granaries, a vital position for which both nations provided a reliable workforce. In the fifteenth century, they were mainly Catalans from Perpignan,³⁰ and in the sixteenth they were increasingly Genoese.³¹

Through the mid-sixteenth century, Sicily gradually served as the principal source of capital and grain to support Spain's multi-fronted wars. To enhance profits and generate income, the Spanish Crown bestowed royal privileges on the Genoese and Catalans,³² sometimes intervening directly on their behalf with the viceroys on the island. In return, the trading nations generated the profits needed to support the Spanish imperial armed forces. They became, for instance, the principal suppliers of grain for the imperial troops during the Italian Wars (1494–1559).³³ Their profits from the grain trade allowed them to fund the Spaniards to engage in perpetual campaigns to

29. Helmut Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain: A Study in the Practice of Empire* (New York: Staples Press, 1951), 134.

30. Del Treppo, *Els mercaders catalans*, 136.

31. ASPa, Maestro Portulano (1544–1823), the Genoese were conspicuous between the years 1558 to 1608, especially the Spinola family.

32. These privileges were renewed from one viceroy to the next. ASG, A.S. 2792, Letter from Viceroy of Sicily, Marquis of Rigliena to Republic of Genoa, Palermo September 14, 1609.

33. Bankers' records and vessel captains' logs indicate that Catalans and Genoese were active in grain negotiations in southern Italy throughout the early modern era. Most of the operations were written off in Naples, seat of the Genoese banks. On Sicily, Catalan consuls recurrently purchased grain from their Genoese associates in Palermo. For instance,

maintain their hold on the Netherlands (after the revolt of 1567). In other words, they lent money for war because it profited them two ways: via interest on the loans and profits on military procurement.

Tellingly, when the imperial auditor Marchese d'Oriolo dismissed the harbor master of Palermo, Genoese Ottavio Spinola, on the grounds of corruption, the Genoese argued that such a decision would endanger the finances of the state. D'Oriolo retorted that the Genoese were jeopardizing the Sicilian grain trade (presumably because their main concern was profit rather than support to the Sicilians). Without a suitable harbor master, Genoese and Catalan ships remained immobilized in the ports, leaving their valuable cargo to rot. When King Philip II heard of this trade disruption, he backed Spinola by recalling the Spanish auditor, claiming that his duty was not to impose reforms.³⁴ Finding no fault in trying to make profit and needing Genoese trade on the island to maintain its course, he wrote to d'Oriolo that he was to return to Spain with only "the most substantial" accusations.³⁵ This episode underscores the Spanish dependence on Genoese and Catalans grain trade.

Similarly, on the Italian mainland, Genoese and Catalans joined forces to bolster their economic sway. In the Kingdom of Naples, their activities were variegated and the bond between the Catalans and Genoese was ubiquitous in anything that related to trade or official appointment. For instance, their investment and cooperation were salient in the guilds (with more involvement by the Genoese), in the export of spices (which the Catalans monopolized), in banking and trading, in the collection of gabelles, and as the crown's delegates. Working in concert with their team-nation, both Genoese and Catalans used their talents to thrive financially. The Genoese used the commercial networks created by the Catalans, whereas the latter

see ASN, (Banchieri Antichi) B.A. n. 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni, Friday August 4, 1531. Catalan merchants Raffael Galzerano, Martin Buzal e Stefano Vaglies were business acolytes of the Genoese in the corn trade. See for instance, ASN, B.A. n. 13 (1540) Lomellino & Doria.

34. The job of the auditors was in fact to gather information for the king, to propose reforms, and to mediate between different interests (such as those of the aristocracy, the parliament, and the church). See Tommaso Astarita, *Between Salt Water and Holy Water: A History of Southern Italy* (New York: Norton & Co., 2005), 89.

35. *L'Archivio dei Visitarori Generali di Sicilia*, Pietro Burgarella e Grazia Fallico eds. vol XCIII (Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, 1977), 40–41.

starting placing their financial investments in the hands of the Genoese, who slowly emerged as both the favorite and wealthiest nation in the Habsburg Empire. As a result, in the fifteenth century, the administration of southern Italy as a whole was predominantly Catalan, but toward the middle of the sixteenth century, it became increasingly Genoese.

Guild memberships and tax records indicate that Genoese and Catalans collaborated in the making and selling of luxury products such as saffron and silk. The [previous chapter](#) underscored the slow ascent of the Genoese nation in the Neapolitan silk and wool guilds. At the dawn of the sixteenth century, the Genoese made up about one-third of the guilds' master artisans; the Catalans represented around ten percent.³⁶ The Catalans also controlled the import of spices, monopolized by the Beltram family, which paid a total of 1,572 ducats yearly for the gabelle on saffron.³⁷ They were involved with the spice trade through their links to the Iberian Peninsula (along with Tuscany, one of the few areas in Western Europe where crocuses grow).³⁸

36. ASN, Mercanti registrati al Consolato del' Arte della Seta: Libro delle Matricole vol. 1. Microfilm vol. 1–12, Mercanti XXII matricolati in lo consolato de Iohan Baptista Viespolo di Napoli, Angelo Ferrechio Ienoese et Angelo di Mauro di la Cava in lo ano 1522. See also Mario del Treppo, "Stranieri nel Regno di Napoli." The Catalan Perotto Beltram was custom officer of the silk gabelle in Bisignano,. See ASN, Serie Nuova Arrendamenti, gabella della seta.

37. The breakdown among the Beltram members was as follows: Alfonso Beltram 131 ducats, Carlo Beltram 131 ducats, Cesare Beltram 218 ducats, Fabritio Beltram 218 ducats, Mario Beltram 305 ducats, Scipione Beltram 489 ducats, and Eufomia Beltram 80 ducats. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria, Significatoria 285 I fascicolo n. 10. We know of their involvement with the spice trade only thanks to the *Regia Corte's* introduction of a new tax on the *fondaco* (warehouse/custom house) of saffron in 1577, which reveals that the Beltram household must have imported roughly 16,000 kilos of saffron per year, an extraordinary amount for early modern times. The tax on the *fondaco* of saffron imposed the payment of one *carlino* per *rotolo* (about one kilo) of saffron. Because the total tax amounted to 1,570 ducats per year, and the *carlino* equaled one-tenth of a ducat, the estimate is that the Beltram exported 16,000 per year. Most of the saffron destined to the Italian peninsula lists Milan as its point of arrival. See Federigo Melis, "Napoli e il suo Regno nelle fonti aziendali toscane del XIV–XV secolo," in *Studi di storia economica toscana nel Medioevo e nel Rinascimento in memoria di Federigo Melis* (Pisa: Pacini, 1987), 367–388.

38. Saffron was grown in Tuscany as well as in Spain and North Africa. The Florentine merchants controlled the Tuscan markets, as David Abulafia, "Crocuses and Crusaders: San Gimignano, Pisa, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem," in *Outremer: Studies in the History*

The Kingdom of Naples became the basis of operations of exchange conducted throughout the European continent between the Genoese and Catalans.³⁹ The Genoese benefited from the Catalan network established in the Middle Ages across the Italian peninsula.⁴⁰ The Genoese Spinola family became the nucleus of the prominent Catalan-Genoese commercial network in Naples, and the Catalans placed investments for their heirs in Genoese hands.⁴¹ Thus, by the early sixteenth century, the Catalans understood that their economic survival in southern Italy depended on an entente with their Genoese counterparts. For instance, the Catalan Rafael Vidal was Spinola's agent and purchased spices from French merchants.⁴² Grain exported from Taranto was then sold to one of the Vidal kinsmen, Marco Vidal, based in Florence.⁴³ The Catalan Stephano Vaglies worked

of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem Presented to Joshua Prawer, edited by B. Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer, and R. C. Smail (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1982), 227–243, has shown, whereas the Catalans controlled that of the Iberian Peninsula. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria Significatoria 285, fascicolo I, n. 10.

39. On February 1, 1531, Perotto Villagut paid 3,495 ducats of gold to Gabriel Vidal for an operation of change in Rome with value of one-quarter of one percent for the transfer made at the De Xeres and Castiglio Bank. On Tuesday June 6, 1531, the presentation of the *chinea* (white horse) to Pope Clement VII on St. Peter's day came from Neapolitan funds: Alonso Sánchez (on behalf of the king) paid Lucchesi Bernardino Cenami and Vincenzo Guinigi 1,125 ducats in exchange for an operation with the Xeres and Castiglio Bank in Rome. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni.

40. On Monday January 16, 1532, conspicuous Florentine merchant Jacobo Filippo Guadagni reimbursed Catalans Jacobo Collomer and Johan Vignes for trade conducted in Valencia (Spain). See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 7 (1532) Lercaro e Imperiale.

41. The entries about Catalans include the heirs of Perotto Beltram 38 ducats, Janot Beltram de Napoli 139 ducats, Janot Beltram de Vostra 18 ducats, Signora Luise Ram 138 ducats, Stephano Vaglies 8 ducats, Gabriel Vidal 6 ducats, Monsignore Raphael Vidal 22 ducats, Perotto Villagut 3 ducats. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 5: Libro Maggiore di Jacopo Nicolo Spinola (1530).

42. On Thursday, January 12, 1531, Rafael Vidal bought twelve sacks of spices from French merchant Pietro Fornieri. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni.

43. On Tuesday, May 30, 1531, Catalan Marco Vidal based in Florence paid 2,030 ducats of gold for grain from Taranto. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni.

as Spinola's agent in Spain selling iron in Catalonia,⁴⁴ conducted business deals with Iacobo Spinola that were written off in Naples,⁴⁵ and worked for Augustino Spinola as a procurer of grain.⁴⁶ Catalans Martino Buzal and Stefano Vaglies also worked in close association with the Genoese Francesco Lomellino and Nicolo Doria, bankers for whom they bought grain.⁴⁷ The Catalan Gonsalvo de Xeres bought grain from Calabria which he resold in local markets.⁴⁸ The Catalan Perotto Villagut carried out financial exchanges with Gabriel Vidal through the Genoese Spinola network. He operated in Italy, the Netherlands, and the Iberian Peninsula. Some of these undertakings involved the exchange of gold in Rome via the De Xeres and Castiglio bank. Perotto Villagut repaid the Spinola of Naples for operations undertaken in Bruges.⁴⁹ The Genoese also traded with the Catalans based in the Spanish peninsula, such as Angelo Rocha from Valencia.⁵⁰ Other Catalans, such as Raffaello Galzerano, were associated with the Genoese Francesco Lomellino and Augustino Pallavicino.⁵¹

44. On Friday, January 13, 1531, Stefano Vaglies worked with his man Antonio Peres and paid Signore Michel Gio Gomes [Presidente della Sommaria] 113 ducats for 36 grana of iron from Catalonia. On April 21, 1531, Stefano Vaglies was paid 210 ducats for 77 iron bars from Catalonia. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni; the monopoly on the collection of indirect taxes on iron in Bari, Otranto, and Basilicata was detained by Lucchesi traders. See Giuseppe Coniglio, *Il Regno di Napoli al tempo di Carlo V: Amministrazione e vita economico-sociale* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1951), 114.

45. ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni, Thursday, January 19, 1531.

46. Agent Vaglies paid 95 ducats on Saturday, June 23, 1509, to maestro Andrea di Carbonara on the account of Augustino Spinola. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 1 Giornale di cassa (1509) Ravaschiero.

47. Martino Buzal and Stefano Vaglies paid 12,000 ducats for grain for Lomellino and Doria. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 13 (1540) Lomellino & Doria, Thursday, February 18, 1540.

48. De Xeres bought 316 tomoli of grain from Calabria for 178 ducats. This complemented the 1,000 tomoli of grain sold at 5 carlini per tomoli. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni, Tuesday, January 31, 1531.

49. On Monday 24, 1531, Perotto Villagut paid 66 ducats of gold for an operation performed in Bruges. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 6 (1531) Spinola e compagni.

50. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 8 (1542) Lercaro-Imperiale, Tuesday, July 4, 1542, and Saturday July 8, 1542.

51. On Thursday, January 7, 1540, it was Rafael Galzerano who paid 530 ducats to the treasurer of the kingdom on behalf of his Genoese associates for the *terzo* tax imposed

Galzerano also traded at the fairs of the Apparition in Lyon with his business associate and conational Diego Jaime de Haro.⁵²

The Genoese cooperated with the most well-established Catalan merchants in southern Italy. The Catalan Jew Paolo Toloza, for instance, was an agent of Genoese bankers Lomellino and Germano Ravaschiero.⁵³ He recurrently purchased oil from Apulia, whereas the Genoese Augustino Pallavicino secured grain for shipment to Spain, where Toloza sold his products.⁵⁴ Toloza also sold grain and timber collected in Apulia on behalf of the Genoese.⁵⁵ Similarly, he exported grain from Messina for the Genoese⁵⁶ and conducted business in Calabria with the Genoese agent Nicolo de Goano.⁵⁷ Toloza is an important figure for the socioeconomic development of Naples.⁵⁸ He had migrated to the kingdom after the introduction of the Spanish Inquisition and acquired Neapolitan citizenship in

on foreigners conducting business in the kingdom (this will be expanded in the [next chapter](#)). See ASN, *Banchieri Antichi* n. 13 (1540) Lomellino & Doria.

52. ASN, *Banchieri Antichi* n. 13 (1540) Lomellino & Doria, January 26, 1540.

53. When Perotto Villagut owed 4,000 ducats to Paulo Toloza, the debt was accounted in Ravaschiero's journal. See ASN, *Banchieri Antichi* n. 1 *Giornale di cassa* (1509) Ravaschiero, Tuesday, April 17, 1509.

54. The first Genoese banker's entry indicates that Toloza had purchased oil from Apulia since the year 1506. See ASN, *Banchieri Antichi* n. 1 *Giornale di cassa* (1509) Ravaschiero, February 18, 1509.

55. Agent Toloza was paid 585 ducats for 30,000 *carra* and 35,000 *tomoli* of grain. See ASN, *Banchieri Antichi* n. 1 *Giornale di cassa* (1509) Ravaschiero, Wednesday, May 30, 1509.

56. On Monday, June 23, 1509, Paulo Toloza paid 190 ducats for 140 *tomoli* of grain bought in Messina. See ASN, *Banchieri Antichi* n. 1 *Giornale di cassa* (1509) Ravaschiero.

57. The entry regards transfers from one account to the next for business done in Calabria by Goana and Toloza on behalf of Ravaschiero. See ASN, *Banchieri Antichi* n. 1 *Giornale di cassa* (1509) Ravaschiero, Tuesday, September 15, 1509.

58. Bookkeeping from various Genoese banks suggests that in the early sixteenth century, the famous Abrabanel family, expatriate marranos from the Spanish peninsula, appealed to the Genoese for loans. In 1520, King Charles V announced a charter that pledged – among other privileges – that the Jewish population “will freely trade, practice commerce, open banks and loan money, and this according to the fixed norms of the Holy See.” See Nicola Ferorelli, *Gli Ebrei nell'Italia Meridionale dall'età romana al secolo XVIII* (Bologna: Arnaldo Forni Editore, 1915). Until their final expulsion in 1541, members of the Abrabanel family worked in concert with Genoese bankers. Very much like the Genoese, Iberian Jews became prosperous in the Apulian and Calabrian regions, points of anchor for the silk trade.

1486. He was a dealer in grain and a collector of the gabelle on salt, possessed fiefs throughout the kingdom of Naples, lived in a sumptuous villa below the Certosa di San Martino (the highest point in Naples), frequented the highest nobility, married the Neapolitan Countess of Saponara (Violante Sanseverino),⁵⁹ and even managed to be elected in the seggio di Portanova (one of the city's seven districts, restricted to the local nobility).⁶⁰

Because trade was the preferred sector of both Catalans and Genoese, they started acting as officers of the crown in Naples, just as they did in Sicily. During Aragonese rule in the fifteenth century, the entire financial administration of kings Alfonso and Ferrante was transferred to Naples and depended on the managerial skills of the Catalans. Alan Ryder explains that “staffed by professional men, many of them not Italian, this revitalized bureaucracy strove with some success to foster a state interest distinct from, and antithetical to the baronage.”⁶¹ As in Sicily, the Catalans in Naples worked as customs officers, warehouse managers, and harbor masters.⁶² Because of their geographic and personal proximity to the crown, added to their ancient commitment to the Kingdom of Naples, the Catalans often acted as the crown's executives in the provinces. Of the Catalan families with whom the Genoese had extensive commercial dealings, virtually all were holding offices. In the province of Basilicata alone, for instance, the Catalan Michele Villagut served for a decade either as treasurer⁶³ or commissary of the

59. Luis Ram and Paolo Toloza, along with Stefano Vaglies, Rafael Galzerano, and Martin Buzal are the most conspicuous names in the file *Banchieri Antichi*. Paolo Toloza exported grain at the peril of his life when in 1508 the people of Naples tried to kill him while shouting “bread, bread” in the streets. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, III A, vol. 9, *Lo libro delle cose de Napoli scritto dal Giuliano Passaro settaiolo Napoletano*, 170.

60. Aurelio Musi, “Le élites internazionali a Napoli dal primo Cinquecento alla Guerra dei trent'anni,” in *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche*, 133–161.

61. Alan Ryder shows that Alfonso reformed the institutions of government so as to create a machine independent of the nobility. See *The Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous: The Making of a Modern State* (New York: Oxford Clarendon Press: 1976), 53.

62. Mario del Treppo, “Il re e il mercante”, 255–304.

63. Villagut was treasurer from 1547 to 1548 and 1549 to 1557. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria, Liquidazione dei Conti, Tesorieri e percettori, Provincia di Basilicata, vol. 508, n. 10, 11, 12.

province⁶⁴; whereas kinsman Baldassare Villagut held the same office in the province of Principato Ultra.⁶⁵ This Catalan monopoly over state posts gradually changed with the sixteenth century and the arrival of more Genoese on the financial scene.

Some of the kingdom's provinces slowly became areas of contention between Catalans and Genoese. The Spanish viceroys were largely responsible for this occurrence. The administration of the most important provinces was left to the trading nations with the greatest degree of managerial skills: up through the fifteenth century the Catalans, and in the mid-sixteenth century the Genoese. As the [previous chapter](#) has explained, it was in Calabria and Apulia that silk production developed; moreover, these provinces were of significant geopolitical importance as they were subject to constant Turkish attacks. Therefore, their administration was entrusted only to faithful and trustworthy citizens and supporters of the crown. Both Catalans and Genoese there served as high executives of the crown: the Catalan Martino de Busal was the treasurer of the province of Calabria Ultra for a decade until 1532, when Genoese Giambattista Spinola assumed the function. It remained in Genoese hands until 1576.⁶⁶ The highest offices, such as those of provincial regents, were occupied by the Genoese. Giovan Battista Spinola was the regent of the royal treasury of Calabria Ultra,⁶⁷ followed soon after by Turino Ravaschiero.⁶⁸ Other

64. Villagut was commissary of the province from 1548 to 1550. See Giuseppe Coniglio, *Vicereame di Napoli nel secolo XVII: notizie sulla vita commerciale e finanziaria secondo nuove ricerche negli archivi italiani e spagnoli* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1955), 17.

65. Villagut was treasurer of the province in 1552. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommatoria, Liquidazione dei Conti, Tesorieri e percettori, Provincia di Principato Ultra, vol. 508, n. 11–12.

66. ASN, Regia Camera della Sommatoria, Liquidazione dei Conti, Tesorieri e percettori, Provincia di Calabria Ultra, vol. 509; Busal (treasurer from 1521 to 1531), vol. 465; Spinola (treasurer from 1559 to 1560), vol. 480–482; Ravaschiero (treasurer from 1564 to 1576), vol. 485–501.

67. Spinola was the regent of the royal treasury from 1559 to 1560. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommatoria, Liquidazione dei Conti, Tesorieri e percettori, Provincia di Calabria Ultra, vol. 480.

68. Ravaschiero was regent of the royal treasury from 1575 to 1576. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommatoria, Liquidazione dei Conti, Tesorieri e percettori, Provincia di Calabria Ultra, vol. 490.

commissary offices shared between Genoese and Catalans ranged from Basilicata⁶⁹ to Principato Citra⁷⁰ and Terra di Lavoro.⁷¹

Until the mid-sixteenth century, Catalans and Genoese divided up state appointments in the capital city. The Genoese became customs officers and took over other commerce-related offices; the Catalans served as state administrators and tribunal officers. The Catalan Francesco de Haro, for instance, worked as warden of the royal prison of the *Vicaria*, whereas Ferrante de Haro was a councilor of the same tribunal, and Giovan Vincenzo Vaglies became commissary of the tribunal of the *Vicaria*.⁷² Gabriel Vital(e) or Vidal was lieutenant of the kingdom's general treasury; his brother Raffaele Vital was a merchant. Francisco Moles was president of the tribunal of the *Regia Camera della Sommaria* of Naples for nearly a decade,⁷³ and Luys Ram (Count of St. Agasta) was master of the mint.⁷⁴

But in the mid-sixteenth century, the Spanish Crown was becoming more dependent on merchant bankers, most of them Genoese located in Genoa. Whereas the Genoese in Naples continued to thrive as a result of their connection with their conationals back in Liguria, the Catalans lost momentum as state administrators. Also, the Genoese were able to establish themselves in the important triangle of Barcelona–Valencia–Mallorca at the expense of Catalan traders. Using their linkages with the Italian peninsula and their capacity to establish companies throughout the Mediterranean basin, the Genoese gradually eclipsed the Catalan commercial hegemony in

69. Bruno Busal was auditor of Principato Citra e Basilicata (1582, 1584). See Giuseppe Coniglio, *Visitarori del Vicerego di Napoli* (Bari: Tip. Del Sud, 1974), Legajo 349.

70. Stefano de Mari (Genoese) became regent commissary of Principato Citra. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 31, 32, 33 (year 1561) de Mari.

71. Cristoforo del Castiglio was commissary in Terra di Lavoro. See ASN, Regia camera della sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria n 314.

72. De Haro worked for the *Vicaria* from 1561 to 1563. See Giuseppe Coniglio, *Visitarori del Vicerego*, legajo 8. De Haro was counselor in 1577 and in 1583. See *ibid.*, Legajo 339 (year 1577), and Legajo 340 (year 1583). De Haro was counselor in 1577 and in 1583. See *ibid.*, Legajo 339 (year 1577), and Legajo 340 (year 1583).

73. Moles was president of the tribunal from 1551 to 1559. See *ibid.*, Legajo 347.

74. The Ram family belonged to the lower stratum of the kingdom's nobility. See Maria Antonietta Visceglia, "Dislocazione territoriale e dimensione del possesso feudale nel Regno di Napoli a metà Cinquecento," in *Signori, Patrizi, Cavalieri in Italia centro-meridionale nell'Età moderna*, edited by Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Rome: Laterza, 1992), 31–75.

the western Mediterranean.⁷⁵ These trends gradually put the Genoese into more positions of power, both financial and political. Parallel to their slow ascent promoted mainly by their cooperation with the Catalans, the Genoese experienced competition with the Florentines.

GENOESE AND FLORENTINES: COMPETITION 1480–1580

When the Catalans stopped serving as state administrators, the Florentines started to rise, which presented a threat to the Genoese not only in southern Italy, but also throughout Europe. The fact that the Catalans were no longer used as crown officials afforded the Genoese the possibility to face their Florentine competitors. Like the Genoese, the Florentines were able to combine trading and banking. Intimate connections tied the great Florentine finance houses to the courts and grain estates of southern Italy. Filippo Strozzi (1428–91), for instance, one of the richest men in Europe started his family fortune in Naples while the Medici exiled him from Florence. Through banking, the Florentines had economic links to the papacy and princes all over Europe. All the time that the Genoese and Catalans were cooperating, the Florentines had been there, amassing status. By 1480 they had become significant competitors with the Genoese.

Beginning with the reign of Ferrante of Aragón (1458–94), Florentine and Genoese relationships were far from amicable. When Genoese corsairs, hired by Ludovico il Moro of Milan, allied themselves with pirates of Catalan origin, Ferrante did not intervene on behalf of his Florentine allies because he required Genoese support against both the Turks, who had attacked Otranto, and the French, who had pretensions over the kingdom.⁷⁶ In 1485, the Genoese–Florentine conflict over the territory of Lunigiana had repercussions for the Kingdom of Naples. The Florentine ambassador to Naples complained to the *Dieci di Balìa* (Seal of the Magistrates) in Florence about Genoese behavior: “While we were at war against the Genoese over

75. See Hermann Kellenbenz, “Gli Operatori Economici e il Mondo Economico Italiano nell’Europa di Federico Melis,” in *I Mercanti Italiani nell’Europa Medievale e Rinascimentale* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1990), 9–42.

76. *Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli: Piero Nasi, Antonio della Valle e Niccolò Michelozzi (10 aprile 1491–2 giugno 1492)*, edited by Bruno Figliuolo e Sabrina Marcotti (Salerno: Carlone ed., 2004).

injuries and damages done in past times, nothing seems to stop them, they persevere in their appalling disposition and ill-will against us.”⁷⁷ Mario del Treppo asserts that, as a result, there was a “subtle maritime war” between Florentines and Genoese,⁷⁸ which summarizes the situation rather clearly but does not delve into the heart of the matter. Substantially, the two nations were competing over trading rights.

By the time Charles V became emperor in 1519, foreigners such as the Genoese and Florentines had acquired a prominent presence in the Neapolitan political system. As the Spaniards were themselves foreigners to the Italian Peninsula, they relied on the northern Italian merchants as a reliable instrument of stabilization. The Florentines were among the first trading nations to gain access to the kingdom’s commerce and to connect the kingdom’s finances to Bruges, London, Barcelona, Venice, Milan, Genoa, and Palermo.⁷⁹ Naples was the Florentines’ Mediterranean center, which rivaled their financial dealings in London, Paris, or Bruges. This economic clout turned the Tuscans into intimate associates of the Habsburg Crown.⁸⁰ With their pan-European banks and system of exchanges, their economic worth surpassed by far that of the Iberians and other Italians, whose strength depended mainly on trade within the Mediterranean. If the Florentines attained economic supremacy, they might supplant the Genoese in their alliance with the Spanish Crown. The Kingdom of Naples’s banking system, however, allowed both Genoese and Florentines to thrive.⁸¹

Like the Genoese, the Florentines aimed at the kingdom’s richest region, Calabria, because of its silk production. The [previous chapter](#) highlighted

77. Letter from the *Dieci di Balìa* to the Florentine ambassador to Naples Giovanni Lanfredini, Firenze, June 18, 1485. See *Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli: Giovanni Lanfredini (maggio 1485–ottobre 1486)*, edited by Elisabetta Scarton (Salerno: Carlone ed., 2002).

78. Del Treppo, *Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche in Europa*.

79. Del Treppo, “Stranieri nel regno di Napoli,” 214.

80. In the 1300s, the Genoese were already active in the kingdom and imported cloth from Milan and France, whereas the Florentines had difficulties trying to pierce the Neapolitan market. See David Abulafia, “Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265–1370,” in *The Economic History Review*, ser. 2, XXXIII (1981), 377–388.

81. Some scholars have argued that Naples’s banking system merged feudal production and capitalist distribution. Germán Navarro Espinach and David Igual Luis, “Mercaderes-banqueros en tiempos de Alfonso el Magnánimo,” in *Atti del XVI Congresso Internazionale di Storia della Corona d’Aragona*, Naples, 18–24 settembre 1997, vol. 1, eds. Guido D’Agostino e Giulia Buffardi (Naples: Paparo Edizioni, 2000), 949–967.

how merchants acquired their silk in Calabria because of its high quality.⁸² Throughout the sixteenth century, the Florentines, much like the Genoese, imported silk from Calabria, a costly effort because of the gabelle and additional ten percent tax on the imported silk's total revenue.⁸³ The high quality of the silk, however, more than compensated for the money spent on taxation. Meanwhile, the local population profited from the manufactured goods introduced by the Ligurian and Tuscan merchants. Locals bartered Calabrian raw silk for Florentine (and Genoese) silk textiles or cloth.⁸⁴ So it was a typical exchange of raw material for finished products.

The Florentines also threatened Genoese prestige because the Florentines had dynastic connections to the Spanish Crown (Eleonor de Toledo married Cosimo I of Medici, and Charles V's illegitimate daughter married Alessandro of Medici).⁸⁵ During processions in Neapolitan waters, the Genoese objected when Tuscan vessels were given precedence. In his careful instructions to the ambassador at the court of Spain, the Genoese doge stated:

[Genoa] precedes in dignity and state the Florentines. The Lucchese are by far our inferiors, while the Venetians are merely our equal. Since there is no comparison possible, you will not accept their ambassador's visit unless they greet you with the title of Illustrious . . . [Because] we precede Florence in authority, we have no less dignity than Venice, and we may treat the Lucchese as our sons.⁸⁶

When victory was celebrated over the Turkish armada in 1595, and a long procession took place around the city of Palermo, the consul was irritated that the Genoese galley, *Santa Ninfa*, was not accorded a triumphal arch

82. Although in the sixteenth century, the Genoese achieved an unparalleled dominance over the finances and economy of Naples, Venice still exercised powerful influence along the Adriatic shores of southern Italy.

83. Roberta Morelli, *La Seta Fiorentina nel Cinquecento* (Milan: A. Giuffrè Editore, 1976), 54–55.

84. Del Treppo, "Stranieri nel regno di Napoli," 215.

85. Carlos José Hernando Sánchez explains that Spain maintains a relation with the Medici based on "clientelism." See "Fernando I de Austria e Italia: entre el Sacro Imperio y la monarquía de España" in *Comprendere le Monarchie Iberiche*, 107–163.

86. ASG, A.S. 2707 Istruzioni a Ministri, letter from Doge of Genoa to Giovanni Battista Serra, Ambasciatore Ordinario Presso il Re di Spagna, Genova November 16, 1622.

like that of the Florentines.⁸⁷ He openly accused the viceroy of hostility toward the privileges of the Genoese nation. A nation's reputation was one of the elements that preserved its privileges; hence, it was important for the Genoese to safeguard their position in the eyes of the Spanish Crown in Italy.

Tuscans and Genoese collaborated financially until the mid-sixteenth century when Florentine financial misdemeanors finally enabled the Genoese nation to pursue its economic ascent. The Biffoli, Billi, Cini, and Palmieri families, the most important Florentine families in Naples, frequently worked as associates of the Genoese Spinola, Pallavicino, Lomellino, Ravaschiero, and Grimaldi families in grain, oil, soap, and silk transactions.⁸⁸ The Tuscan banks' commercial agents represented both nations at the fairs in Italy, France, Netherlands, and Spain.⁸⁹ By midcentury, however, this collaboration ceased. The Florentine Angelo Biffoli, who was involved in exchange operations throughout the Italian peninsula, France, Spain, and Sicily, embezzled money belonging to the Spanish treasury in the kingdom. Angelo Biffoli and Alfonso Sánchez, general treasurer of the kingdom, had been associates since 1557. During the following years, Sánchez embezzled money by using his position as treasurer to ship oil and spices to Venice at a high profit. He also spent gold

87. ASG, A.S. 2647 (1506–1681: Console Due Sicilie: Palermo) n.393, Letter from Consul Henrico Franchi to Genoese Republic, Palermo, July 10, 1595.

88. Since the creation of the very first Genoese bank in Naples, Florentines, Catalans, and Ligurian merchants worked together. Therefore, their economic entente dates from the days of the Aragonese Crown. For involvement of Pietrangelo and Lionardo Cimini with Pier Francesco Ravaschiero, see ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria, Significatoria 285 I fascicolo n. 10, April 18, 1576. See also ASN, Banchieri Antichi Numero 1, Giornale di cassa (1509) Ravaschiero. Angelo Biffoli was the Florentine consul in Naples, and very much like the Genoese consuls, was involved in trade. It is relevant to note that the first Florentine bank was created more than sixty years following the Genoese one. This is an indication of their increasing economic status. They were the last foreign nation to access such a status in the kingdom. After them, the crown would ensure control over business and banking transactions, involving more Neapolitans. Biffoli was also for a year *arrendatore delle Seta di Calabria*. See ASN, Serie Nuova Arrendamenti, n.1674.

89. ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 54 (Biffoli) "Nostri Francesco & Niccolo Biffoli di Firenze" (1573); the fairs of Besançon and Lyon were conspicuous places for Genoese, Catalans, and Florentines, as were those of Piacenza in northern Italy, Antwerp and Brussels in the Netherlands, and Valencia in Spain.

and silver set aside for the building of the treasury in Naples, conducted financial operations of exchange prohibited to state officers, and was ultimately detained by the *Visitatore Generale* Reverend Don Gaspar de Quiroga in 1563.⁹⁰

As a result of a number of mechanisms, including poor investments, the Florentine banks ceased to operate in Naples. Antonio Calabria has argued that the Genoese supplanted the Tuscans in the Neapolitan marketplace because the latter's number, assets, and risk taking diminished.⁹¹ Also, the Sánchez affair was a moment that coincided with one of the Habsburg bankruptcies. Moreover, the last quarter of the sixteenth century corresponds to the Florentines' waning involvement in international commerce. The heart of its trade, cloth, was lost to England and to Flanders, and banking followed trade. Eventually, the Genoese final victory was pronounced when Spanish viceroy Don Garcia de Toledo's personal debt to Angelo Biffoli was repaid through the Genoese Ravaschiero and Spinola Bank.⁹²

GENOESE DOMINANCE: 1580–1640

The Genoese eventually asserted themselves over the Catalans and the Florentines as the Spanish Crown's favorite nation in the mid-sixteenth century. The two periods of cooperation and competition led to their dominance in the Spanish world. Ultimately, their surpassing of Catalans and Florentines reinforced the symbiotic relationship between the Genoese and the Spanish in southern Italy. What favored the Genoese was their ability to establish themselves in the mercantile triangle of Barcelona-Valencia-Mallorca at the expense of Catalan traders, and to assert themselves as the Spanish Crown's bankers at the expense of the Florentines. The participation of the Genoese in the civic life of southern Italians through appointments in various offices of the crown was solidified in the

90. See Coniglio, *Visitatori del Vicereame*, 20.

91. See Antonio Calabria, "What Happened to Tuscan Capital Investment in Sixteenth-Century Naples? An Unsolved Problem in the History of Early Capitalism" in *Essays in Economic and Business History* (2000), 1–16.

92. On Tuesday, April 26, 1569, Don Garcia de Toledo was debtor of 1,000 ducats with Angelo Biffoli. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 44 (1569) Ravaschiero-Spinola.

mid-sixteenth century, enhancing their political and economic strength. The last decade of the sixteenth century marks the end of the Tuscan financial ascendancy in southern Italy, leaving the Genoese to become the Spanish Crown's bankers across Europe.

Though in the other parts of the world diasporic communities were usually treated as outsiders, exercising little influence on the historical developments of the host regions, in the Mediterranean trade, they became insiders as a consequence of widespread commercial integration during the early Middle Ages. The Genoese relationship to the other trading nations facilitated their penetration of southern Italy's finances. Both Catalans and Florentines had established commercial linkages with the local community long before the arrival of the Genoese or the Habsburg Crown. But the system of economic alliances and business partnerships allowed the Genoese to conquer a dominant share of the market. Their dominance of the banking system and their financial services to the Spanish Crown enabled them to emerge as the favorite commercial nation in southern Italy.

Current historiography presents the period from 1300 to 1500 as the Florentine and Catalan apex.⁹³ But both nations were concurrent adversaries and associates of the Genoese in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. All three nations had carved space for themselves in the Aragonese-Habsburg world, but over the two centuries only the Genoese managed to attract the dominant support of the crown. This state of affairs required daily negotiations with the crown, the viceregal authorities, and people from the kingdom, a topic to which we turn in the [next chapter](#). The viceroys attempted to engage in good government and protect the local people's economic interests; the Genoese used their financial and political

93. For the apex of Catalan maritime trade, see Damien Coulon, *Barcelone et le grand commerce d'Orient au moyen-âge: Un siècle de relations avec l'Égypte et la Syrie-Palestine (ca. 1330–1430)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004). See also his "Barcelone, pôle d'impulsion de réseaux à la fin du Moyen-Âge" in *Espaces et réseaux en Méditerranée, VIe-XVIIe siècles*, 2 vols., edited by Damien Coulon, Christophe Picard, Dominique Valérian (Saint-Denis: Editions Bouchène, 2010), 19–39. For a comprehensive work on the Catalan Mediterranean Empire, see J.L. Shneidman's *The Rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire 1200–1350* (London: University of London Press, 1970). For various aspects of Florentine history during the Renaissance, see the works of John Najemy, Gene Brucker, Richard Goldthwaite, Richard Trexler, and Lauro Martines among others.

clout with the Spanish Crown to harvest the resources of the kingdom (and its people) and protect their interests, which coincided with those of the crown. We will see that mainly because of the need to preserve the assets of Genoese traders-bankers, imperial management conflicted with local tenets of governance.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Genoese Merchants: Between the Viceroy's Buon Governo and Habsburg Expansion

Kings cannot achieve heroic actions without money.

—COUNT-DUKE OLIVARES, 1625

The Genoese were envied and even hated because of their fortune, but their loans in service to the royal finances avoided the dangers of many tempests.

—GIULIO CESARE CAPACCIO, 1630

On June 7, 1647, a brief rebellion erupted in Naples against the ever-increasing taxes imposed by the Spanish viceroy. Masaniello, the ringleader, shouted to the crowd,

Open your eyes, my people, these are the traitors of our nation; I know that tomorrow I will be killed, but I do not care . . . and, my people, if you want to make sure to get His Majesty's attention, you should follow my advice and make of this public square a harbor, and build a bridge linking Naples to Spain.¹

1. "Orsú, popolo mio, ecco i traditori della patria; io so che domani debbo essere ucciso, ma non me ne curo . . . e poi, popolo mio, se vuoi star sicuro, e farti sentire da sua Maestá, devi seguire il mio consiglio, e fare un porto di questa piazza ed un ponte da Nápoli a Spagna." Bartolommeo Capasso, *Masaniello: Ricordi della storia e della vita napoletana nel secolo XVII* (Naples: Arturo Berisio Editore, 1979), 58.

Following its leader, the angry crowd shouted in the streets, “long live the King, and down with bad government.”² The revolt originated in legitimate popular discontent with the immediate outburst derived from an annual mock battle between Neapolitans and Turkish invaders held in early June for the Feast of the Madonna of the Carmine.³ When the news broke that the Spanish had levied yet another tax on fruit, Masaniello – in charge of the mock Neapolitan army in the festival – transformed his make-believe army into a real one and marched on the palace to obtain justice from the Spanish viceroy.⁴ With a mob of tens of thousands roaming the streets, the viceroy was forced to make concessions: the repeal of the fruit tax and the reinstitution of reforms dating from the previous century. However, the Spanish authorities eventually executed Masaniello and his mob.

The revolt of Masaniello arose at the end of thirty years of a grueling war (1618–48) among continental powers, for which southern Italy had contributed men, money, and food. The upheaval was fundamentally a fiscal revolt, but it also expressed the exacerbation of conflict among Neapolitan commoners, the local nobility, wealthy foreigners, and Spanish officials. For the philosopher Pietro Giannone, writing two generations later, the uprising symbolized the clash between Iberian and Neapolitan powers, the corruption of viceroys and ministers, and the conflict between nobility and commoners.⁵

Although this rebellion has been studied as one in the cycle of seventeenth-century protests within the Spanish domains (together with revolts in Portugal, Sicily, and Catalonia), I propose an alternative view.⁶

2. “Viva il Re, mora il malgoverno.” Tommaso de Santis, *Historia del tumulto di Napoli* (Leyden: Elsevir, 1652), 49.

3. For a vivid account of the revolt, see Peter Burke, “The Virgin of the Carmine and the Revolt of Masaniello,” in *Past and Present*, no. 99 (May 1983), 3–21. See also Rosario Villari, *La Rivolta antispagnola a Napoli: Le origini (1585–1647)* (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1967). More recently by the same author, *Un Sogno di Libertà: Napoli nel declino di un impero, 1585–1648* (Milan: Edizioni Mondadori, 2012).

4. Aurelio Musi, *La rivolta di Masaniello nella scena politica barocca* (Naples: Guida Editore, 1989), 12, 22, 135.

5. Pietro Giannone, *Istoria civile del Regno di Napoli*, vol. 5 (Naples: Niccolò Naso, 1723), 304.

6. The first scholar to suggest a cycle of protests within a single composite state was R. B. Merriman, *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). For

Analyzing the prelude to the revolt reveals that the Spanish viceroys had made efforts to engage in good government but had been repeatedly foiled by a few powerful Genoese merchant bankers who manipulated the viceroys, who indeed tried to maintain *buon governo* in southern Italy, and the Habsburg Crown, which needed Genoese finances to pursue its expansion on the European continent. Masaniello appealed to the monarch and vilified the viceroys, but it was the latter who wrangled with both Genoese and the crown to ensure the welfare of the kingdom. That is, the revolt suggests that the Spanish kings and the Genoese merchants were complementary imperialists. A clear conflict of interest emerges between imperial vision and local concerns, or between maintenance of the empire and the establishment of good government. What Masaniello did not see was that the prosperity of the Habsburg Empire required constant negotiation. The Genoese struggled to preserve their economic interests, the crown to sustain its empire, and the viceroys to provide good government.

The principles of good government Masaniello pleaded for included peace, justice, security, and harmony. Masaniello's harangue of "down with bad government" blamed the viceroys but saw only the most immediate problem. His wish to see a bridge built between Naples and Spain alluded to the mutual dependency between the two places, and the idea of a harbor to replace the square indicated the need to enhance Naples's commercial activities rather than raise its gabelles. What he did not really understand was that some viceroys did engage in good government. Masaniello wrongly appealed to the king to restore order, because it was the crown's heavy reliance on Genoese funds – funds originating partly in the gabelles – that provoked the financial ruin of the kingdom. A few viceroys did take their task of preserving the kingdom's welfare seriously because they learned from the mistakes of their predecessors and recognized the inefficiency of the imperial system. Realizing the urgency of the situation in the Spanish domains, they genuinely tried to uphold the subjects' rights. Rightly so, they understood that the only way to proceed properly was to change the system of privileges.

One of the most lucrative assets of the Genoese community was its right to collect indirect taxes (gabelles) on traded products such as silk, oil, and grain, and also indirect taxes due to the city, the court, or the king. As the

a more recent update, see Wayne te Brake, *Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998).

government lacked the means to collect the gabelles, it farmed them out under agreements to entrepreneurs who bought the right to collect a specific gabelle in a designated area and then tried to maximize their income. This medieval privilege had been granted to the Genoese before the Habsburg Crown's arrival in Naples. Some viceroys enacted bans that compelled the Genoese nation to take cuts in its share of feudal privileges, forcing it to participate in the financial burden of the region.

Although the primary duty of the viceroys was to administer the lands and possibly derive financial benefits for the Spanish monarch, in the Kingdom of Naples the state of local affairs led some of them to favor local needs. In fact, an anonymous booklet published at the time of the revolt implicitly blamed not local government but the king himself: it stated that to preserve both good government and his reputation, the king ought not raise unjust gabelles.⁷ Thus, unlike Masaniello and his followers, the local elite realized that there were conflicts of interest between the monarchy and its viceroys. The kings granted the viceroys the privilege of *merum et mixtum imperium* (power of the sword and of civil jurisdiction), which some of them used for public good.⁸ Such was the case of the third Duke of Alba (r.1556–58), Viceroy Duke of Alcalá (r.1559–71), Viceroy Benavente (r.1603–10), Viceroy Count of Lemos (r.1610–16), Viceroy Duke of Ossuna (r.1616–20), Viceroy Cardinal Zapata (r.1620–22), Viceroy Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, fifth Duke of Alba (r.1622–29), and Viceroy Duke of Medina (r.1637–44).

The Spanish ruling principle of good government contrasted with local feudal principles. Until recently, Italianists underscored the Spanish conquest of 1503 as the watershed point after which the Kingdom of Naples became a commonplace example of misrule.⁹ Machiavelli affirmed

7. "Il Cittadino Fedele: Discorso breve della giusta, generosa, e prudente risoluzione del valoroso, e fedelissimo popolo di Napoli per liberarsi dall'insopportabili gravetze impostegli da Spagnuoli" Napoli, 1647 in *Per il Re o per la Patria: La fedeltà nel seicento*, ed. Rosario Villari (Rome: Laterza, 1994), 41–57.

8. This medieval privilege allowed the viceroys to rule with an iron fist. The local parliament was made up of the local privileged classes who wished to preserve the financial and political status quo. By the mid-sixteenth century, the strengthening of royal authority made it always more difficult for them to assert themselves over viceregal decisions.

9. Benedetto Croce, *History of the Kingdom of Naples* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

in the early sixteenth century that in the Kingdom of Naples, “there has never arisen any Republic or any political life . . . the material is so corrupt, laws do not suffice to keep it in hand.”¹⁰ It was the local baronial class, however, that prevented the emergence of a political culture, and therefore of good government. To that effect, in the following century, Neapolitan humanist Giulio Cesare Capaccio saw Spanish government as a relief from the barons and as synonymous with good laws.¹¹ For Capaccio, Spanish leadership exemplified true “reason of state.”¹² He favored the monarchy but also welcomed the Spanish regime because *de facto* rule was done by the viceroys. The king’s officials checked the nobility’s abuse of vassals, the growing tide of banditry, and administrative disorder.¹³ Unlike feudalism, good government sought to bring order, discipline, and justice to the Spanish lands.

The Spanish viceroys tried to uphold governing ideals, even though they did not always succeed.¹⁴ Historian of the *Mezzogiorno* Rosario Villari suggests that good government included the commitment to ensure fiscal solvency and revenue growth, to provide sufficient food for the capital, to keep the peace, and to apply uniform justice.¹⁵ Villari suggests that the local

10. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1984), ch. 55, 246.

11. Giulio Cesare Capaccio, *Il Forastiero: Dialoghi* (Naples: Gio Domenico Roncagliolo, 1630), 561–73.

12. John Marino found that Capaccio envisioned two true modes of government that spoke to the king’s greatness: imperial laws (adjudicated by royal tribunals) and statutes and laws (administered by royal courts). See “The Foreigner and the Citizen: A Dialogue on Good Government in Spanish Naples” in *Reason and Its Others: Italy, Spain, and the New World*, eds. David Castillo and Massimo Lollini (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006), 145–164.

13. Giuseppe Galasso, “Trends and Problems in Neapolitan History in the Age of Charles V” in *Good Government in Spanish Naples*, eds. Antonio Calabria and John Marino (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 13–78.

14. “Quattro cosas son las principales en que consiste el buen gobierno deste reyno: en la Buena administración que vulgarmente llaman la grassa que se pide particularmente en esta ciudad; en la observancia de la justicia e prematicas; en el beneficio conservación y aumento del Patrimonio Real y en la Buena disciplina y orden de la milicia y fuerças que su majestad sustenta y mantiene en este Reyno con grande costa y cuydado y es de creer non sin causas de Buena consideración por razon de stado.” See Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome MS 2417 ff 195–200.

15. Villari, *La Rivolta antispagnola*, 252–253.

government's expedient decision making required at times the private self-interested selling of public revenue to private speculators.¹⁶ Thus, good government required maintaining privileges as well.¹⁷ In fact, John Elliott argues that "divide and conquer" was the rule for the viceroalties within the empire because good government required some subjects to be granted privileges over others.¹⁸ In the relationship between ideal government and practice, management strategies were left to the viceroys. The administration of the kingdom rested on dire economic realities and organizational rationale.¹⁹ For this reason, good government was complex, and, as Helmut Koenigsberger suggests, Spanish rule in Italy was not the rule of decadence, but rather an attempt to continue the Renaissance ideal of good government under a universal emperor.²⁰

Thus, in southern Italy, the viceroys exercised the concept of *buon governo* by mediating the Habsburg kings' expansionist policies and the

16. *Ibid.*

17. Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome MS 2417 ff 61; and John H. Parry, *The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century* (Folcroft, PA: Folcroft Press, 1969).

18. John H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716* (New York: The New American Library, 1966).

19. The notion of *buon governo* has been discussed by various scholars. Antonio Calabria has analyzed fiscal policies and the mechanisms applied by the Spanish overlords to raise the cash necessary to carry out imperial policies. See *The Cost of Empire: The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Time of Spanish Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Like Calabria, Giovanni Muto has looked at Spanish imperial finances, concentrating on the emergence of the modern state. See *Le finanze pubbliche napoletane tra riforme e restaurazione (1520–1634)* (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1980). Antonio Calabria and John Marino considered the continuous influence of the Renaissance ideals of good government and found the Spanish viceroys greatly engaged in the creation of state building. See *Good Government in Spanish Naples*. Giuseppe Galasso has found that Spanish imperial rule attempted to lead the kingdom into statehood but failed because of the lack of new social forces (i.e., a native merchant class and new bureaucracy) and strengthening of the feudal orders. See *Il Mezzogiorno nella Storia d'Italia* (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1977). Carlos José Hernando-Sánchez has written a political history of Habsburg imperial rule stressing the centralizing efforts of the Spanish to consolidate their domains. See *El reino de Nápoles en el imperio de Carlos V: la consolidación de la conquista* (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001).

20. Helmut G. Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain: A Study in the Practice of Empire* (New York: Staples Press, 1951). See also by the same author, *The Practice of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969).

financial needs of the kingdom. Giovanni Muto speaks of two programs of the viceroys: reformism and expansionism. By stressing that the viceroys were trapped between Spanish imperialism and Neapolitan socioeconomic pressures, Muto differs from Geoffrey Parker, who postulated a political and military “grand strategy of the Spanish Crown.” The viceroys’ duties to administer the region kept them very much on the borderline of their allegiance to the crown, and imperial schemes always infringed upon the viceroys’ *buon governo*. It can be argued that the viceroys’ failure to maintain good government reflects not an intention to exploit the Kingdom of Naples but the active intervention of the Genoese, made possible by the wars the kings were engaged in.²¹ This was the crux of the symbiotic alliance between these merchants and the crown: through advances on future revenues, the crown was able to meet military pressures anywhere in the Spanish Empire.²² In fact, real military action in 1647 did not start in Naples until the Doria squadron, under the command of General Giorgio Giustiniani, came to aid in the repression of the revolt.²³ When Sicily followed in the outbreak of popular revolts, eleven galleys were sent to help the Spanish gain control of Messina. This way, the financial oligarchy of the Genoese allowed the Habsburgs from Charles V to Philip IV to pursue their imperial policies.

This chapter describes episodes over three periods involving the Spanish viceroys who attempted to maintain good government, the Genoese merchants who exploited the kingdom’s resources, and the Habsburg kings who sought revenues. First, it presents Naples’s financial contribution to the empire in the sixteenth century, then it turns to the continuing struggle for *buon governo* and Spanish territorial expansion in the seventeenth century, and finally it examines the repercussions of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48). Imperial expansion and provincial management

21. It can be argued that this system worked because the Habsburg Crown was an institutional monarchy with various centers whose economy was mercantilist. See Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, *Conference on Génova y la Monarquía Hispánica* (Seville, September 16–18, 2009).

22. In *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), Immanuel Wallerstein contends that the Habsburg stake in Genoa’s economic well-being coincided with the need to integrate the northern Italian city-states into Spain, thereby controlling the European world economy.

23. See Francesco Casoni, *Annali della repubblica di Genova nel decimosesto* (Genoa: Casamara, 1779–1800), vol. 6, 4–5.

depended on endless negotiations, which made Naples one of the great links of the Habsburg chain. To extract money from the Genoese, the viceroys clearly disobeyed the Habsburg kings' orders to uphold the Genoese privileges in the kingdom. Maintaining the empire entailed the need to protect the western Mediterranean against Turkish assault, prevent the spread of Lutheranism in Europe, and ensure the profitability of Spain's extra-European domains. To finance all these enterprises, the Habsburgs relied partly on Genoese negotiation in the kingdom of Naples to preserve the empire.

THE MID-SIXTEENTH-CENTURY CHALLENGES

Viceroy Duke of Alba (r.1556–58) was the first viceroy to realize the strategic importance of southern Italy for the preservation of Spanish interests. Alba explained his situation to King Philip II: "I came to Naples principally to find money, dealing as best as I could with the ministers of the Collateral Council."²⁴ These ministers were a handful of "supreme ministers" who were doctors in law. The nobility was barred from political power and only the meritorious *togati* (robed ones) could be part of the Council of State. Thus, although Charles V had granted the viceroys *merum et mixtum imperium*, in reality their authority was constantly undermined by the most elite ministers. In the practice of good government, the constant struggle between Spanish viceroys and local ministers became a hindrance. In his correspondence with the king, the viceroy declared that "in this kingdom there is need to provide for everything, but above all money."²⁵ Similar to his predecessor, Viceroy Bernardino de Mendoza, who often inquired facetiously, "Are there any business in Naples?" Alba begged for change.²⁶ After a few months in residence, Alba further noticed that the kingdom lacked all bare necessities and expressed his iron resolve

24. *Epistolario del III Duque de Alba*, Letter from Viceroy Duke of Alba to King Philip II, Naples, January 6, 1557 (Madrid: Diana, 1952). See Pier Luigi Rovito, *Il Vicereame Spagnolo di Napoli: Ordinamento, Istituzioni, Culture di Governo* (Naples: Arte Tipografica Editrice, 2003), 50–59.

25. *Epistolario dell III Duque de Alba*, February 15, 1556.

26. Mendoza's real words were "A onde son los negocios de Nápoles?" See Domenico Parrino, *Teatro Eroico e politico de' governi de' vicere del Regno di Napoli dal tempo del re Ferdinando il Cattolico fin'all'anno 1683. Regnando la fel. mem. di Carlo Secondo*.

to remedy the city's grain problem.²⁷ He explained to the king that "thinking about exporting one grain of wheat from this kingdom to Genoa would be impossible, because the penury is so great that men drop dead."²⁸ That is, the Genoese export privileges encroached upon his own exercise of good government. By implication, he emphasized the contractual dimension of the king's empire: the ruler was to ensure public peace and protection in exchange for a contribution proportional to what the Neapolitans could afford. In its willingness to serve the king with its lives and fiscal obligation, Naples was *fedelissima* (extremely faithful); but its financial disarray added to social discontent and poverty necessitated canceling the privileges of the Genoese.

It was not a good time for the viceroy in Naples to anger the financiers of Philip II. In the Netherlands, anti-Catholic factions were rioting against Spanish rule, and more than ever advances from bankers were needed. Displeased with Alba's rationale, the Genoese doge pleaded his merchants' case with the monarch and threatened to retaliate in kind by imposing similar economic measures on Spanish transactions in Genoa. A paralysis in transactions with the city of Genoa meant an interruption of the financial alliance with the Genoese bankers throughout Europe. Maintaining Genoese privileges in the city of Naples was part of a conditional entente, based on reciprocity and agreements. King Philip II surely recalled the words of his father, Charles V, from his political testament:

As to Genoa, I think I am more assured now; for the future it will depend on how things are carried out. You must be careful to keep them devoted to you, as it touches upon the safety of all of the rest of Italy, the Kingdoms of Naples, Sicily and Milan, and not only for these, but even more so for the other realms of Spain, the islands of Sardegna, Mallorca, and Menorca.²⁹

Nel quale si narrano i fatti piu illustri, e singolari, accaduti nella citta, e Regno di Napoli nel corsodi due secoli (Naples: Nuova Stampa del Parrino e del Mutii, 1692), 210.

27. *Ibid.*, March 28, 1556.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Charles V's political testament was recorded on January 18, 1548, in *Corpus Documental*, Letter CCCLXXIX, II, 569–92. For a recent commentary, see James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V: Impresario of War, Campaign Strategy, International Finances, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21–22.

In these times of war, reliable financiers needed to be nurtured. Alba himself during a Council of State the following years recommended to Philip to “preserve Genoa,” which could fall into neither French nor into Spanish hands. On the contrary, “what would be best for His Majesty’s government” explained Alba to the king, stressing the city’s independence and Spain’s dependence on Genoa, “was that Genoa remain in its current condition: a Republic.”³⁰

Philip II repeatedly intervened directly with the viceroys in Naples on behalf of the Genoese to guarantee their financial support for his endeavors. The political situation in the Netherlands was mirrored in the Mediterranean, and Genoese finances were crucial to allow the Spanish monarchy to combat the Ottomans.³¹ The first of many setbacks in the Mediterranean was the loss of Djerba in 1560. During the tenure of the Viceroy Duke of Alcalá (r.1559–71), Spanish treasurer Gómez Suárez de Figueroa arranged for a *donativo* of 100,000 scudi of gold from prominent Genoese financiers in the kingdom, Paris Lomellino and Christoforo Centurione.³² Fearing the infringement on their financial privileges in Naples, the Genoese appealed directly to the Spanish king for assistance. The monarch put them at ease and assured the Genoese of his personal regard for the Republic. Time and again, the king reminded the viceroys that he “personally wished to see the Genoese well treated and financially favored in the Spanish possessions.”³³ The Genoese struggle with the viceroys thus exposes how Naples was one of the anchor points for the

30. “Se Genova fosse della Francia, sarebbe la cosa peggiore per molti motivi . . . se Genova appartenesse a Vostra Maestà non sarebbe affatto meglio . . . mentre ciò che egli giudicherebbe meglio per Vostra Maestà sarebbe che Genova fosse una repubblica rimanendo nella sua condizione precedente.” AGSim, Estado, Leg 1405, fol. 94.

31. For the importance of the Kingdom of Naples in the Mediterranean conflict, see Giulio Fenicia, *Il regno di Napoli e la difesa del Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II (1556–1598): organizzazione e finanziamento* (Bari: Cacucci Editore, 2003).

32. Ricardo Madgaleno Villanueva, Catalogo XVI del Archivo General de Simancas, *Papeles de Estado de la correspondencia y negociación de Nápoles*, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas y Universidad de Valladolid, 1942, Legajo 1055, Año 1566. James D. Tracy’s (*Emperor Charles V*) argues that once the Habsburgs were established in Italy, Naples always needed to provide *donativi* to pay the debts of recent wars.

33. ASG, Giunta di Marina 2, Consoli Nationali et esteri (1601–94), Letter from the King of Spain to the Viceroy of Naples, October 13, 1603. This is one of many such letters.

monarch's Mediterranean imperial strategies, increasingly threatened by Turkish advances. But even though the viceroy was attempting to secure funds for the kingdom, the Genoese could not allow Naples to be well governed, because for them, also, the region was an anchor point. Local negotiations to ensure the welfare of the Kingdom of Naples came as a very distant priority in the face of the harsh realities of the loss of Spanish territories throughout Europe and the Mediterranean.

As a result of these imperial policies, the turn of the seventeenth century marks a rupture in state finances. As Europe as a whole descended into financial crisis, the Kingdom of Naples was badly hit. Indeed, a contemporary referred to the Kingdom of Naples as the "Castile of Italy," financially drained in Spain's pursuit of empire.³⁴ The viceroys maintained their balancing act between international state finances and a local policy of *buon governo*. In 1580, Philip II had joined the crowns of Spain and Portugal. This event merged the colonies in the New World and all the earlier realms, making ruling all the more difficult and expensive.

The viceroys were caught in expansionist wars, and their struggle with the Genoese was representative of their tightrope walk between local and international interests. In a dispatch to Genoa in 1581, Viceroy of Sicily Marc'antonio Colonna explained his position vis-à-vis the merchants and their crucial role as part of the social capital of southern Italy: "my natural inclinations and rule of good government had always prompted me not only to favor the merchants, ensuring that everyone respect them while never abusing the prerogatives of the court, but also to manage to bring capable ones here."³⁵ Incapable of mending the fiscal hole through the entrepreneurship of merchants, Viceroy Count of Miranda (r. 1586–95) argued in 1592, "I remind your majesty that the Royal court of Naples is in no condition to bear such obligation [of another loan to the crown] because it is so weakened that it cannot meet even its ordinary and predictable expenses."³⁶ Francesco Caracciolo has pondered whether

34. This idea has been elaborated on by Giuseppe Galasso, *Alla Periferia dell'Impero: il Regno di Napoli nel Periodo Spagnolo (secoli XVI–XVII)* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Ed. 1994), 216, who sees a "castellanization" of the Italian peninsula and by John H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469–1716* (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 255.

35. ASG, A.S. 2792, letter from Marc'antonio Colonna, Viceroy of Sicily to Genoa, Palermo, February 26, 1581.

36. Francesco Caracciolo, *Il Regno di Napoli nei secoli XVI e XVII* (Rome: Tipografia Pio X, 1966), 48–49.

the viceroys were bad economists, bad politicians, or both.³⁷ If we see them as imperial governors, aware of the contradictions but eager both to pressure the Genoese and to try to gain the loyalty of the Neapolitans, neither of these categories applies. More simply put, the viceroys' main focus was to maintain the kingdom's financial assets within local boundaries. But Spain was fighting nearly every state on the European continent, and the financial effort to maintain extra-European possessions led the monarch to neglect the needs of his European territories. Dependent on loans for continued existence, Spain inefficiently stretched itself to the limit (as the sun never set on the Habsburg Empire). Although the alliance with the Genoese brought momentary financial relief, it wound up exhausting the Spanish domains' resources, therefore undermining the very essence of the imperial system.

THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS

In 1607, the Spanish state entered yet another bankruptcy, with wide repercussions for all the provinces of the empire. To mend the gaping fiscal hole, Viceroy Benavente (r.1603–10) located an adequate source of money in the kingdom: the wealthy Genoese community. He proceeded to catalog all Genoese earnings in the kingdom and then to tax them. He argued that “foreigners sucked the blood of this kingdom . . . it would be wise to suspend their collection of the trimestrial gabelle for a while . . . and in particular [that of] the Genoese nation, which owns all the income of this kingdom.”³⁸ The viceroy established an inventory, listing feudal and personal revenues, as well as lands and baronial estates, that the Genoese had inherited or acquired during their lifetimes from the royal court, the city of Naples, and the commune, as well as rents, favors, and gifts.³⁹ When the Genoese consul Grillo received notice of the

37. *Ibid.*, 50.

38. Raffaele Colapietra, ed., *Problemi monetari negli scrittori napoletani del seicento* (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1973), 20–21.

39. The Genoese consul convened the Genoese nationals registered as residents in Naples. Sixty such families were present at the meeting that acknowledged their contribution to the viceroy's new ban. The most famous of them included the Grillo, Fornari, Spinola, Serra, Grimaldi, Mari-Pallavicino, Squarciafico, Cattaneo, Lomellino, Gentile, Lagomacini, Pavese, Naselli, Massa, Saluzzo, de Mari, Malacida,

imminent tax, he alleged that it would inflict great financial damage on the community he administered.⁴⁰

Fortuitously for the Genoese, local military exigencies enabled them to circumvent the tax and earn money at the same time. The viceroy needed funds and galleys to protect the kingdom's coasts against Ottoman attacks and so appealed to the Genoese for assistance. As the court had already contracted numerous loans for the kingdom's necessities through the Genoese banks, Benavente agreed not to impose the tax; in return, the Genoese would erase the court's debts, and also send their ships.⁴¹ In addition, a memorandum from the Collateral Council provided the Genoese with annual earnings to partially defray the costs of garrisoning soldiers near Naples to counter the Turkish threat.⁴² The agreement between the viceroy and the Genoese meant that the costs of protecting the kingdom fell upon the merchant bankers. That is, the Spanish imperial system infringed upon good government because it relied on private individuals such as the Genoese to ensure the safety of the Spanish domains, and it allowed them to make substantial profits in the process.⁴³

Benavente's measure to tax the Genoese was destined to fail. The Habsburg imperial project invariably worked in the Genoese's favor, as it was more beneficial to the empire to have the Genoese provide military assistance than to eliminate the private collection of gabelles. The Genoese

Carmagnola, Centurione, Doria, Vivaldo, Cigala, Belmosto, and di Negro families. The list did not include the Genoese located outside the capital.

40. On May 12, 1609, the Genoese Republic tried to satisfy the demands of the Spanish Crown. Thus, the doge ordered three Genoese in Naples (Tomaso Pinello, Paolo Grillo, and Giacomo Fornari) to collect the nation's tax on high incomes. See ASG, A.S. 2635 letter from Console Tomaso Pinello to Republic of Genoa, Naples, May 12, 1609.

41. ASG, A.S. 2635 letter from Console Tomaso Pinello to Republic of Genoa, Naples, July 7, 1609.

42. ASG, A.S. 2636 letter from Console Batta Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, June 20, 1610; 300,000 ducats were levied from the kingdom to help the Genoese prepare the armada. See Ricardo Magdaleno Redondo, Archivo General de Simancas, *Papeles de Estado*, Legajo 1026, Año 1537. The Republic came to the rescue of the court in its military offenses of Puerto Viejo and Istria. *Ibid.*, Año 1564.

43. It was typical for the Spanish troops to be paid in the Neapolitan arsenal under the supervision of the viceroy and then to embark on the Genoese galleys. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, VI A, vol 13 p. 60 *Giornali del governo dell'excellentissimo Duca d'Ossuna vicere del regno di Napoli da Francesco Zazzera Napolitano*, MDCXVI.

families in Naples had access to the galleys of their republic, thereby gaining financial power in southern Italy. In short, the Genoese agreed to provide financial relief, military leadership, and galleys for transportation, and, in exchange, the Spanish viceroy legalized their right to collect both direct and indirect taxes in the kingdom.⁴⁴ Local politics played an important part, as Neapolitan ministers struck deals with the Genoese when it seemed most convenient. The Genoese consistently provided military and financial assistance but never agreed to surrender their mercantile privileges, which were the source of their financial success.⁴⁵ Negotiations seem always to have been working in the Genoese's favor, thanks to their variegated portfolio.

The Kingdom of Naples found in Viceroy Lemos (r.1610–16) an even greater supporter. He was mindful of the crown's inability to address the financial exhaustion of the kingdom and tried to distribute local resources rightly. In 1610, Lemos refused to pay debts not contracted in Naples (thus attacking the very essence of the imperial system), writing to the sovereign "if you require financial contributions from this kingdom above the possibility of the state patrimony, then you will need a more industrious and forceful man to go ahead with this enterprise."⁴⁶ Trying a series of strategies, he suspended foreigners' collection of gabelles from the court (the public debt). He lowered the tax on public income (whose collection was chiefly in the hands of foreigners).⁴⁷ He also tried to discontinue the collection of all inherited income (through interests on debts and gabelles on silk, iron, and oil) and income guaranteed for life.⁴⁸ The court also impounded fallow lands, which Lemos decreed must be spread equally

44. ASG, A.S. 2636 letter from Console Batta Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, November 9, 1610.

45. The Genoese galleys were crucial for the transportation of soldiers and horses to northern Italy but also on the Adriatic side to fight the Venetians. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, VI A, vol. 13, 50 *Giornali del governo dell'excellentissimo Duca d'Ossuna*.

46. Giovanni Muto, *Le finanze pubbliche Napoletane*, 93.

47. ASG, A.S. 2636 letter from Consul Batta Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, July 20, 1610.

48. ASG, A.S. 2636 letter from Console Batta Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, April 5, 1611. For a detailed work on the *arrendamenti*, see Luigi de Rosa, *Studi sugli arrendamenti del Regno di Napoli* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 1958).

among foreigners and locals.⁴⁹ The Collateral Council claimed that this course of action was in accordance with the “antique form of ruling” (i.e., *buon governo*), which provided for the destitute people of the kingdom.

Unfortunately, Lemos’s policy attempts to resolve the kingdom’s fiscal gap resulted in two financial failures: it lowered the value of the Neapolitan currency in outside markets, and it failed to collect the money he expected from the Genoese. Despite his well-intended actions, his measures culminated in the kingdom’s 1622 financial crisis, brought on by the mounting deficit and the inflation of credits.⁵⁰ The reduction of the yearly interest evidently greatly affected the Genoese and, by extension, the Spanish Crown. The interest due to foreigners amounted to 1,250,000 ducats per year, and the Genoese owned 1,120,000 of that.⁵¹ Should Lemos’s annulment of foreigners’ collection of direct and indirect taxes be passed, the Genoese would not only lose much of their assets, but also the opportunity to extend further loans to the monarch. Neither the crown nor the Genoese were willing to jeopardize this steady revenue. Thus, not only was the kingdom’s financial situation disastrous, but the association between Genoese and Habsburgs also prolonged the exploitation of the region.

Once again, the Genoese protested against the court’s interference with the collection of their gabelle in the kingdom,⁵² and Genoese Consul Giacomo Lagomacino secured a copy of the decree stipulating the right

49. ASG, A.S. 2328 Litterarum n. 783, Letter from Agente Stefano Salvago to Republic of Genoa, Naples, August 9, 1611.

50. Ruggiero Romano, “Between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: The Economic Crisis of 1619–22,” in *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, eds. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (Boston: Routledge, 1978), 165–225. For a more detailed explanation of the devaluation of the local currency in the Kingdom of Naples, see BNN, mss Brancaccio, IV A, vol. 2, car 38 “summario de la consulta de los expedients para que no se saque dinero del reyno,” car 39 “copia della lettera del duque de Ossuna a S.M. sopra il valutare la moneta d’oro nel regno,” car 42 “expedients apuntados para que la moneda entre en el reyno,” car 43 “discorso del Mco. Sebastiano d’Ayello sopra il mancamento della moneta nel reyno nell’anno 1590,” and finally car 44 “discorso sobre el precio y liga de la moneda de oro y plata del reyno de Nápoles.”

51. Galasso, *Alla periferia dell’impero*, 204.

52. ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Console Batta Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, January 24, 1612.

to receive their income from the viceroy.⁵³ After much debate with the consul, the Spanish king sanctioned this decree, making the right inalienable. Lemos's administration is representative of the kingdom's entry into a new age, along with the rest of Europe. The viceroy had come across a suitable source of funds, the Genoese gabelles, whose non-collection would in turn hamper the movement of capital from Naples to the king. So, to try to maintain good government, the viceroy attempted to contest the privileges the monarchy granted to the Genoese (thereby undermining the alliance between the Genoese and the Habsburgs) so as to find financial resources for the kingdom. For him, good government meant redistributing assets to keep the kingdom financially afloat. The king, however, saw things differently and did not wish to see his financiers distressed by local hindrances.

Lieutenant-General Cardinal Antonio Zapata (r.1620–22) also targeted the Genoese community for funds, yet again, without success. In 1621, he tried to suspend *Jus Luendi* (the right to inherit financial pledges) for foreigners for three years.⁵⁴ The Genoese consul appealed to the Republic, arguing that “such a ban was not only harmful to the nation, but against all liberty to dispose freely of one's own patrimony.” The doge then wrote to King Philip IV, claiming that “such a decree went against justice” and, he added, “would not only be harmful to the Genoese nation but also to His Catholic Majesty, whose common interests were inseparable.”⁵⁵ The language was nearly threatening the king that his failure to intervene would lead to his doom. That year marked the end of the Twelve-Year Truce (1609–21) between the Netherlands and Spain. As France and England recognized the Netherlands, a triple alliance was formed against Spain, and the empire needed money to muster troops. Consul Cornelio Spinola tried in vain to negotiate with Cardinal Zapata to suppress the suspension of *Jus Luendi*.⁵⁶ Zapata did not back down and made a further attack with the decree requiring accounts. He finally issued a decree on the reform of the Neapolitan currency. The purpose was to “raise

53. ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Console Giacomo Lagomacino to Republic of Genoa, Naples, February 4, 1614.

54. ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Console Cornelio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, September 25, 1621.

55. *Ibid.*, October 8, 1621.

56. *Ibid.*, October 21, 1621.

the opulence of the kingdom . . . to better commerce with commodity and general utility . . . especially for merchants and foreigners who draw income from this kingdom.” All foreigners were to provide a detailed explanation of their income in the kingdom within thirty days of the decree’s publication. Should they not respect the order, the Royal Audience (Royal Court of Law) would seize their revenues for three years. The Genoese bowed to the order, but not without trying individually to interrupt the moratorium through the intervention of friends of the nation highly placed at court.⁵⁷ By rendering their financial services central to the survival of the crown, the Genoese easily turned their fate in Naples. As the doge explicitly stated in his letter, the fortune and interests of Genoese and Habsburgs were entwined. The loss of privileges imposed on foreigners in Naples affected Habsburg foreign policy on the European continent.⁵⁸ Therefore, the monarchy was constantly negotiating conflicts in favor of the Genoese in Naples.

The clash between the Genoese and the viceroys was exacerbated when Viceroy Don Antonio Álvarez de Toledo Duke of Alba (r.1622–29) exploited the power vacuum created by the change of monarch in 1621 to harass the Genoese. That year, young Philip IV took the lead of the Habsburg Empire. More savvy than his father, Philip nonetheless inherited a financial wreck. During the hiatus, without consulting the king, Alba required the Genoese nation to double its usual payment: twenty-five

57. ASG, A.S. 2328 Litterarum n.795 Letter from Agent Stefano Salvago to Republic of Genoa, Naples, August 23, 1622.

58. Aurelio Musi has consulted a manuscript written by Consul Cornelio Spinola located at the BNN, mss XI, E 31. The consul saw the economic stagnation of the kingdom as a result of the lack of state intervention. Using a medical metaphor to pinpoint the political conditions of a sick kingdom, Spinola explained: “la cagione del male per ordinarle li rimedii oportuni e provederlo di preservarvi per l’avenire, applicandole nella sua convalescenza forze proporzionate.” See “Da élite internazionale ad élite locale: i mercanti Genovesi nel Regno di Napoli e il caso di Cornelio Spinola” in *Rapporti diplomatici e scambi commerciali nel Mediterraneo moderno*, ed., Mirella Mafici (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2005), 41–65. Similarly, John Elliott had found that the Spanish economic problem in the Mediterranean had been denounced by the *arbitristas* (a group of seventeenth-century Spanish reformers worried about the projects of socioeconomic regeneration of Spain) who also used medical metaphors. According to Elliott, “they were doctors who had diagnosed with accuracy the problems within the body politics.” See *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

percent of its income.⁵⁹ This initiative was clearly contrary to the king's command to safeguard Genoese financial assets in the Kingdom of Naples. To locate funds, the viceroy clearly disobeyed the king's orders. The decree imposed by the viceroy would seize twenty-five percent of foreigners' income before the arrival of the new king, creating a stir among the Genoese community because it essentially canceled the king's directives.⁶⁰ This course of action followed the Neapolitan ministers' recommendation to enact the decree before the new king's ascent to the throne. Evidently, the Duke of Alba's cunning tactic aimed at exploiting the hiatus, willingly defying the king's orders. Once the ban was issued, the only way for the Genoese to counter it was to appeal directly to the monarch, send a copy of the privileges, and wait until the crown issued new orders to the viceroy. This could take anywhere from three months to a year. Meanwhile, local authorities could collect twenty-five percent on the Genoese income, which would be impossible to recover because the court owed vast sums of money.

The Genoese nation's constant negotiation with local authorities at times hampered its assistance to the crown.⁶¹ Both lending and gabelle collection tied the Genoese to the Habsburgs. If the empire failed, so would Genoa. Although the viceroys' initiatives acted as disincentives for the Genoese, the need for enormous loans compelled the king to champion the traders. For instance, Alba's decision to require twenty-five percent from gabelle collectors amounted to an average of 30,000 ducats per year for each collector.⁶² Philip IV mediated not only with Alba to exempt the Genoese from the tax, but also to repay the money already paid. The king intervened frequently on behalf of his favorite nation in the Kingdom of Naples to secure Genoese financial support elsewhere in the Spanish dominions.

59. *Ibid.*, there is no date or signature on this letter, but as it came with the copy of the ban on the reform on currency, it is safe to assume that it was sent between September 1622 and the end of the year (which saw the arrival of a new Genoese consul).

60. ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Console Cornelio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples; there is no date on the letter, but it comes as a warrant of the ban issued on March 2, 1622; therefore, it was sent sometime between March 1622 and the end of the year.

61. ASG, A.S. 2637, Letter from Console Cornelio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, April 28, 1626.

62. *Ibid.*, August 29, 1626.

The viceroy believed that the Genoese needed to fulfill their financial obligation to the region. The viceroys' role was to press for Genoese fiscal participation to preserve the kingdom's welfare. The Genoese, however, were not willing to pay for good government with a loss of their privileges. This episode acquired a different meaning for the Habsburg Empire. Reducing Genoese income meant lessening their capacity to extend loans to the crown. The conflict between the Genoese and the viceroys was therefore aggravated by the context of imperial domination. Because of the intervention of the crown, their interests became mutually opposed. The contrast in civic engagement in the Kingdom of Naples thus further enhanced the fundamental tensions between the two parties.

Eventually, the Genoese doge intervened directly with the new ruler, claiming that "the Genoese always supported financially and militarily the Catholic Kings, who allowed this privileged nation to do business in all their possessions."⁶³ Moreover, "during bad times, the Genoese brought their financial assistance to the kingdom. It would be," he argued, "only decent to accommodate their needs now." He concluded by arguing that "agreements in this kingdom would have repercussions on others." A timely warning: as pointed out by the doge, Southern Italy was indeed one of the great links of the Habsburg chain. Most importantly, the crown was forced into a politics of interventionism because, more than justice, Philip IV was concerned about keeping his financiers satisfied and willing to lend for greater imperial ventures. While the Kingdom of Naples was undergoing a major financial crisis, war on the European continent exploded, further increasing the strain on Spain and its Genoese bankers.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (1618–48)

The Thirty Years' War erupted mainly over religious disputes between Catholics and Protestants, but it quickly turned into a territorial conflict.⁶⁴ Despite the enormous sums sent annually from Castile and Italy to Flanders,

63. *Ibid.*

64. According to Joachim Whaley, the Thirty Years' War was a constitutional crisis triggered by religious difference rather than fundamentally about religion. See *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, vol. 1. *Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493–1648* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

the Spanish armies could not break Dutch resistance. The great scheme of Habsburg hegemony was to establish an imperial system in Italy to facilitate military action in the Netherlands. Maintaining a controlling influence in upper Italy became vital, and Lombardy, in particular, became a strategic region because of its location at the beginning of the Spanish Road, which led from northern Italy to the Netherlands and became the preferred highway for numerous recruited Catholic soldiers.⁶⁵ Fernand Braudel notes that during the Thirty Years' War, "Italy was more than ever the point of departure for Spain's every move."⁶⁶ The city of Milan became the springboard for the military, political, and financial actions of the Habsburg dynasty.

About 1625, the Spanish Habsburgs began to develop an energetic policy in which all the Spanish possessions in Italy became tributaries of one another. Naples economically sustained Milan, and Milan geopolitically sustained Naples: the Duke of Alba argued that

the state of Milan is important to the preservation and defense of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily . . . having control of Milan, the Kings of Spain have a foot in the door of Naples because the day that Milan would fall, it would be just a step before losing Naples, which is much easier to take than the state of Milan.⁶⁷

It was therefore natural that Naples contribute to protecting Lombardy.⁶⁸ The 1624 project of the Union of Arms of King Philip IV's prime minister, Count-Duke Olivares, brought Naples to the center of the Spanish military effort. Between 1631 and 1643, about 1 million ducats per year left Naples

65. See Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

66. Fernand Braudel, "L'Italia fuori d'Italia," in *Storia d'Italia Einaudi*, 2 vols. (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), 2231.

67. Galasso, *Alla Periferia dell'impero*, 308.

68. Milan and Naples provided mutual support via the Genoese. For instance, the king asked the Republic to transport 4,000 infantrymen from Naples to Lombardy. A letter from Viceroy Duke of Ossuna reached Consul Antonio Spinola in the summer of 1618. Milan urgently required soldiers, galleons, and other provisions of war in addition to 300,000 ducats. See ASG, A.S. 2788 Litterarum, Lettere principi alla Repubblica di Genoa (1600–32), Naples, March 3, 1618.

for the defense of Milan.⁶⁹ Count Olivares's maxim that "Kings cannot achieve heroic actions without money" rang true.⁷⁰

The Genoese based in the Kingdom of Naples were active in supporting the king's efforts in Lombardy. Indeed, since the times of Charles V, the Saragoza-Milan-Naples financial route had been part of the Genoese axis in Italy.⁷¹ Moreover, as the antechamber of the Spanish in the Italian peninsula, Lombardy "covered" both Naples and Genoa.⁷² The Spanish-Genoese alliance had territorial repercussions for the Republic. Because of the geographic location of Genoa, the city was endangered by Spanish military decisions.⁷³ And both Lombardy and Liguria were close to France, whose enmity increased following an alliance with the Protestant Germans against the Habsburgs. Early in the conflict, in 1618, the forces of the king of France were coveting Alsace and the Pyrenees from the Habsburgs, and threatening the Ligurian coast.⁷⁴ Territorial interests combined with their political alliance with the Habsburgs drew the Genoese into the conflict.⁷⁵

Throughout the mid-seventeenth century, the Genoese supported war efforts of the Habsburg Empire in the Mediterranean and in the Spanish Netherlands.⁷⁶ In 1624, the king and the Genoese resident in Naples,

69. Galasso, *Alla Periferia dell'impero*, 314.

70. Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 326.

71. *Ibid.*, 315.

72. Musi, *L'Italia dei viceré*, 42.

73. The viceroy of Naples had sent an envoy to warn the Genoese to be prepared to rally their forces in support of His Catholic Majesty. See ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Console Antonio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, July 31, 1618.

74. When an allied French-Savoyard army threatened Genoa by land and by sea, Viceroy Duke of Ossuna used his military intelligence from France, Marseille, and Burgundy to warn the Republic of the threat. Moreover, he summoned Antonio Spinola and Octavio Serra, Genoese residents in Naples, to apprehend the situation, and even offered military support. See ASG, A.S. 2788 n.118, Letter from Duque de Osuna to Republic of Genoa, July 30, 1618.

75. The Italian republics were asked to contribute to the military support of Lombardy through a monthly stipend to the state of Milan of 25,000 ducats. The republic of Florence gave 15,000 ducats, the republic of Genoa gave 8,000, Siena 5,000, and Luca 4,000. See Parrino, *Teatro Eroico*, 91.

76. In 1615, the Genoese provided 400 horses and 500 men for the kingdom. A couple of months later, eight galleys left Naples for the Levant. ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Console Antonio Spinola to Repubblica di Genova, Naples, August 2, 1615.

Ottavio Centurione, agreed on an *asiento* of five million ducats to support the military operations in Flanders.⁷⁷ Spanish military endeavors and Genoese finances in Naples thus continued to be intimately entwined. Each new loan to the king not only increased Genoese bargaining power, but also increased the risk of further lending. What allowed the Genoese financiers to survive the 1627 bankruptcy was that they had diversified their portfolios. This explains their struggle to preserve lucrative feudal privileges such as the gabelles: should loan granting fail, the collection of gabelles would compensate for the loss.

In 1627, a new era started for the Spanish Empire that depended greatly on the Genoese. Trade with the Americas had declined: in 1598, two million ducats were entering Spain from the silver mines. In 1618, the figure was only 800,000. During the reign of Philip IV, the silver coming from the Americas was already committed years ahead. Indeed, 1627 saw the worst bankruptcy ever, and a Dutch fleet captured New Spain's entire treasure fleet off the coast of Cuba. From then on, Genoa provided the only steady supply of funds destined to imperial pursuits on the continent. At the end of 1626, the Spanish economy imploded. The Spanish Crown started using Marranos from Amsterdam as the crown's bankers. However, because of the diversification of their portfolio and their military involvement, the Genoese remained active financial providers of the Spanish Crown. For instance, Genoese ambassador Gio Batta Saluzzo received orders from the Republic to remind the king that the Genoese had been fighting alongside the Spanish in Lombardy for years. Should the monarch wish to maintain this military alliance and post troops in northern Italy, he needed the Genoese middlemen.⁷⁸ Therefore, Genoese privileges in the states of Milan and Naples needed to be maintained. The king once again honored their request. By 1627, a number of factors had become evident. First, the Genoese nation provided more for the Spanish Crown than the Neapolitan court did. Second, the king would agree to nearly anything to preserve

77. Giovanni Muto, *Le finanze pubbliche Napoletane*, 110.

78. ASG, A.S. 2712, Materie Politiche, Istruzioni a ministri (Spagna: 1529–1659) “Istruzione per il Magnifico Illustrissimo Gio Batta Saluzzo ambasciatore ordinario a Sua Maesta sopra il decreto della suspensione de pagamento a trattanti con copia di lettera in piu con materiale scritta al Magnifico Batta Serra.” Genoa, February 27, 1627. As in many such documents, the first part of the letter is in Spanish and the second in Italian. The second half is not a translation but a continuation.

Spain's endangered territories; the Spanish monarchy had reached the point of empire preservation rather than empire management. Third, the king condoned the Genoese domination of resources (as is seen in his act of having the interests paid back) with the view of guaranteeing loans for his imperial goals on the continent. Good government was coming in direct competition with imperial management: the viceroys were increasingly becoming obstacles to the Habsburgs' vision of linking their European possessions under "one crown, one sword."

Alba's defiance of the king's orders stemmed from his need to protect southern Italy, Spain's enclave in the Mediterranean. However, the Genoese declared that they had already used their personal resources for continued support of southern Italy. Indeed, in 1631 the Genoese ambassador in Madrid had just loaned 60,000 ducats to the sovereign in support of his army in Naples. For the viceroy, there seemed to be less room to compromise as the war proceeded and Neapolitan finances worsened. The viceroy was trying to remedy the sense of exhaustion caused by Spain's wars with the rest of Europe. However, as a result of the confrontation between Alba and Spinola, the king intervened once again. He thanked the Genoese for their financial assistance toward the royal galleys and infantry and lifted their financial obligation in Naples, in exchange for a further loan of two millions to cover past expenses.⁷⁹ The further repercussions were multiple. For the king, the protection of his domains depended on the acquisition of funds. After 1627, his thoughts were on the preservation of the empire and the covering of past expenses rather than on engagement in an in-depth protection of his lands. The imperial effort had reached the salvaging stage, which was increased by the great competition over the acquisition of the American colonies.

In 1632, Viceroy Duke of Alcalà (r. 1629–32) tried a stalling maneuver by physically hiding the privileges documenting the exemption of the Genoese from taxation in the kingdom. First, the Genoese pleaded with the viceroy to respect these privileges.⁸⁰ Second, the Republic sent precise

79. The king required the Count of Monterey, president of the Council of State in Italy, lieutenant and captain general in the Kingdom of Naples to repay the entire balance. See ASG, A.S. 1638, Letter from the King of Spain to Count of Monterey, Madrid, November 10, 1631.

80. The privileges of the nation in the Spanish dominions had been in place since the year 1342. See ASG, Giunta di Marina 2, Letter from Duke of Alcalà to Viceroy of Naples, September 10, 1632.

instructions to the Genoese ambassador in Madrid, listing many years of viceroys' mismanagement exacerbated by "capricious and absent-minded ministers."⁸¹ The doge complained of the lack of justice and *buon governo* toward "the people most dedicated to the king in Naples." Philip IV took action and ordered the viceroy to respect the Genoese privileges in southern Italy. However, to win time and gather some last-minute funds, the viceroy purposely concealed this order.⁸² This political maneuver was not effective in securing financial support for the kingdom.

The Thirty Years' War deepened the financial ruin of the region. In 1639, the Duke of Medina (r.1637–44) told the crown, "the state of the Royal Patrimony cannot supply the contributions which the King our Lord orders for Germany and the State of Milan, or even meet the normal obligations and expenses of this kingdom."⁸³ That year, the Spanish fleet suffered another defeat against the forces of the Low Countries in the Battle of the Downs. Ultimately, the kingdom's resources were permanently drained. In 1647, its people revolted against the fruit gabelle because the viceroys were unable to maintain *buon governo*. And in 1648, despite continuous assistance from the Genoese, the Peace of Westphalia stripped the Habsburg Empire of the Netherlands.⁸⁴

Lucien Febvre noted that in the 1640s, the world seemed to collapse. The inefficiency of Spanish rule sparked contemporaneous revolts in Naples,

81. ASG, A.S. 2712, "Istruzioni a Cesare Durazzo ambasciatore straordinario presso il Re Cattolico," Genoa, March 1, 1634.

82. The ministers of the Collateral Council dragged their feet for a couple of months. See ASG, A.S. 2638, n.240, 253 and 257, Letters from Console Cornelio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, March 8, 1633, March 15, 1633, and April 21, 1633.

83. Antonio Calabria, *The Cost of Empire*, 110.

84. Interestingly, Peter H. Wilson argues that the conflict strained the imperial power of the Austrian Habsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire, but even so, the German Empire did not collapse, and "it was the challengers who went under." He states that "both the Empire and its components emerged stronger from the war." See "Meaningless Conflict?: The Character of the Thirty Years War" in *The Projection and Limitations of Imperial Powers, 1618–1850*, ed. Frederick C. Schneid (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 1–35. For a full account by the same author, see *The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). Here Wilson argues that the war contributed to the development of sovereign states of relatively stable political order.

Catalonia, Sicily, and Portugal. Surplus from the Americas vanished into wars on many fronts.⁸⁵ For Spain, the Americas had never served to fuel commerce or industry, because much of the Spanish trade was used to strengthen its navy and protect its realms in Europe and the Mediterranean. In Charles Tilly's words, "war makes the state, and the state makes war."⁸⁶ Unable to repay its Genoese financiers, the Spanish Crown lost its military capacity and its territories.

The only true winners were the Genoese, who enjoyed their accustomed financial good fortune. The Genoese had kept the short-term loans policy, enabling them to adjust quickly when the Spanish Empire started losing momentum. In 1634, the total income of Genoese finances in the Kingdom of Naples was estimated at 4.5 million ducats.⁸⁷ Whereas the consequences for the Habsburg Crown were dire, the Genoese were pushed in alternative directions (titles of nobility, fiefdoms, endogamy, building local ties rather than long-distance ones). The Genoese did not descend into a financial abyss as scholars suggest; they simply converted their profits into land and titles. Rather than financiers and long-distance traders, they became grantees of Spain and ministers. And for those who continued to lend money, their interests then lay in the Americas.

Recognizing Naples as a crucial component of the Spanish Empire, or as the "Castile of Italy," creates a deeper understanding of how the Habsburgs' European empire functioned. The tension between the Spanish viceroys and the Genoese community illustrates the importance of the Kingdom of Naples for Habsburg imperial expansion. Genoese merchants and Spanish viceroys were the individuals who made the empire work. The viceroys strove to provide for the basic needs of the kingdom's population by locating adequate sources of funding, whereas the Genoese profited from their economic and political clout to extract their resources, which translated into profit for themselves and military and financial support for the Habsburg monarchy.

85. Dennis O. Flynn, "Fiscal Crisis and the Decline of Spain (Castile)," *The Journal of Economic History*, 42:1 (March 1982), 139–147.

86. Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–191.

87. ASG, A.S. 2639 Consoli due Sicilie (1634–1641) n.133, Letter from Console Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, January 3, 1634.

They profited enormously from their tax-collecting contracts and the interest they charged on loans to the Spanish Crown. When their financial interests were threatened by proposals for fiscal reform advanced by the Spanish viceroys, they exercised all their influence to block them, by appealing directly to the king, over the head of the viceroy. They thus contributed to the financial and economic malaise that led to the massive revolt of 1647, which was a direct response from an exhausted population to the endless demands for new taxes.

CHAPTER SIX

Holy Week: The Genoese in the Ceremonial Triptych

For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven.

—ECCLESIASTES 3:1–15

Vital supporters of Christians in the East, the Genoese also supported the Christians who settled in Naples. They extended their support to domains under their jurisdiction and under foreign rule.

—FRANCESCO CEVA GRIMALDI,
Memorie Storiche della Città di Napoli, 1857

On November 25, 1535, Holy Roman Emperor Charles V made a triumphal entrance into the city of Naples on his way back from seizing Tunis from privateer Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, a conquest that was part of an ongoing Mediterranean struggle between Christians and Muslims. The Kingdom of Naples was the easternmost realm of Charles's Mediterranean possessions and the front line in the Habsburg conflict with the Turks and their French allies. To celebrate his victory, he was welcomed by the representatives of the city districts (the *Eletti*) and by church dignitaries who escorted him to his quarters in Castel Nuovo. He rode under a baldachin (ceremonial canopy) held by the *Eletti* and led a long procession that stopped at the Cathedral of Naples, the *Duomo*, and all the city's districts, the *seggi*, on the way to the castle. In each of the six *seggi*, he received the feudal greetings of his vassals.

Before reaching his residence, he entered the Duomo to pray and to swear he would protect the privileges of all the citizens.¹ The city officials organized lavish pageantry to celebrate his arrival. Chroniclers report that at Porta Capuana, three angels descended to give Charles his scepter and crown, as well as keys to the city.² While trumpets blared, mythological figures saluted him. Arches whose decorations compared him to Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, and Scipio Africanus (a reference to the defeat of Tunis) celebrated “the most happy vanquisher of the Ottoman fury” but also a “wonder of the world.”³ The arches also showed the raising of the Turkish siege of Vienna, the victory over Tunis, and a scene of Charles receiving the king of Tunis (exiled by Barbarossa), an emblem of *Humanitas*.⁴ In Piazza Selleria, the center of city government, the emperor found a huge mountain of giants (created from food), which an eagle (symbol of empire) destroyed upon its arrival in a lightning flash.⁵ For five months, the most important Italian dignitaries traveled to Naples to pay him homage. During the emperor’s stay, many entertainments were

1. Charles’s speech was as follows: “Yo quiero, y yo juro osservar, y hazer observar todos los privilegios, gracias, y capitulos concessos à esta fidelissima Ciudad, pur los otros reyes y a un usas conceder.” See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche della Città di Napoli* (Naples: Arnaldo Forni Ed., 1857), 291.

2. Andrea Sala, *La triomphale entrata di Carlo V. Imperatore Augusto in la inclinata città di Napoli, e di Messina, con il significato delli archi triumphali, e delle figure antiche in prosa e versi latini* (Florence: Biblioteca Moreniana, 1536); Paolo Danza, *Il triomphale apparato per la entrata della Cesarea Maesta in Napoli, con tutte le particolarita, archi triumphali, statue antiche, cosa bellissima* (Florence: Biblioteca Moreniana, 1536); an author using the pseudonym of Parthenio Incognito, *Il glorioso triompho et bellissimo apparato ne la felicissima entrata di la Maesta Ces, in la nobilissima città di Parthenope fatto con lo particolare ingresso di esta Maesta ordinatissimamente* (Naples: Mastro Matthio Canze De Bione a Canto lo Carmine, 1535); anonymous, “Relation de l’entrée de Charles Quint dans la ville de Naples: 25 novembre 1535” in Louis Prosper Gachard, ed., *Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas*, 4 vols. (Brussels: F. Hayez, 1874–82), vol. 2, 573–581.

3. See Antonio Castaldo, *Istoria del Regno di Napoli*, BNN, mss Brancaccio, III A, vol. 9, 17–18.

4. Bonner Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State: Triumphal Progresses of Foreign Sovereigns in Renaissance Italy 1494–1600* (Florence: Leo. S. Olschki Editore, 1986), 158.

5. Bonner Mitchell, *Italian Civic Pageantry in the High Renaissance: A Descriptive Bibliography of Triumphal Entries and Selected Other Festivals for State Occasions* (Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1979), 101.

staged, including jousts, races, and a masked ball during carnival.⁶ The city and the élite competed in entertaining him with banquets, theatrical performances, and bullfights.⁷ The city became the center of the Christian world for an entire winter. Before Charles left the kingdom, the archbishop gave a series of sermons in the Duomo to celebrate Charles's shielding of Christianity against the Muslim infidels.

More than mere allegorical merriments, the welcoming ceremony illustrates Spain's need to find allies among the city's communities to counter the spiritual threat to Charles's imperial dynasty. Speeches, treatises, and inscriptions during Charles's visit emphasized the contribution of the Naples nobles to the emperor's wars, especially to the conquest of Tunis – and their rank and authority.⁸ The real supporters of his cause, however, lay elsewhere in the kingdom. If we explore the city's Easter celebrations following Charles's entry, it becomes abundantly clear that there was a reorganization of the social constituencies, reflecting a new civil and political order.⁹ Those who had assisted the crown against the French–Ottoman coalition were rewarded by being acknowledged during the festivities.¹⁰ The feudal lords participated as vassals, not as protectors of the crown.¹¹ The Genoese, on the other hand, as humanist Paolo Giovio

6. Antonino Castaldo, *Dell'istoria di notar Antonino Castaldo libri quattro. Ne' quali si descrivono gli avvenimenti più memorabili succeduti nel regno di Napoli sotto il governo del viceré D. Pietro di Toledo e de' viceré suoi successori fino al cardinal Granvela* (Naples: Nella stamperia di G. Gravier, 1769), Tomo VI, 48–59.

7. Tommaso Astarita, *Between Salt Water and Holy Water: A History of Southern Italy* (New York: Norton & Co., 2005) 87.

8. *Ibid.*, 88.

9. For an account on the role of the Spanish Empire on papal politics and the process of developing informal imperialism, also during Easter, see Thomas Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome: 1500–1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

10. In 1442, Alfonso the Magnanimous also entered Naples, which he had brought under the suzerainty of the Aragonese. Alfonso celebrated his triumph in the style of the Roman Caesars and was greeted by the Florentine community. In the procession, the figure of the Roman Caesar followed the Florentines in an ornate carriage with a globe at his feet. See Alan Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous, King of Aragon, Naples, and Sicily, 1396–1456* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 248–250. For a description of the theological virtues and symbols of the procession, see Peter Stacey, *Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

11. The barons offered their help to the emperor “for the defense of the faithful kingdom against the powerful navy of the Turk and to protect the kingdoms of

informs us, had been part of Charles V's assault on Tunis against Barbarossa.¹² Genoese admiral Andrea Doria had been on the front line next to Charles. During the entrance ceremony, two columns, one of cloud and one of fire, represented the emperor's two captains: Doria the captain of the sea and Vasto the captain of the land troops.¹³ The emperor's entrance thus situated itself in the background of the war between Christianity and Islam. Spiritual celebrations reflected the new imperial order established by Charles, in which the Genoese held center stage.¹⁴

The Easter procession reflects a change made to Catholic liturgy to acknowledge the martial, financial, and spiritual merits of the Genoese, and to impart a new spiritual and social framework to the kingdom. The Easter ritual of Naples reflected the reliance of the Habsburg dynasty on financiers to fight religious wars.¹⁵ Charles's domains on the European continent witnessed countless spiritual threats, whereas the Genoese were

Naples and Sicily" but not through monetary assistance. On the contrary, they offered themselves to provide 30,000 ducats toward the rebuilding of fortifications and towers in their own lands should the viceroy "give the order to the Genoese galleys to provide the necessary assistance the kingdom needed." They asked to be sent German and Spanish soldiers to protect them while requiring the viceroy to ensure the Genoese would be taxed because they, too, were feudal owners. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, VII B, vol. 2 car 71 r "proposte che fanno i nobili delle città di Napoli al vicerè per la difesa del regno dalle invasioni di Turchi, et promesse di contributo per lo scopo sudetto."

12. See Paolo Giovio, *Dialogo delle Imprese Militare et Amoroze* (Milan: Giovanni Antonio degli Antoni, 1559). The Spanish kings recurrently also used the city of Genoa to do their triumphal entrances because it was situated on an important trade and transport route and the city was an ally of the Spanish Empire. Charles V did so five times between 1529 and 1543, to be greeted with elaborate ceremony and afforded the opportunity to consult princes, ambassadors, and papal legates. The visit in 1548 of Don Felipe, the future Philip II, permitted the reaffirming of the city's vital links with Spain.

13. BNN, mss Brancaccio, IV B, bol 10, car 209, Antonio Castaldo, *Historia*.

14. Charles V's claims of re-creating the Roman Empire at the height of the Renaissance have been the center of discussions on early modern imperialism. His dream of empire was buttressed by his grand chancellor Mercurino di Gattinara, who played a critical role in establishing Habsburg political dominion in Italy. See John Headly, *The Emperor and His Chancellor: A Study of Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

15. Giuliana Vitale argues that the Aragonese monarchs were in search of sacralization through ceremonies of legitimacy and also through the promotion of the cult of saints. See *Ritualità Monarchica, Cerimonie e Pratiche Devozionali nella Napoli Aragonese* (Salerno: Laveglia Carbone, 2006).

mainly involved in shielding southern Italy against Islam. They were recompensed for their devotion to the region by way of conspicuous display.

The Easter celebration was divided into three spiritual stages: the Genoese procession on Thursday, the Spanish celebration on Friday, and the Neapolitan participation on Saturday. Because of the intense spiritual competition for parading privileges, each moment of the procession had a specific meaning for the public watching the pageants. The acceptance of the Genoese in the religious rituals gave a new blueprint to Naples's celebrations, making a statement about their prominence in the city and in the empire.¹⁶ The procession was a display of splendor and concealed messages. Because all wanted to integrate the Spanish-organized fête, change in the 1535 Easter festival resulted in the representation of each constituency's contribution to the unity of the Spanish Empire.

Scholars interested in rituals and processions in the Italian city-states have produced a wealth of research.¹⁷ For Spanish Naples, Franco Mancini, Gabriel Guarino, and John Marino have provided cultural histories concentrating on religious, civic, and festive rituals.¹⁸ Anthropologists and

16. According to George Gorse, back in Genoa ceremonial entries symbolized the triumph of a prince over subordinated cities. See "Triumphal Entries into Genoa in the Sixteenth Century" in *All the World's a Stage: Art and Pageantry in the Renaissance and Baroque* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), vol. 1, 193–196.

17. The most important work on Venice is by Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); for Florence, see Richard Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980); for Rome, see Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *La Città Rituale: Roma e le sue Ceremonie in Età Moderna* (Rome: Viella, 2002).

18. Franco Mancini, *Feste ed Apparati Civili e Religiosi in Napoli dal Viceregno alla Capitale* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1968); Gabriel Guarino, *Representing the King's Splendor: Communication and Reception of Symbolic Forms of Power in Viceregal Naples* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), is a study on the use of rituals as means of governance; John Marino, *Becoming Neapolitan: Citizen Culture in Baroque Naples* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), has argued that the Spaniards used rituals to exploit class division in Naples, cement their alliance with those in power, and incorporate Naples into their imperial system. See an interesting essay by Gina Ianella, "Les fêtes de la Saint Jean à Naples, 1581–1632" in *Les fêtes urbaines en Italie à l'époque de la Renaissance: Vérone, Florence, Sienne, Naples*, eds. Françoise Decroisette et Michel Plaisance (Paris: Klincksieck, 1993), 131–185. See also Jean-Michel Sallmann, *Naples et ses saints à l'âge baroque: 1540–1750* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1994).

literary scholars such as Herman Tak and Michele Rak have enriched the historical literature on rituals in southern Italy.¹⁹ Maria Antonietta Visceglia has argued that owing to political and social instability, civic and religious celebrations reflected Naples's increasing dependence on Spain.²⁰ But the historiography of the Easter sequence is still largely absent. The 1535 Easter celebration started to assimilate Genoese and other merchants into the religious and civic landscape of the city, making of them part of the elite.

The role of the Genoese in the rituals was a way to affirm their power and propose themselves as protectors from external aggression. The viceregal period marks a significant change in ritual patterns as a result of the heavy involvement of the Genoese in the sociopolitical affairs of the realm. By using religious symbolism, imperial domination linked private advancement to the advent of a new social order. Understanding the Easter ritual as part of an imperial change is important first because it illuminates both the religious cosmos and the political order. Rituals inculcated social participation through the traditional means of the church, but the pervading concept was that of civic involvement. Second, it underscores the ways in which people were rewarded for their financial contribution to the empire.²¹ Penetrating the socio-spiritual realm of the city was as much a

19. Herman Tak examines the city of Calvello's processions and rituals in the premodern era. See *Southern Italian Festivals: A Local History of Ritual and Change* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000); Michele Rak, "A Dismisura d'Uomo: Feste e Spettacolo del Barocco Napoletano" in *Gian Lorenzo Bemini e le Arti Visive*, ed. Marcello Fagiolo (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1987), 259–312; see also "Il Sistema delle Feste nella Napoli Barocca" in *Barocco Napoletano*, ed. Gaetana Cantone (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1992), 301–327.

20. See *Identità Sociale: La Nobiltà Napoletana nella prima età Moderna* (Milan: Edizioni Unicopoli, 1998), 204–205. Scholars have also examined Spanish religious rituals in the context of honor. Benedetto Croce argued that people who lived in the early modern period perceived the Spanish character as imbued with a deep sense of honor. Magnanimity, generosity, and honor were important social values. Gabriel Guarino argues that the binding element was the royal dynasty, which imparted pride in affiliation with the Habsburg Empire. Cavalcades, entrances, ceremonies all marked grandeur and honor, whereas ceremonies and rituals showed political and administrative partnership. See "Representing the King's Splendor", RSA Montreal, 2011.

21. This aspect was particularly important to the Kingdom of Naples; before he left the city, Charles V asked for a donation of 1.5 million ducats to the parliament on January 8, 1536. See Tomaso Costo, *Apologia istorica del regno di Napoli* (Naples: stamparia di G. D. Roncagliolo, 1613), 132.

mark of prestige as acquiring titles of nobility. Third, because foreigners were seldom assimilated into the rituals of a city, it highlights the exceptional importance of the Genoese. The Easter procession intermingled sacred and secular meanings, thereby showing how the language of religion was used to attain political aims.²² The celebration first forced unison among citizens to support the cause of the emperor (Christianity) and second encouraged the embrace of the imperial structure versus feudalism. This chapter retraces the spiritual journey of the Genoese in superseding the nobility and insinuating themselves into the religious rituals.

EASTER IN THE CONTEXT OF FEUDAL VERSUS IMPERIAL AND SECULAR VERSUS RELIGIOUS

Through their spiritual and financial aid, the Genoese financiers enabled the rise of the Habsburg Empire and the transformation of southern Italy from a less feudal into a more imperial domain. The Easter celebrations played a part in the Spanish imperial quest. Charles's acknowledgment of the Neapolitan *seggi* was a mark of his respect for the city governance and laws, but his riding with the local aristocracy can also be seen as a way to demonstrate the weight of his imperial crown.²³ By centralizing power, the pan-European dynasty seized political control from the hands of the feudal barons.²⁴ As Charles approached the city, one could hear people screaming with joy along the road and shouting "empire, empire, and Caesar."²⁵ Roy

22. Edward Muir has argued that during the Corpus Christi festival, Venice displayed the most precise hierarchy of sacred and profane spaces. See *Civic Ritual*, 119–134.

23. For a short essay on rituals of the viceregal court, see Giovanni Muto, "Apparati e Ceremoniali di Corte della Napoli Spagnola" in *I Linguaggi del Potere nell'età Barocca*, ed. Francesca Cantù (Rome: Viella, 2009), 113–149.

24. According to Aurelio Cernigliaro, Charles V's efforts to control feudal jurisdiction was connected to his plan to build a modern, centralized, and "absolutist" state. See *Sovranità e Feudo nel Regno di Napoli, 1505–1557* (Naples: Jovene Editore, 1983). Eleni Sakellariou argues that the policy as regards baronial juridical jurisdictions started in the 1540s. This policy, influenced by the late medieval political theory of sovereignty, aimed at reasserting royal authority. See "Royal Justice in the Aragonese Kingdom of Naples: Theory and the Realities of Power" in *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 26: 1 (2011), 31–50.

25. Antonino Castaldo, *Dell'istoria di notar Antonino Castaldo*, 113–117. For a description of this event, see also the manuscript in *Istoria del regno di Napoli*. BNN, mss Brancaccio, III A, vol. 9, car 17–19.

Strong argues that the adulation of Charles as *dominus mundi* throughout Italy reflected the people's desire for a universal solution to the breakdown of the old feudal order.²⁶ In the new imperial (but also Christian) order, a new class of people (merchant-financiers such as Genoese and Florentines) held center stage.

Charles's dynasty possessed a strong religious dimension arising from its sense of responsibility toward Christianity in Europe and the Mediterranean.²⁷ Christian rituals became increasingly important for Charles to keep his empire together. Demonstrations of power, splendor, and piety, especially during the main periods of religious festivals, were the rulers' traditional rhetorical means of solidifying power, instilling order in society, and imparting communal belonging. When he made his triumphant entry into Naples, the emperor was hailed as a conqueror of the Muslim foes and proclaimed champion of Christendom. His sojourn in Naples was immediately followed by a visit to the papacy, for Charles's role in Mediterranean defense required his presence in Rome.²⁸ Crowned a few years before in Bologna by the pope, Charles took his role as Holy Roman Emperor seriously. In the Eternal City, on Easter Monday 1536, in the

26. Roy Strong, *Art and Power: Renaissance Festivals, 1450–1650* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 85. Thomas Dandele, *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) tells us about the importance of empires for the creation of early modern states, and that of Charles in particular.

27. See Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), on the crusades of the sixteenth century. During Charles's royal entrances throughout his European domains, the symbolism represented in the ephemeral art and architecture produced for the occasion emphasized that Charles derived his right to rule not only from his earthly inheritance, but especially also from his divine election. See Gordon Kipling, "The King's Advent Transformed: The Consecration of the City in the Sixteenth-Century Civic Triumph" in *Ceremonial Culture in Pre-Modern Europe*, ed. Nicholas Howe (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2007), 89–127.

28. Because he returned from his North African campaign, Charles visited the Italian peninsula in the guise of an ancient emperor returning from conquest in Carthage. Interestingly, Rome's preparation for Charles's entry involved an astonishing feat of organization considering that nine years earlier, his army had ruined the city. Martha Pollack suggests that, as a result, he was seen as both an emperor and a conqueror. See *Cities at War in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 235–239.

presence of Pope Paul III, cardinals, and ambassadors, the emperor made a passionate speech against French King Francis I, who had allied with Sultan Suleiman.²⁹ Charles declared,

If the king of France would not have peace among the Christian republics we shall be forced to fight in a duel with sword and knives because, after all, we are two men like all the others . . . Soon we will not be able to defend ourselves against the Turk who is waiting for such an opportunity to extinguish Christianity.³⁰

Easter was such a moment of spiritual union for the Christian world that Charles took it upon himself to shield it against impious aggressors.

The Spaniards' willingness to incorporate Italian spiritual life served not only to remedy Turkish advance into Christian territories, but also to consolidate Spanish reorganization of the power structure of Naples. Rulers felt a sense of duty toward their religion, which only universal rule bequeathed.³¹ It was an important part of the sixteenth-century rhetoric to demonstrate this duty through rituals. Peter Burke sees Italian rituals as a type of communication that was both public and symbolic.³² During the celebrations that accompanied Neapolitan rituals, the Iberian

29. On January 1, Charles heard the sermon of Padre Ambrogio Salvia, who recommended that he eradicate heretics of any kind. He took advantage of the fact that France had made claims over Milan to request 500,000 ducats from the barons to support his cause. See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie storiche della città di Napoli* (Naples: Arnaldo Forni Editore, 1857), 291.

30. BNN, mss Branc, III B, vol. 12, car 37 r. dated April 18, 1536. "lettera sopra il ragionamento che feci l'imperatore Carlo V l'anno 1536 venendo da Tunisi in presentia di Papa paolo III e cardinali": "Non si potrà difendere contra il Turco, il quale non aspetta altro che una simile occasione per ingolarsi tutta la Republica Christiana. Era molto meglio terminare tutte le differenze che sono tra essi, tra loro due persone solo con spade et pugnali, perché fuora de loro regali et Imperiali dignità non erano però piu che due huomini come gli altri."

31. The Ottomans too argued that universal rule was the motto of the ruler. Muslim theology emphasized that Islam was a purified version of Christianity. See Tijana Krstić, *Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

32. Peter Burke, *The Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

officials sought to bolster spiritual unity between Spaniards and Italians. The consecration of the host that happened after the Easter procession, or the belief in the miracle of the Resurrection performed through transubstantiation, or the turning of bread and wine into the body of Christ confirmed the equality of all Christians in the face of external threat to sanctify the ruling regime and ostracize its enemies. In Naples, this performance was a ritual that required the participation of all citizens: rich and poor, lay and religious, nobles and merchants.

Centralized monarchies and their courts took over the ritual work of their subjects, and the king became both lawgiver and divine figure, as we have seen with Charles's entrance to Naples. Although Easter was a feast day of the church, civic authorities now controlled the commemoration of the Resurrection.³³ Secular authorities orchestrated the order of the procession and determined who could participate. The Genoese were able to influence the secular authorities in the imparting of rituals. Their political clout was such that Viceroy Don Pedro de Toledo (r.1532–53) made this festival a rite of inclusion merging the Genoese into local religious rituals. Thus, religious structures assisted people in understanding new civic developments. In a way, the ruler reached secular ends through religious means. The Easter celebrations became a new didactic venue to impart not only the spiritual, but also the social order of the city.

Before the triumphant entry of Charles V in 1535, Easter ritual was already divided into different stages, each announcing a specific moment in the life of Christ, with the *Triduum* at its apex.³⁴ Easter started brightly

33. During the Middle Ages, it was the clergy's prerogative to see to the cohesion of the community through rituals. During the Renaissance, the court assumed these responsibilities and the power that the medieval church previously held was transferred to the secular authorities. Richard Trexler has contended that the sacrality of the church was transposed to the ruler, and the city turned from processions to theater. See *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), xxi.

34. For Naples, the sequence of liturgical event is easily retraced through the duties of the archbishops. Starting in 1609 with the building of the San Gennaro chapel, the cathedral attained its prominence over the medieval church of Santa Chiara, and Easter Week started with Passion Sunday, followed by Palm Sunday, and then the Triduum the following week. Passion Sunday marked the "opening season" of liturgical events and as such enabled the powerful archbishops to assert themselves over the city's rituals. See ASDio, *Diario dei Maestri Ceremonieri* vols. 1 (1609–1812) and 2 (1619–1846).

with Palm Sunday (commemorating Jesus's entry into Jerusalem),³⁵ reached dramatic height on Good Friday (day of the Crucifixion), and closed brightly again on Easter Monday (honoring the entry of Christ into heaven).³⁶ Since the thirteenth century, the Neapolitans walked with palms and crosses on Palm Sunday. The crosses were planted so that people could erect altars with presents for the needy. These charitable offerings were lay inspirations and proceeded without supervision by the bishop.³⁷ On Maundy Thursday, there was usually a procession of silence, announcing the capture of Christ in the gardens of Gethsemane. This was a tragic, silent procession, late at night, with people parading with drums. The standards of the brotherhoods and confraternities opened the processions, representing the various arts and crafts of Naples along with the secular and religious orders of the city. On the morning of Good Friday, people walked in the footsteps of Christ to Golgotha, carrying images of the Passion, commemorating his path.

The celebrations of the Mystery of the Passion started during the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous.³⁸ His panegyrist explained that King Alfonso liked to "celebrate Christian games every year with magnificent celebrations while having many people attend these very solemn and devout

35. Palm Sunday celebrated the day of Christ's entry into Jerusalem, when devout Christians were seen carrying palms and leaves. That day, the archbishop of Naples went around in a procession that included receiving two castrated goats from the abbot of the Church of San Giorgio Maggiore. For the occasion, one of the goat's horns was decorated with silver horns and the other with golden ones. See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche*, 52.

36. During the Easter vigil at midnight, the clergy entered the dark churches in silence and moved the cross from the sepulcher to the high altar. Then the candles were lit, and the cross was carried in a solemn procession through the church, the cloister, or the cemetery, while the *Cum Rex gloriae* was sung. When the procession returned, the victorious entry of Christ in heaven was announced in song at the door of the churches. Then, there was the visitation of the sepulcher, where a cleric announced that the Savior was risen. See Calogero Tagliareni, *Opera manoscritta del marchese Giovanni Battista del Tufo poeta napoletano del '500: usi e costume, spassi, giochi e feste in Napoli* (Naples: R. Pironti e Figli, 1954), 65.

37. Camillo Tutini, *Dell'origine e fundation de' seggi di Napoli* (Naples: Beltrano, 1644), 159–160.

38. See Nunzio Federigo Faraglia, *Diurnali Detti del Duca di Monteleone: Nella Primitiva Lezione da un Testo a Penna* (Charleston, SC: Nabu Press, 2012).

representations.”³⁹ The Royal Chapel in Castel Nuovo possessed relics of the cross and Christ’s tunic, which were displayed for the occasion.⁴⁰ The members of the confraternities and guilds formed the shell of the procession, wearing hats or hoods as a sign of mourning and chanting, holding torches and candles, imitating the suffering of Christ. The heart of the ritual was the Resurrection of Christ. On Easter Sunday, the day of the Resurrection, jubilant processions were the highlight of Holy Week, with music, chants, and displays of wooden images of Christ. There were biblical characters, Apocrypha (lives of the saints), representations of Christ’s life, and stories from the Bible. Only members of the clergy performed the commemoration of the Resurrection of Christ.

To satisfy the new power group, the Genoese, Holy Week processions from the times of Don Toledo were structured into a tripartite composition of Holy Thursday–Friday–Saturday, instilling a new order to the Neapolitan *civitas*. The Genoese participated in the Maundy Thursday procession, the Spaniards in the Good Friday one, and the Neapolitans in the Easter Saturday one. This division also echoed the Catholic Church’s post-Tridentine policies. Needing to regulate the Easter celebrations, on January 7, 1536, Pope Paul III proclaimed the oracle *vivae vocis* (there is thus no bull) ordering the processions of Holy Thursday–Friday to follow a specific script: the perambulation of the religious brotherhoods (or confraternities) of the light and the confraternities of the blood. Those of the light were not allowed to flagellate; the participants simply carried torches. Those of the blood would “make discipline the night of the Holy Thursday procession.”⁴¹ In Naples, the apex of Holy Week became Friday, and the acknowledgment of the rise of the Genoese was “balanced” by a more explicit inclusion of lay Neapolitan nobles and their dependents – carefully made symbolically subordinate to the viceroy. The first day of the triptych, the Genoese announced the memorial of the Crucifixion. The sepulcher

39. See Vittorio Gleijeses, *La Storia di Napoli: dalle origini ai giorni nostri*, vol. 2 (Naples: Edizioni Alfonso d’Aragona, 1996), 788. Panormita described the king’s deeds in *De dictis et factis regis Alfonsi*, later collected as Antonio Beccadelli, *De dictis et factis regis Alfonsi Regis Aragonum libri quatuor* (Basel: Heruagiana, 1538).

40. In 1453, Alfonso asked the pope to grant special indulgences to those who venerated these relics. See Alan Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous: The Making of a Modern State* (New York: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1976), 28.

41. José Sánchez Herrero, *La Semana Santa de Sevilla* (Seville: Silex Ed., 2003), 79.

was erected in the parish church, and women brought white cornstalks.⁴² The bread that symbolized the Last Supper was then blessed. Holy Friday, the new ritual core, was the night of the Spanish and was followed by a period of mourning with a nocturnal procession to the cemetery. The Spaniards introduced their traditional Good Friday devotion as a new ceremony to Naples, a candlelight procession that began two hours after sunset.⁴³ In Naples, this was the so-called *giro dei sepolcri* (tour of the sepulchers). Easter Saturday saw the participation of the Neapolitan nobility and the communities of the city. After midnight Easter was celebrated.

CEREMONIAL TRIPTYCH DAY ONE: MAUNDY THURSDAY

In what had been a day reserved for the standards of brotherhoods and confraternities, holy rituals and processions now promoted merchants, a previously neglected social group. These new participants included wealthy Italian merchants, including Genoese and Florentines who had offered financial relief to the Spanish Crown and provided manpower and economic assistance in the Christian-Muslim struggle. Their participation in the city's celebrations was meant to recognize their pivotal role in the protection (martial and spiritual) of the kingdom in contrast to the barons, who made demands but gave nothing in return. Genoese and Florentines followed the emperor, hence were true Christians. Empowering one group meant downplaying another: the nobility, who frowned on the viceroys' streamlining policies.

Italian merchants contributed spectacles to the Easter celebrations, satisfying their political needs while echoing their financial and spiritual ones. During Passover night (from Wednesday to Holy Thursday), the Genoese and the Florentine communities shared center stage. The Florentines had the privilege of initiating the Easter season in their church, San Giovanni dei Fiorentini, where mass was given in the dark at one in the morning, with all the court musicians of the viceroy's palace playing and singing.⁴⁴ People of status could be found listening to the prayers. The Florentines participated in "sacred spectacles" by organizing games, a ritual practice they imported from

42. This custom was a tribute to the dead Christ and a plea for a good harvest. See Herman Tak, *Southern Italian Festivals*, 115–116.

43. See John Marino, *Becoming Neapolitan*, 95.

44. Emmanuele Kanceff, ed., *Oeuvres de Jean-Jacques Bouchard, Journal*, vol. 2: *Voyage dans le Royaume de Naples* (Turin: G. Giappichelli, 1976), 186.

Tuscany.⁴⁵ The Florentines were intimately linked to the Spanish Crown by dynastic ties.⁴⁶ These strategic alliances no doubt served to reinforce ties with the Strozzi and Medici banks.⁴⁷ The Tunis expedition, Giovio explains, had cost a million and a half gold scudi, which Charles was now trying to recoup from Italy. Giovio stresses that the emperor had everything “except the soul of the Florentine, that is cash.”⁴⁸

Whereas the Florentines merely sang, the Genoese took to the streets and flagellated themselves, their confraternity forming a phantasmagoric procession of faithful penitents.⁴⁹ For the Genoese, the night of Good Friday was dramatic as they flagellated themselves in a show of devotion. In Spain, a Genoese confraternity in Valencia had introduced the disciplining of the flesh in 1487.⁵⁰ Scourging methods long practiced in Italy were perpetuated in Naples.⁵¹ The fête became a visual stimulus but also made a civic statement:

45. Their participation in religious celebrations, especially that of the Eucharist, was recorded by Giovanni Pontano, *De Liberalitate*, vol. 2: *De Magnificentia* (Amsterdam: Johannes Tresser, 1498).

46. Eleonora of Toledo, daughter of the viceroy, had been Charles V's bride of choice for Cosimo de Medici, future Duke of Florence, and her solemn entry into Florence celebrated the emperor's triumphs. See Roy Strong, *Art and Power*, 75. Charles also married his daughter Margaret to Alessandro de Medici during his visit to Naples. When Alessandro came to kiss the emperor's hand during his imperial visit of Naples in 1535, Charles said, “you'd better go kiss your bride.” A brief account of Charles's entry into Naples can be found in Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche della Città di Napoli*, 289–292.

47. In his political testament to his son Philip recorded on January 18, 1548, Charles V wrote: “The Duke of Florence, ever since I first provided him with his state had always shown greatest affection to me and care for my interests, and it is my belief that this friendship will continue with you, all the more so as he is connected by marriage to the house of Toledo.” See *Corpus Documental*, Letter CCCLXXIX, II, 569–592. For a commentary, see James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V: Impresario of War, Campaign Strategy, International Finances, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21–22.

48. Paolo Giovio, *Opera*, vol. I (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello stato, 1987), 172.

49. The name *congregazione dei battenti* (“congregation of the flagellants”) derived from the Holy Thursday visit to the sepulchers during which they hit themselves. See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche della Città di Napoli*, 661.

50. Maureen Flynn, *Sacred Charity: Confraternities and Social Welfare in Spain, 1400–1700* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 127.

51. Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were five companies of flagellants in Naples. From the *Repertorio dei volumi di Santa Visita* from the *Archivio Diocesano*, the confraternities were S.Maria Disciplinata in S.Maria la Scala, S.Giovanni

the participation and legitimization of the merchant communities. Piety during Easter was not about internal devotion but about external demonstration of faith.⁵² The Genoese were active participants in a crowd of penitents who whipped themselves and carried crosses around the streets. While the *seggi* members listened to mass, the Genoese “in sign of humility beat their torsos with their fists, and hit their backs with whips tipped with metal until they bled.”⁵³ Accompanied by music and lights, the procession of the flagellants represented the Passion of Christ. Pietro De Stefano’s description of Holy Thursday, the day of the Last Supper, is picturesque:

The chapel that the Genoese call *Casazza* is the place where the flagellants dress up to accompany the dead of their nation. The night of Holy Thursday, they dress up in great numbers, and walk most of the night in procession with whips of metal to which are added pieces of silver. This way the blood from their shoulders demonstrates their devotion. Because of the human redemption done during that day, they visit some of the city’s sepulchers with numerous torches. During those days Christ voluntarily shed blood and created human Redemption for us miserable sinners.⁵⁴

della Disciplina from the Church of San Giovanni a Mare, the Disciplinati di Nostro Signore Gesù Cristo in the Church of S.Matteo al Laninaio, the Augustissima Compagnia della Disciplina della Santa Croce from Sant’Agostino alla Zecca, and the confraternity of San Cristoforo e Disciplina Maggiore in Santa Maria la Nuova. They all processed on Holy Thursday. See Silvana Musella, “Dimensione sociale e prassi associative di una confraternita napoletana nell’età della controriforma” in *Per la Storia sociale e religiosa del Mezzogiorno d’Italia*, eds. Carla Russo and Giuseppe Galasso (Naples: Guida, 1980), 339–438.

52. Peter Brown had argued that one of the distinguishing features of early Christianity was its belief in the mobility of the sacred. See *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 86–105.

53. “Caminano nella maggior parte di quella notte in processione con certi scoriati di funicelli ovesono certe rosette d’argento, per cavarlosi il sangue dale spalle per loro divotione.” Pietro de Stefano, *Descrittione dei luoghi sacri della città di Napoli con li fondatori di essi, reliquie, sepolture, et epitaphi scelti che in quelle si ritrovano, l’intrate e i possessori, che al presente le possiedono, et altre cose degne di memoria, opera non meno dilettevole che utile* (Naples: Raymondo Amato, 1560), 59.

54. “Detta capella è nominata da detta nazione Genovese la *Casazza* ove si vesteno i Battenti per accompagnare li morti della loro nazione, et ancho vi si vessero la notte del Giovedì Santo, in gran numero, e caminano nella maggior parte di quella notte in

Genoese piety meant suffering, and discipline was part of the Thursday sequence. It was evocative because it showed spiritual devotion and true faith. As De Stefano stated, blood had to be shed as a sign of redemption for Christ's suffering. Through pain, the Genoese were, like all flagellants, also repenting of their sins (perhaps including an extreme dedication to trading and banking). Through blood and suffering, the Genoese were integrating into their new landscape. The spikes forcing themselves into their skin symbolized their assimilation into a new land. They put themselves through the scourging process for the welfare of others, securing God's mercy for their host community. The extravagant display was didactic and served to show the local population what real piety was like. Passion displays and martyr tragedies played on both the incarnation and on physical suffering. Devotional practices, rooted in sacraments and sacramental, were intensely physical. Francesco Ceva Grimaldi described the procession of the Genoese penitents: "The evening of Holy Thursday, the Genoese congregation paid visit to the sepulchers walking barefoot, beating themselves until blood came out, with rigid cords and silver spears; this was really edifying and moving."⁵⁵

Spanish and Genoese followed the new sequence ordered by the pope in which Thursday was reserved for the blood and Friday for the light.⁵⁶ Although both nations' congregations practiced flagellation, the exuberant piety of the Genoese contrasted with the austere piety of the Spaniards. Blood was the benchmark of pain and elicited an external sign of piety. The Genoese extreme piety and will to repent seemed uncontrollable, whereas Spanish self-control was calculated, poised, and internalized, eliciting both reflection and fear from the onlookers. The public display of the Genoese in a penitent role diverged greatly from the Spanish disciplined role. The public self-flagellation represented their sincerity to God and prominence in their spiritual role. This *mise-en-scène* also perhaps represented the new body politics. The body was represented by the Genoese and the spirit by

processione con certi scorciati di funicelli ovesono certe rosette d'argento, per cavamosi il sangue dale spalle per loro divotione, con un buon numero di torchi accesi visitando alcuni sepolcri dela città, per la Redentione humana fu fatta in tal giorno, nel quale sparse volonta riamnnete il sangue Christo nostro redentore per noi miseri peccatori." See *ibid.* 55. "Questo si faceva la sera del giovedì santo dalla congregazione dei Genovesi, che visitavano scalzi i sepolcri, battendosi a sangue, con corde ligate a speroni d'argento, ed era cosa veramente edificante quanto commovente." Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche della Città di Napoli*, 661.

56. José Sánchez Herrero, *La Semana Santa de Sevilla*, 79.

the Spaniards. This sequence was delightfully recorded by one of the most poignant Neapolitan poets:

On Thursday evening when the night is dark
 So many of them go out
 With music and lights on
 The procession of the Genoese starts
 It is with great attention
 That they cause themselves torment
 Hitting themselves without fear
 Fleshing their blood out
 All would be touched by their sincere affection
 As if their chests were made of diamonds.
 The following day
 The Spaniards do the same
 But in silence, order, and style
 More coordinated
 Than those above mentioned.⁵⁷

57. Lascio il giovedì sera a notte oscura
 L'uscir di tante genti
 Con musici cantando e lumi accesi,
 Detta la Procession de' Genovesi;
 Che, ponendovi cura
 Come si dan tormenti,
 Battendosi ciascun senza dimora
 Cavando il sangue fuori,
 Vi moverebbon tutte ai degni affetti,
 Ancor che aveste di diamanti i petti.
 L'altro giorno d'appresso
 Fanno il Spagnuol l'istesso,
 Ma con altro silenzio, ordine e stile,
 Meglio assai concertati
 Che quei pria nominate.

Scipione Volpicella, *Giovan Battista del Tufo: Illustratore di Napoli del Secolo XVI*, (Stamperia della Regia Università, 1880, [1588]), 151. See especially the paragraphs on the *Descrizione de' sepolcri napolitani della settimana santa, la processione de' Genovesi il giovedì santo, la Processione de' Spagnoli il venerdì santo*, and the *Processione dei Confrati della Concessione di monte Calvario*.

But the Genoese participation also reminded everyone (viceroys, emperor, and Neapolitans) that the Genoese had shed blood for the people of southern Italy. During Easter, their magnanimity (through financial and martial sacrifice for the kingdom) was stressed. Used as a didactic moment, Easter was arguably the Genoese's ultimate demonstration of Christianity. They put on a show for the population but also for themselves, flaunting their devotion to the kingdom and their link to the international prestige of the Spanish monarchy.⁵⁸ Prestige (social and spiritual) and respect guaranteed them a greater role in the city's social life. Acclaimed as spiritual protectors of the kingdom, the Genoese found self-gratification in the Easter rituals. Their role in the procession celebrating the miracle of Christ gave clout to their community.

The Genoese sought recognition for their efforts to protect the kingdom through the city's spiritual procession during Easter. The emperor offered himself as the secular head of Christianity, and those who supported him were considered highly Christian. In contrast, those who did not were deemed un-Christian. Allegiance to the monarchy meant faithfulness toward Christianity as well. The Genoese assimilation of local rites allowed them to assert their sway over the local population, notably the Neapolitan elite, whose participation in the rituals had previously functioned as a showcase for power and prestige. At the same time, their distancing from the local Neapolitan aristocracy enabled them to reinforce their Genoese identity. Setting themselves apart afforded spiritual clout to their community. Thus, the rituals became a repository of Spanish imperial politics supported by the financial and spiritual backing of the Genoese. And now power and prestige were in the hands of merchant-financiers.

When the Genoese joined the procession, the rituals varied from representations of religious and feudal power to those of religious and imperial power. During the celebrations, the Genoese represented the unison of the Christian faith to offer protection against heathen foes, whereas the Spaniards reinforced their domination of their southern Italian kingdom by offering themselves and their affiliates as protectors of the city. Because of their active

58. The widening of the Habsburg dynasty provided a sense of community but also antagonism toward its enemies. Medieval Spaniards of the times of the Reyes Católicos called this phenomenon *homo hispanicus* because they believed in the honor of the hidalgo race. Later on, the Genoese and others identified with the international prestige of the monarchy.

role in safeguarding southern Italy, the Genoese demanded that both the Spaniards and the local nobility accept them as equals, even as civic and spiritual leaders of the city. By asserting themselves spiritually, they affirmed their power and prestige over the old feudal nobility (and gained their fiefs). By participating in the most important Catholic ritual of the city, the Genoese made themselves essential to the social and spiritual life of their hosts.

The first day of Holy Week created the opportunity for the Genoese to present an idealized version of the community, one in which they served as protectors against spiritual (and military) threats to Christianity, and by extension against the old barons. Change in the Easter celebrations mirrored change in the political structure of Naples. The desire to participate in Holy Week celebrations was strategic: Easter is the principal feast of the ecclesiastical year. It is the oldest feast of the Christian Church. The performance called for an emotional response that bound people into a community of faith. However, it did not entail communion in social status. Although religious unity was the goal, it was the civic authorities along with the merchant communities that regulated the spiritual order of the city.⁵⁹ Holy Week's division into three spiritual stages not only reinforced the division among the city's three communities, but also elevated the merchant-financiers. The celebration became a civic as well as a religious ritual, sanctioning Genoese social acceptance.

It is important to remember that the Genoese had acquired fiefs less than a decade before, when some feudal nobles had allied themselves with the French. Even as the celebrations displayed unity in the Habsburg domains in the face of constant spiritual threat, the Genoese proposed themselves as substitutes for the feudal nobility who provided neither spiritual nor financial assistance during wartime. It was not the local barons who supported Charles and the Spanish Empire against threats that concerned their domains, but the Genoese. The barons' conspiracy of 1528 was all too

59. David Nirenberg argues that in fourteenth-century Aragón, the Holy Week celebration included Jews, Moors, and Christians in a communal festival but humiliated non-Christians by forcing them to witness and acknowledge a triumphal Christianity. See *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 200–230. Jane K. Wickersham has analyzed a phenomenon of humiliation toward Protestants during their religious trial in Catholic Rome in *Rituals of Prosecution: The Roman Inquisition and the Prosecution of Philo-Protestants in Sixteenth-century Italy* (Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

present in Charles's mind. Thus, new social groups were acknowledged as fundamental in the spiritual well-being of the Spanish monarchy, replacing the old aristocracy in rituals. The Genoese used Easter to underline this new political reality.

The Genoese sought to be acknowledged as financially and spiritually involved in the rise of the Habsburg monarchy, which declared itself as both a Christian (versus Muslim) and imperial (versus feudal) power. Once Charles departed the city to spend Easter in Rome, the Easter celebrations in Naples reflected the new imperial and Christian dimension of Habsburg rule. Because the Genoese both stymied the old feudal order and shielded Christianity against Islam, they took a center role.⁶⁰ The Genoese reinforced the spiritual unity among Spaniards, Genoese, and Neapolitans and reinforced a commitment to Charles as head of Catholicism in the face of constant Muslim and feudal threats to the kingdom.

Asserting their power by altering the order of the processions, the Genoese made these rituals stand as social documents. The festivals of Naples bound the people into a community to provide them with a collective identity in the face of foreign invasions but also in the face of the old baronial class. At the same time, the festivals accentuated both the power and the integration of the feast giver.⁶¹ The reformation of these rituals served to both consolidate religious fulfillment and legitimize the new political order, one in which the Genoese could afford to have their desires fulfilled. Placing themselves at the center of the city's most important celebration, they strengthened their control of and reverence from the population but also proposed themselves as

60. Edward Muir has argued that because of the diversity in social groups, the "foreign" power that ruled Naples allowed concessions in popular beliefs, sacred places, and expressions of devotion. See "The Virgin of the Street Corner: The Place of the Sacred in Italian Cities" in *The Renaissance: Italy and Abroad*, ed. John J. Martin (New York: Routledge, 2003), 279–296.

61. Clifford Geertz proposed the idea of the "theater state" in which the repetition of rituals creates the idea of the state as something that transcends the interests of particular individuals. For him, ceremonies served as both "model of" society (i.e., the representation of an existing arrangement) and "model for" society (i.e., a kind of instruction booklet for how the state should be organized. See *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 136. Similarly, Mona Ozouf has argued that "feasts break the course of life and seam the skeleton of daily life." See *Festivals and the French Revolution*, trans. by Alan Sheridan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 12.

spiritual protectors of the city. If the Spanish viceroys sought to pursue their imperial politics, they would have to take account of the Genoese in their display of splendor.⁶² Processing right before the Spaniards, they announced their share in the new hegemony.

CEREMONIAL TRIPTYCH DAY TWO: GOOD FRIDAY

The second day of the triptych contrasted greatly with the preceding day. Spaniards and Italians placed themselves along the path of Jesus's Resurrection, seeking to both redeem their sins and validate their spiritual position in the city. After the Florentines had sung and the Genoese had perambulated, the viceroy and his family visited the archbishopric. There the priest gave him the key to the sepulcher, which he hung around his neck until the following day, Easter Friday, when he returned it to the priest who would symbolically remove Jesus Christ from the sepulcher.⁶³ The Spanish thus reserved the high point of Holy Week – the death of Jesus – for themselves. This ceremony held on Friday gave the viceroy both civic and religious sway in the symbolic raising of Jesus from the dead. This ritual was part of a coherent sequence of events that the population read as an instruction booklet. It became a communal ritual that expressed both the civic and religious order of the city.

Good Friday was the day the Spanish congregation chose to parade in the streets: it was the day of Christ's death, thus the most important of Holy Week – the confluence of Thursday and Saturday. As the time of the Crucifixion, it was a day of mourning, but it announced the Resurrection on Sunday night at midnight. The message the Spaniards conveyed was that they had sacrificed themselves for their people. Spanish rule was thus depicted as a source of renewal and spiritual vigor. Although its faith and rule had been challenged, both by Muslims (Turks, corsairs, North Africans) and by Christians (French and local barons), the viceroyalty ushered in a new era in which both the sacrality and universality of Spanish power would bring spiritual and political glory to the kingdom. By redefining the centrality of the Easter rituals, the Spaniards imposed their leadership.

62. For an example of Spanish festivities in Naples, see Gabriel Guarino, "Spanish Celebrations in Seventeenth-Century Naples," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 37 (2006), 25–41.

63. Jean-Jacques Bouchard, *Voyage dans le Royaume de Naples*, 186.

The Holy Friday candlelight procession began two hours after sunset and was the climax of the Easter celebrations. The night started with the *giro dei sepolcri* (tour of the sepulchers), followed by the procession of the Holy Sacrament. For the *giro dei sepolcri*, the Spanish church was the most ostentatiously decorated. The churches of Santa Chiara, Gesù Nuovo, San Paolo, and Monte Oliveto were adorned with votive candles and lamps around the Sacrament. The Church of Santa Maria of the Incoronata exhibited its most precious relic to believers: “the Crown of Thorns that was put on Christ’s head for the redemption of our sins.”⁶⁴ The Concettione degli Spagnoli a strada Toledo was the most ornate of all, with precious stones, angels, diamonds, and pearls.⁶⁵ The knights of the order of San Giacomo of the Sword, wearing white robes with red crosses, attended Vesper.⁶⁶ Members of the nobility stood in one of the chapels facing the one where the viceroy and his family prayed. The *Strada Toledo* and the Castel Sant’Elmo were the spiritual crux of the procession. Each participant held a votive candle, and each Mystery of the Passion (represented by wooden statues that men held) was followed by a troop of flagellants to identify with Christ’s suffering. Juan de Garnica in 1595 chronicled the penitents as “a great multitude of soldiers and other Spaniards, who flagellate themselves, wear habits, and carry torches with great devotion, silence, and order.”⁶⁷ Giovanni Battista del Tufo in 1588 recorded their perambulation similarly:

Every once in a while a man played the trumpet which instilled fear among the people. Following behind came the line of participants, of which some held big torches and others big sticks, which culminated with bowls of glass. Amidst all this they burnt lights lit with wax or oil.

64. Pietro De Stefano, *Descrittione dei luoghi sacri della città di Napoli*, 60. The Church of the Incoronata was built to celebrate the royal wedding of Joanne of Anjou and Louis of Taranto on May 21, 1352, which took place in the chapel of the Incoronata in honor of the Crown of Thorns belonging to Jesus Christ. See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche*, 253.

65. Jean-Jacques Bouchard, *Voyage dans le Royaume de Naples*, 187.

66. Pompeo Sarnelli, *Guida de’ forastieri, curiosi di vedere, e d’intendere le cose più notabili della regal città di Napoli, e del suo amenissimo distretto. Ritrovata colla lettura de’ buoni scrittori, e colla propria diligenza dall’abate Pompeo Sarnelli . . . In questa nuova ed. dall’autore molto ampliata, e da Antonio Bulifon di vaghe figure abbellita* (Naples: Giuseppe Roselli, 1692), 297.

67. Paolo Cherchi, “Juan de Garnica: Un Memoriale sul Cerimoniale della Corte Napoletana” *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane* n.92 (1975), 213–224.

At the heart of this entire splendor one could hear the crack of the flagellants' whips. Moreover the streets were painted with the blood of those who wounded themselves in this night of the dead, arousing pity among the onlookers.⁶⁸

By standing at the center of the parade of the Easter celebrations, the Spanish tried to equate their power with the Passion of Christ. The spiritual, physical, and mental suffering of the Spaniards in keeping their imperial domains safe was reflected in the Friday procession. The Passion offered protection and elicited unity.⁶⁹ Only the spiritual purity of the Spanish afforded them the right to rule. Spanish and Genoese created a sense of communal belonging for themselves and the Neapolitans. Spanish *buon governo* demanded unity and concord within the Catholic territories.⁷⁰ As Muir has put it, "good government could be seen."⁷¹ Throughout Italy, "civic rituals attempted to establish a symbolic center of harmony through . . . the frequent parades of authoritative officials."⁷² Good government and good leadership situated themselves within the Passion of Christ. It was an arduous path, but suffering was part of the eternal redemption. Meanwhile, the celebrations provided a sense of security and continuity in the midst of life's uncertainties.⁷³

68. Calogero Tagliareni, *Opera manoscritta del marchese Giovanni Battista del Tufo*, 58.

69. Protection, religiosity, and unity were the great themes of the Spanish Passion. For instance, the diaries of Viceroy Duke of Ossuna in 1616 specified that "Holy Friday, the usual procession of flagellants went out while the viceroy kept doors of the palace closed so that he could confess in silence and hear the predications of the Passion in the chapel." See BNN, mss Brancaccio, VI A, vol. 13, p. 41 *Giornali del governo dell'excellentissimo Duca d'Ossuna vicerè del regno di Napoli da Francesco Zazzera Napolitano*, 1616.

70. Thomas Dandele, who has scrutinized the Spanish community in Rome notes, "the Easter ceremony is a good example of these parallel practices of [Spanish] political domination and nation-building." See *Spanish Rome: 1500–1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 114.

71. Edward Muir, "The Eye of the Procession: Ritual Ways of Seeing the Renaissance." In *Ceremonial Culture in Pre-Modern Europe*, ed. Nicholas Howe (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 129–153.

72. Edward Muir, *Ritual in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 239.

73. Sociologist David Kertzer argues that "ritual is a means by which we express our social dependence; what is important in ritual is our common participation and emotional involvement." See *Ritual, Politics, and Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 67.

CEREMONIAL TRIPTYCH DAY THREE: HOLY SATURDAY

The third day of the sequence, the day of the miracle celebrated at midnight, saw the procession of the Neapolitans. The last social constituency to participate in the Easter celebrations, the Neapolitan nobility was acknowledged as important participants in the social order. During the procession, there was a strategic involvement of the Neapolitan grandees in the Mysteries of the Passion. The Spaniards invited the heads of the city's prominent families to walk behind each one of the Mysteries.⁷⁴ These *patres familias* would, in turn, summon all their family members, clients, and dependents to walk along with them.⁷⁵ The aim was to bring the greatest number of people to boast the many dependents each family possessed. The most significant families hired the services of people who self-flagellated during the procession.⁷⁶ Hence, there was a competition for suffering. The Genoese whipped themselves, the Spaniards showed how self-contained they were in the face of pain, and the Neapolitans brought numbers to the whipping.

By letting aristocrats and guilds parade in the order of importance they established, the Spaniards subtly subdued a population that was all too eager to exhibit its popularity rather than exercise *de facto* power. Most of the Neapolitan nobility and members of guilds and other civil bodies were part of the procession. This custom ensured that everyone witnessed as well as experienced the procession. It allowed the Spanish to keep the worthy citizens busy with conspicuous consumption rather than actively engaged in politics. This method of ceremonial coercion solidified the aristocracy into a parading role, confining it to passivity rather than activity in the administration of the kingdom. The idea was not only to subdue the barons, but also to boost the participation of the Genoese.

Whereas the Thursday procession had shown the Genoese's relation with Christ, the Saturday procession showed the Neapolitans' relation

74. That day, the confraternity of the Montecalvario carried the figure of the Virgin along with the other Mysteries of the Passion. The viceroy accompanied that procession, followed by nobles, themselves followed by high-ranking state officials. See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie storiche della città di Napoli*, 661.

75. Jean-Jacques Bouchard, *Voyage dans le Royaume de Naples*, 188.

76. Maureen Flynn argues that men inflicted pain on themselves by self-flagellation to express their personal anxieties, an occasion she calls "a spectacle of suffering." See *Sacred Charities*.

with the viceroy. On Saturday night, the Neapolitans paid homage to the mystery of Christ's burial, waiting for the symbolic moment of his Resurrection. During the procession of the Resurrection, which took longer than that of Good Friday, the *Strada Toledo* was still the nexus. The main participants in this commemoration included the Neapolitan nobility, who came and went, riding their horses and saluting the ladies standing on the sides of the procession road.⁷⁷ Each door, window, and façade along the road was decorated, and music could be heard. Bread was blessed while the bells of Easter were ringing, which signified a blessing. The viceroy usually looked at the procession from the height of his palace. Occasionally he would ride in his carriage to salute the ladies. Then each congregation walked under the viceroy's window. Some confraternity members danced and others sang while the Mysteries were displayed.⁷⁸ The Neapolitans also showed their esteem to the viceroy who embodied both temporal and religious authority.

The meaning of the Saturday procession was radically opposed to that of Thursday. The relationship between Neapolitans and Christ was distant, whereas that of the Genoese was intimate, echoing their spiritual role in the city. The Genoese were part of a Christian empire and benefited from the largesse of the crown. The Neapolitan barons showed their allegiance to the Spanish viceroys rather than to Christ directly, because they had failed to show their ability to defend the kingdom and Christianity. They merely paraded, just as they did in real life. Public rituals were efficacious times to reflect the ongoing competition and conflict among social groups and civic identities in Naples.⁷⁹ The Neapolitans demonstrated their allegiance to the state while displaying their submission to the new order.⁸⁰ In contrast, the

77. Jean-Jacques Bouchard, *Voyage dans le Royaume de Naples*, 190–192.

78. Nicholas Terpstra has proposed that the confraternities' embrace of civic religion could become vehicles for the politically subversive whereas others became the arm of the politically dominant. See "Boundaries of Brotherhood: Laity and Clergy in the Social Spaces of Religion" in *Faith's Boundaries: Laity and Clergy in Early Modern Confraternities*, eds. Nicholas Terpstra, Adriano Prosperi, and Stefania Pastore (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2012), xi–xxxii.

79. Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Identità Sociale*, 204–205.

80. In the 1580s, because of the fear of rebellion by nobles, Viceroy Ossuna forbade lay members to belong to the Compagnia dei Bianchi della Giustizia, a charitable organization whose members participated in the city's processions. Some barons were

Genoese demonstrated their allegiance to the state while revealing their usefulness to the new order.

The Easter procession instructed the population that the Kingdom of Naples was now part of an empire and no longer a feudal kingdom. The nobility took on a parading role while the Genoese showed their spiritual dedication, hence were serious Christians. By mixing the religious ritual of blessing the bread with the social representation of saluting and parading, the Easter vigil inserted the figure of the viceroy into the celebrations, placing him literally high above and at the center of this day of reverence. Saluting the population from the spatial location of the palace was equated with the superiority of the viceroy's position over his people.⁸¹ This rite of allegiance sacralized his position, thereby asserting his right over the kingdom's management. The imposition of Spanish spiritual presence reflects what Max Weber defined as "routinization of power."⁸² For Weber, religious rituals make everything run simply in a highly predictable manner and thus help affirm social differences and political control. Don Pedro exercised a more autocratic form of government than his predecessors, diminishing the elite's autonomy and privileges, and allowing non-nobles to assimilate into the aristocracy. The feudal aristocracy failed to convince Charles to dismiss Toledo, perhaps one of the reasons that led him to favor the Genoese in the procession.

Pasquale López once proposed that processions in early modern Naples had nothing to do with either religious symbols or nation building but aimed merely to "keep the nobility entertained, contrast with ecclesiastic powers, and keep the population quiet with celebrations and processions to

accused of fomenting rebellions during the meetings of the sacred order and during its Christian rituals. See Francesco Notari, "La Compagnia dei Bianchi della Giustizia: l'assistenza ai condannati a morte nella Napoli moderna" in *Chiesa, assistenza e società nel Mezzogiorno moderno*, ed. Carla Russo (Galatina: Congedo, 1994), 281–371.

81. In Venice, the Easter procession took place on the day of the Resurrection. The doge came down from his palace and paraded in the streets surrounded by the golden standards of St. Mark. See Martin da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise: cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dalle origini a 1275*, ed. Alberto Limentani (Florence: Leo. S. Olschki Editore, 1972), 246–251.

82. "The Nature of Charismatic Authority and Its Routinization," in *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

better face the financial exigencies of both the kingdom and Spain.”⁸³ This “bread and circus theory” fails to account for the internal and external forces at play in Naples’s rituals: the Catholic Church, the hegemony of the Habsburg Crown, the power of the Neapolitan overlords, and the local balance of power (in which the Genoese held no minor role). These rites of procession were the progeny of religiosity on the one hand and imperial rule on the other.⁸⁴ In addition, they must be read as both the product and cause of the new social order.

The manipulation of religious liturgy led to interplay between Catholic rituals and imperial strategy. In their new formulation of the Easter procession, Spanish viceroys and Italian merchants exercised their symbiosis. The Genoese merchants’ relationship with Don Pedro de Toledo marks a transition in Spanish rule in southern Italy: it sought to bolster the imperial order. Spiritual competition was intense, as revealed in the triptych. As foreign nations competed as close financial and spiritual allies of the Spanish Crown, the triptych imparted a specific sequence that revealed the new order. The inclusion of foreign communities in the Easter processions attests that foreign nations wrangled for proximity to the Spaniards, whose technique of imperial rule rested in the giving and taking of agency. The Genoese efforts to advance their separate identity through spiritual devotion buttressed the power and inclusion of their community. The Spanish authorities appealed to the Italian subjects’ spiritual and political anxieties to control them. The Genoese offered to resolve spiritual anxieties, hence showing their true power.

The Spaniards acted as spiritual regulators of the city, whereas the Genoese managed to alter the original sequence of the processions. Both the Spanish and the Genoese inserted themselves into the missionary activities of the Counter Reformation. In countries such as France, the missionary methods included catechism; in Spain and Italy, they were more penitentiary. By using religious celebrations to support their ambitions, they conferred new meanings onto the rituals while reinforcing their social

83. Pasquale López, *Riforma Cattolica e Vita Religiosa e Culturale a Napoli dalla fine del Cinquecento ai primi anni del Settecento* (Naples: Istituto Editoriale del Mezzogiorno, 1964).

84. Michael Hechter refers to this kind of change in the power structure as “soft imperialism.” See *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999).

position over both the nobility and the common people. The [next chapter](#) shows that the spiritual engagement of the Genoese went further than rituals of procession. The Genoese established their church, San Giorgio dei Genovesi, which served not only the spiritual needs of their community but also as the nation's entrepôt and seat of spiritual competition with the other nations, reinforcing their alliance with the crown. San Giorgio supplies another example of the Genoese desire to acculturate to southern Italy's social landscape while maintaining strong ties to their collective identity.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Genoese Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Competition in Church, Sea, and Grave

The Genoese possess so much in this city, from family members, belonging, and marriage alliances, to their church, which they initially built under the convent of Santa Maria la Nuova. They have constructed a magnificent church of their nation conveniently located next to the Incoronata. While the edifice previously served as a theatre, making this place infamous, the Genoese have now ennobled this neighborhood with the protection of San Giorgio, and with their government.

—GIULIO CESARE CAPACCIO, 1623¹

This chapter probes the tensions in the spiritual life of a mercantile nation whose aim was to reconcile piety and trade while competing actively with the other nations, a rivalry that found expression in various ways. The Genoese spiritual involvement in their host community was meant to attract the favors of the Spanish Crown. To outshine the other nations and maintain the privileges bestowed on them by the crown, the Genoese displayed a high degree of commitment to Christian tenets. During the Middle Ages, the only specific locale for

1. Giulio Cesare Capaccio, *Il Forastiero*, ed. Franco Strazzullo (Sorrento: Franco di Mauro Editore, 1993), 688.

representation was the church,² and thus the other mercantile nations represented spiritual competitors. Representation went hand in hand with the idea of competition. In that sense, the Church of San Giorgio stood, as Capaccio correctly perceived, in the eye of the storm. Other significant foci of rivalry included ceremonial precedence, especially over the Knights of Malta, and funerary architecture, the sea, and the grave.

The Church of San Giorgio dei Genovesi occupied a conspicuous position in the Naples's cityscape.³ The Genoese "ennoblement" of the merchant neighborhood, which included churches of the Greek, Florentine, Catalan and Spanish nations, through their patron saint and government meant a deeper entrenchment in the southern Italian spiritual space. The church contributed to the reputation of its members and to their standing in the kingdom, and it served three purposes: spiritual expression, representation, and utility. First, the church served the spiritual needs of the Genoese community. It was the seat of religious confraternities that participated in the city processions alongside Neapolitan grandees and Spanish officials. Second, the church contributed to the conspicuous consumption among foreign nations seeking to attract the Spanish king's favors by exhibiting the most opulent forms of piety.⁴ Third, San Giorgio served as the meeting place of the nation, as an election hall, and as a merchants' entrepôt.

2. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. by Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 8.

3. The historiography on the Genoese church of Naples is nonexistent. For Palermo however, see the historically contextualized report of Federico Carmelo, *I mercanti genovesi in Sicilia e la chiesa della loro nazione in Palermo* (Palermo: Graf. Luigi Cappugi, 1958). See also Giuseppe Lombardo, *La chiesa di San Giorgio dei Genovesi in Palermo* (Palermo: Graf. Luigi Cappugi, 1933).

4. It is typical of members of a nation in diaspora to erect churches. Having established strong links with their new community, Armenian merchants had their own church in Julfa (India). The church later on offered a sacred ground to "host" the English East India Company's corpses. See Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

THE CHURCHES OF THE NATIONS

All Genoese churches across the Mediterranean were dedicated to the *Superba's* patron saint, George. Often depicted riding a horse and striking a dragon, St. George had appeared as the protector of crusaders in 1198, after which the Genoese, among other nations in Europe, adopted the saint as their protector.⁵ Focal point of the Genoese quarters in Naples, Palermo, Messina, and Trapani, San Giorgio exemplified the Genoese involvement in the life of these cities. The Church of San Giorgio dei Genovesi in Naples occupied a conspicuous position in the port area, amid its bustling mercantile activities, and near the Catalan, Florentine, German, Lombard, and Spanish churches.⁶ Ideally positioned right above the harbor and close to Castel Nuovo, San Giorgio dei Genovesi stood in front of San Giovanni dei Fiorentini and Tutti Santi dei Greci, and in the vicinity of San Giacomo degli Spagnoli.⁷ The church of the Lombards, Santa Anna dei Lombardi, was founded in 1497.⁸ In 1518, the Greeks founded their church, Santi Apostoli or Tutti Santi, situated above the street of the Incoronata.⁹ The Portuguese merchant Michel Vaj's renovated the Ascensione di Nostra

5. Interestingly, George declined in sixteenth-century Genoa but remained prominent in the colonies. The Caffaro chronicles mention the "Banner of St. George" taken out of the Church of San Giorgio on the waterfront for Genoese crusades, intercession, and authorization of crusading fleets. For an updated discussion of the chronicles, see John Dodson, "The Genoese Civic Annals: Caffaro and His Continuators" in *Chronicling History: Chroniclers and Historians in Medieval and Renaissance Italy*, eds. Sharon Dale, Alison Williams Lewin, and Duane J. Osheim (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), 55–85.

6. One of the rare works on the Lombards in Naples is Franco Strazzullo, *I Lombardi a Napoli sulla fine dell'400* (Naples: Fondazione Pasquale Corsicato, 1992). For an account of the fifteenth-century Florentine consuls in Naples, see Elisabetta Scarton ed., *Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli* (Salerno: Carlone, 2002).

7. San Giacomo degli Spagnoli was the work of Viceroy Don Pedro de Toledo (1532–53).

8. See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche della Città di Napoli* (Naples: Arnaldo Forni Ed., 1857), 355.

9. A senator from the city of Constantinople created Tutti Santi. In 1572, the two cities of Corou and Patras in the Levant were destroyed by the Turks; led by Andrea Doria, many Greeks decided to resettle. Thereafter, the Greeks used the Church of San Pietro e Paolo. See S. D'Aloe, "Catalogo di tutti gli edifizii sacri della città di Napoli e suoi sobborghi" in *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane*, Anno VIII, fasc. 1, 2, 3 (1883).

Signora le Grazie a Catena.¹⁰ The Florentines owned San Giovanni Battista dei Fiorentini above the street of the Incoronata.¹¹ San Pietro Martire was the church of the Catalan nation until 1587, when the chapel was added to San Giacomo degli Spagnoli.¹² These were the spiritual rivals of the Genoese in the city of Naples. Each nation was recognized because it had a seat of representation in the community.¹³

San Giorgio dei Genovesi is located within walking distance of San Giacomo degli Spagnoli and served as the spiritual nerve center of its nation. As the print from the *Cosmographie Universelle* indicates (Figure 7.1), both churches stood in the area between Castel Nuovo and San Lorenzo. Most importantly, San Giacomo degli Spagnoli stood in a place called *Genova picciola* (small Genoa) or *Genova nuova* (new Genoa) because of the predominantly Ligurian ownership.¹⁴ In the early 1500s, the Genoese had abandoned the neighborhood of *Pietra del Pesce*, where their *loggia* remained, and moved to this more expensive area of town. A 1535 account mentions that the place where “the Genoese *loggia* is located used to be their place of residence. The Greek word is *λόγια*, meaning congregation

10. The Ascensione di Nostra Signora le Grazie a Catena was an antique church dating from 1360 that the Portuguese merchant widened and modernized in 1600.

11. Pope Pius V approved the Florentine parish in 1540. See Pietro de Stefano, *Descrittione dei luoghi sacri della città di Napoli con li fondatori di essi, reliquie, sepolture, et epitaphii scelti che in quelle si ritrovano, l'intrate e i possessori, che al presente le possiedono, et altre cose degne di memoria, opera non meno dilettevole che utile* (Naples: Appresso Raymondo Amato, 1560), 39. In 1559, the friars of the Order of San Domenico gave the Florentine a new church called San Vincenzo. Coincidentally, San Vincenzo used to be the Spanish church, but Don Pedro de Toledo transferred the Spaniards to their new location in 1540 with the agreement of Pope Paul III.

12. *San Pietro Martire* was founded by the Angevin King Charles II. See de Stefano, *Descrittione dei luoghi sacri di Napoli*, 119. The Catalans maintained their chapels in the Church of San Pietro a Martire even if they followed mass in San Giacomo degli Spagnoli. See BNN, Brancaccio, D 2, num 12, vol. 1, carta 8 r. (c.1609).

13. The Genoese church benefited from the financial support of its parishioners. For instance, the Genoese residents periodically contributed to donations to the oratory and chapel of San Giorgio. Apart from the bankers' records, see Archivio Storico Diocesano di Napoli (ASDio), Fondo Benefici, 33, Folio 215 for the year 1595.

14. See Monsignor Raffaele Borrelli, *Memorie Storiche della Chiesa di San Giacomo dei Nobili Spagnuoli e Sue Dipendenze* (Naples: R. Tipografia Francesco Giannini e Figli, 1903), 14.




FIGURE 7.1 Sebastian Munster, Naples from *Cosmographie universelle* (1556) Ge FF 3058 (pl. 249) (1), Courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Site Richelieu.

and convent.”¹⁵ Viceroy Don Pedro de Toledo bought many houses that belonged to the Genoese in that same area to build the Spanish church,¹⁶ whose epitaphs celebrated knights and soldiers who fought alongside Charles V.¹⁷ Many of the Genoese palaces, such as the Marini, Imperiale, and Spinola, stood in *Genova picciola*. Don Pedro possibly chose that location for the Spanish church because of its centrality and closeness to the harbor and Castel Nuovo, where the viceroy resided and held court. In

15. Benedetto di Falco, *Descrittione dei luoghi antiqui di Napoli e del suo amenissimo distretto*, edited by Ottavio Morisani (Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1972 [1st ed. Naples: Mattia Cancer da Brescia, 1535]). Rua Toscana is also adjacent to the tradesmen’s neighborhood. The present *Pietra del Pesce* (fish market) was the Hall of the Genoese, supported by thirty pillars, in the same manner as the fish market of Rome. Di Falco’s commentary dates to the early sixteenth century, a time when the Genoese had already transferred their living quarters away from the merchants’ neighborhood.

16. Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche di Napoli*, 326.

17. De Stefano, *Descrittione dei luoghi sacri di Napoli*, 30.

this new urban center, the Spanish church became a locus of authority amid the churches of merchant communities such as the Florentines, Catalans, Genoese, and Greeks.

Committed to strengthening ties with the Neapolitan community, the Genoese church reflected the local late Renaissance–Baroque artistic scene. Symbolizing the attachment to Genoa’s patron saint, the central piece by Andrea Sabatini da Salerno (1485–1530) named *Saint George slaying the Dragon* rests in the apse. After Antonello da Messina, Andrea Sabatini da Salerno is considered one of the most important painters of the southern Italian Renaissance and one of the best disciples of Raphael. Another treasure is the painting by Battistello Caracciolo (1578–1635), a follower of Caravaggio, entitled *St Anthony resurrects a dead man*. In the third chapel frescoes by Giacomo Cestaro (1718–85), a pupil of Francesco Solimena, a southern Italian baroque painter who dominated the Neapolitan painting scene in the late seventeenth century, underscore the Genoese tie to the Italian south. Cestaro himself had an artistic connection to Genoa—he did works that sits in the Berio Chapel such as *S. Camillo*, *S. Caterina of Genova*, the *Trinity*, and the *Apparizione della Vergine a S. Giuseppe Calasanzio*, also in Genoa in the church of the Scolopi. Francesco De Mura (1696–1782), another pupil of Solimena, and a baroque artist, did ecclesiastical commissions in and around Naples while painting for San Giorgio dei Genovesi. Finally, the church hosts a canvas by Giovanni Francesco Romanelli (1610–62), a baroque Roman painter whose touch was fancied by Italian and French ecclesiasts and rulers. The altar has a marble relief of *Sant’Agostino* of the seventeenth-century Tuscan school. The Genoese nation’s choice of artists reflects its connection to Naples and to the international baroque scene. The choice of artists for the embellishment of San Giorgio unveils a desire to both be perceived as patron of the arts and flaunt its capacity to afford these prominent artists. These two criteria enabled the Genoese to spiritually compete with the other merchant nations.

The architecture of San Giorgio was reminiscent of the baroque style the Genoese already prized in their homeland, a style that allowed them to display religiosity, achieve representation, and reinforce their community’s distinctiveness.¹⁸ The architect Bartolomeo Picchiatti, who initially

18. For a discussion on the baroque style of San Giorgio, see the classic study by Anthony Blunt, *Neapolitan Baroque and Rococo Architecture* (London: A. Zwemmer, 1975).

worked as an assistant to famous Giulio Cesare Fontana, did the restoration of the church in the 1620s.¹⁹ Whereas the exterior of the church exhibits a simple and harmonious façade, the interior displays abundant stucco, a cupola, and a Latin-cross plan with single nave and lateral chapels.²⁰ There is a typical baroque structure with a staircase to reach the entrance with a more refined, classical style, and a triumphal (triple arch, triptych) traditional division of façade, nave, and side aisles or chapels divisions that reflect the triumphalism of the street (the streets and chapels needed to appear sumptuous, triumphant, or ostentatious).²¹ The Genoese were noted for this “luxurious” flair in their native city (in palaces such as San Siro, Spinola, San Andrea of Jesuits, and Pallavicino) with marble, stucco, and gilded design. It was the Genoese signature style and way of presentation. Similarly to Venice’s civic rituals, which are well documented, Genoa’s republican constitution invited the creation of an elaborate ceremonial every two years for the installation of the doge, with processions; cathedral worship; and a public oration, subsequently published.²² San Giorgio fulfilled these requisites in Naples. Through architecture, dress, ceremonies, and reputation, the Genoese competed with the other merchant nations. Meanwhile, exporting this extravagant style to Naples provided the diasporic community with a strong sense of continuity and identity even in a foreign environment.

19. A biography of the Fontana family was done by Sabina De Cavi, *Architecture and Royal Presence: Domenico and Giulio Cesare Fontana in Spanish Naples* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).

20. For a work on the Neapolitan churches’ architecture, see Vincenzo Regina, *Le chiese di Napoli: Viaggio indimenticabile attraverso la storia artistica, architettonica, letteraria, civile e spirituale della Napoli sacra* (Naples: Newton e Compton editore, 2004).

21. Rudolf Wittkower, *Baroque Architecture in Italy, 1600–1750* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

22. The city of Genoa itself hosted a vigorous spiritual life that both supported its civic institutions and strengthened its foreign policy. Rich through trade and the manufacture of silk and velvet goods, and forming a natural amphitheater for festival display on land and sea, Genoa extended its frequent public rituals into brilliantly costumed processions set within both temporary and permanent festival architecture. See Maria Ines Aliverti, “Festivals in Genoa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” in “*Europa Triumphans*,” *Court and Civic Festivals in Early Modern Europe*, edited by J. R. Mulryne, Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly, and Margaret Shewring, vol. I (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 219–358.

SANTA MARIA LA NUOVA

To the casual eye, the Genoese seemed pious, but through a painstaking analysis of the consuls' dispatches, we can trace some cross-currents in their spiritual life: the competition among nations, the real role of the community's church, the reason behind their desire to build a bigger church, and the tension between the doge and his consuls in Naples. Two political agendas are evident over this period of two centuries: that of the Genoese doges, whose religious pursuits paralleled those of the Spaniards, and that of the Genoese consuls, whose aim was to satisfy the needs of their industrious conationals. The doges insisted on representing the spiritual needs of the community, whereas the consuls concentrated on its commercial needs. Rather than being contradictory, these two slants both found forms of expression within the kingdom.

Though the Genoese had been trading in the kingdom since the twelfth century, the creation of San Giorgio dei Genovesi in Naples coincided exactly with the first banker's record in 1509.²³ Once they permanently settled in the city, they immediately founded their national church. At the dawn of the sixteenth century, as commerce prospered, the nation's hundred registered members saw to the purchase of "a place where they could congregate for their business."²⁴ Before the building of San Giorgio as the Genoese national symbol, Ligurian worshippers attended the Church of Santa Maria la Nuova, where the friars had granted the nation the right to build an oratory with a chapel dedicated to San Giorgio.²⁵ Parishioners worshipped in Santa Maria la Nuova from the first decade of the sixteenth century until their church's completion in the 1560s. The church also

23. Some nineteenth-century documents argue for the creation of San Giorgio dei Genovesi in the year 1525. See S. D'Aloe, "Catalogo di tutti gli edifizii sacri della città di Napoli e suoi sobborghi." However, the use of secular records has helped me retrace the creation of the church to the year 1509. It was the hospital of the Genoese in Santa Maria la Nuova that was approved in 1525, not the oratory itself.

24. ASDio, Benefici 33 fascio 215, n. 2, Letter from Chaplain Fabrizio di Costanza to Republic of Genoa, Naples, May 19, 1595.

25. Padre Gaetano Rocco, *Santa Maria la Nova di Napoli: nella storia e nell'arte* (Naples: Tipografia Pontificia degli Artigianelli, 1927). The Church of Santa Maria la Nuova is a medieval church that occupies the place of an ancient temple. It was finished by Charles of Anjou and his son Robert at what was then the highest point of the city.

hosted the Genoese hospital, where the confraternity of flagellants processing on Holy Thursday congregated.²⁶

Santa Maria la Nuova had been for the Genoese a choice that reconciled commerce and religious convenience, for its position in the Porto neighborhood facilitated both worship and trade. Contemporary accounts of Naples describe the church of Santa Maria la Nuova towering over the cityscape. Di Franco depicts it “above the ancient port of Naples,” Petrarch explains that “it was built at the site of the antique castle because of its strategic position,”²⁷ and Pontano notices it as “one of the city’s edifices with the most imposing towers and threatening fortifications, which both the earth and the sea behold.”²⁸ Yet after seventy-five years of *convivenza* (coexistence) with the Franciscans of Santa Maria la Nuova, the Genoese searched for their own place of worship.²⁹ They bought an ancient riding school with adjacent houses in via dell’ Incoronata, which became the Church of San Giorgio dei Genovesi.³⁰ Consul Lomellino in 1585 explained why the Genoese nation had decided to build the new church. To get him to ratify the fairly recent church, Lomellino appealed to the doge’s sense of civic pride.³¹ He rationalized that “it would be a service rendered to this kingdom: for the heirs of our nation, for our Lord God, for our nation’s immense purity and honor. The ensuing accomplishment would be one of the most worthy of its kind in

26. De Magistris explains that “San Giorgio was a big chapel standing under the infirmary of Santa Maria la Nova built in 1525 by the Genoese nation, where a congregation of flagellants was hosted. After many years the said Genoese erected the beautiful church of S. Maria Incoronata, so that the old church was incorporated to the *Frati Minori*’s infirmary.” See S. D’Aloe, “Catalogo di tutti gli edifizii sacri della città di Napoli.”

27. Benedetto di Falco, *Descrittione dei luoghi antichi di Napoli*.

28. See Giovanni Pontano, *Le Guerre di Napoli* (Venice: Michele Tramezino ed., 1544).

29. Jacopo Nicolo Spinola funded the services of Santa Maria la Nuova’s friars. On January 22, 1530, he awarded them 137 ducats. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. (1530) Libro Maggiore di Jacopo Nicolo Spinola.

30. Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche di Napoli*, 293.

31. As a case in point, the Genoese consul served not only as head of his nation but as head of the nation’s church as well, as Consul Paolo Giustiniano illuminates: “I served three years in this office and as head of the newly open church of San Giorgio.” See ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Paolo Giustiniano to Doge of Genoa, Naples, May 5, 1589. Once elected by his conationals, the Genoese consul was called Genoese Consul and Governor of the Church of San Giorgio.

the entire world.”³² A decade later, Marc’aurelio Giustiniano, the new consul, was torn between decorum and utility and suggested to the Genoese Senate: “we are looking for a new parish where we could found a hospital and a church . . . [thus] . . . it would be auspicious to levy a fee from the [Genoese] traders in the kingdom to help in this regard.”³³

The purchase of a new place of worship fulfilled all these needs: utility, representation, and spiritual expression. Consul Giustiniano explained the Genoese church’s mission in Naples in the following way:

The deputies of our nation have gathered to discuss the erection of the new church and hospital, which was awaited for a long time and desired by everyone as much for the service of our Lord as for that of our poor, and as a great help to commerce by land and sea. We have found many poor, sick, and afflicted by other calamities that we should help, and also for the decorum of our nation, and finally for the grace of our Lord God and his glorious mother, and our protector San Giorgio, we continued the efforts of some gentlemen to buy a new place of worship. We bought a place called “cavallarizza”³⁴ because it used to be the Royal Riding School, in the Piazza Incoronata for 4700 ducats.³⁵

How did the new building help commerce? The move to San Giorgio freed space at Santa Maria La Nuova for use as a warehouse.³⁶ When the Genoese transferred their religious quarters from Santa Maria la Nuova to the new San Giorgio, the old oratory continued to serve as a warehouse. The Genoese maintained ownership of ten such warehouses in the city, each

32. ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Marc’aurelio Lomellino to Doge of Genoa, Naples, December 8, 1585.

33. ASG., A.S. 2635 (1510–1610), Lettere Consoli Due Sicilie: Naples, Letter from Consul Marc’aurelio Giustiniano to Doge of Genoa, Naples May 17, 1595.

34. ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 7.

35. ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Paolo Giustiniano to Doge of Genoa, Naples, November 27, 1587.

36. As Santa Maria la Nuova was still used as a place of worship, the conversion into an entrepôt had to be ratified by the pope and vicar of Naples. See ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 4, Letter addressed to the Doge of Genoa entitled “I fratti osservanti probanza ad justam huomini nationais Ianuen’ in civita Neapoli commorati pro obtinanza profanazione loci sua oratory ipso alli concessi per guardianos e per domus Santa Maria de Nuova de Neapoli” year 1595.

costing 15 ducats per month in rent. They would sell those and rent the oratory as a warehouse from the friars of Santa Maria la Nuova for “only” 150 scudi a year. The chapel would cost 15 ducats per month, whereas selling it would “yield little income.”³⁷ In their description of the items to be stored there, the Genoese declared “goods,” oil,³⁸ and grain.³⁹ In 1560, Pietro de Stefano described the Church of San Giorgio dei Genovesi as a working organism, standing in the strada dell’ Incoronata, already celebrating mass and performing processions. According to the records, the Genoese obtained from the pope the transfer of rites from Santa Maria la Nuova to San Giorgio only in 1587. According to di Stefano, however, San Giorgio was completed at least by 1560. This evidence indicates that the Genoese used their new church for twenty-five years before bothering with the (admittedly complicated) paperwork. Meanwhile, they had both a new church and a new warehouse, as the sources mention.⁴⁰

The transfer, however, did not at first meet with the approval of the doge in Genoa, where the church was seen as the symbol for the nation’s image. The doge’s initial objections stemmed from the fact that new Church of San Giorgio was primarily designed to facilitate business deals in the kingdom, as it served as a *loggia* of merchants, and not mainly as a sanctuary. Competition with the other foreign nations, probably the Florentines,

37. ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 6, articolo 4.

38. ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 5, Letter from Mco Pietro Iacobo Pietro Mastrodatti of the Episcopal court to Bishop Don Nardi Antonio, March 10, 1596.

39. ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 6, articolo 5.

40. Both religious and secular privileges needed to be rehabilitated. The Genoese drafted an agreement with Viceroy of Naples Don Jose de Zuñiga Count of Miranda and Regent Anibal Moles because they needed to ensure the renewal of their privileges from both church (*curia*) and state (*viceroy*). For the *curia*, Abbot Anello Russo Chancellor and visitor general agreed to transfer church rites and processions to the new San Giorgio. See ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 13: October 27, 1587. For the state, they ended up paying the Regia Camera della Sommaria, of which Francesco Diaz and Roberto de Pietro took care. See ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 8. The vicar obtained His Holiness’s agreement to sell the old church and erect a new one. The chaplain di Costanza ensured that the chapel was under neither regal nor baronial authority. The Genoese residents in Naples obtained from Pope Clement VIII a bull allowing them to sell the old church to invest in the new one. In this, there would be no involvement of any king. See ASDio, Benefici 33, fascio 215, n. 1, Letter from Reverend R. Gorostiola to Republic of Genoa, entitled “Georgy Ianuentium Cappella Antiquioris Profanatio,” Naples, May 10, 1595.

Catalans, and Knights of Malta, was always on the agenda and was one of the main arguments to convince the Genoese back in Liguria to finance the church in the Kingdom of Naples. In 1593, Consul Saluzzo pointed to the Florentines, Lombards, Germans, and others, who “with respect to our nation are inferior, both in number and in resources, but who nonetheless possess each one a beautiful church in this city.”⁴¹ This statement is supported by the figures compiled in 1597 by Cardinal Alfonso Gesualdo. His parish visitation recorded two hundred souls registered with San Giovanni dei Fiorentini and four hundred with San Giorgio dei Genovesi, whereas San Pietro dei Greci counted only twenty.⁴²

The doge’s approval was needed for the funding scheme. As Consul Paolo Giustiniani explained, as the new church would also serve as a *loggia* for the merchants, the money would, logically, come from fees on transactions: “our ultimate goal was to create a place big enough to accommodate business dealings and traders’ goods, which are important in this kingdom. We discussed with various gentlemen of our nation ways to get funds for this holy enterprise and we came up with a decree subject to Our *Serenissima*’s approval.”⁴³ The following consul, Battista de Franchi, explained that

To maintain the church of our nation in a decent state we have gathered our citizens to take the most suitable decision. Most of us voted in favor of a unanimous contribution via the fee on silk purchases. This provision was agreed upon for a period of ten years. Those who would not contribute to the tax would have to pay twice as much (as fine).⁴⁴

41. Notary Dionisio di Maria, Mastro d’Atti of the Genoese nation signed the decree. See ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Francesco Saluzzo to Republic of Genoa, Naples, April 23, 1593. We know that the Florentine church had cost 15,000 ducats. See Pompeo Sarnelli, *Guida de’ forastieri, curiosi di vedere, e d’intendere le cose più notabili della regal città di Napoli, e del suo amenissimo distretto* (Naples: Antonio Bulifon, 1692), 298.

42. Cardinal Gesualdo was empowered by Pope Clement VIII on August 9, 1596, to reform the Neapolitan parishes. Perhaps inspired by Protestant disseminative tactics, he posted at the cathedral doors an edict that invited Neapolitan clerics to a more austere life. See N.F. Faraglia, “Descrizione delle parrocchie di Napoli fatta nel 1598” in *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane*, n. 23 (1998), 502–566.

43. ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Paolo Giustiniano to Doge of Genoa, Naples, November 27, 1587.

44. ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Battista de Franchi to Republic of Genoa, Naples, June 18, 1590.

To convince the *Serenissima* to abide by the nation's resolution, he added that if the tax were not approved "our nation would be offended and ashamed vis-à-vis the other foreigners. Moreover, service to Our Lord, for which your *Serenissima* has always had great consideration, would not be rendered."⁴⁵

It is clear that commerce and piety were intimately entwined for the Genoese nation. In her study of the Genoese community in Seville, Ruth Pike notes that "no matter how profound and sincere their religion, it was adapted to their commercial policy."⁴⁶ For Naples, the silk trade allowed the Genoese to assert themselves as the primary mercantile nation and also provided the funds to satisfy public decorum. The primary function of a church to meet the pious needs of the community was linked to its function for trade, explaining the rationale for Genoese gentlemen to levy funds on silk exports to finance the erection of the church.⁴⁷ The consul explained the details of the agreement:

Each year, our nation's merchants buy large quantities of silk in this kingdom. The silk reserved for export usually requires a fee of one carlino per bale of silk that goes to the Consul, usable at his discretion. Today we are asking for five carlini per bale of silk for each purchaser to

45. *Ibid.*

46. Ruth Pike, *Enterprise and Adventure: The Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the New World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 22.

47. The Genoese nation was supporting its church with its lucrative silk trade. Documents illustrate that since its creation, the Church of San Giorgio had been supported by private funds. Therefore, from 1509 to 1812, Ligurian traders in the kingdom had willingly set aside part of their income for the survival of their church. Worthy of note, the usual suspect families were the ones supporting the church by allotting part of their income on goods [rendite]. Thus, in the nineteenth century, the Prince of Acquaviva, Don Carlo de Mari, was still benefactor [patrono] of San Giorgio's chapel. The church had existed for three centuries thanks to a donation that his antecedents had earmarked from taxes on both grain and flour [arrendamento di grano e farina]. ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318: Commissione della liquidazione del debito pubblico, vol. 475 n.2243, Document from the Tribunale di prima istanza to the Prince Acquaviva Carlo de Mari, Napoli, September 15, 1807. The imposition was calculated based on the prices of grain and flour. Usually grain cost 17 grana per tomolo, and flour 5 grana per tomolo. The initial capital invested by Gio Battista de Mari was 17,596 ducats; the arrendamento on grain brought an annual income of 703 ducats, and that on flour brought 543 ducats.

support the church. If all our nation's merchants in Naples contribute one grano per centenaro contracted on each deal, these will be used for the building of our church and hospital.⁴⁸

Appealing to the doge's sense of civic pride was ultimately successful.⁴⁹ The consul estimated the cost to build the new San Giorgio at 10,000 ducats.⁵⁰ The doge ratified the fee for a period of five years. Saluzzo noted: "out of zeal for our pious and holy enterprise, we bought a place that is still in debit of 2,000 ducats."⁵¹ Basically, the Genoese nation already owned eighty percent in capital. The consul thanked the doge for his support, which would undeniably "please Lord God, the Genoese nation, and His Divine Majesty who pursued peace, honor, and infinite glory."⁵² This way the Genoese maintained both the status of favorite nation and superiority over the other foreign (mercantile) nations.

COMMERCE AND PIETY IN SICILY

In Sicily as in Naples, the Genoese church in Palermo was maintained at the expense of the nation's members.⁵³ Those who refused to provide financial

48. ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Paolo Giustiniano to Doge of Genoa, Naples, November 27, 1587.

49. The Genoese bought the place from the archiepiscopal court. See ASDio, Benefici 33 fascio 215, n. 7.

50. ASDio, Benefici 33 fascio 215, n. 6, article 3. One such gentlemen was the mco ("magnifico" = magnificent, an honorific title) Francesco Spinola who contracted a debt of 1,350 ducats, on which he was still paying interest. See ASDio, Benefici 33 fascio 215, n. 7. San Giorgio was entirely supported by its conational benefactors. One example of such donations is Preceptor Serra's contribution of 250 ducats to the governors of the Church of San Giorgio. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi, n. 4 (1626), Volume of precettore Serra, November 22, 1626.

51. "Fu per zelo di cio [rispetto alla Nation nostra] per l'effetto di quest'opra pia e santa . . . gli si resta anchora in debito de Ducati 2000 in circa con pagar interessi de parti de essi." See ASG, A.S. 2635 (1510–1610) Naples, Consul Saluzzo to Doge of Genoa, 1593.

52. "Il che facendo faranno opera molto grata al Signor Dio e sara ancora di molta laude della Nation nostra, la quale sua divina Maesta conservi in paci e l'essalti in honori e glorie infiniti." See *Ibid.*

53. In 1574, a decree stated that each Genoese exporting grain from the Kingdom of Sicily would contribute 2 grana per salma and one grano per ounce on the price of

support were barred from trading with their conationals. Like those in Naples, the Genoese consuls in Palermo emphasized the importance of religious edifices to uphold the integrity of the nation. Consul Cigala maintained that “San Giorgio dei Genovesi was not only a landmark for the Genoese nation but a jewel in the observer’s eye.”⁵⁴ It had evolved in the same way as its counterpart in Naples: “in the fifteenth century, the Genoese residents in Palermo built a sumptuous chapel in the Basilica of San Francesco of Assisi, while the following century they obtained their own imposing church in the harbor area of the Sicilian capital.”⁵⁵ Genoese consul Camillo Pallavicino recalled that the sumptuous Church of San Giorgio of Palermo had been built “first for the celebration of our Patron Saint.”⁵⁶ Combining utility and representation, the church was used for games, festivities, processions, and meetings.⁵⁷ To maintain the nation and its decorum, the consul in Palermo, Battista Cigala, asked the doge to enact a decree that banned Genoese from the motherland and from commerce with the other Genoese should they refuse to pay the tax to maintain the Genoese church.⁵⁸

The Genoese community of Palermo decorated its church with important works of art, symbols of the nation’s financial prominence and patronage of

merchandise. This decree was reiterated in 1595 and specified that the Genoese also contributed to an annual income for the consulate of 1,200 L (pounds) invested toward funds collected for repair and the chaplain’s salary, priests, and other daily expenses. ASG, Giunta di Marina 2, Letter from Mco Consul Gio Battista Cigala to Doge of Genoa, Palermo, September 7, 1630.

54. ASG, Giunta di Marina 2: 1636, Consoli Nationali et esteri (1601–94), Letter from Mco Consul Gio Battista Cigala, Palermo, September 7, 1630, to Doge of Genoa.

55. C. Trasselli, “Genovesi in Sicilia,” in *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, n.s., IX (LXXXIII), 153–178.

56. ASG, A.S. 2647, Letter from Consul Camillo Pallavicino to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, October 18, 1613.

57. San Giorgio dei Genovesi in Palermo preceded Naples as it was erected in 1480. The Genoese residents in Palermo originally worshiped in the cloister of San Francesco of Assisi in the same way the Genoese residents in Naples had done with Santa Maria la Nuova. They then purchased the church of San Luca, which they renamed San Giorgio dei Genovesi. They also erected a hospital for the Genoese. See S. V. Bozzo, “La Chiesa di S. Giorgio dei Genovesi in Palermo” in *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, anno III, Fasc. II (1878), 226–251.

58. ASG, Giunta di Marina 2, Letter from Mco Consul Gio Battista Cigala to Doge of Genoa, Palermo, September 7, 1630.

the artistic community. Two works by Jacopo Palma (1480–1528), *Martyrdom of St. George* (reminding viewers of the Genoese patron saint) and *Baptism of Jesus* are among them.⁵⁹ A native of Venice, Palma may have been a student of Titian and is said to have influenced Tintoretto and Veronese. He did religious works in a number of Venetian churches in a style called *Sacra Conversazione* because he depicted the Virgin and child and saints. Filippo Paladini (1544–1614), an artist whose work recalls the mannerism of Caravaggio, painted *San Luca who depicts the Madonna*. His canvases appear in various Sicilian churches. Jacopo da Empoli (1551–1640), a late mannerist from Tuscany painted the *Martyrdom of Saint Vincent of Saragossa*. According to art historians, he anticipated the method called stereoscopy, a technique that seeks to reproduce views of two identical images as a single three-dimensional image. Giovanni Andrea De Ferrari (1598–1669), a Genoese baroque easel painter who did many altar pieces, produced the *Lady Queen of Genoa*. Finally, the Neapolitan Luca Giordano (1634–1705) painted the *Madonna of the Rosary and Saints*. Nicknamed the “thunderbolt” for his versatility and elaborate baroque style, Giordano spent ten years at the Spanish court, painted for the Escorial (the Spanish royal palace), the Toledo Cathedral, and the Buen Retiro. After gaining the title of *caballero* from the king, he returned to Naples where his rococo style influenced Italian painters throughout the eighteenth century. As with San Giorgio in Naples, all the artists who contributed to the adornment of the Genoese church in Palermo had some connections with the international art scene, with Genoa, and with southern Italy.

The Genoese of Palermo used their church as place of interment, exhibiting the burial stones as one walked inside the central nave. The floor of the church was nothing but a funeral ground, designed to reveal the financial contributions of conspicuous Genoese merchants to the rest of the Palermo community. Built between 1575 and 1596, the architecture of the church is a reminder of the early Renaissance (similar to the Santa Maria la Nuova church in Naples) with austere masonry, protective characteristics, and the classical styles displayed. The architect, Giorgio di Faccio, originally from Turin, divided the church into three naves with lateral

59. According to Giorgio Vasari, *Le Vite de' più eccellenti pittori, scultori, e architettori* (Florence: Giunti, 1568), “Jacopo Palma deserves the greatest praise, and the honor of being numbered among those who are masters of art and who are able to express with facility in their pictures their most sublime conceptions.”

chapels for the sepulture of prominent Genoese families. It was an early Renaissance style that Leon Battista Alberti (who designed the façade of the Palazzo Rucellai in Florence) improved later on. This sober style also reflected the First Crusade of 1095, a reminder of the key role of the Genoese in crusades and pilgrimages, and in the conquest of the Holy Land.

The Genoese doge conducted similar policies in all Sicilian cities such as Trapani and Messina: churches were deemed central to the decorum of the Genoese community. Consul Cigala of Trapani asked the doge what he considered to be the greatest benefit of the church for the nation; the doge replied that it was more beneficial to possess a church of the nation than pieces of real estate throughout the Sicilian capital. The consul explained that “it is very important for the nation, since it has no other place of public meeting”; to which the doge replied that the nation’s ancient chapel in the parish of San Lorenzo also needed to be renovated,⁶⁰ and he ordered the jurors of the city of Trapani to ensure that both the Church of San Giorgio and the antique chapel of San Giorgio were in a proper state.⁶¹ The proconsul of the city of Trapani, Francisco Brignole, guaranteed the rebuilding of the chapel. In Messina, the same policies were followed. A poorhouse was needed, so the consul appealed to the traders’ generosity. To provide for the poor belonging to the Genoese community, the consul proposed to solicit a contribution from all the imports and exports of the nation’s goods. His estimate translated to “about one *grano* per ounce for a year [which represents about six percent of the value] and half a *grano* for two years.”⁶² Piety and charity were very much linked to commerce and the nation’s honor. If a nation could build a beautiful church, attend to its poor, and provide spiritual services to the masses while using the premises to discuss deals, then its standing in the community was assured.

60. ASG, Giunta di Marina 2, Letter from Consul Gio Batta Cigala to Doge of Genoa, Palermo, May 26, 1631.

61. The *giurati* (jurors) intended to tear down the walls of the church and just keep the chapel. They needed 50 Lira of this currency (Sicilian) and to find sufficient funds, the consul offered to sell a series of houses owned by the Genoese nation. ASG, Giunta di Marina 2, Letter from Consul Gio Battista Cigala to Doge of Genoa, Palermo, May 26, 1631.

62. ASG, A.S. 2634, Consoli Gaeta – Messina – Palermo (1529–1804) n.207, Letter from Consul Raphaello Giustiniano to Republic of Genoa, Messina, June 3, 1562. Unfortunately, it is not possible to figure the exact number of poor to which the consul was referring.

SAN GIORGIO: PAPAL AND CROWN FAVORITE

The Genoese church also helped its nation maintain good relations with the papacy and the viceroyalty. Through their infinite web of Genoese connections with the papacy, they even obtained assistance from cardinals in Rome to expand and render their place of worship more majestic.⁶³ In this post-Trent age, the strengthening of the Catholic Church coincided with the Genoese spiritual devotion. In 1605, the Genoese community of Naples voted on a plan to demolish part of their church to embellish it, buying from the Certosa priests a place contiguous to theirs. The following year, the consul informed the doge that the restoration of the church was underway largely through the influence of Cardinal Pinello, a close associate of the pope, who had approved San Giorgio as the church of the Genoese nation.⁶⁴

Throughout the sixteenth century, the pope frequently levied tithe revenues (*terza decima*) on the Italian clergy to wage wars against the Turks. As the Genoese were generally in the forefront of military attacks, Genoa and Rome worked as close associates. Over the century, the popes' tithes from the Kingdom of Naples amounted to 20,000 ducats annually.⁶⁵ San Giorgio dei Genovesi was, however, exempted.⁶⁶ The pope granted

63. ASG., A.S. 2635, Letter from Consul Paolo Grillo to Republic of Genoa, Naples, May 5, 1606.

64. *Ibid.*, Naples September 5, 1606.

65. The great tithe collections imposed on all of Italy were in 1602 (three collections to which Naples contributed thirty-three percent of the sum collected in the entire peninsula), 1620, 1632, 1660, and 1684. See Matthew Vester, "The Bresse Clergy Assembly and Tithe Grants, 1560–80" in *Sixteenth Century Journal*, XXXV/3 (2004), 771–794. See also Hermann Kellenbenz and Paolo Prodi, *Fisco, Religione, Stato nell'età confessionale* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989). For the Kingdom of Naples, see from the same edited volume Aurelio Musi, "Fisco, religione, e Stato nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia (secoli XVI–XVII)," 427–457.

66. In 1739, when the number of parishes and clerics came to be reduced in the kingdom, San Giorgio dei Genovesi was still exempt from pontifical sentence. The largesse also included the Annunziata, San Giacomo degli Spagnoli, San Antonio di Vienna, San Giovanni a Mare, San Giovanni dei Fiorentini, Santa Maria Incoronata, Santa Maria del Popolo, San Eligio, San Angelo a Nido, and Santa Maria della Paziienza. Three of these were churches incorporated in the Monti di Pietà. See Romeo de Maio, *Società e Vita Religiosa a Napoli nell'Età Moderna: 1656–1799* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1971).

the nation both spiritual and temporal administration, allowing San Giorgio to give the sacraments and the Eucharist, perform processions, celebrate mass, and conduct funerals.⁶⁷ The Genoese consul was free to manage his church, provided he respected the canons pronounced during the Tridentine Council, and the pope did not garner tithes from San Giorgio so long as all religious construction, concessions, or provisions were pursued in conformity with the laws of the church.⁶⁸

In the first decades of the seventeenth century, the viceregal fisc (the royal office that collected taxes) in Naples attempted to tap church revenues and sought to tax San Giorgio.⁶⁹ But Genoese influence, together with the manpower, funds, and galleys they loaned to the Spanish, eventually caused the order to be rescinded. Ecclesiastics and religious organizations such as churches, monasteries, religious schools, orphanages, hospitals, and charities were declared exempt from the tax.⁷⁰ Much like rituals, the embellishment of the church exposed Genoese piety to public view and attracted the attention of the Spanish Crown. The most prominent Ligurian financiers undertook works to improve San Giorgio.⁷¹ In 1614, for instance, Cornelio Spinola received compliments directly from the king because mass was being celebrated, and alms were being collected in great quantity.⁷² A decade later, mass was celebrated in

67. ASDio, *Miscellanea Parrocchie A 77*, Letter from Pope San Carlus S. Jus. to the Church of San Giorgio dei Genovesi entitled “*Bulla erect.mis et emolumento parochi*,” Rome, bull’s copy from May 4, 1623.

68. The Republic of Genoa and the papacy had built a long entente since the fifteenth century. The Spinola family in particular had sent an oration on behalf of the Republic on Pope Alexander VI’s (the Borgia pope) elevation to the papal see in 1493. See Jacobus Spinola, *Iacobus Spinoa Iu. V doctor Illustrissimo ac excel. elevatio Principi don suo singularissimo Ludouico Marie, Bari Duci Salute et comendatione* (Rome : S. Planck, 1492).

69. In 1634, the total Genoese income in the kingdom was estimated at 4.5 million ducats. See ASG, A.S. 2639, Consoli due Sicilie (1634–41) n.133, Letter from Consul Cornelio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, January 3, 1634.

70. ASG, A.S. 2639 n.200, Letter from Consul Cornelio Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, May 26, 1634.

71. The patrons who financed San Giorgio’s beautification were Pier Antonio Bozzolo, Gio Agostino Spinola, Ascanio Spinola, and Gio Batta Spinola and Ruberto Spinola, those last two being governors of the edifice. See ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Consul Giacomo Lagomacino Republic of Genoa, Naples, April 22, 1614.

72. The Marquis of Santa Croce (advisor to the viceroy) redeemed the ornaments that had been used as security for a loan from Gio Simeone Moccia, a Neapolitan citizen.

honor of the patron Saint Bernard in the Church of San Giorgio, and Consul de Mari informs us that the *Te Deum* was sung to thank the Spanish monarch for the graces bestowed upon his favorite nation. August 20 is the feast day of Saint Bernard, who gave advice to bishops, kings, and popes and preached the second crusade. Bernard is remembered for kindling the enthusiasm for Christendom and the crusades when two great armies were dispatched against the infidels in the Holy Land. In return for this homage, the king ordered a show of fireworks from the three castles of the city (Castel Sant' Elmo, Castel Nuovo, Castel Dell'Ovo) in the presence of the viceroy.⁷³ The Spaniards built Castel Sant'Elmo at the top of the city for military purposes, but also as a reverence to Saint Elmo (or Erasmo), protector of sailors during storms at sea. The legend has it that he made his presence known by lights in the rigging, called St. Elmo's fire. Fireworks became a requisite element of state and dynastic events during the Renaissance, celebrating peace with the means of war.⁷⁴ Because fireworks were interpreted as the civilian counterpart of military technology, a display of fireworks in honor of the Genoese acknowledged them not only as great traders and seafarers, but also as military defenders. Whereas fireworks were outside demonstrations of the Genoese contribution to the Spanish imperium, the Genoese church stood as an internal demonstration of its parishioners' faith and spiritual commitment to the Spaniards, the Catholic Church, and the nation's prestige.

SPIRITUAL COMPETITION AT SEA: THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA

The sea became an area of spiritual contention between the Genoese and the Order of Malta. In 1530, Emperor Charles V had granted the island of Malta to the Knights of St. John, who had been expelled a few years before

ASG, A.S. 2636, Letter from Consul Michele Cavo to Republic of Genoa, Naples, April 16, 1619.

73. ASG, A.S. 2637, Consoli due Sicilie (1625–28), Letter from Consul de Mari to Republic of Genoa, Naples, August 21, 1625.

74. For a discussion on firework displays, see Martha Pollack, *Cities at War in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 291–307.

from Rhodes by the Turks.⁷⁵ A religious and military order, the knights provided the same service as the Genoese: protecting Western (and therefore Christian) powers in the Mediterranean. Also called “the Religion of Malta,” they represented both spiritual and martial competition for the Genoese.⁷⁶ Both nations vied to protect Spain against the Muslims, both viewed themselves as imbued with religious authority rooted in the crusades, and both sought prestige and honor at sea.

According to royal conventions, the Genoese enjoyed the privilege of “favorite nation,” a title that enabled the Genoese galleys to parade first during processions in the bay of Naples. However, the galleys of Malta recurrently ignored the protocol and passed the Genoese during the processions. The Genoese consul appealed to his doge.⁷⁷ In 1622, the Genoese doge responded that “our Republic has always been one of the greatest powers in Italy. Long before the Order of Malta was instituted, we had kingdoms and provinces, and empires in the sea with maritime forces that greatly surpass their numbers.” The *Serenissima*’s doge appealed to honorific benchmarks that served as markers of Genoese identity:

The vanity of this order is very grand in pretending to display their standard before ours. These people are only a bunch of zealots without empire to speak of. They reside on a rock under the jurisdiction of

75. The knights were initially called the knights Hospitalers of St. John of Jerusalem; they then became the Knights of St. John, and eventually the Knights of Malta. They left Rhodes in 1523, stopped in Crete for a few years, to finally settle in Malta in 1530. They remained there until Napoleon expelled them in 1797. Whenever mentioned, the Knights of St. John were referred to as *la Religione di Malta*.

76. While they were in Rhodes, the Knights of St. John had good rapports with the Genoese, in particular with their colony, Chios. See Ann Williams, “Sacra Militia, the Order of St John: Crusade, Corsairing and Trade in Rhodes and Malta, 1460–1631” in *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel’s Maritime Legacy*, eds. Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood, and Mohamed-Salah Omri (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 139–156.

77. ASG, A.S. 2635, Lettere Console Due Sicilie: Napoli, Letter from Consul Damiano Pallavicino to the Republic of Genoa, July 7, 1598; ASG, A.S. 2712, Materie Politiche: Istruzioni a ministri (Spagna 1529–1659), Letter from ambassador Saluzzo to court in Madrid to Republic of Genoa, March 21, 1615; ASG, A.S. 2712, Materie Politiche: Istruzioni a ministri (Spagna 1529–1659), Letter from extraordinary ambassador Costantino Doria to court in Madrid to Republic of Genoa, 1641 [only the year is given].

others, and with scarcely five or six galleys to their name. Such pretensions require the qualities of tradition, dignity, empire, and forces. There is simply no comparison possible between the two. Genoa was among the first cities founded in Italy. Similarly Genoa's seaborne empire is unequalled, and bears much consideration on land, not only in Italy but also in the Orient.⁷⁸

The doge's emphasis on tradition and antiquity reveals Genoa's Achilles' heel: trade hampered social prestige. Up to 1599, it had been fairly easy to get into the order of Malta and parade among French and Spanish grandees.⁷⁹ But beginning in the 1600s, one of the admission requirements was a direct affront to the Genoese of Naples: anyone "whose family had practiced commerce, was a banker, cashier, tax collector, who worked in a warehouse, had sold silk, wool, or grain" was refused entry into the order.⁸⁰ The Genoese were disturbed when their prominence was not respected. On the island of Sicily, for instance, the Genoese consuls invariably aimed at securing the primacy of the Genoese standards in all the cities, castles, and fortresses during the king's processions. In 1621, Genoese Consul Cavana was particularly pleased to report that Philip IV had chosen the galleys of Genoa over those of Malta to parade first and had quickly passed along the order to those who held jurisdiction (*università*) over the island.⁸¹

The Genoese saw themselves as more pious than the Maltese. In one appeal to the Spanish Crown, the Genoese doge sought to downplay the accomplishments of the Knights of St. John, whom he regarded as a horde of corsairs raiding the eastern Mediterranean. Their involvement in piracy had triggered a reaction by Süleyman the Magnificent, who expelled them from the island of Rhodes. "The said religion should venerate us like fathers since their origin stems from the help of our forces in the Holy Land,"⁸²

78. "Istruzioni a Costantino Pinelli, Ambasciatore Ordinario Presso il Re di Spagna," Genoa, August 11, 1621, in *Istruzioni e Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Genovesi*, a cura di Raffaele Ciasca, vol. 2: Spagna (1619–1635) (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Età Moderna e Contemporanea, 1955), 24.

79. Claudio Donati, *L'Idea di Nobiltà in Italia: Secoli XIV–XVIII*, (Rome: Ed. Laterza, 1988), 250.

80. *Ibid.*, 258.

81. ASG, A.S. 2647, Letter from Consul Geronimo Cavana to Genoese Republic, Palermo, August 9, 1621.

82. *Ibid.*, letter 305.

explained the doge. Yet the Grand Master of Malta received lump sums for the protection of His Catholic Majesty in Mediterranean waters.⁸³ Not only was this fact an insult to the Genoese honor, but also the loan made by Spain to pay for the salary of the Maltese had been made through a Genoese bank. So the Genoese doge persisted: “the recuperation of the Holy Land by the Genoese marks the origins of the religion of Malta.”⁸⁴ It was an offense to even consider raising the standards of Malta before that of the Republic.⁸⁵ The Knights of St. John’s main accomplishment was repelling Ottoman forces during the Siege of Malta. On the other hand, the Genoese had actively contributed to raising sufficient galleys for the showdown in the battle of Lepanto and had defeated the Turks “during the time of Andrea Doria, and in the glorious battle of 1571 against the Turks, it was our standards that always preceded.”⁸⁶

One way of assessing one’s degree of honor and piety was through ceremonial precedence. The Maltese were in no position to compete economically with the Genoese, yet the recognition they received by the crown disturbed the Genoese nation.⁸⁷ Alessandro Giustiniani, a Genoese captain anchored in Palermo, offers an interesting account of the

83. On Tuesday, December 31, 1566, the Grand Master of the Order of Malta, Signore fra don Pedro d’Avila y de Guzman, received 180 ducats of gold to accompany and guarantee His Catholic Majesty’s safe passage. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi, n. 39 (1566–67), Pallavicino e Spinola.

84. “Istruzioni a Costantino Pinelli, Ambasciatore Ordinario Presso il Re di Spagna,” Genoa, August 11, 1621, in *Istruzioni e Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Genovesi*, 25.

85. In 1620, the Genoese wrote to the pope asking to be given precedence over the Order of Malta during the raising of flags. The pope, however, replied negatively arguing that in 1532, when Doria accompanied the emperor, the Genoese were given precedence. After 1539, however, it was declared that “no podrían navegar con este tiempo otras galleras se non eran las de San Juan.” It is clear that the idea behind this was that the galleys of the emperor should not precede that of the pope. The pope added that the galleys of the religion of Malta were at the service of Christianity all year round, whereas that of the Catholic Majesty in the Kingdom of Naples was feudatory of the church. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, VI A, vol. 16 car 93 “Memoriale dei Genovesi per la precedenza del loro standardo a quello di Malta con la risposta per la religione di malta.”

86. “Istruzioni a Costantino Pinelli, Ambasciatore Ordinario Presso il Re di Spagna,” Genoa, August 11, 1621, in *Istruzioni e Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Genovesi*, 26.

87. It is noteworthy to mention that the Maltese even had created their own bank in the city of Naples. Although it was impossible for the Order of Malta to compete with the Genoese capital, the Banco di Chiavari belonged to their organization. See ASG, A.S. 1666 Marittimarum (year 1540–1653), Relazione di Alessando Giustiniani

ceremonial and attention the Genoese expected:⁸⁸ “the lower ministers and the Pronotary of the kingdom came to introduce themselves with all compliments and ceremonies. Since I was the captain of the Genoese galleys, they displayed the same treatment as they had done with the magnificent Gioannettino Doria, general of the galleys in Naples.”⁸⁹ His explanation of the ceremonial of arrival also highlights the unity of the Genoese nation: “the consul of our nation Magnificent Paolo Geronimo Pallavicino came to greet me with all the friends of the nation, some of them titled and dignitaries of the kingdom. They formed a cortege with their carriages to escort me to the palace, where dignitaries waited for me and as soon as I entered made a reverential salute.”⁹⁰ Best of all, he was treated equally with the Maltese:

In the palace, a whole controversy started over where we should install the table. We debated over whether to eat under the baldachin which is more honorific and ostentatious when a prince is reduced to eat outside. We then ate under the baldachin and may His Excellency be reassured that there is nothing different with the way in which the prince of Malta was treated.⁹¹

Giustiniani recognized how necessary this display of favor was: “I must admit that this lunch was really curious. While the grandees of Spain’s attempt to observe the ceremonial, as if it were something of such importance, was unsettling, the food was really good and I thank His Excellency’s

comissario delle due galere di Genova in Sicilia, Naples, August 26, 1613. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi: Sezione Filangieri. The fact that the Maltese did not tolerate bankers in their organization yet themselves owned a bank is interesting. This contradiction must surely have infuriated the Genoese.

88. Thomas Allison Kirk argues that “ceding precedence to the Maltese was not merely an insult to the Genoese but also a reminder for the Spaniards that the republic had no right to behave as an independent state.” See *Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in the Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559–1684* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2005), 92–95. I however believe that the Spanish monarch sought a politics of *divide et impera* rather than negating the republic’s status as a sovereign state.

89. ASG, A.S. 1666 Marittimarum (year 1540–1653), Relazione di Alessandro Giustiniani comissario delle due galere di Genova in Sicilia, Naples, August 26, 1613.

90. *Ibid.*

91. *Ibid.*

status for it.”⁹² The display of a nation’s standards, its order of appearance in naval processions, the longevity of its history, its demonstration of piety, the degree of esteem displayed for it in court dinners, all determined the amount of honor and status it could receive.

SPIRITUAL COMPETITION THROUGH FUNERARY MONUMENTS

Even funerary monuments became a site of competition for the Genoese to acquire privileges and gain power. A dispute emerged over whether San Giorgio in Palermo should house the tombstones of Genoese commoners.⁹³ As the Genoese nobles were all wealthy merchants who belonged more to the new rising bourgeoisie than to the old feudal aristocracy,⁹⁴ this internal class division tells us much about the ultimate aim of the Genoese. Consul Ottaviano Pasqua took his position in favor of equality in the eyes of God: “I do not wish to favor nobles over others. To me it is indifferent whether one or the other has a burial place in the church, whether they are sons of noble consuls and benefactors or other. Why do we have to make such a difference among our sons?”⁹⁵ But above all, “Since we are in a foreign country, I would like to avoid civil war among members of our nation.” Instead, the nation needed to protect itself against outsiders and not pursue constant litigation over unimportant matters: “I want to add something more important: we are in a foreign land, and thus we should not irritate one another but enhance our privileges.”⁹⁶

92. *Ibid.*

93. Important dignitaries were buried in their national church. It is the case of Viceroy Don Pedro de Toledo whose sepulcher lies in San Giacomo degli Spagnoli. In Santa Maria La Nuova, important merchants who were ennobled such as De Mari (Genoese), Doria del quondam Francesco (Genoese), and Citarella del quondam Paolo (Neapolitan) are buried. Turbolo (Neapolitan) has a monument to himself inside the church. See Gaetano Rocco, *Santa Maria la Nova di Napoli*.

94. In Genoa after the revolt of new nobles in 1575 and reform of the constitution, more new nobles were allowed in the government. The *Liber Nobilitatis*, or Golden Book of Genoese nobility, was still the point of reference, but there were alternating old and new nobles who served as biennial doges as well as in posts in the councils (such as procurators, senators, and in minor and major councils).

95. ASG, A.S. 2647, Letter from Consul Ottaviano Pasqua to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, May 20, 1602.

96. *Ibid.*

The consul realized that the essence of the nation was not birth but commerce: “Semeria was able to build his tomb, whereas he is neither powerful nor conspicuous among princes and ministers [of Palermo]. Groppo [should be able to do the same as he] has many businesses in this kingdom and owns a house inferior to none of the nobles. The state of his affairs was constructed based on his astuteness.”⁹⁷ As in Naples, the church and the traders’ *loggia* depended on the same budget and in fact shared walls. For the Genoese, faith and commerce were inextricable:

We know very well that most of our nation’s members are of the same condition, which form most of the Loggia. If the traders are annoyed I do not know how the nobility will maintain the ordinary expenses. Traders contribute continuously to the weekly alms, those of Christmas, of Easter, and marriages of our sons. They are of great importance to us. Could Her Serenissima [Genoa] intervene at least to have our privileges respected? Thank God the [Viceroy] Signore Duke of Ossuna has been clement to our nation so far.⁹⁸

The discourse on the disparity between nobility and commoners was directly related to the way the nation conducted its relations with the Spanish Crown. Local agents of the *Superba* insisted that to assume the responsibility of consul, one did not need aristocratic descent. The key qualities required were the ability to fight for the respect of the nation’s privileges in His Catholic Majesty’s lands, to attend church regularly, to give charity to the poor, and to collect the tax on merchants’ goods for the maintenance of the church.⁹⁹ Consul Pasqua’s request is also indicative of the importance of Genoese traders’ finances in the support of their *loggia*. The spiritual responsibility to maintain church, funerary monuments, and *loggia* was that of the traders, and not of the nobility.

97. *Ibid.*

98. *Ibid.* The Duke of Ossuna was an ally and advocate of the Genoese nation. He wrote various memorials to the king asking him to support the Genoese religious enterprises in the kingdom.

99. ASG, A.S. 2647, Letter from Consul Camillo Pallavicino to Republic of Genoa, Palermo, April 3, 1623.

Funerary monuments are a good indication of social status and authority.¹⁰⁰ Visceglia argues that although Neapolitan nobles formerly wanted to be buried in their fiefs, over time they preferred to be buried in the capital, to be “seen.”¹⁰¹ Even once departed, they wanted to occupy the social landscape. Similarly, Gérard Labrot has concluded that in Naples between 1500 and 1600, Neapolitan barons sought to “occupy the space” by owning one palace in Naples and one palace in the fief.¹⁰² Visceglia explains that

the chapel was considered on the same plane as feudal domains . . . [it] was not only a place of familial religious devotion, but also and above all the seat of a cult for the memory of the founders. It was almost a spatial and temporal prolongation of their earthly home. Death was considered an opportunity to tell the story of the family and to revive its splendor.¹⁰³

Much like processions, festivals, and churches, tombs therefore revealed the intense competition for wealth, power, and prestige. Even in death, Genoese, Neapolitans, and Spaniards sought to dominate the spiritual landscape.

Originally, the sovereigns chose to link their place of interment to the history of the city. Thus, the Aragonese kings selected the medieval complex of San Domenico Maggiore.¹⁰⁴ The Neapolitan elite sought to win favors from the Aragonese, a trend reflected in their tombs. Hence, the church of Monteoliveto held the sepulchers of King Ferrante of Aragon’s two sons, the legitimate Francesco of Aragón, the illegitimate Carlo of

100. Arne Karsten, ed., *Das Grabmal des Günstlings: Studien zur Memorialkultur frühneuzeitlicher Favoriten* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2011), explains that early modern burial monuments made visible social relationships that anchored the identity of the deceased, and the favorite were defined by their relationship with the monarch.

101. Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Il Bisogno di Eternità: I Comportamenti Aristocratici a Napoli in Età Moderna* (Naples: Guida Ed., 1988), 123–124.

102. Gérard Labrot, *Baroni in città: Residenze e comportamenti dell'aristocrazia napoletana (1530–1734)* (Naples: Società Editrice Napoletana, 1979).

103. Visceglia, *Il Bisogno di Eternità*, 135–136.

104. Attention to the bodies of deceased royalty was a trademark of Spanish public patronage. For an interesting discussion of the link between the royal legitimacy of tombs and the importance of San Domenico Maggiore as a royal pantheon of Aragonese families and selected affiliated noblemen, see Sabina de Cavi, *Architecture and Royal Presence*, 108–132.

Aragón; his daughter Maria of Aragón, duchess of Amalfi; and Cardinal Colonna, viceroy of the kingdom.¹⁰⁵ In the same way, the Spanish and Genoese elite devoted both time and energy to perpetuating their grandeur and role in the kingdom. Viceroy Toledo's funerary apparatus in San Giacomo degli Spagnoli was didactic. At the four corners behind the altar and upon a huge sarcophagus stand Wisdom, Justice, Moderation, and Power. Each side represents the deeds of Toledo: the enterprise against Otranto, the victory over Barbarossa, the entrance of Charles V into Naples, and Don Pedro and his second wife Donna Vincenza Spinelli reading a devotional book.¹⁰⁶

Eventually, funerary monuments mirrored a change in mentality, of which the Genoese were very much aware. Some churches housed the graves of prominent Genoese merchants alongside Iberian and Italian dignitaries. In the convent of Santa Maria la Nuova, the Genoese De Mari was buried next to local merchants such as Citarella and Turbolo, and Neapolitan grandees such as the Castriota or Macedonio.¹⁰⁷ Visceglia shows that families from the old and new nobilities came to occupy the same ecclesiastic space, but she provides no explanation.¹⁰⁸ Gérard Delille's examination of the sacralization of space points to the significance of this phenomenon: "while administrative limits are easily disturbed, it is not the same with sacred order. If an infringement is committed toward the order, it is a sacrilege."¹⁰⁹ The burial of merchants within the church expresses acceptance of a new sacred order. Those to be praised were no longer the old aristocracy but those who demonstrated a high degree of spiritual worth. Through their economic weight, the Genoese inserted themselves into this spiritual demonstration also in death.¹¹⁰ The Genoese nation

105. Pietro De Stefano, *Descrittione dei luoghi sacri di Napoli*, 94.

106. Inside San Pietro Martire is buried Isabella Chiaramonte, wife of King Ferrante of Aragona and their daughter Queen Maria of Hungary. See *ibid.*, 119.

107. Gaetano Rocco, *Santa Maria la Nova di Napoli*.

108. Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Il Bisogno di Eternità*, 128.

109. Gérard Delille, *Famille et Propriété dans le Royaume de Naples, XVème–XIXème Siècle*, n.259 (Rome: Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 1985), 109–110.

110. Blake de Maria has shown that wealthy immigrant merchants moved toward integration into Venetian society in civic (through palaces), sacred (through charities and family chapels), and architectural (through art and residences) spaces. See *Becoming Venetian: Immigrants and the Arts in Early Modern Venice* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

amply fulfilled the role of upholder of the Catholic crown in southern Italy. Eventually, families from the new nobility such as the De Mari entered the social and spiritual landscape of Naples because of their wealth and the services they rendered to the Spanish Crown.¹¹¹

The entwined aspects of commerce and piety were best demonstrated through the Genoese church, the spiritual rivalry with other nations, and through funerary monuments. Central to Genoese spiritual life in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, San Giorgio dei Genovesi helped propel the community to the rank of favorite nation. Torn between deep religiosity and allegiance to trade, the Genoese met the challenge imposed by the Spanish vision of a Catholic empire. In the context of the Counter-Reformation, which aimed at recovering souls, demonstrating piety, and teaching the dictates of the Church, the Genoese endeavored to convey to the pope, to the Spanish Crown, and to the other merchant nations their commitment to the Tridentine reforms.

The Genoese nation's religious life helped establish its relationship with the Neapolitan elite (wealthy merchants, Spanish grandees, the papacy, and the barons) and also with its spiritual rivals (the Knights of Malta and the other merchant nations). Rituals, processions, pious architecture, works of arts, and funerary monuments were all symbols not only of the notable competition among the rich nations of early modern Naples and Sicily, but also of the incredible amount of energy devoted to maintaining the fruitful symbiosis with the Spanish Crown.

Energetically wrangling with the other nations to maintain their status of spiritual leaders alongside the Spaniards, the Genoese were not afraid of maneuvering on land, at sea, and in death to assert themselves. Their desire to beautify their nation's church while inserting the kingdom's sacred order through funerary burials is yet another instance of the Genoese capacity to retain their identity while adapting to their new environment. Similarly, the [next chapter](#) devotes attention to the Genoese insertion into local charities out of religiosity, conspicuous consumption, and a mix of spiritual and financial competition.

111. Eventually, the Mari, princes of Acquaviva, founded four chapels within the Church of San Giorgio. See ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318, vol. 475 n.2243.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Genoese Participation in Charitable Institutions

Love each other as I have loved you.

—JOHN 15:9–12

I believe . . . wealth, if it is used to keep the needy, can gain a man esteems and praise. With magnanimity and splendor, fame and dignity can be attained. In emergencies and times of need we see every day how useful is the wealth of private citizens to the country itself.

—LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI (*On the Family*, 1432)

In 1537, Genoese merchant Taddeo de Ponte bequeathed all his belongings, consisting of houses, lands, and incomes from his gabelle on articles of consumption, to two Neapolitan charitable institutions: the Santa Casa dell'Annunziata and the Santa Casa degli Incurabili.¹ In 1565, the Genoese Andrea Imperiale left his son David an annual income of 1,000 ducats in Naples, which he could collect only after he either produced an heir or turned sixty-five; in the meantime, the income would go to the Hospedale degli Incurabili.² In 1580, Genoese Imperia Gentile left a life interest in her entire estate to an orphan of the Annunziata, Marsiglia Pignatella. When Marsiglia

1. Act passed by Notary Antonuccio Palermo of Naples on July 12, 1537. See S. Ravacini, *Sulla universalità dell'opera ospedaliera della S. Casa degli Incurabili in Napoli* (Naples: Tipografia Barnaba cons. di Antonio, 1899).

2. From the year 1565, the Illustrious Abbot and magistrate of the Office of the Poor and of the Hospital of the Incurabili would enjoy the usufruct from the Imperiale income of 1,000 ducats, but the ownership of the income remained in the Imperiale family. See ASG, M.S. 449 Collezione Lagomarsino (Letter I) Famiglia Imperiale.

died, the inheritance passed in full to the Santa Casa dell'Annunziata.³ The following year, the eminent Genoese banker Nicolò Spinola disinherited his family in favor of the Annunziata.⁴ In 1610, the Genoese Benedetto de Marinis selected the Santa Casa degli Incurabili as sole inheritor should his descendants fail to provide heirs, a predicament that materialized a century later, when the Incurabili came into possession of the full inheritance.⁵ These cases of beneficence to the city of Naples were not isolated instances; the Genoese made substantial contributions to these two and other charities there, although their generosity has not received attention from historians.⁶ Yet in northern Italy, foreign benefactors to local charities were extremely rare. In Milan, which was also controlled by the Spanish Crown, there were another handful of benefactors, most of them Spanish. A donation of 11 ducats in 1578 from two Neapolitan pilgrims, Giovanni Ciernera and Jacopo da Todi, to the Monte di Pietà di Milano is still remembered as an act of random kindness.⁷ This chapter examines the Genoese investment in the charities in the Kingdom of Naples and how they interacted with Spanish and Neapolitan practices, arguing that Genoese giving in Naples stemmed

3. Imperia Gentile, daughter of Rizuiolo Gentile of the land of Nucara, registered the act on June 10, 1580, through Notary Seano. See Giambattista D'Addosio Segretario Capo dello Stabilimento, dal 1466 a 1680, *Sommario dei testamenti e legati a favore della santa Casa dell'Annunziata di Napoli che si conservano nell'archivio de' pio luogo* (Naples: Pei tipi Barbara Bons., 1895).

4. Notary Nazario di Parolisi recorded the testament on April 3, 1581, under vol. 8, p. 470. See D'Addosio, *Sommario dei testamenti della santa Casa dell'Annunziata*.

5. Notary Andrea Cassetta of Napoli opened on July 6, 1610, a testament for Benedetto de Marinis, who died in 1640. See S. Ravacini, *Sulla universalità della S. Casa degli Incurabili*.

6. A historiographical parenthesis is necessary at this point. Part of the reason behind this lacuna is that the information about Genoese investment in organizations of beneficence is not available in either Genoese or Spanish state archives. The analysis of Genoese philanthropy in Naples has required me to assemble bankers' records along with private charities' bookkeeping, notaries' registers, and individual wills in Naples, an endeavor that has taken me to family archives, public libraries, and diocesan archives. In the case of the Genoese charities, I only came across their existence by glancing at nineteenth-century documents relating to the liquidation of charitable organs in the kingdom.

7. See Piero Compostella, *Il Monte di Pietà di Milano: L'Istituto nella storia e nella vita Milanese attraverso i secoli XV e XVI* (Milan: Banca del Monte di Milano, 1973).

from both private piety (spiritual, moral, religious exercises) and worldly purposes (acquisition of honor and status as well as privileges and even cash benefits). It demonstrates their adaptation to the Neapolitan social environment.

Philanthropy was common in early modern Europe. Beginning in the Middle Ages, the well-to-do had a duty toward common people to provide *benemerenzza sine fine* (benevolence without end).⁸ Kindness to social inferiors displayed Christian values. During the Renaissance, poorhouses, orphanages, and chapels became conspicuous features of the European landscape. Part of the nobility's duty was to endorse these institutions as a way to display benevolence and to share the good graces granted to their families.⁹ What had been an open ritual binding Christians became a compulsory function imposed on prescribed groups to underscore authority and obedience. Scholars agree that state and lay engagement in poor relief increased, and resources were regularized, centralized, even rationalized. Italian historiography labels this phenomenon the *religione della carità* (religion of charity) because it was encouraged by the ecclesiastical structure of the Counter-Reformation.¹⁰ The Tridentine decrees reiterated the "good works" aspect of Catholic religiosity, exhorting devout Catholics to respect the sacraments by tending to the afflicted, consoling the orphans, curing the sick, and instructing the ignorant.¹¹ Uprooted by war and famine, the poor crowded into the cities,

8. See Federico Carmelo, *I mercanti genovesi in Sicilia e la chiesa della loro nazione in Palermo* (Naples: Graf. Luigi Cappugi, 1958).

9. For Samuel K. Cohn, sixteenth-century charitable institutions served as an alternative to convents that had become too crowded, whereas giving served the interests of female sociability and identity. See *Death and Poverty in Siena, 1205–1800: Strategies for the Afterlife* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 201.

10. See Adriano Prosperi, *Tribunali della coscienza: Inquisitori, confessori, missionari*, Turin: Einaudi Ed., 1996. See also Giovanni Muto, "Forme e contenuti economici dell'assistenza nel Mezzogiorno moderno: il caso di Napoli," in *Timore e Carità: I poveri nell'Italia moderna*, eds. G. Politi, M. Rosa, and F. della Peruta (Cremona: Biblioteca statale e libreria civica di Cremona, 1982), 237–258. See Nicholas Terpstra, "Confraternities and Public Charity: Modes of Civic Welfare in Early Modern Italy" in *Confraternities and Catholic Reform in Italy, France, and Spain*, eds. John P. Donnelly and M. W. Maher (Kirkville, MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999), 97–121.

11. Nicholas Terpstra, *Cultures of Charity: Women, Politics, and the Reform of Poor Relief in Renaissance Italy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), shows how Bologna dealt with the life cycles of poverty.

accentuating the sense of civic disarray. John Martin affirms that the elite responded by channeling the energies of the laity into charitable activities to confront the crisis.¹² Charities acted as agents of social order in an increasingly hierarchical period.¹³ In what Brian Pullan has dubbed the “social miracle,” participation in benevolent associations became de rigueur.¹⁴ But the nobility also engaged in civic activity to reinforce its social position.¹⁵ As Edward Muir has put it: “besides living on great estates, nobles were supposed to be generous and open-handed, as the saying went, *spendere largamente* [spend generously].”¹⁶ The social miracle was also a way for the affluent to flaunt their magnanimity.¹⁷

The scholarly consensus is that in Liguria itself, charity did not stem from spiritual devotion but was adapted to political and financial ends.¹⁸ Peter

12. See John Martin, “Religion, Renewal, and Reform in the Sixteenth Century,” in *Early Modern Italy*, ed. John A. Marino (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 30–47.

13. See Nicholas Terpstra, “The Politics of Ritual Kinship” in *The Politics of Ritual Kinship: Confraternities and Social Order in Early Modern Italy*, ed. Nicholas Terpstra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–29.

14. Brian Pullan, “‘Support and Redeem’: Charity and Poor Relief in Italian Cities from the 14th to the 17th Century,” in *Poverty and Charity: Europe, Italy, Venice, 1400–1700*, ed. Brian Pullan (Brookfield: Variorum, 1994), 177–208.

15. Philip Gavitt has proposed that the study of charitable institutions provides access to how ties between the elite and citizen-subjects were forged and reaffirmed. In Florence, “charitable and religious institutions reflected a matrix of connections among charity, confessional discipline, *civiltà*, and public order.” See *Gender, Honor, and Charity in Late Renaissance Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 29.

16. Edward Muir, “Art and Pageantry in Renaissance Venice” in *Major Problems in the History of the Italian Renaissance*, eds. Benjamin G. Kohl and Alison Andrews Smith (Lexington: D. C. Heath & Co., 1995), 403–412.

17. For the Kingdom of Naples, Gérard Delille argues that poor relief was not always a disinterested act but a way to secure a specific juridical position using the means of transmission made possible by the charities’ testaments. See “Un esempio di assistenza private: i monti di maritaggio nel Regno di Napoli (secoli XVI–XVIII)” in *Timore e carità: I poveri nell’Italia moderna*, 227–281.

18. Edoardo Grendi follows the Spanish model of deep honor, arguing that the Genoese’s strong commitment to charitable institutions was regulated by morality and religiosity. Scholars tend to diverge from these conclusions. *La repubblica aristocratica dei genovesi: Politica, carità e commercio fra Cinque e Seicento* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987), 304.

Burke argues that Renaissance Genoese had no civic spirit;¹⁹ charities grew out of political menace and ostentatious consumption. Similarly, Steven Epstein has found that in the first decades of the sixteenth century, the Genoese distrust of institutional solutions triggered a retreat from the old system of spiritual and social charity.²⁰ Edoardo Grendi has reasoned that Genoese charities stemmed from the need to confront the “social conjuncture.”²¹ Finally, Ruth Pike has understood the Genoese community in Seville as holding neither ideology nor spiritual allegiance to anyone, whereas religion was generally adapted to commercial policies.²² For the Genoese in Naples, charity did not entirely stem from devoutness and was greatly linked to the procurement of material benefits.

This chapter examines the four major types of Genoese involvement in charitable institutions in Naples in a roughly chronological sequence extending from the late fifteenth century into the seventeenth. The Genoese were engaged as donors and administrators in the two main poorhouses of the city, the Annunziata and Incurabili. They participated in the transformation of charities into banking, they invested in the creation of family-owned charities, and eventually they built their own poorhouses. Although the factors at work varied with the type of institution and the

19. Burke argues that Genoese civism was not a question of civism but political needs. In fact, according to Philip II, the annexation of Genoa would be easy because the Genoese liked individual profit more than civil liberty. See “L’espace public et privé à Gênes à la fin de la Renaissance: l’humanisme civique d’Andrea Spinola” in *La Ville à la Renaissance: Espaces, Représentations, Pouvoirs*, ed. Gérard Chaix (Paris: Honoré Champion Editeur, 2008), 99–105. Through her analysis of political institutions, however, Christine Shaw has argued that the Genoese possessed some spirit of civic government. See “Principles and Practice in the Civic Government of Fifteenth-century Genoa,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 58:1 (Spring 2005), 45–90.

20. At the dawn of the early modern age, the Ospedale di Pammatone (whose statutes dated from 1442) was created with the aim of consolidating all the medieval hospitals of the region. It opened its doors to attend to Genoese and foreign “poor sick people.” See Grendi, *La repubblica aristocratica dei genovesi*, 291. Steven Epstein found that in the Genoese homeland, in the face of war and domestic factionalism, the Genoese opted to withdraw from trusted spiritual charities to embrace new alternatives: personal and impersonal charity. See *Genoa and the Genoese: 958–1528* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 186.

21. Grendi, *La Repubblica aristocratica dei genovesi*.

22. See Ruth Pike, *Enterprise and Adventure: The Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the New World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966).

specific period, charity stemmed from simultaneous motives. First, the Genoese possessed strong Christian values and were connected to the spiritual reforms of the sixteenth century. Second, giving made a good impression on the Spanish Crown, thus helping maintain favorite-nation status. Third, exhibiting care for southern Italians involved joining the wealthy circles of altruistic donors, a membership that might make it easier for the crown to grant fiefs. And fourth, in an economy where deals depended on personal networks, giving proved one's worthiness to keep receiving.

THE GENOESE IN "THE TWO EYES OF NAPLES, THE TWO COLUMNS THAT HOLD THE CITY," 1500–1600

The Genoese imitated the charitable spirit of the Spanish and Neapolitan elite by offering their services and support to the *Incurabili* and *Annunziata*.²³ In the Spanish world, and in Italy in particular, the display of generosity was tied to imperial motives. *Buon governo* included not only administering justice, but also providing for the kingdom's subjects.²⁴ To this end, the crown diverted revenue from the Kingdom of Naples's gabelles into charitable causes. Imperial executives guaranteed their Italian subjects' interests but were also responsible for inculcating Spanish religious and civic morality. Good leadership created unity. High moral standards preserved Spanish rule.

Much like the rest of Europe, Naples was prone to giving to charities.²⁵ The early medieval (550–1100) and Angevin (1266–1442) periods

23. The Spanish sense of honor carried social values. Henry Kamen argues that "correct behavior was . . . never simply a personal option: it was a requirement imposed and judged by community norms, and regulated according to contexts of religion, gender, or economy." In *Early Modern European Society* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 122.

24. See Benedetto Croce, *History of the Kingdom of Naples*, trans. by Frances Frenaye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

25. There are three periods in the history of the kingdom's charitable institutions, of which the most prosperous corresponds to the involvement of Spanish and Genoese in the spiritual landscape of the city. Naples's long tradition of beneficence began in the early Middle Ages. From the sixth to the twelfth centuries, seven charitable establishments were in operation along with dozens of congregations and parishes whose

witnessed the first creations of charitable organs, with eighteen institutions founded to provide for the poor and to shelter those who undertook pilgrimages to the Holy Land.²⁶ The Santa Casa dell' Annunziata was erected in 1303. The years of Spanish rule (1442–1713) saw the creation of fifty charitable institutions. When the Genoese started contributing, the two most important were the Incurabili and the Annunziata, considered “the two eyes of Naples and columns that hold the city” because they symbolized the entire population’s commitment to social welfare.²⁷ To display kindness toward one’s social inferior was also a symbol of social

purpose was to relieve the city’s indigents. During this period, charity was mainly the domain of religious associations, monastic orders, and guilds. In the sixth century, Santa Maria Intercede and San Gennaro a Diaconia were created. In the ninth century, San Andrea, the Benedettini, and Ospedale in chiesa di San Andrea a Nido appeared. In 1116, San Michele Arcangelo and Santa Croce in San Agostino Maggiore were erected. See Ernesto Vecchione and Ettore Genovese, *Le istituzioni di beneficenza nella città di Napoli: Estratto delle opera inedite dell’avvocato Ernesto Vecchione, Storia della beneficenza napoletana e Guida pratica delle Opere Pie di Napoli* (Naples: Premiata Scuola Tipografica dei Sordomuti, 1908), 556–559. The High Middle Ages witnessed the second period of the creation of charitable organs. The French House of Anjou was then the overseer of Naples (1266–1442) and undertook the foundation of relief institutions. The first one from this period, named San Eligio, was created in 1270 as a hospital. It was the first lay hospital in the kingdom. See Teresa Filangieri Ravaschieri Fieschi, *Storia della carità napoletana*, 4 vols. (Naples: Stabilimento Tipografico di Francesco Giannini, 1875): vol. 1, p. 26. In 1275, the Ospedale di San Giovanni a Mare, which provided for the pilgrims to Jerusalem, was created. See Vecchione, *Storia della beneficenza*, 559. The following year, the Ospedale di Santa Maria di Piedigrotta and the Ospedale di Santa Maria Maddalena al Ponte Guizzardo were established. Finally, the Santa Casa dell’ Annunziata was erected in 1304. Indeed, eighteen such institutions were founded in this second period though only six proved to be enduring. The third period (1442–1713), during the governance of the Spaniards, was the most substantial when fifty charitable institutions existed. I have excluded from this figure the charitable associations created by lay and religious corporations as well as those founded by guild members (both guilds and confraternities required a specific professional status to benefit from donations).

26. See Maria Teresa Urso, “Un ospedale napoletano in età moderna: La SS.a Trinità dei Pellegrini e Convalescenti” in *Chiesa, assistenza e società nel Mezzogiorno moderno*, ed. Carla Russo (Galatina: Congedo, 1994), 473–513.

27. In 1570, Father Cornelio Musso referred to the two institutions as such because he saw them as pillars of generosity that allowed Naples to combat poverty and diseases. For a succinct discussion of both institutions, see Romeo de Maio, *Riforme e miti nella Chiesa del Cinquecento* (Naples: Guida Editori, 1973).

vision and Christian values. The only way to remedy the population's state of indigence was to participate actively in its social restoration.²⁸ Habsburg overseers, Neapolitan grandees, and foreign merchants all exhibited a high degree of social concern. The two municipal institutions became the core of social interaction and conspicuous consumption among the elite.²⁹

There was an intimate link between Genoese clergy and Neapolitan charities through confraternities. In 1497, St. Catherine of Genoa (1447–1510) established the Compagnia del Divino Amore, whose members were laymen, laywomen, and priests who sought to connect the personal spirituality of each Christian to larger social concerns. The Genoese Compagnia spread across Italy and helped form civic charitable networks in Brescia, Verona, and most notably Rome, where the Genoese Ettore Vernazza made the Oratory of *Divino Amore* central to Catholic reform.³⁰ In Naples, Vernazza helped reestablish the Bianchi della Giustizia confraternity,³¹ whose seat was the charitable house of

28. After the unification of Italy, social reforms induced authors to recap the history of public assistance in the kingdom. Chronologically, these texts are Scipione Staffa da Vincenzo, *Del riordinamento degli stabilimenti di beneficenza nella città di Napoli*; Teresa Filangieri Ravaschieri Fieschi, *Storia della carità napoletana*; E. Vecchione and E. Genovese, *Le istituzioni di beneficenza nella città di Napoli*. For a gendered history of the Neapolitan charitable institutions, see Laura Barletta, "Le donne nelle istituzioni di beneficenza napoletane" in *Donne e Religione a Napoli: Secoli XVI–XVIII*, eds. Giuseppe Galasso and Adriana Valerio (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2001), 238–265.

29. In the 1590s, there were ten hospitals of beneficence in Naples: Vittoria; S. Giacomo degli Spagnoli; S. Nicola alla Carità; S. Angelo a Nido; Trinità dei Pellegirni; Misericordia per i sacerdoti, infermi e pellegrini; S. Giovanni di Dio; Incurabili; S. Annunziata; S. Eligio. See Nunzio Federigo Faraglia, "Il Censimento della popolazione di Napoli negli anni 1591, 1593, 1595" in *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane*, XXII (1897), 262–278.

30. Christopher F. Black, "The Development of Confraternity Studies over the Past Thirty Years" in *Politics of Ritual Kinship*, 9–29. Vernazza was also the first to nourish the idea of relieving those condemned to death. For details on the congregation's birth, see Francesco Notari, "La Compagnia dei Bianchi della Giustizia: l'assistenza ai condannati a morte nella Napoli moderna" in *Chiesa, assistenza e società nel Mezzogiorno moderno*, ed. Carla Russo (Galatina: Congedo, 1994), 281–371.

31. See G. Boccadamo, "Maria Longo: L'ospedale degli Incurabili e la sua insula," in *Campania Sacra*, n. 1–2 (1999): 37–170. I thank Father Antonio Illibato from the Archivio Storico Diocesano di Napoli, who first introduced me to Ettore Vernazza and his *Congregazione dei Bianchi della Giustizia*. The confraternity members used to

the Incurabili.³² Founded nearly a century before the Incurabili's opening, the Bianchi della Giustizia played a fundamental role in the development of the Tridentine precepts in Naples.³³ With its brothers, lords, friars, and members from the office of the archbishop, it constituted an important part of the religious landscape.³⁴ The Bianchi members included the elite of Neapolitan society and provided a model for the Society of Jesus in Naples. The order counted eighty-five members: fifteen ecclesiastics and seventy laymen. The friars' role was to provide moral support to the sick and those condemned to the death penalty; the laymen visited the sick and prisoners and offered economic support to their families. The congregation of the Incurabili had been closed by the Aragonese in 1443 but was reopened in

gather around the future saint called Giacomo della Marca, wearing a white shirt, which became the standard attire for the whole confraternity.

32. The origins of the Santa Casa degli Incurabili are obscure but can be traced to Spanish and Genoese origins. Sources indicate its foundation in 1519 by a noble lady who hailed from Catalonia named Maria Lorenza Lonc (italianized Longo), wife of Giovan Francesco Lonc, regent of the *Collaterale*. Maria Lonc miraculously recovered from a grave sickness and vowed to the Madonna of Loreto to dedicate her life to the care of the sick in Naples. In her task, she was inspired by the hospital of San Giacomo di Augusta located in Rome. Archivio Storico di Napoli, *Aspetti della riforma Cattolica e del Concilio di Trento a Napoli: Mostra Documentaria*, ed. Jole Mazzoleni (Naples: L'arte tipografica, 1966). Scipione Staffa (*Del Riordinamento degli Stabilimenti di Napoli*) traces its creation to the year 1521. The Incurabili was also referred to as Santa Maria del Popolo. For an account on the religious order, see E. Pontieri, "Sulle Origini della Compagnia dei Bianchi della Giustizia in Napoli e suoi statuti del 1525" in *Campania Sacra*, III (1972), 1–26. See also Romeo de Maio, *Riforme e miti nella Chiesa del Cinquecento* (Naples: Guida Editori, 1973).

33. The Confraternity dei Bianchi was founded in 1430 and had its seat in Santa Maria la Nuova. In 1519, it moved to San Pietro ad Aram, and in 1524 to Santa Maria Succurre Miseris (or Incurabili). Girolamo Vignes and Ettore Pignatelli were two of the most important promoters of the confraternity. See Mark A. Lewis, "The Development of Jesuit Confraternity Activity in the Kingdom of Naples in the Sixteenth century and Seventeenth century" in *Politics of Ritual Kinship*, 210–227.

34. The body of the Bianchi della Giustizia's patron saint, San Giacomo della Marca, was held as a relic at Santa Maria la Nuova, the early seat of the Genoese church. See Pietro de Stefano, *Descrittione dei luoghi sacri della città di Napoli con li fondatori di essi, reliquie, sepolture, et epitaphii scelti che in quelle si ritrovano, l'intrate e i possessori, che al presente le possiedono, et altre cose degne di memoria, opera non meno dilettevole che utile* (Naples: Raymondo Amato, 1560).

1519 by Callisto Piacentino and Ettore Vernazza with the consent of Giovan Pietro Carafa, the future Pope Paul IV.

The hospital of the Incurabili was one of the most important religious institutions in the Italian peninsula. In 1572, the Genoese papal nuncio Antonio Sauli reported that the hospital's annual expenditure amounted to almost 36,000 scudi and that it accommodated 1,200 sick people.³⁵ Studying the Incurabili's inventory discloses 221 donations from individual benefactors in the century after its creation.³⁶ Most important gifts originated from people in and around Naples. Further important contributions came from Emperor Charles V in 1525 and in 1531 and from prominent financiers in 1530, 1537, 1569, and 1572. The attractive feature of cash donations was their flexibility; many individuals opted to contribute in kind rather than in currency. For his first donation, the emperor allotted more than four thousand pounds of salt; for his second, he bestowed hundreds of ducats annually, plus grain.³⁷ The viceroy Duke of Ossuna asked Charles's son, King Philip II, to sponsor the Incurabili, which was maintained by private beneficence:

In the Ospedale degli Incurabili of this city great work is done, but for years alms have been lacking. A great donation would be extremely beneficial for this kingdom so dependent on this charitable house. I suggest His Majesty's [Philip II] promulgation of an edict in parliament. This donation would be dedicated solely to the said charity since everyone here is inclined to support the chapels and charities they favor.³⁸

The principles of *buon governo* encouraged philanthropy on the part of the foreign nations in the capital city. There was an international

35. Pasquale Villani, ed., *Nunziature di Napoli*, Archivio Segreto del Vaticano, Nunz, Na. 2, ff. 191–194, Dispatch from papal Nuncio Antonio Sauli to apostolic treasurer Tolomei Galli, Naples, November 25, 1572.

36. Ravacini, *Sulla universalità della S. Casa degli Incurabili*.

37. On March 3, 1525, King Charles V donated 36 tomoli of salt (one tomolo = 55.3 kilos or 120 pounds) to the Santa Casa degli Incurabili through an order from Brussels to the viceroy in Naples. On March 11, 1531, the king bequeathed an annual income of 300 ducats to the Santa Casa and 36 tomoli of grain every year. See Filangieri, *Storia della carità napoletana*.

38. AGSim, Fondo Estado, Legajo 1085 (year 1582) folio 109, Memorial from the Duke of Ossuna to His Majesty, Naples, November 6, 1582.

atmosphere of beneficence toward the Incurabili. Its administration represented the variegated social landscape of the city; of its seven masters, one belonged to the Consiglio Collaterale (the most important organ of government that was managed by the viceroy) and represented the king, one was a baron, one a *cavaliere dei sedili* (knight who represented the seven city's districts), one a foreign gentleman (most of the time a Spaniard), two Neapolitan citizens, and one a foreign merchant.³⁹ Out of a total of 173 benefactors in the sixteenth century, the patron families were among the most affluent foreign bankers involved in the kingdom's finances. Thus, the institution became the core of social interaction among people of different national and social backgrounds: Genoese bankers, Catalan merchants and Spanish rulers, Florentine and Flemish traders, Neapolitan aristocrats, and other foreign and local bourgeois.

The Genoese followed in the Spanish and Neapolitan footsteps of beneficence. Genoese Iacopo Nicolo Spinola started the tradition of private individuals' generosity to the Incurabili.⁴⁰ The Genoese benefactors were wealthy merchant families such as the Spinola, Ravaschiero, De Ponte, Lomellino, and Doria. They reinvested income earned from the king's privileges into local charities.⁴¹ In 1569, the Genoese Ravaschiero, Prince of Satriano, contributed 10,000 scudi to the institution.⁴² The Ravaschiero family, descendants of the Count of Lavagna, recorded in the family book

39. See Mazzoleni, ed., *Aspetti della riforma Cattolica*.

40. On January 22, 1539, the Spinola bank gave 63 ducats to the Hospitale degli Incurabili. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi, n. 5 (1530), Libro Maggiore di Jacopo Nicolo Spinola.

41. The Genoese Torino Ravaschiero (earlier introduced as royal treasurer of the province of Calabria Ultra), for instance, gave hundreds of ducats monthly for the children's alms of the Hospital of San Giacomo degli Spagnoli. On Friday, January 7, 1569, Torino Ravaschiero transferred through the Ravaschiero-Spinola bank his monthly donation of 39 ducats for the hospital of San Giacomo degli Spagnoli. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi, n. 44 (1569) Ravaschiero-Spinola; Ravaschiero displayed the same generosity with the bank he did not own in partnership. In November 1578, he forwarded a total of 120 ducats to the hospital. See ASN, Regia Camera della Sommaria: Liquidazione dei Conti: Dipendenza della Sommaria, Significatoria 285 I fascicolo N 10 (November 1578).

42. See Ernersto Vecchione and Ettore Genovese, *Le istituzioni di beneficenza nella città di Napoli*. See ASG, ms 461 Collezione Lagomarsino (Letter R) Famiglia Ravaschiero.

that it had always fought alongside the Spaniards against Turks, French, Venetians, Florentines, and Catalans.⁴³ Bankers' records provide important pieces of evidence for the Genoese donations. The Genoese Lomellino-Doria bank often transferred money to the Incurabili.⁴⁴ The Genoese De Mari conferred funds, the Genoese Centurione granted capital from their gabelle, the Genoese Squarciafico ceded some of their gabelle income, and the Genoese De Marini bequeathed their entire assets to the Incurabili.⁴⁵ Other laudable benefactors of the Incurabili were wealthy bankers such as the Genoese Girolamo Spinola and the Neapolitan Bernardino Turbolo, and merchants such as the Genoese Taddeo de Ponte.⁴⁶

The Spanish Crown, the local aristocracy, and the church also invested in the other major charitable institution of the kingdom, the Annunziata or Ospizio dei Trovatelli (foundling hospice), the most important institution for abandoned children in the *Mezzogiorno* throughout the early modern

43. ASG, ms 461 Collezione Lagomarsino (Letter R) Famiglia Ravaschiero. Their origins could be traced back to 1212. The Ravaschiero contributed to charities around town, such as the S. Margherita dei Ferrilli in the Sedile di Porto Novo (ASDio, Fondo Benefici 15, folio 86, year 1563); and to the S. Maria della Consolazione delli Affitti (ASDio Fondo Benefici 46, folio 315, year 1634). They were in competition with the Biffoli family, which also contributed to local charities such as the Cappellania dell'altare Maggiore in S. Maggiore (ASDio Fondo Benefici 18, folio 105, year 1573).

44. On April 6, 1540, the bank transferred 33 ducats to the Hospitale degli Incurabili, corresponding to the payments for November–December 1539 and January–February 1540. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi, n. 13 (1540) Lomellino & Doria.

45. On May 6, 1600, Giovan Battista de Mari included a legacy in his testament signed by Notary Francesco Antonio dello Furno from Naples of 100 ducats for the Santa Casa; On October 29, 1621, Porzia Centurione appealed to Notary Lucio Capezzuto from Naples to bestow 1,000 ducats she possessed from the gabelle on the city of Naples and other taxes inherited by her during her four marriages. On May 13, 1631, Francesca Squarciafico signed under the pen of Notary Giovan Domenico Cotignola from Naples the legacy of some of her income from the gabelle on products of consumption to the Santa Casa. On July 6, 1640, Notary Andrea Cassetta from Naples enacted Benedetto de Marini's testament drafted on July 6, 1610, which provided that should he pass away without heirs, the Santa Casa should be given full right of succession. The Santa Casa did come into possession of de Marini's bequest in 1710.

46. On April 5, 1569, Girolamo Spinola conferred through Notary Giovan Battista Basso 150 ducats from his gabelle on products of consumption to the Santa Casa; on October 25, 1572, Bernardino Turbolo bestowed 2,000 ducats from his gabelle on the Naples custom duty.

era.⁴⁷ King Ferrante had endowed the institution with two hundred ducats yearly.⁴⁸ In 1532, the Piazza del Popolo (one of the city's districts) contributed 6,550 ducats to the Annunziata.⁴⁹ Charles V adorned the Annunziata with marble, paintings, and precious ornaments. The Annunziata's greatest donor, Cardinal Luigi of Aragón, bishop of Aversa, bequeathed all his land in Montevergine and income, an endowment of 100,000 ducats, whereupon the Annunziata's governors opened a bank for the house called Ave Gratia Plena. As a result, the Annunziata's income was higher than that of all the Neapolitan feudal lords together.

The same merchants who had competed for the status of favorite nation of the Spanish Crown actively competed to donate to the Annunziata. The donations occurred in different ways. The donor could grant an annual income; cede a lump sum at once; or allot in-kind goods such as cloth, beds, and cash for marriage dowries.⁵⁰ Most recipients of the dowries were orphans and poor girls. Notable Catalan merchants of the Vaglies and Villagut families gave alms, and Perotto Villagut (the Catalan merchant

47. The Annunziata was second only to the Hospital of San Eligio, another such bank and *monte* created in 1270 by the Angevin King Charles I. See Scipione Staffa, *Del Riordinamento degli Stabilimenti di Napoli*.

48. Notar Giacomo, *Cronaca del Regno di Napoli*. BNN, mss Brancaccio, II F, vol. 6, Naples, December 20, 1505.

49. Through the Lercaro and Imperiale bank, we know that the Piazza del Popolo district supported the Hospital and Venerable Church of the Annunziata. See ASN, *Banchieri Antichi*, n. 7 (1532) Lercaro e Imperiale.

50. On October 7, 1527, Benedetto de Marini hired Notary Paulillo to donate to the Annunziata 250 ducats under vol. 1, p. 739. Isabella Gentile appointed Notary de Ypletis on August 3, 1572, to distribute 15 *uncia* to the Annunziata, half in kind and the other half in cloths of linen. The act was recorded under vol. 3, p. 93. Ottaviano Ravaschiero bequeathed 200 ducats a month to the Annunziata. Notary de Monica recorded the act on September 30, 1596 under vol. 4, p. 572. Livia Squarciafico, Duchess of Acerenza (married to Cosmo Pinelli, Duke of Acerenza), contributed to 1,000 ducats logged on January 15, 1602, by Notary Avricola under vol. 4, p. 1309. Cosmo Pinelli, duke of Acerenza bestowed 2,000 ducats to the Annunziata in April 23, 1602, through Notary Castaldo under vol. 5, p. 1395; Gio Francesco Grimaldi, Marquis of Modugno, conferred 6,000 ducats destined to dowries and beds for the hospital of the Annunziata on June 30, 1616, through the services of Notary Montanaro, who indexed the act under vol. 5, p. 1348, and under vol. 7, p. 756. See D'Addosio, *Santa Casa dell'Annunziata*, 1895.

mentioned in [Chapter 4](#)) even donated funds to build a chapel in the Annunziata.⁵¹ Others included people from the realm and wealthy Spaniards.⁵² Most foreign donors, however, were of Genoese origin, and their contributions were the most noteworthy, reaching about one-third of all donations. Considering that a typical Annunziata orphan could find employment as a maid making roughly 5 ducats per year when she reached maturity, a donation of 6,000 ducats was remarkable. The Genoese Lomellino-Doria bank transferred funds from its income derived from the Royal Customs of Naples to the Annunziata.⁵³ The most prominent Genoese families, such as the Gentile, Grimaldi, De Mari, Ravaschiero, Squarciafico and Pinelli, contributed actively and substantially.⁵⁴ Overall, the De Mari family was the main supporter of the Annunziata.⁵⁵

51. Dianora Vagles [Vaglies], widow Busal, registered on December 10, 1586, with Notary Baratta in vol. 5, p. 1425, a bequest to the Chapel of the Annunziata of 15 ducats a month; Perotto Villaut [Villagut] ceded on September 29, 1533, in vol. 1, p. 805 300 ducats to build a chapel in the *Annunziata*, 200 ducats in dowry and another 200 ducats for the Annunziata's alms. See *Sommario dei testamenti e legati a favore della santa Casa dell'Annunziata*.

52. Private individuals invested resources to erect monuments with their effigy such as Alonso Sánchez, and Eleanora Requesenz, wife of Viceroy Cardona, and their daughter Beatrice, who had funerary statues built. See Teresa Filangieri, *Storia della carità napoletana*.

53. On Thursday March 4, 1540, the Lomellino-Doria contributed 20 ducats to the Venerabile Hospitale della Nunziata de Napoli. These were payable to the *Annunziata's* procurator Vincenzo Pizarane. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi n. 13 (1540) Lomellino & Doria.

54. Genoese donations were extremely high considering that children younger than fifteen received food and fifteen *carlini* per month, while beyond that age they collected only food and shelter. Typically once these women found work as maids, the salary was between 4 and 6 ducats a year. See Giovanna da Molin, "Dal Conservatorio all'alunato: L'assistenza alle esposte dell'Annunziata di Napoli (secoli XVIII–XIX)," in *Forme di Assistenza in Italia dal XV al XX secolo*, Giovanna da Molin ed. (Udine: Forum, 2002), Atti del Convegno della Società Italiana di Demografia Storica, "La demografia storica italiana al passaggio del millennio," Bologna, 23–25 Novembre 2000. Nicholas Terpstra has found that most recipients of charity were women. See *Culture of Charity*.

55. On September 10, 1565 Sara de Mari signed through Notary Scoppa under the act vol. 2, p. 359, a donation of 4 ducats per month in favor of the Annunziata; Agostino de Mari registered under vol. 3, p. 61, with Notary Batinello on June 24, 1572, the transfer of an annual contribution of 80 ducats; Bridiga de Mari, aunt of Agostino Grimaldi willed an endowment of 6,000 ducats to the Annunziata. The act was passed through

Neapolitan nobles and foreign bourgeois joined in the administration, and merchant bankers of all nationalities competed to serve as governor of the Annunziata. A council or a large body of governors, all of them generous donors, usually administered such institutions. The governors were often eminent citizens elected by town councils or magistrates with ex officio seats on the board. Created in 1303, the Annunziata had an endowment of 300,000 ducats by 1493.⁵⁶ The administration of the Annunziata further reinforced the cooperation, if not competition, between the local elite and foreign merchants. Merchants and members of the Piazza Capuana and Piazza del Popolo, both prominent city districts, acted as overseers of the Annunziata, accentuating a steady conspicuous display of generosity. Both the Annunziata and the Incurabili counted foreigners in the upper echelon of their administration. They provide a valuable insight into their association and the exercise of civic devotion.

The position of Annunziata governor was sought after because it carried a notable financial remuneration. Why did the Annunziata's board members turn to prominent foreigners for stewardship?⁵⁷ These savvy financiers offered their acumen in exchange for a generous fee. Preceptor records from the year 1605 indicate that an Annunziata governor's stipend was 1,134 ducats per year.⁵⁸ For comparison, the doge of the Genoese Republic received between 1,100 and 1,300 ducats per year.⁵⁹ The economic stability of the house depended not only on generous benefactors, but also on the administrative ingenuity of the governors to manage the estates as well. In other European cities, charitable institutions used professional men, artisans, and traders in their central administration; in Lyon as well as in London,

the hands of Notary Piazza on January 18, 1584, in vol. 4, p. 289. See D'Addosio, *Santa Casa dell'Annunziata*.

56. Ravaschieri, vol. 1, p. 115. Its Italian equivalents were the Santo Spirito in Sassia of Rome, the Pietà in Venice, the Santa Maria della Scala in Siena, and the Santa Maria degli Innocenti in Florence.

57. The smaller charitable organ called conservatorio dello Spirito Santo also included a foreign merchant as one of its seven governors (which also included one nobleman, one civil attorney, and four select citizens). See Mazzoleni, *Aspetti della riforma Cattolica*, 54.

58. See ASN, Banchi Antichi, n. 42 (1605) Precettore dei fiscali di Terra di Lavoro (contado di Molise) Giannettino Auseda.

59. See Christine Shaw, "Principles and Practice in the Civic Government of Fifteenth-Century Genoa," *Renaissance Quarterly*, 63, no.1 (Spring 2005), 45–90.

these people's business ethic suited the proper governance of charities.⁶⁰ The house was therefore ruled by a corps of experts whose cooperation furthered the organization of collective life and who benefited financially from its administration. They fulfilled their moral duty by displaying beneficence, contributed to the protection of their fellow citizens, and acquired in return a growing esteem within the community while earning a hefty income. Their collaborative efforts led to a mounting social engagement, which in turn ensured the solvency of the kingdom's charitable institutions. The *Annunziata* books reveal that throughout the sixteenth century, about fifty percent of the governors were important bankers and merchants, mostly foreigners. They included the Genoese Germano Ravaschiero (1523) and Mario de Mari (1617); the Florentines Bartolomeo Billi (1544, 1548, 1554, 1556), Angelo Biffoli (1547), and Francesco Biffoli (1565, 1572); the Tuscan Pietro Angelo Cimino (1581); and the Catalans Rafael Galzerano (1545) and Eliseo Ram (1589).⁶¹

The governors' aspirations merged remuneration and prestige. They combined their duty to the charitable institution with their regular banking activity, which also earned them important "residual" income.⁶² Their display of benevolence reinforced the Genoese entry into Naples's social elite while strengthening their financial position still further. The *Annunziata* elicited social partnership and competition among foreign merchants because providing for the poor was done not merely for religious but for social purposes (such as acquiring prestige and honor), civic purposes (such as protecting their fellow citizens from poverty), and financial purposes (such as the large remuneration the governorship entailed).

60. See Sheldon J. Watts, *A Social History of Western Europe, 1450–1720: Tensions and Solidarities among Rural People* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1984), 234, 239.

61. Giambattista D'Addosio, *Origine, Vicende Storiche e Progressi della Real Casa dell'Annunziata di Napoli (Ospizio dei Trovatelli) per il Giambattista d'Addosio Segretario di detto Pio Luogo Cavaliere dell'Ordine Equestre di S. Martino* (Naples: Pei Tipi Di Antonio Cons., 1883).

62. Residual income and steady revenues enabled the Spinola family's mercantile activities in the kingdom to generate fortunes greater than the viceregal court's endowment. The prosperous Spinola family was a famed creditor of the royal court. See for instance ASN, *Banchieri Antichi*, n.193 (1636) libro di clientele del conto di Cornelio di Spinola. The total Genoese income in 1634 was estimated at 4.5 million ducats. See ASG, A. S., vol. 2639 *Consoli due Sicilie (1634–1641)* n.133, Letter from Console Spinola to Republic of Genoa, Naples, January 3, 1634.

Acting as charities' governors allowed the wealthy elite to donate capital, receive financial compensation for it, acquire prestige, and appear generous while doing so.⁶³ The Genoese who invested in the city's charities gained social acceptance and spiritual points from the Spanish Crown and the Neapolitan nobility, augmenting their position of favorite nation.

TRANSFORMING CHARITY INTO BANKING: THE MONTI DI PIETÀ, 1515–1630

Around 1515 a new type of social-welfare institution appeared. Monti di Pietà (literally Pious Mountains, or piles of funds of money) were conceived as institutions to provide specifically for paupers (hospitals provided for pilgrims, orphans, and victims of war).⁶⁴ In what has been termed “new philanthropy,”⁶⁵ Monti combined hospital services and low-cost credit for

63. An account of the Annunziata's origins from a contemporary observer presents the hospital as the result of a Neapolitan aristocrat's generosity: “The Church of the *Annunziata* lies in a place which used to be solitary and dangerous, called for this reason the *Mal Passo*. A Neapolitan gentleman of an unknown house built a hospital and a church under the auspice of the Virgin. The place was destined to the cure of the sick to whom he gave a lump income provided that each year a gentleman from Capuana (one of Naples's six districts) would be elected to the management and care of the hospital. Then Queen Joanna II, the Duke of Scalea of the San Severino house, and other lords of the house of Gaetana fended for the Annunziata's numerous sick so that the *Annunziata* could rival any such famous hospital in Italy.” See Benedetto di Falco, *Descrittione dei luoghi antiqui di Napoli e del suo amenissimo distretto*, ed. Ottavio Morisani (Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1972) [1st ed. Mattia Cancer da Brescia, Naples (1535).]

64. In Genoa between 1480 and 1582, 134 such associations emerged. Of these, 70 continued their activities well into the 1700s. After the year 1582, another 124 charitable institutions arose, bringing the number to about 200 in the mid-eighteenth century. Edoardo Grendi, “Morfologia e dinamica della vita associativa urbana: Le confraternite a Genova fra i secoli XVI e XVIII,” *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, Nuova Serie 5 (1965), 239–311.

65. In Tuscany, however, the Monti di Pietà's existence stemmed from a strong political goal: to bring the market economy and pauperism under state control. The centralized atmosphere of the Medici administration supported Jewish banking with the intention of regulating the mercantile bourgeoisie. See Cristina Galasso, “Banchi ebraici e Monti di Pietà in Toscana” in *Monti di Pietà e presenza ebraica in Italia (secoli XV–XVIII)*, ed. Daniele Montanari (Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1999), 159–180. The elite

the poor.⁶⁶ The main promoter of the early Monti was the Franciscan order, which sought to supplant Jewish moneylenders.⁶⁷ At the Fifth Lateran Council (May 4, 1515), Pope Leo X's bull *Inter multiplices* condemned usury but sanctified Monti di Pietà, which allowed employee compensation, management expenses, and administration cost. The first was founded in Perugia (1462), followed by Siena (1472), and then Bologna and Milan (1473), Genoa (1483), Ravenna (1492), Naples (1519), and

exploited the fact that, throughout Italy, both spiritual and city executives differentiated the *mercator industrius* from the Jewish *usurarius*. See Agnese Sinisi, "Per una storia dei Monti di Pietà nel Regno di Napoli," in *Monti di Pietà e presenza ebraica*, 245–283. The banking component of charities mainly aimed at stopping usury, which allegedly had proliferated in the kingdom since the arrival of Spanish Jews in 1492. The Annunziata bank's creation was described in the following terms: "in 1539, after Charles V issued the order to expel the Jews from the Kingdom of Naples, in order to prevent usury, charity started with this house to provide for the poor and to loan money without interest." The origin of the Annunziata's bank was recorded only in 1725 by governors who sought Pope Benedict XIII's approval for transactions contracted with a series of creditors. D'Addosio, *Real Casa dell'Annunziata*. In practice, however, this statement is surprising because by the time of the Monti's creation, there were few Jewish-owned banks in the city of Naples. This assertion corroborates the controversies over the Monti's "myth of origin," highly debated in Italian historiography. Indeed, the Monti's foundation had much less to do with the Jews than with the reassertion of the Post-Tridentine Church. Carlo Borromeo's (archbishop of Milan 1563–84) work in Lombardy contributed to converting the Monte di Milano as one of the prototypes. See Daniele Montanari, "Banchi feneratizi e Monti di Pietà in Lombardia" in *Monti di Pietà e presenza ebraica in Italia (secoli XV–XVIII)*, ed. Daniele Montanari (Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1999), 71–95.

66. There were different kinds of Monti. The *monti di famiglia* (or *monti di maritaggio*), which aimed at providing dowries for poor women; the *monti di Pietà*, whose capital was in money and kind; the *monti delle confraternite*, whose goal was to worship the founder of the confraternity, and the *monti frumentari* (or *monti granari*) developed mainly in the internal provinces and championed by Pope Benedict XIII. By 1790, the whole kingdom counted 500 *monti frumentari* (or *granari*). See G. Masi, "I Monti frumentari e pecuniari in Provincia di Bari," in *Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani*, vol. 5 (Milan: Giuffrè, 1962), 340–348.

67. Contemporary theological debates have related the birth of the Monte di Pietà's bank to the need to resolve usury. See M. Monaco, "La questione dei Monti di Pietà al V Concilio Lateranense," *Rivista di Studi Salernitani*, 4 (1971), 121–127. In theory, the Monti served both to oust Jews from banking and enhance the prestige of the local aristocracy. Brian Pullan argues that sixteenth-century Italy gave birth to "new philanthropy." See "Support and Redeem," 177–208.

finally Rome (1539). The Monte di Pietà were hybrid institutions that brought together solicitude for the poor and the needs of the economy under the explicit consent of the Catholic Church.⁶⁸

The objective of the Monti was to make loans a public enterprise and not one monopolized by private bankers. But this Europe-wide phenomenon was also another way of generating capital. It is not surprising then that by the mid-sixteenth century, authorities in the major Italian states (Naples, Florence, and Milan) started annexing the Monti di Pietà.⁶⁹ Evidently, what prompted the authorities to open charitable banking institutions did not stem so much from the “social miracle” as it did from the need to turn the poor relief’s dividends into a state project. Thus, as Henry Kamen explains, “in an age when banking was relatively unknown, the authorities became bankers, borrowing from citizens and paying them their interest out of taxation.”⁷⁰ They used the charitable organs’ annuities as a form of public investment and proposed loans at low interest rates. As the adage went, “the pain and vice of the private somehow stems from the grandeur and glory of the public.”⁷¹

The Annunziata and Incurabili accumulated wealth, which in turn attracted Spanish administrators who sought to transform the organs of beneficence into banking institutions. Hence, the Annunziata came to

68. Federico Arcelli mentions that Rome’s and Naples’s Monti were founded simultaneously and that this reflected the religious policies of Emperor Charles V in Italy. However, the three Neapolitan Monti di Pietà were all founded prior to 1539. See *Banking and Charity in Sixteenth-Century Italy (The Holy Monte di Pietà of Rome: 1539–84)* (Leicestershire: Upfront Publishing, 2003).

69. In the Florentine state, Cosimo de’ Medici used funds from communal institutions for his own political schemes. Cosimo offered patronage to the Florentine patriciate and rich foreigners by tapping the cheap credit available through the fifty-five Monti di Pietà of Florence. He did so because through his power of patronage, he placated borrowers and placed them in his debt. He allowed his friends, clients, charitable institutions, and foreigners to borrow from the Monti di Pietà amounts based on his own will to exercise patronage and political control. See Carol Bresnahan Menning, *Charity and State in Late Renaissance Italy: The Monte di Pietà of Florence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

70. See Henry Kamen, *Early Modern European Society* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 101.

71. Franco Casoni, “Costumi delli Genovesi.” ASG, Fondo Brignole Sale, 110 E. 14, folio 2r.

serve as both a charitable house and a financial institution.⁷² The Incurabili also opted to serve as a lending institution, opening the Banco di Santa Maria del Popolo as the lending institution attached to the bank.⁷³ By providing loans to citizens, the city's charities became part of the banking system. A religiously motivated enterprise was eventually altered for financial ends. The transformation of the charities into Monti di Pietà was meant to create supplementary sources of credit. Anyone who generated capital for charities participated in this transformation. Spanish overseers claimed to annex these religious institutions out of strong Christian value (such as to provide free loans to the poor or to prevent usury from Jewish lenders).⁷⁴

The annexation of the Monti did not drive wealthy bankers out of business but added to the Genoese indispensability in southern Italy. The Monti concentrated on lower-cost local credit for people with lower

72. The Banco di Napoli, which was the seat of the Sacro Monte della Pietà, founded in 1539, describes itself as a typical institution of the Counter-Reformation. It was created "with beneficial ends to fight usury and to extend loans without interest. This constitutes the root of the Banco di Napoli." See pamphlet of Filiale di Napoli Pegni, Palazzo Carafa, Cappella e Museo del Monte di Pietà.

73. Because the governors had managed the Church of the Spirito Santo's capital well, its annual income amounted to 30,000 ducats, after which it was decided to open the corresponding bank. See Francesco Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche della Città di Napoli* (Naples: Arnaldo Forni Ed., 1857), 244.

74. Various accounts mention the need to create Monti di Pietà to do away with Jewish usury. The first, recorded in 1725 (Giambattista D'Addosio, *Real Casa dell'Annunziata*) spells out: "In 1539, after Charles V issued the order to expel the Jews from the Kingdom of Naples, to prevent usury, charity started with this house to provide for the poor and to loan money without interest." The second explains that "in 1540 Don Pedro de Toledo expelled the Jews who were devouring Naples with their usury. He established a public fund named the Sacro Monte della Pietà in order to assist poor people but also to make sure that no other citizen would follow in the footsteps of the Jews." (Nel anno 1540 Don Pietro scacciò via i Giudei, che divoravano coll'usure le costanze de' poveri, ed affine, che non mancasse il commodo a' bisognosi di tor denari in prestanza sopra del pegno, come anche per togliere a Cittadini l'occasione d'imitare, e forse di superare in questa materia il rigor degli Ebrei, fondò il Sacro Monte della Pietà.) See Domenico Antonio Parrino, *Teatro Eroico, e politico de' governi de' vicere del regno di Napoli dal tempo del re Ferdinando il Cattolico fino all'anno 1683* (Naples: Nuova Stampa, 1692), 164. A fine short study of the Marranos in Naples is Peter Mazur, *The New Christians of Spanish Naples: 1528–1671, a Fragile Elite* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); he shows them acquiring wealth, influence, and aristocratic titles.

means, but they did not pose a competitive threat to the Genoese merchants and banking houses. Federico Arcelli argues that it was only on the fund-raising side that the Monti were potential rivals of the great merchant bankers. The Monti received favors, indulgences, and privileges from the church, but the bankers' customers were wealthy individuals often involved in more than one commercial center.⁷⁵ In Naples, the poor banked in the Monti (now made city institutions), but the rich continued to bank in the wealthy family (mostly Genoese) institutions.⁷⁶ The rich started banking in the new city institutions as well, but this did not mark the downfall of private banking because large loans granted by private banks required a high security deposit that small borrowers could not afford: "From 1563 private banks such as the [Genoese] Ravaschieri, the

75. See Arcelli, *Banking and Charity*, 2003. As seen in previous chapters, the Genoese were able to avoid bankruptcy by redirecting their activities into other financial areas in the kingdom. First, bankers' accounts clearly attest to the continuance of their day-to-day financial activity. Second, they continued to grant loans to the crown and the upper class in the kingdom. De Rosa even argues that public banking provoked a dwindling of capital. Both the Spanish court and the Neapolitan nobility used the interest-free loans, indebting themselves even more. De Rosa, "Banchi pubblici, banchi privati," 499–503. Third, the Genoese emerged as the kingdom's benefactors, relieving the court and the aristocracy. The feudal aristocracy became absentee owners who left foreign merchants free rein to extend their reach in the countryside.

76. During the tenure of Viceroy Enrique de Guzmán, Second Duke of Olivares (1595–98), a controversy emerged, told by Domenico Parrino one century later: "Because of several banks' bankruptcies a great deal of people who kept accounts with them were financially damaged. It was proposed to the viceroy by the merchant Saluzzo, a Genoese, to create a general fund in which all dues to the city and the kingdom would be deposited. The city's deputies opposed the idea strongly, claiming that since there were many banks that had been created by pious foundations it would not be reasonable to put the citizens' money into the hands of foreigners who were the ones overseeing most such establishments." See *Teatro Eroico*, 386. "Per fallimenti seguiti di diversi banchieri, con grandissimo danno di non poche persone che tenevano il denaro nelle lor mani, fù proposto al vicere dal mercatante Saluzzo, genovese di nazione, l'espedito di fondare in Napoli una depositaria generale, nella quale si dovessero fare tutti i depositi della città e del regno. Vi s'opposero gagliardamente i deputati della città, affermando ch'essendoci molti banchi fondati da luoghi pii, e governati con sommo zelo, non era ragionevole violentare l'arbitrio de' cittadini a confidare il denaro a mano di forastieri."

Lomellini, the Olciatti, and the [Neapolitan] Solani and others required an initial security deposit of 100,000 ducats, a system called *apud sacras aedes*.”⁷⁷

Public versus private banking became enmeshed with differing concepts of *buon governo* held by different viceroys, but eventually, by the time of the Thirty Years’ War, even the king was borrowing from the Monti. For that reason, Viceroy Granvelle (r.1571–75) supported private banking, especially by the Genoese, who were “people of war” indispensable to the Spanish monarch.⁷⁸ Conversely, Viceroy Zuñiga y Requesens (r.1579–82) advocated public banking. The pretext was to abolish exorbitant profit taking and to protect citizens, but really he aimed at preventing competition. As we saw in [Chapter 5](#), there was a gap between imperial projects and the Spanish viceroys’ local mission. Zuñiga sent a memorial to the king trying to gather support for his cause:

Your excellency has ordered that there be only four [private] banks in Naples. Two belong to [Genoese] Bernardo Olgiatti, [Genoese] Agostino and Geronimo Grimaldi, Nando Luca Citarella and Liberato de Rinaldo, Leonardo Calamazza, Fabrizio and Scipione Pontecorvi. They and their successors and heirs for twenty years and until the year 1600 will be the only ones allowed. It will be forbidden to open another bank in Naples. There will be no other kind of deposit or exchange, or means of money-transfer, except for the Monte di Pietà.⁷⁹

The upshot was a compromise. King Philip II’s reliance on Genoese financiers secured the existence of the established private banks against the viceroy’s wishes, but the six public banks that were founded between 1584 and 1600 were all institutions rooted in public assistance.⁸⁰

77. It was said that “citizens entrusted their funds to the administrators of charities and not to private businessmen any longer.” See D’Addosio, *Real Casa dell’Annunziata*.

78. AGSim, Legajo 1073, Folio 90, letter from Viceroy Granvelle to the King, Naples, December 29, 1576.

79. From Viceroy Don Iuan de Zuñiga to King Philip II, Copy extract from vol. 1^o delle cautele fol. 1200, Naples, June 27, 1580. See D’Addosio, *Real Casa dell’Annunziata*.

80. The seven organisms of credit with regal authorizations were the Sacro Monte e Banco della Pietà (1584), il Banco della Santissima Annunziata (1587) linked to the Santa Casa dell’Annunziata, the Banco di Santa Maria del Popolo (1589) with

Eventually, the considerable endowment of the Monti made them prey to the sovereign's endless military needs.⁸¹ The seventeenth-century chronicler of the Annunziata (the charity also had created an adjacent Monte) illustrates that the king relied on Monti funds as one of his sources to pursue the Thirty Years' War:

Philip IV rescued Emperor Ferdinand in Germany who was fighting heretics. He ordered the Count of Monterey, Viceroy of Naples on February 11, 1632, to sell all the effects of the regal court, including feudal and domanial possessions. The Annunziata rescued His Majesty and provided 60,000 ducats. In return, the viceroy gave it an annual income of 5,000 ducats starting May 1, 1632.⁸²

This means that when the king took over a capital sum from the Monte, he agreed in return to pay an annual income. That is, 60,000 ducats ended up as a loan at 12.5 percent. Thus, those who contributed to the wealth of the Monti, including the Genoese, allowed the king to tap a Neapolitan source of funds. Beneficence paid for war.⁸³

the hospital of the same name, the Banco Sant'Eliggio (1592), the Banco di San Giacomo e Vittoria (1597) with the hospital of the same name, and the Monte e Banco dei Poveri (1600). Only the Banco del Santissimo Salvatore (1640) did not derive from a charitable origin. See de Rosa, "Banchi pubblici, banchi privati," 499–503.

81. A memorial sent on October 14, 1621, by Michel Sorriano to the papacy about the state of affairs of both the Annunziata and the Incurabili mentioned that rich foreigners (Genoese and Venetians) were able to make loans to the emperor via their financial investments in Naples. Moreover "they have ensured that their heirs will inherit the amount plus interests put into charities . . . they obtain what is the king's patrimony via their loans . . . and they export great quantity of money outside of the kingdom . . . thereby altering the value of the local currency." Finally, according to Sorriano, "what pious endeavors were missing was help from the banks." BNN, mss Brancaccio, VII A, vol. 1 car 18 r "relazione sulle cose di Napoli"; "los incurables que las otras dos quedan de la Anunziada y el monte, la una esta sobrada."

82. D'Addosio, *Real Casa dell'Annunziata*.

83. According to Giuseppe Galasso the mismanagement of the Annunziata in the early eighteenth century led to its bankruptcy, which itself led to a crisis in the kingdom's bank system. See *Napoli spagnola dopo Masaniello: Politica, cultura, società* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1972), 616–621.

THE GENOESE CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, 1580S–1812

The Genoese philanthropic tradition in the south had started with their involvement with the Annunziata and Incurabili, followed with the Monti, finding its final expression with two Genoese poorhouses in Naples: the Santa Maria del Rimedio di Genova and the Ospedale delli Incurabili di Genova. The Genoese establishment of two charitable organs highlights their desire to both insinuate themselves into Naples's spiritual landscape and maintain the collective identity of their community. For nearly three centuries, from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, Genoese individuals financed these two houses. These organizations certainly were manifestations of generosity, but they were also a mark of exclusivity for the Genoese nation.⁸⁴ In their heyday, they added to the Genoese splendor and prominence in the kingdom. They incorporated the dual aims of the Genoese: to maintain a moral and spiritual alliance with the Spanish Crown and to affirm the status of the Genoese community as a wealthy and magnanimous nation by emulating the local aristocracy's spirit of beneficence.

These two charitable institutions were designed to provide assistance to both Neapolitan and Genoese citizens. Citizens of the Republic of San Giorgio, who counted eight thousand members in Naples at the end of the sixteenth century, included bankers, traders, and guild members.⁸⁵ This is an indication of their social status: most Genoese in the Kingdom of Naples were moneyed. Hence, both houses operated through private funds, much in the same way as the Church of San Giorgio dei Genovesi, and mainly served the impoverished local community. The church fulfilled the spiritual needs of the Genoese aristocracy; starting in the 1580s, the two charities fulfilled the financial needs of the relatively small number of destitute Genoese and also poor Neapolitan natives.⁸⁶

84. In his book *The Fuggers of Augsburg: Pursuing Wealth and Honor in Renaissance Germany* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), Mark Häberlein explains that the Fuggers secured financial capital through cultural capital and were church builders, patrons of art, and benefactors. Honor was a central motivator to trade with these individuals and brought moral legitimacy on the practice of making money.

85. See N. F. Faraglia, "Descrizione delle parrocchie di Napoli fatta nel 1598" in *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Napoletane*, n. 23 (1998), 502–566.

86. The church of Santa Maria la Nuova, utilized by the Genoese nation before the building of San Giorgio, possessed a hospital adjacent to it. See Ceva Grimaldi, *Memorie Storiche*, 293–294.

The Genoese in Naples participated in the *religione della carità* by reinvesting their spare income from the collection of gabelles such as those on new flour and grain.⁸⁷ The appointment of a charitable trust indicates that the gabelle income was reinvested into godly purposes for the sake of everyone's souls. By using their imperial privileges for the benefit of the Neapolitan population, the Genoese showed Christian values. This was a true philanthropic exercise: Santa Maria del Rimedio was funded by private individuals to assist the city's general populace. Santa Maria del Rimedio, founded most likely between 1580 and 1630, was operated by Tommaso Invrea in conjunction with the Serra, Spinola, and Pallavicino families as procurators.⁸⁸ The three procurators were related by blood, and following established Genoese tradition, they shared equally in the house. Indexes from the time of its liquidation (1812)⁸⁹ specify that these three families were registered Genoese citizens who had set aside initial capital for the institution and continued to designate funds for its maintenance from their income on the new flour gabelle as well as from the income on the grain gabelle.⁹⁰

In the kingdom, charitable organs usually relied on two types of income for their survival: first, the *arrendamenti*, that is, gabelles on articles of

87. The annual income of the charity of *Santa Maria del Rimedio* was of 186 ducats and 190 grana. At the time of its dissolution in 1812, the document states that the institution had been operating for three hundred years. Giovanni Tommaso Invrea, the son of Tommaso Invrea, the founder, died in 1650 in Naples on a business trip. Hence Tommaso might have opened the institution anytime between 1580 and 1630.

88. On February 2, 1691, the Prince of Caramanica and the Duke of Monteleone bought the institution. See ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318, vol. 475 n.2245, document 3.

89. ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318, vol. 475 n.2245, document 2, Napoli, August 17, 1807. This financial security enabled a long life for an institution that by the year 1807 still boasted an endowment equal to its initial amount. It is therefore evident that the Genoese provided the same financial foundation for Santa Maria del Rimedio as they had done for their national church. Although the charitable institution went through numerous changes in ownership, the house continued in operation until the early nineteenth century.

90. The Signori Francesco Serra quondam Gio Carlo, Giovanni Pietro, Giovanni Battista, Francesco Vincenzo, all Serra brothers, in association with Giacomo, Agostino Spinola, Massimiliano, Matteo Franzone and Ridolfo Pallavicino, and Nicola Ignacio of Genoa. The initial capital for the Monte was 4,672 ducats and 16 tari. See ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318, vol. 475 n.2245, document 1. The annual income of the Monte was 186 ducats and 190 grana.

consumption, such as salt, tobacco, and flour, generally owned by the kingdom's barons and wealthy foreign merchants; and second, municipal taxes on import-export items, most prominently silk, iron, oil, and wine. These municipal taxes or *fiscali* complemented what the feudatories paid to the king's tax collector. Most importantly, the donors signed over the gabelle rights – permanently or temporarily – to the charity, in the way modern donors might sign over stocks. However, charities did not manage tax collections. The gabelle owner did.

The second Genoese charitable house in Naples, the Ospedale degli Incurabili di Genova, was most likely founded between 1600 and 1640. Its procurator, Vincenzo Imperiale, Marquis of Latiano, provided for the charity through his income from the gabelle on the old flour.⁹¹ The Ospedale degli Incurabili also benefited from a similar endowment from the Spinola San Luca family.⁹² Steady donations throughout the early modern period enabled the Genoese charity to function for more than two centuries. Both Santa Maria del Rimedio di Genova and the Ospedale degli Incurabili di Genova became conspicuous institutions on the Parthenopean scene.⁹³

91. Vincenzo Imperiale gave 178 ducats and 23 tari per year. See ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318, vol. 501 n.2455, "arrendamento della farina vecchia: liquidazione a favore di Latiano vincenzo Imperiale," Naples, February 1812. The capital set aside for the Ospedale dell'Incurabili della città di Genova was 783 ducats and 73 tari; its annual income was 339 ducats and 88 tari. See ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318, vol. 501 n.2463, "arrendamento delle Farine vecchie: liquidazione in beneficio dell' Ospedale delli Incurabili di Genova," Napoli, September 7, 1807. The Incurabili's procurator, Vincenzo Imperiale (1582–1648), was the son of Davide, who died heroically at the Battle of Lepanto.

92. Giuseppe Mongiardino, procurator of the Ospedale's governors, the Spinola di S. Luca family of Genoa, acknowledged a capital of 6,886 ducats and 68 tari. ASN, Debito Pubblico, n.318, vol. 501 n.2464, "arrendamento delle Farine Vecchie: liquidazione in beneficio di Gov.ni della famiglia Spinola S. Luca," Napoli, May 9, 1809.

93. In Messina, for instance, the Genoese used their church as a site for charity to build a poorhouse for their nation. Consul Giustiniano appealed to the traders' generosity to financially support the charitable endeavor: "It would be sensible to solicit a contribution from all the import-export of our nation's merchandise and goods. We have already thought about one *grano* per *uncia* for a year . . . This way we will be able to provide for the poor of our nation. It is the gifts from our generous donors that provide shelter for our poor." See ASG, A.S. 2634, Consoli Gaeta – Messina – Palermo (1529–1804) n.207, Letter from Consul Raphaello Giustiniano to Republic of Genoa, Messina, June 3, 1562.

THE FAMILY MONTI, 1650–1700

Starting in the 1650s, privately owned charitable institutions developed. Public beneficence was still existent but fell prey to the public authorities, leaving space for the local upper class to demonstrate its altruism. For the well-to-do, municipal charities were not sufficient. Nobles felt the need to establish Monti bearing their names and districts to render benevolence more exclusive. Foreign merchants, wealthy bourgeois, and aristocratic families created Monti to associate their names with beneficence, fortune, and respect.

Throughout Europe, local aristocrats were closely identified with particular charities, churches, and chapels, whose walls recorded their lineage and generosity. Ostentatious family charities became a way for the elite to compete, assert prestige, and exalt their status.⁹⁴ Although states and church-sponsored charitable institutions continued, government subsidies never replaced the need for generous private donors. While the wealthy continued to donate to public charities (allowing them to flaunt their wealth, generosity, and service to their cities), they also created family Monti (primarily investment funds that enabled families to accumulate ever larger amounts of money needed for instance to match their daughters to proper husbands).⁹⁵

In Naples, patricians whose principal aim was to provide solidarity among their members and to conserve their fortunes and lineage within Naples's *seggi* (or *piazze*) created Monti.⁹⁶ There were five such *seggi*:

94. Sandra Cavallo argues that charitable giving in Turin became a mark of social prestige, reflecting glory on the giver. See *Charity and Power in Early Modern Italy: Benefactors and Their Motives in Turin: 1541–1789* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

95. The rich invested funds in aristocratic Monti, whereas the middle class sought membership in confraternities because confraternities acted as artificial families, tied not by blood but by common rule whose members gained prestige and spiritual benefits. Craftsmen, merchants, fellow townsmen and conationals in foreign cities often identified with members of confraternities or sought protection against disaster by forming new ones. See Brian Pullan, "Support and Redeem," 177–208.

96. For a summary essay on the Monte, see Franca Assante, "The Prophets of Welfare: The Monti and Conservatori in Neapolitan Guilds in the Early Modern Age" in *Guilds, Markets and Work Regulations in Italy, 16th–19th Centuries*, eds. Alberto Guenzi, Paola Massa, and Fausto Piola astelli (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), 423–435. For

Capuana, Nido, Montagna, Porto, and Portanova. Each *seggio* represented a district of the city, each headed by important noble families.⁹⁷ The significance of the *seggi* lay in the fact that belonging to one conferred access to urban power. It did not grant a higher grade of nobility but bestowed honor onto those selected to participate in the city's decisions.⁹⁸ For instance, the Monte Capece (1584) united various noble families – Zurlo, Minutolo, Aprani, Piscicelli – from the *seggio* di Capuana. The Monte Caraffa (1582) united the Caraffa of Nido;⁹⁹ the Monte dei Giunti (1585) united Pignatelli, Caracciolo, Caetani d'Aragona, Spinelli, and Miroballo. The Monte della Cassa Grande (1578) united the Caracciolo from the *seggio* of Capuana. These clanic organizations also sought to merge feudal and military traditions under the same insignia. Although smaller than their larger municipal counterparts, the beneficiaries of private Monti were mainly clan members (and those who swore allegiance to the clan). As most notable family donated, family Monti were a way of spreading dependency across the entire clan rather than an individual patron. The Genoese community smoothly adopted the philanthropic tone of Naples's wealthy while promoting their community: the Genoese merchant family Spinola endorsed the Monte Spinola in 1634, followed shortly thereafter by the Flemish Monte Romer in 1673, located in the same district.¹⁰⁰

For the Genoese, absorbing the ambition of the family Monti was another indication of their ability to combine allegiance to their home country's culture with their capacity to adapt to a new environment. Back in Genoa, the institution of the *albergo* was a private institution of mutual

the importance of the *seggi* to Neapolitan society, see Camillo Tutini, *Dell'Origine e Fondazione de Seggi Di Napoli* (Naples: Beltrano, 1644).

97. Lodovico Contarini remarked early on that “to be or not to be in one of the Neapolitan *seggi* neither prevents nor provides real marks of nobility, but simply such *seggi* allow men to participate in the government of the city.” See *La Nobiltà di Napoli: Dialogo* (Naples: Fiorentino Editore, 1569), 31.

98. Maria Antonietta Visceglia found that most of the feudal nobility was registered to the Neapolitan *seggi*. See “Dislocazione territoriale e dimensione del possesso feudale nel regno di Napoli a metà Cinquecento” in *Signori, patrizi, cavalieri in Italia centro-meridionale nell'età moderna*, ed. Maria Antonietta (Rome: Laterza, 1992), 31–75.

99. The Giustiniani family was able to enter the *seggio* di Nido in the sixteenth century. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, II F, vol. 13, carta 83 r.

100. Scipione Staffa da Vincenzo, *Del riordinamento degli stabilimenti di beneficenza nella città di Napoli* (Naples: Stabilimento Tipografico dei Classici Italiani, 1867).

support (economic, political, and military at times) based on family names, common interests, and compatible strategies. In time, the *albergo* grew to encompass more families and bound their destinies. Thus, the *seggi* did not differ so much from the *alberghi*. The affluent Genoese families back in Liguria used the *alberghi* as conduits for charity by clusters of family. Their deliberate strategy to mimic the Neapolitan spiritual landscape was a sign of the Genoese inclination to both preserve their traditions and acclimatize to new ones.

Although they allegedly emanated from religious aspirations, the Monti legitimated the affluence of the new mercantile elite and their pursuit of status. Foreign nobles, recently ennobled families, and those of mercantile origins, even if they acquired citizenship, went through difficulties to reach the formal status of their rank.¹⁰¹ Monte Spinola became an indication of the Spinola family's wealth.¹⁰² As the Genoese government prohibited its citizens from entering the Neapolitan *seggi*,¹⁰³ Spinola also joined the Monte di Manso (1608), which was open to noble families that did not belong to a *seggio*.¹⁰⁴ Flemish merchant Gaspar Romer joined Monte di Manso that same year. The family Monti enabled the most affluent

101. Giovanni Muto, "Il Regno di Napoli sotto la Dominazione Spagnola," *Storia della Società Italiana*, 9 (1989), 237–238.

102. In 1636, the Spinola were the only ones able to lend 100,000 ducats to the royal court. See ASN, Banchieri Antichi, n.193 (1636), libro di clientele del conto di Cornelio di Spinola.

103. This prohibition did not deter the extremely wealthy Genoese in Naples; in 1623, Cesare Capaccio reported that the De Mari family was fighting for its reintegration into the Piazza Capuana on the ground that Niccolò Barnabò de Mari had been a member of the *seggio* and deputy on behalf of the said *piazza* in 1420. See Franco Strazzullo, ed., *Il Forastiero* (Sorrento: Franco di Mauro Editore, 1993), 683.

104. Throughout the early modern period, there were only about 150 families that belonged to the noble *seggi*, and only the king could admit newcomers. The *popolo* consisted of the higher ranks of professionals, merchants, and artisans. The Monte di Manso (1608) was open to noble families that did not belong to a *seggio*. As the Genoese government prohibited its citizens from entering the Neapolitan *seggi*, both Spinola and Romer probably fell under the category of nobility *fuori seggio*. See Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Identità sociali: La nobiltà napoletana nella prima età moderna* (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 1998), 144–147. There were some notable exceptions to this rule. The Giustiniani, for instance, were accepted into the *seggio* of Nido in the 1530s. See BNN, mss Brancaccio, II F, vol. 13, carta 83 r. "declaratione fatta da' nobili della Piazza di Nido come la casa Giustiniani di Genova gode nella Piazza de Nido."

(Neapolitan, Genoese, and others) to flaunt not only their magnanimity, but also their social origins. Being part of a family Monte (designed mainly as investment funds for the wealthy) did not preclude rich foreigners from continuing to provide for municipal charities. In 1673, for instance, Romer bequeathed a total of 300,000 ducats to the Monti di Pietà, hospitals, and convents of the Kingdom of Naples.¹⁰⁵ Because benefactors sought public acknowledgment for their services, philanthropy became competitive. The pressure of public display added to the religious fervor of the Counter-Reformation, and both catalyzed the spread of private charities.¹⁰⁶

The Genoese chose to express benevolence for both spiritual and earthly motives. By founding family Monti and donating to municipal charities, as did the Neapolitan elite, the Genoese emulated the local aristocracy's generosity and exhibited strong Christian standards, while consolidating their connection with the Iberian and Italian nobility. With religion (through their church), with spectacles (through processions), and with martial defense (through military protection), the idea was to demonstrate their social position while displaying strong Christian values. The Genoese were religious because it was what Christians did, but in the context of the charities there were also ulterior sociocultural incentives. In that context, however, the Genoese both supported the Monti (by continuing to give private loans) and profited from them (by helping the Spanish war efforts, gaining direct economic benefit from it). Munificence affected the city, its inhabitants, the king, and God. The Genoese pledged to the city's charitable spirit because, as Leon Battesti Alberti stated, it was the wealth of private citizens that contributed to the well-being of the entire country.

Southern Italy's generous environment induced the Genoese residents in Naples to behave like *nouveaux riches*, demonstrating a relentlessly philanthropic spirit and partaking in acts of spirituality and civility. Poor relief in the tradition of the Annunziata and Incurabili satisfied both the spiritual morality and the social aspirations of the Genoese nation, whereas family

105. See Romeo de Maio, *Religiosità a Napoli: 1656–1799* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1997). Romer's testament can be found at the ASN, Monasteri Soppressi, vol. 4600, codicilli from April 1 and 2, 1674.

106. Pullan argues that poor relief was not necessarily informed by a spirit of generosity but by the very climate of the Counter-Reformation. See "Support and Redeem," 177–208.

Monti enabled a particular family to assert itself in the social landscape. The family Monti enabled the most prosperous families such as the Spinola, Ravaschiero, and Mari to affirm, and sometimes capitalize on, their Genoese lineage and identity. Displaying not only spiritual but also moral and financial obligations to the kingdom, the Genoese maintained their status of favorite nation of the Spanish Crown. Making good use of their possessions, that is, spending their money intelligently and distributing it with generosity, Genoese merchant-traders acquired a respectable place in society. As the Latin motto went, “pecunia si uti nescis domina; pecunia si uti scis ancilla” (if you do not know how to use money it is your master; if you know how to use money it is your servant). By displaying generosity toward the local population, the Genoese both showed loyalty to the crown and deep Christian morals to the population.

Conclusion

With merchants, try to find a prince who will grant you an open line of credit. It will always serve you well to accept their fees for a good line of credit, making them feel content and safe. In particular, should you desire to preserve our realms, do maintain the Genoese nation always involved in our finances.

—POLITICAL TESTAMENT OF CHARLES V TO PHILIP II, C.1550¹

Scholars interested in imperialism in the Mediterranean and Europe, and also those who focus on the relation between Old and New Worlds will appreciate the relevance of the Genoese commercial empire as a long-lasting yet still understudied case study in the history of early modern imperialism. Rising as a merchant empire in the eastern Mediterranean from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, the Genoese shifted their interest to Western Europe as a financial empire in the sixteenth century, to focus eventually on the New World as the financiers of Spanish colonial enterprises from the mid-sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Through family ties, the capacity to live in diaspora, and connections to established dynastic empires, the Genoese economic system

1. “Coi mercanti, hà da cercare un principe di mantenersi il credito, il che gli riuscirà sempre, ch’egli rassegni loro per i loro crediti e convenuti e molumenti, et gli mantega poi loro vivi et sicuri, et particolarmente con la natione Genovese, dovete voi cio osservare perché tenendola impegnata se i nostri regni per questa via dei suoi crediti et interessi.” BNN, mss Brancaccio, V D, vol. 18 car 1, p. 21 “Ragionamento di Carlo V imperatore al Re Filippo suo figliolo nella consignatione del governo de suoi stati et regni dove si contiene come si debbe governare in tempo della Pace, et della guerra.”

linked southern Spain (notably Seville, where financial operations for the New World were taking place), northern Europe (notably Flanders, where precapitalist activities were occurring), and the Mediterranean (notably southern Italy, which became one of the Genoese's commercial hubs).

Whether in the Atlantic or in the Mediterranean, alliances were created first in continental Europe and, in time, exported overseas. The system of alliances created by the Genoese merchant empire sheds light on the far-flung "patchwork" empire of the Spanish. Becoming a political satellite of Spain in the Mediterranean (with terms negotiated in Andrea Doria's first naval contract [*condotta*] of 1528) ensured that the *Superba* would be a privileged exploiter of the new and vast Spanish Empire in the New World. The Spanish Empire consisted of mixed relations (with republics, principalities, and local and foreign rulers) in which the Genoese played a crucial role. The political testament of Emperor Charles V is an indication of their function not only as a republic, but also as a financial and merchant empire within the Habsburg Empire. The Genoese "posted" in southern Italy stood as one of the knots of the commercial empire, which up to 1480 linked places east and west of the Mediterranean through commerce, and from 1528 on linked Old and New Worlds through finance.

The principle of symbiotic imperialism enabled both the Spanish Crown and Genoese merchant bankers to thrive in Euro-Mediterranean politics and economics. Just as modern nations depend on central banks and sophisticated armies to implement their imperial projects, so did the Spanish Crown rely on financiers and manpower to annex territories, impose taxes, exploit local resources, and spread its religion. Spanish imperialism would have been impossible without Genoese financial muscle. In turn, throughout the Spanish Mediterranean empire, the Genoese benefited from ample opportunities to raise fiscal and land revenues, acquire fiefs and tax privileges, obtain prestige and honor, and live as absentee owners, which in turn allowed them to become a crucial link to Habsburg imperial expansion on the European continent.

Genoa had an efficient form of capitalism, and for its inhabitants the big investment was the Spanish Crown. Genoa was the Wall Street of Europe: it was from Genoa that the financial movements of Europe were orchestrated throughout the premodern era.² Thanks to their international

2. For Naples, see Giovanni Muto, "Tra 'Hombres de Negocios' e Banchi Pubblici: Progetti di Autonomia Finanziaria nello Stato Napoletano (Secoli XVI–XVII)," in

network, the Genoese became mediators for the Spanish imperial project on the European continent. Multiple networks located in Spanish Habsburg possessions allowed for the loan system to work. When the crown needed to secure funds in the Netherlands, Germany, or Italy, the Genoese appealed to one of their local branches where such operations could be performed. Thus, the crown could borrow anywhere throughout Europe. Naples emerged as an imperial city connected financially and dynastically to the Spanish and Genoese international networks. The Genoese intervention in the Kingdom of Naples befitted the aspiration of Philip II's advisor, Don Luis de Requesens, who affirmed that "the preservation, peace, and grandeur of Spain depend on the affairs of Italy being well ordered."³

The Genoese were chief informal actors of the wars in Europe: the Mediterranean wars (1480–1669), the Wars of Religion throughout the sixteenth century, the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), the Habsburg–Ottoman wars, and the continuous Spanish rivalry and intrigues with the French and the popes. The involvement of the Genoese allowed the Habsburg Crown to maintain its possessions or at least to fight for them. Diasporic communities thrived throughout Europe and had a decisive role in territorial disputes with monarchical states such as France, England, and Turkey. Territorial competition among these states, as has been noted in [Chapter 1](#), was central to Renaissance European politics. Rivalry was conducted on the field of battle but also through diplomacy and finances, as the works of Garrett Mattingly and Donald Queller have suggested.⁴

People like the Genoese financially engineered the creation of the Spanish Empire in Italy, and through economic and political negotiations, they contributed to its day-to-day functioning. From their perspective, we can reevaluate early modern Habsburg imperialism. In a recent essay, Michael J. Levin has contended that the *Pax Hispanica* posited by

Saggi Sul Governo dell'Economia nel Mezzogiorno Spagnolo (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1992), 35–48.

3. Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 80–83.

4. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964); Donald Queller, *Medieval Diplomacy and the Fourth Crusade* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980).

Fernand Braudel was largely a myth.⁵ Disputing the conclusions of Thomas Dandeleit and Geoffrey Parker, who have pointed at the Spanish dominance over Naples, Genoa, Milan, Florence, and Rome,⁶ Levin argues that as Spanish military power and economic clout increased, imperial rule weakened. Scholars have argued that empire builders had to improvise,⁷ and those exploring the political aspirations of the Iberian monarchies have advanced a theory of “imperial vocation.”⁸ Glancing at the crucial role of foreign nations involved in governance helps reconsider the role of Habsburg imperialism in Italy. Aurelio Musi has proposed that the Italian microsystems’ (Milan, Naples, and Sicily) capacity to integrate the imperial structure contributed to the duration of the Spanish Empire.⁹ Through the Genoese contribution to this empire, we can agree with the conclusions of Anthony Pagden, who suggests that the Spanish political system was sometimes benevolent and sometimes despotic, but it endured for three centuries.¹⁰

Most nations bordering the Mediterranean Sea made claims to it. Hence, the relationship among the various empires of the early modern Mediterranean had both economic and cultural significance.¹¹ France and

5. Michael J. Levin, *Agents of Empire: Spanish Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). By the same author, see “Italy and the Limits of the Spanish Empire” in *The Limits of Empire: European Imperial Formations in Early Modern World History*, ed. Tonio Andrade (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 121–136.

6. Thomas Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome: 1500–1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, and from the same author *The World Is Not Enough: The Imperial Vision of Philip II of Spain* (Waco, TX: Markham Press Fund, 2001).

7. See, for instance, Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

8. Essays in this edited volume examine Castile, Portugal, Mexico, and Peru. See especially the historiographical essay by Manfredi Merluzzi, “Impero o monarchia universale? Il caso della Castiglia tra XVI e XVII secolo” in *Comprendere le monarchie iberiche: Risorse materiali e rappresentazioni del potere*, ed. Gaetano Sabatini (Rome: Viella, 2010), 73–106.

9. See Aurelio Musi, “Le Rivolte Italiane nel sistema imperiale spagnolo” in *Mediterranea: ricerche storiche*, vol. 4 (2005), 209–220. See also *Il Mezzogiorno Spagnolo: La via napoletana allo stato moderno* (Naples: Guida, 1991).

10. See Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination, 1513–1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

11. Thomas T. Allsen, “Pre-modern Empires” in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley (New York: Oxford, 2011), 361–378 argues that

Turkey were the main antagonists of the Spanish dynasty. At times, the Venetians, the other Italian mercantile nation par excellence, created alliances with the Ottomans, which they broke shortly before renewing them. All professed some sort of religious authority, but really all pursued commercial and financial monopoly. The system of alliances or flexibility due to trade meant that both actors and politics shifted constantly. Only by trying to assess all the players in the trade competition can we make sense of premodern Mediterranean events.

In contrast to the dynastic empires, the Genoese built a mercantile empire that was not territorial, but still family based. They became entrenched in the life of their host because they used friends and family posted throughout Italy in business transactions. Sometimes they worked in partnership with other mercantile nations in their use of the guild system and their relationship with Catalans and Florentines. When it came to commerce, the foreign nations collaborated, but when their mutual relationship with the crown was in contention, the relationship tended to develop into competition, compelling the Genoese to go above and beyond the call of duty, to provide services (financial, commercial, and spiritual) that were not initially part of their agreement. Competition pushed them to diversify their portfolio and extend new services to the crown in exchange for favorite nation status, which bought titles and land along with status.

Similarly to the rest of the Italian peninsula and the entire Mediterranean basin, Naples was a breeding ground for diasporic communities. The Spanish *conversos* of Naples were another quintessentially family-based merchant nation. It has recently been demonstrated that their alliance with the viceroys resembled that between the Spanish and the Genoese, for it aimed at enforcing Catholic identity and the imperial mission of the Spanish monarchy. Peter Mazur has maintained that far from being a space for religious warfare and intolerance, the *conversos* population of Naples (similarly to the Genoese) obtained wealth, influence, and even aristocratic titles and political roles.¹² Inversely, for some scholars, the concept of religious identity was not a factor in early modern trade; they claim that

traditional empire builders (like the Spanish Habsburgs) sometimes acculturated with subject peoples while changing their identities.

12. Peter Mazur, *The New Christians of Spanish Naples: 1528–1671, a Fragile Elite* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

there were more business deals across religions than between coreligionists.¹³ However, scholars examining the early modern era have shown ways in which intra-religious business partnerships facilitated exchanges (across the Mediterranean but also in the Indian Ocean, China, and the Americas).¹⁴ Though some specialists still believe in the “conflict of civilizations,” there was a much greater need of accommodation within each religion than vis-à-vis other religions.¹⁵ Trade diaspora presents itself as a good methodology to understand how commerce operated in premodern times because it focuses on networks rather than simply on communities, religion, or political affiliation. S. D. Goitein, for instance, found both coreligionists and commercial partners bound together by parallel needs, calling for a “Mediterranean society.”¹⁶ And Avner Greif refers to the economic behavior and mercantile network of the Maghreb Jews as collectivist.¹⁷

13. See Cátia Antunes, “Evolving Dynamics in the Portuguese Seaport System: The Influence of Cross-Cultural Relations, 1580–1776,” Sixth International Congress of Maritime History, Ghent, July 2–6, 2012. Similarly, Francesca Trivellato has argued for transcultural cooperation between Sephardi, Christians, and Hindus in which economic interaction operated in absence of ethno-religious mechanisms. See *The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

14. For the Mediterranean, see, for instance, Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean* (New York: Brill, 1995).

15. For the conflict of civilizations, see “The Background War of the Early Modern Era: Christian and Muslim States in Contest for Dominion, Trade, and Cultural Preeminence” in *Religious Conflicts and Accommodation in the Early Modern World*, eds. Marguerite Ragnow and William Phillips Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 9–54; for the idea of accommodation within each world religion, see in the same volume Jamie Rae Bluestone and William D. Phillips Jr., “Introduction,” 1–7.

16. S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arabic World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, 6 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

17. Avner Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” *The American Economic Review*, vol. 83, n. 3 (June 1993), 525–548. See also the essay published the following year, “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualistic Societies,” *The Journal of Political Economy*, 102:5 (October 1994), 912–950. Departing from Greif but examining the institutions, even loose, of merchants, Francesca Trivellato calls what I define as network the Republics of Merchants. See “A Republic of Merchants?” in *Finding Europe: Discourses on Margins, Communities*,

Networks represented new ways of organizing trade, and they worked because they were instruments that facilitated the circulation of merchandise, men, capital, and information. These structures aimed at securing activities. Networks enabled foreign merchants to acquired predominance because they were the ones responsible for connecting local societies with faraway spaces, products, and capital.¹⁸ Damien Coulon and Dominique Valérian have proposed that commercial networks were both markers and actors of Mediterranean networks, sometimes created *a posteriori* through institutions, social recognition, or complex commercial associations. For Olivia Remie Constable, commercial communities provide compelling contexts through which to demonstrate the connection and cooperation of a shared Mediterranean world.¹⁹ Networks were systems of relations that could follow commercial, matrimonial, and communal configurations. Hence, similar to religious affiliation, familial solidarity is no longer a valid category to understand commercial networks and strategies in early modern times. When financial interests were involved, networks among families (which decided to create alliances through marriage or through mutual assistance in maritime endeavors) worked better than networks within families.²⁰

Actors of the trade diaspora actively participated in the fluidity of pre-modern Mediterranean encounters. The history of Italian long-distance traders, whether Genoese or Venetians, enables us to perceive this Mediterranean not necessarily in antagonistic terms but in view of religious coexistence. More and more, scholars studying the Mediterranean sense that the narrative of antagonism must be replaced by one of cultural

Images, eds. Anthony Molho and Diogo Ramada Curto (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 133–158.

18. Damien Coulon and Dominique Valérian, “Introduction,” *Espaces et réseaux en méditerranée, VIe–XVIe siècle*, 1 (Saint Denis: Editions Bouchène, 2010), 7–22.

19. See Olivia Remie Constable, “Merchants and Cross-Cultural Commerce in the Medieval Mediterranean World” in *History as Prelude: Muslims and Jews in the Medieval Mediterranean* ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 131–154.

20. Laurent Ferrer, “Groupements, alliances et réseaux: l’organisation des solidarités familiales dans l’italie medieval,” *Espaces et réseaux en méditerranée, VIe–XVIe siècle*, 2, 233–254.

mediation.²¹ Studies such as those by Eric Dursteler on Venetian mercantile activities in premodern Constantinople and E. Nathalie Rothman on premodern Venice are examples of the necessity to accept peaceful cross-religious encounters as paradigmatic of Mediterranean relations.²² In the same way as the relations of the Genoese in the Levant, cross-cultural relations were not bound by religion but mainly by the economic status of traders.²³ Genoese success was primarily the result of their class (as in their economic worth), not their religious identity. In fact, in Naples they used their religion to insinuate themselves into the economics (as seen with charities, processions, and their church).

As the result of their ability to mediate, adapt, and hybridize, the Genoese merchants represent the advent of the new bourgeoisie in early modern Europe. This new class of people engaged in activities that traditionally attracted both commoners (trade) and nobles (feudal ownership). Benefiting from trade diaspora networks, they monopolized the mercantile system of the southern Italian peninsula. Whereas the Adriatic coast had been long considered a Venetian lake, the Genoese influence extended all the way to Bari and Otranto. Their acquisition of fiefs allowed them to become property owners and gravitate around the local nobility, with whom they eventually intermingled. Their ubiquitous role in the socio-political life of southern Italy qualified them to participate in social and economic tensions right at the core. Their role as gabelle collectors, treasurers, and merchants led them to establish close relationships with the population, even if at times antagonistic. As for the local nobility, they

21. Georg Christ has done a microhistorical study of Venetian Biagio Dolfin in Alexandria in *Trading Conflicts: Venetian Merchants and Mamluk Officials in Late Medieval Alexandria* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 290. He has found that the Venetian participation in Levantine trade required from merchants more tolerance than conflict, calling for “dependable explanations.”

22. Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

23. See my studies of the Genoese community in Constantinople but especially those of expert scholars such as George Jehel, *Les Génois en Méditerranée Orientale (fin XI^e-Début XIV^e siècle)* (Amiens: Université de Picardie, 1993); and Michel Balard, *Gênes et l’Outremer*, 2 vols. (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1980), and *La Romanie Génoise* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1978).

surpassed them in every possible way – financially, politically, spiritually – and were rewarded accordingly.

The Genoese mastered all aspects of finances and trade. Exchange among merchant communities increased production. At times, this relation developed into a system of predation: they extracted resources from the countryside and benefited from their export. As a result, revenues from banking and commerce allowed the Ligurians to rebound from the numerous Spanish bankruptcies while providing loans to the crown and thriving in all financial, bureaucratic, and commercial activities. Most importantly, they introduced Naples to the precapitalist economy by linking the region to their pan-European commercial networks. Highly mobile transnational agents, the Genoese allowed for a real Mediterranean exchange. Traders are the obvious link of the Mediterranean chain, but we can also consider the movement of captives, art, beliefs, fashion, gender roles, ideas, and technologies to locate some Mediterranean habitus, if not common, at least shared by most players residing along the shores of the sea.²⁴

In southern Italy, commerce was linked to port life, which acted as point of contact between the Mediterranean Sea and the hinterland and made the Genoese the great actors of this commercial network. The ports of Naples, Messina, Gaeta, and Otranto were urban spaces but also undeniable points of contact. The concept of port as both urban space and point of contact brings about the notion of “border” or “frontier.” Nowadays, we identify frontiers in political terms, but for the Genoese they were only networks of exchange. Borders were there to delimit the exchanges. Damien Coulon and Dominique Valérien argue that the flux of exchanges contributed to “relational spaces.”²⁵ Whether in cities, ports, or mountain towns, merchants created new organizations of the space via their networks. Hence, there is an inherent logic of organization in the Mediterranean that can be fathomed if we peruse network configurations. And these were, and need to be apprehended as, multiple (religious, linguistic, juridical, familial etc.).

The link between commerce and urbanism enmeshes the concept of identity with that of access to political rights. Even if they were feudal

24. David Abulafia, “The Mediterranean Basin” in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley (New York: Oxford, 2011), 493–507 conveys how interaction and connections in the Mediterranean Sea, apprehended as both a place and a concept, went beyond the immediate boundaries of the region.

25. Coulon and Valérien, “Introduction.”

owners, when examining the Genoese identity, we are mainly considering their urban identity. Urban centers bestowed onto urban dwellers certain aspects of their institution: access to privileges, citizenship, and political rights. Civil and religious institutions and power exercised over the surrounding countryside gave urban dwellers a status more important than that of those living in villages. In that sense, the inhabitants of Naples, the *città fedelissima*, were higher on the social hierarchy than those in a distant city of the Spanish Empire. Honors, privileges, special relationships all stemmed from the capacity to live and be noticed as an active qualified urban citizen. Social ascension was possible only in a city. We have examined this phenomenon with the Genoese church, funerary monuments, the charitable spirit, and the participation in processions. Moreover, in Italy and Spain, the citizens themselves decided who entered the *seggi* and was part of the community. In Naples, as contemporaries noted, belonging to a *seggio* determined one's status of nobility, and most importantly conferred urban power.²⁶ Therefore, an important part of urban identity centered on the notion of inclusion and exclusion, which meant that political roles were either given or refused to new actors.²⁷ Thus, the sentiments of identity were reinforced because foreigners such as the Genoese were given juridical status. Interestingly, reinforcement of one's identity came from outside. In that sense, there was an obvious cohesion of the group but also of various levels of identity.

Examining the Genoese migration in light of other diasporic communities across the European continent, one can deduce that dislocation did not necessarily transform identity, whether ethnic or religious, but ended up creating some sort of hybridity as these diasporic communities strove to acculturate to their new societies. In early modern societies, skilled foreign migrants were, in general, welcomed across Europe and the Mediterranean

26. Giulio Cesare Capaccio *Il Forastiero: Dialoghi*. Naples: Gio Domenico Roncagliolo, 1630 declared: "while in other parts there would be other ways of distinction to aggrandize the nobility, in Naples it is left to the *seggi* to bestow the title of knight." (In Napoli sono i seggi ne i quali si nudrisce il nome di Cavaliero, in altre parti havriano altre separationi che ingrandiscono la sua nobiltà.)

27. For a discussion of the concept of urban identity in the Kingdom of Naples, see Gérard Delille, "Governo locale e identità urbana: il caso italiano in una prospettiva europea" in *Spagna e Italia in Età Moderna: storiografie a confronto*, eds. Francisco Chacón, Maria-Antonietta Visceglia, Giovanni Murgia, and Gianfranco Tore (Rome: Viella, 2009), 119–133.

lands.²⁸ In regard to cities, migration from outside Europe did not contribute to population growth. Cities needed wise people to manipulate markets (seen as human institutions) to their own advantage.²⁹ Unqualified migrants, on the other hand, generally became outcasts. What happened to qualified migrants or skilled ethnic minorities? Francesca Trivellato has shown that Jewish merchants in Livorno, far from being shunned, participated actively in local and long-distance commerce. Similarly, Brian Catlos has stressed the power relations that existed between rulers and ethnic minorities across the premodern Mediterranean.³⁰ The different families that comprised the Genoese community resided in Naples, often for several generations, but owed their ultimate loyalty to their home city and maintained their communal identity through intermarriage and close business connections with the branches of their families there. They affirmed their ties to their host community, Naples, through their participation in the devotional life of the city and its ceremonies, but this public life centered on their own church, thus affirming their separate communal identity. But the fundamental relationship between the Genoese merchants and their host community remained ambiguous because of the dynamic between diaspora and continuity. The acculturation of the Genoese through the trade diaspora network contributed to the tension in their identity. On the one hand, there was the phenomenon of acculturation in Naples and Sicily, acquiring fiefdoms and titles, joining the local institutions, and participating in the social and spiritual life. On the other hand, the transplanted Genoese continued to identify and be identified as Genoese and to advance a Genoese agenda.

The tension in the hybridity of the Genoese invites more research on other diasporic communities around the Mediterranean.³¹ Scholars of diasporas ponder questions of identity, community, allegiance (citizenship), and displacement and argue for a strong sense of collective identity. They

28. Bert de Munck and Anne Winter, eds. *Gated Communities? Regulating Migration in Early Modern Cities* (London: Ashgate, 2012).

29. Steven Epstein, *An Economic and Social History of Later Medieval Europe, 1000–1500* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 100–101.

30. Brian Catlos, “Ethno-Religious Minorities” in *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, eds. Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 361–377.

31. For an example of hybridity as religious phenomenon, see Steven A. Epstein, “Hybridity” in *ibid.*, 345–357.

often ask whether diasporic populations constitute a community. They contend that distancing and separation lead either to fragmentation of the community or to mechanisms of solidarity. In other words, if there is dispersal, then once they are regrouped, are these communities still diasporic? The most stimulating questions, however, relate not to the intrinsic character of a community but to its degree of hybridity. A community's insinuation into its new social landscape, its capacity to blend in, operate, work, rather than set itself apart, speaks better to the intrinsic characteristics of a community in diaspora. The case of the Genoese in southern Italy is illuminating. What did assist them in making a contribution to the religious processions, permeating the spiritual landscape, and engaging in the charitable sphere? Perhaps there is a sense of adaptability inherent to merchants. Hence, other merchant communities in southern Italy such as the Catalans, Venetians, Florentines, Germans, or the French are worth visiting. Exploring the dynamic among those groups rather than simply that with the local population can disclose new outcomes in the terms of cross-cultural interaction in early modern times.

As a result of the tension between Genoese hybrid identity and vocation as merchant bankers, their relation with the Spanish Crown was affected. The bond between Genoese and Spaniards in southern Italy transcended the realm of economics. Their involvement in civic rituals, religious festivals, and institutions of beneficence entwined the two nations in religious and moral terms. The division between Catholics and Protestants in Germany and the pope's Tridentine reforms had repercussions in the Kingdom of Naples, where both Genoese and Spaniards reinforced their alliance by implementing the dogmas of the Catholic Church and the moral principles of the Counter-Reformation. Loyalty to the Spanish monarchy was shown through social partnership. The mutual dependence of Spanish rulers, foreign merchants, and urban elite and their mutual interest in protecting the kingdom contributed to and thus allowed some redistribution of wealth.

The Genoese's display of benevolence strengthened not only their alliance with the crown, but also their entry into Naples's social elite, while solidifying their financial position. It also strengthened their moral engagement with the Catholic Church. Thus, both local and international politics developed in a way that allowed them to display religiosity and simultaneously be enriched by it. Competitive flaunting of good works and religious fervor reinforced Christian identity and the alliance of

Genoese against Ottoman forces and Barbary corsairs who threatened trade. In turn, by presenting themselves as true Christians and protectors of southern Italians, both nations penetrated the local religious landscape and established themselves as spiritual leaders. In symbiotic imperialism, politics and religion were entwined.

Symbiotic imperialism is a precursor to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century imperialism. Wherever there were missionaries, there were traders (in China, South Africa, Southeast Asia, South America). The Spanish global project indicates that imperialism never got away from religious fervor. As the Genoese Columbus set out to discover a new continent to bypass the Muslims and trade directly with the East, he also nourished a religious quest: to convert heathens to Catholicism, enlarging both the geographical and spiritual dominions of the Catholic monarchs. Didn't Pope Alexander VI use the first gold Columbus brought back from the Americas as propaganda for the undeniable benefits of Catholicism? My effort to internationalize the history of early modern Italian states befits this study's central point: to uncover the symbolic forms of power and acculturation, whose nature was mainly religious. Controlling Spanish subjects' creed meant controlling space, land, and people.

Just as trade and religion were linked, so were government and honor, an important element of the Renaissance ethos. The Genoese acted as locals, cared about the appreciation of the local population, and aspired to integrate the sacred realm of southern Italians by being acknowledged as beneficial to their spiritual well-being. Although Machiavelli warned us, by examining the Spanish example, that leadership was devoid of ethics, rulers still sought to be recognized as magnanimous. Prestige followed the obligation of protecting fellow citizens. Honor is as central to Renaissance studies as religion, because it was how communities interacted. Honor helped people organize, communicate, and understand the cosmic order among them.

More research on Mediterranean empires will enable scholars to compose histories "of" rather than "in" the Mediterranean. As Fernand Braudel first proposed, and Horden and Purcell have reiterated, we need to understand the sea in the *longue durée* and as a wide socioeconomic and cultural environment.³² *Imperial Ambition* demonstrates the "intensification and

32. In Horden and Purcell's words, "the distinctiveness of the Mediterranean derives from the paradoxical coexistence of a milieu of relative easy seaborne communication with an unusually fragmented topography of microregions in the sea's coastland and

abatement” proposed by Horden and Purcell. The sea’s function is to connect its people over the long term. The rapport among the Mediterranean empires was, and still is sometimes, symbiotic or antagonistic because of the need to coexist. An analysis over a long time unveils that there was more cooperation than enmity throughout the premodern period. Only by acknowledging this connection can we appreciate how the sea operates as a single organism whose various histories all interact. This book will, it is hoped, trigger the appearance of new studies of Mediterranean developments understood in their own terms.

island.” See *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 5.

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